

THEME OF THE QUARTER

a closer look at...

CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFERS IN THE THIRD WORLD, 1972-81

[Editors note. On 2 August 1982, the Honorable James L. Buckley, Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science and Technology, released Special Report No. 102, titled as above. The arms transfer data revealed in the report focuses on the quantity of major weapon systems delivered by arms exporting nations to Third World countries over the past decade. The detailed data contained in the text, charts, and tables provide the most comprehensive unclassified source of Third World arms transfers to be released by the U.S. Government, and we have chosen to reprint the report as our theme article. We have also included, at the end of the text and tables, extracts from a press conference conducted by Mr. Buckley at the time of release of the report. We are indebted to Mr. M. S. "Pat" Miller, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, for furnishing this material.]

FOREWORD

Sales and deliveries of major conventional arms -- tanks, warplanes, artillery, and naval ships -- to the developing nations have led to rising arms inventories and growing military capabilities in the Third World. Some of these have been stabilizing, some destabilizing; some in the U.S. national interest, and some not. Many nations, large and small, engage in the transfer of arms as part of their foreign policies, but the U.S.S.R., the United States, France, Great Britain, Italy, West Germany, and the East European Communist nations are by far the most significant suppliers.

The United States, however, is not, by any reasonable measure, the leading supplier of weaponry to the Third World that many people believe it is. If they illustrate anything, trends in the Third World arms trade illustrate the degree of U.S. restraint. In the first half of the decade covered by this report, which included the last years of the Vietnam war, the United States delivered larger quantities than other exporting nations or groups of nations in 7 of the 12 categories of major conventional weapons used in this report. In the second half-decade, however, the United States did not lead in any category and in one category (missile-equipped patrol boats) during these years did not export anything at all. The Soviets, by contrast, led in four categories between 1972 and 1976 and in the last half-decade led in seven. Similarly, the major West European arms exporters as a group were first in only one category of arms between 1972 and 1976 but between 1977 and 1981 led in five categories.

We ourselves are partly to blame for the misconceptions that abound on this subject. First of all, nowhere else in the world are arms transfers the subject of so much governmental disclosure, of such intensive legislative scrutiny, or so extensive a public debate. This is as it should be, because we are a free society and because decisions to supply or not to supply weapons to states not firmly linked to us by shared history, values, and security alliances must be made only after the most serious deliberation. Secondly, our reports of "military sales" include a large proportion of transactions having little directly to do with the transfer of arms. For example, military sales, as normally reported, include construction (sometimes of hospitals), training, and various management services, along with weapons systems and their spare parts and support equipment. But one result of this way of doing business, as contrasted with that of other nations, is the impression of

the United States as the Third World's leading armorer. That impression, as the following report makes clear, is significantly off the mark.

We recognize arms transfers as a legitimate and sometimes necessary instrument of foreign and national security policy. To suggest, however, that the U.S. Government in this or in past Administrations has sought indiscriminately to press arms upon Third World nations is not supported by the facts. Other nations do not disclose the nature and levels of their foreign military sales or assistance to the same extent. Our knowledge of their activities, particularly those of the Communist states, is not complete. The data on their arms transfers contained in this report must, therefore, be regarded as the best minimum, but nonetheless reliable, estimate we can make.

Few activities are as difficult to measure as arms transfers. Data are incomplete, and estimates in monetary terms, the most commonly used measure, are fraught with many problems. These difficulties include the large differences in the composition of arms sales and security assistance programs from one arms-exporting nation to another, down to such technical problems as accurate foreign exchange conversion and varying prices charged in different situations for any given foreign weapons system, particularly the more expensive ones.

For these reasons, the following report presents arms transfer data primarily in terms of the numbers of major conventional weapons systems delivered to the Third World over the decade 1972-81. Because they are concrete, these data are less subject to analytical misinterpretation and technical problems than dollar estimates. Further, it is more difficult for any arms supplier to conceal, for example, the delivery of a squadron of interceptor aircraft than it is to hide the existence, substance, and value of an arms agreement. Our data base from this perspective, while still not all encompassing, is more nearly complete. And the numbers involved in this mode of estimating are more tangible and thus more easily understood.

The following report makes clear that, while dollar estimates of arms transfer agreements have in fact been rising, constant dollar estimates have been more nearly level over the past decade, though both have fluctuated widely from year to year (Figure 1). Actual deliveries of the major conventional weapons systems covered in this report show the absence of any significant upward trend (Figure 2), although many of the newer systems are significantly more effective -- as are the defenses against them.

The data demonstrate that far from the popular image of upwardly spiraling conventional arms trade, that trade, at least as measured by the number of weapons actually delivered, is at best erratic but reasonably level over any significant period of time. They do not, however, take into account reductions in Third World arms inventories caused by war losses, obsolescence, or simple inability to maintain and repair increasingly complex and expensive equipment. Data in numbers of weapons cannot, of course, take account of increases in the sophistication, military effectiveness, and cost burden of modern weapons. Thus, the rising cost of modern military equipment may well serve to restrain aggregate transfers to the poorer countries if not actually to reduce them.

FIGURE 1
Dollar Value of Arms Agreements




FIGURE 2





Figure 3, summarizing the categories of major weapons delivered to the Third World over the past decade from all sources, bears this out. Naval vessels and ground force weapons deliveries were nearly level over the decade (though again varying widely from year to year), and military aircraft show a slight downward trend.

FIGURE 3



Figures 4 and 5 demonstrate quite clearly the second major conclusion we draw from these data: The United States is not, by and large, the leading source of major items of military equipment to the Third World. Figure 4 shows U.S. transfers of military aircraft and helicopters, for example, clearly declining from a Vietnam war peak at the beginning of the decade. By contrast, Soviet and other European Communist aircraft transfers rose rather steadily over the same period to levels roughly three to four times those of the United States in recent years. West European and other suppliers constitute another very substantial source of military aircraft during this entire period, delivering more than twice the U.S. levels of recent years.

FIGURE 4





Figure 5, showing deliveries of major items of ground force equipment, also underscores the wide margin by which Soviet deliveries in this area have exceeded those by the United States over much of the decade. It is further evident that these transfers varied widely from year to year and that here also, there is no clear upward or downward trend.

FIGURE 5




¹Tanks, self-propelled guns, light armor, and artillery.

²Includes European Communist countries excluding U.S.S.R.

Figure 4 combines Soviet and other European Communist transfers, which is an appropriate basis for comparison given the responsiveness of Warsaw Pact actions to Soviet policy direction. Figure 5, by contrast, counts Warsaw Pact transfers in the "Other" category, yet even then, Soviet deliveries alone significantly exceed those of the United States.

Finally, Figure 6 demonstrates the substantial degree to which Soviet and Soviet plus other European Communist deliveries of the tanks and self-propelled guns have exceeded those of the United States.

FIGURE 6



This report makes clear that several popular misconceptions about the U.S. role in arms transfers to the Third World are not based on fact. And it will thus provide a more accurate footing for future debates over U.S. policy. It does not, however, help us determine the wisdom of particular arms transfers. Those decisions can only come from the informed public and congressional consideration of Administration proposals that is uniquely possible in the United States. To insure that that consideration is as well-informed as possible, the Congress has been and will continue to be provided more detailed classified reports on conventional arms transfers to the Third World as required by the Arms Export Control Act.

This report is intended to be the first of a regular series, making public as much of such data as is possible. It, as well as the classified reports presented to the Congress, presents conclusions and data which are fully shared by all relevant agencies of the U.S. Government.

ANALYSIS OF DATA

The estimated constant-dollar value and quantities of conventional weapons sold and delivered to countries other than members of the major military alliances or states closely associated with them have remained fairly constant from year to year throughout the past decade. At the same time, patterns of supply have changed significantly. There has been a net growth in the military inventories of Third World countries; however, this report does not take into account reductions caused by combat losses, obsolete equipment scrapped, or weaponry not usable for lack of spare parts and support.

As the term is used here, the "Third World" includes all nations except members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact; other European countries not belonging to either alliance; and Japan, Australia, and New Zealand. Other definitions of "Third World" could significantly affect summaries of this sort, but this one is broad enough to encompass most parts of the world where limited, conventional military conflicts have been occurring and in which the buying of weaponry may have a social and economic impact disproportionate to the size of the purchases.

Problems in Measurement and Data

Few activities are as difficult to measure as arms sales. The arms trade abounds in rumors, in part because most nations consider military sales or purchases as national security information and restrict disclosure of their activities. The United States, uniquely, publishes considerable data on its security assistance programs and arms transfers; in no other nation are arms exports subjected to such close legislative control and public scrutiny. Other free-world suppliers and recipients disclose enough information, either officially or through information media and public debate, for reasonable estimates to be made. In contrast, Communist states -- and many countries to which they provide arms -- not only reveal little or no information to the general public but actively attempt to conceal their security assistance programs and arms sales or purchases from other governments. The estimated arms agreement dollar values and the quantities of Communist arms delivered, as presented here, undoubtedly err on the conservative side, but we cannot judge precisely how much lower than the reality they in fact are.

The most commonly used denominators of the arms trade are the monetary values and the quantities of weapons sold or delivered. Each has shortcomings and neither is a true measure of military capability. The price of foreign weapons is not always known, forcing analysts to rely upon estimates of cost or upon the known prices of similar weapons. Even if a price may be reliably reported in one case, prices vary with the terms and conditions of other transactions -- one purchaser may acquire a weapon as a grant or on highly concessional terms, whereas a more affluent buyer, or a less effective bargainer, may pay more. In other cases, the price -- particularly of major weapons such as aircraft, armor, and warships -- may be lowered by production offsets, commodity barter, payment in soft currencies, or even by a supplier's eagerness to make a sale for political or economic reasons. A weapon's unit price also can be affected by the quantities bought, varying purchaser requirements for training in its use and maintenance, or differing levels of spare parts and ammunition ordered.

Third World purchasing patterns, if measured only in current dollars and over only a few years, appear to be sharply rising and increasingly erratic because of multibillion dollar, multiyear arms agreements, reflecting not only inflation but also growing exports of high-technology (hence, very expensive) military equipment. Nowhere in the Third World is this phenomenon more evident than in the Near East and South Asia, but it is apparent in other regions as well.

It should be noted that, in the earlier years covered by this study, prices estimated for Soviet weapons were considerably lower than those charged for similar Western weaponry. Since 1977 and possibly earlier, however, Soviet prices appear to have been increasing, so that they now roughly equal or sometimes exceed those of comparable Western arms. This is reflected in the rising dollar estimates, year by year, of Soviet arms agreements compared to the more nearly constant estimated number of Soviet weapons delivered.

Estimates of numbers and types of weapons delivered, particularly of the large systems, provide a more interesting and more concrete measure of military capability transferred. They do not, however, take into account the varying levels of sophistication within a category of weapons -- an F-5 or MiG-21 fighter, for example, is less capable for most missions than is an F-16 or MiG-23. Nor do the numbers and kinds of weapons in a country's inventory necessarily reflect their appropriateness to the type of conflict in which they might be used or to the buyer's ability to maintain them and use them effectively in combat. Again, it must be noted that our data base is not complete on all recipients.

The Arms Exporters

Inevitably, a report of this kind will invite a comparison of the arms sales of different nations. Here, too, a warning is appropriate, particularly where monetary values are the unit of measurement. Security assistance and arms transfer programs vary significantly from country to country.

- U.S. arms transfer programs often involve military construction of significant value, undertaken in and for foreign nations, whereas the Soviets do little or no construction abroad not directly for their own forces.

- The United States provides considerable military training for the recipients of its security assistance. This training is broad based, involving not only instruction in the use and maintenance of the weaponry but also in wider areas of military study such as logistics and the doctrines under which U.S. weapons are designed to be used. We know relatively little about Soviet military training for foreign students and even less about its costs.

- The United States is intensely maintenance conscious. It supplies spare parts and technical assistance needed to service and maintain for its usable lifetime the military equipment it sells in the Third World, generally on the same basis that it supports weapons for its own forces. In contrast, the U.S.S.R. supplies major arms packages containing minimal spare parts and follows up later as needed or according to predicted parts failure rates. This, too, reflects the practice with its own forces, which often are supported from great distances behind the front lines. The same patterns are

generally true of East European programs. Deliveries of spare parts, ammunition, and other weapons-support items of non-U.S. origin are extremely difficult to detect.

- Soviet military equipment comprises virtually all of our estimates of Soviet arms transfers, as well as being by far the largest portion of all Soviet foreign aid. Because U.S. arms transfers covers more than weaponry, its dollar value is shown on three lines: weapons and weapons-related items such as ammunition and spares, military construction, and "other" (defense articles and services, consisting mostly of training). Only the U.S. weapons and weapons-related dollar values are comparable to the estimated values of other countries' arms sales. The United States also provides significant balance-of-payments and project development aid through the economic support fund (ESF). Although security related in a broad sense, ESF is excluded from this report because such foreign counterparts as exist are considered economic assistance.

The speed with which weapons, once ordered, can be delivered is an important factor in the Third World arms trade. As a consequence of the industrial capacity created to support the huge Soviet conventional force modernization program, Moscow has important advantages over all other arms-exporting nations. The U.S.S.R. can deliver significant amounts of weaponry very quickly, as it showed recently in Ethiopia and Vietnam and is now doing in Cuba. Moscow also can offer much more attractive loans than can Western suppliers. For nations not desiring the latest equipment, the U.S.S.R. has kept open the production lines for selected arms, such as the MiG-21 fighter, which is no longer in first-line Soviet units; it also maintains large quantities of older, refurbished weaponry. The Soviets have developed variations of many first-line weapons specifically for export. Other suppliers, in contrast, often must choose between providing new equipment to their own forces or risk losing a sale by being unable to deliver until the weaponry comes off the line 2-4 years later. Moreover, most suppliers do not have large pools of used but still effective arms -- as the United States once had -- which can be provided quickly to their security assistance partners without adversely affecting the capability of their own front-line or reserve forces.

There are also differences among the programs of the major West European arms suppliers [France, West Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom].

- France, the third largest exporter to the Third World, follows a policy of developing on its own the full range of military hardware, usually of totally French design and of a quality and sophistication equal to that produced elsewhere. French forces, however, constitute too small a market to provide the economies of scale needed to produce sophisticated weaponry at reasonable unit cost. For this reason, France pursues arms exports and, because its products span the entire range of sophisticated weaponry, offers potential Third World buyers desiring this level of armament an alternative to buying U.S. or Soviet weapons.

- West Germany has for many years followed a restrictive arms export policy which eschews the sale of major lethal weapons to areas of tension. Bonn may now be moving toward a somewhat less stringent policy in which potential sales may be considered individually in the light of West Germany's

broader world interests. Most of West Germany's arms exports, however, have been to European nations and are outside the scope of this report. Bonn's largest Third World market is in Latin America. West Germany does not produce a complete range of weapons -- Bonn's primary combat aircraft, for example, are built under foreign license or within European consortia. Although other members of these consortia export arms containing West German components, in this report the dollar values of such sales are attributed to the selling nation.

- Italian and U.K. arms exports are significantly smaller than those of the United States, U.S.S.R., and France. Although both nations can manufacture the full range of weaponry, each has limited the types of arms it produces, probably for financial reasons.

Two important supplier groups will be shown separately: the smaller West European nations [Austria, Belgium, Finland, Greece, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and Turkey] and those of Eastern Europe [Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Yugoslavia]. The smaller Western arms exporters compete against the United States, the major West European suppliers, and one another in the Third World within the limited range of high-technology arms they can afford to develop. To a degree not found in the West, weapons design and production in the Warsaw Pact are standardized under the aegis of the Soviet Union. Pact members are allocated specific major systems to produce for the entire organization's forces and for re-export. This further broadens Moscow's arms production and supply base. The U.S.S.R., like any other licensor but to a far greater degree than any Western one, can orchestrate the arms exports of its allies. The latter often can provide weaponry, spares, and ammunition compatible with Soviet equipment in cases, such as the Iran-Iraq war, where Moscow for political reasons does not wish to be seen as a supplier. Within the Warsaw pact, only Romania appears to act with some independence from Moscow. Yugoslavia is not a Warsaw Pact member but for convenience is included in the category "Other European Communist." Belgrade produces many weapons of Soviet design but pursues a much more independent arms export policy than other countries in this category.

Although this report concentrates on the arms exports of the major producers or producer groups, many industrializing nations also export military hardware on a small scale. In any given year, 60 or more countries sell some weaponry. Many, if not most, of the major weapons systems transferred by these "other" arms suppliers are actually re-exports of older weapons acquired elsewhere. A few Third World countries, however, are beginning to emerge as suppliers of new, domestically produced weaponry. Brazil, Israel, and China are noteworthy lesser exporters of new arms, although China is unique in that it supplies a wide range of 1960s-vintage, Soviet-designed arms.

Private arms dealers, ranging from legitimate merchants to outright confidence tricksters, probably account for a far smaller share of the Third World's arms trade than is generally supposed. Although these dealers can probably furnish, licitly or otherwise, significant quantities of small arms, mortars, automatic weapons, ammunition, and the like, they generally cannot

supply or support major systems. The con men, however, frequently allege that they can provide -- given money in advance -- such systems, complete with apparently legitimate end-user certification. Most, however, do not control the weaponry they are offering; rather, they solicit sales of used arms (which they often describe as new or of the latest model) that they only hope to acquire later, through middlemen and ultimately from governmental arms disposal programs.

The Recipients

Within our broad definition of the Third World, there are important differences in the size and patterns of supply among the four major regional arms markets: the Near East and South Asia, sub-Saharan Africa, East Asia, and Latin America. Moreover, the nature of the weaponry -- types, sophistication, new or refurbished -- purchased in each region differs significantly.

Near East and South Asia. By far the greatest Third World regional arms market is the Near East and South Asia. In recent years, this region has accounted for nearly three-quarters of the dollar value of arms agreements made with the major world suppliers. The Near East and South Asian states purchase the largest quantities; the most sophisticated kinds; and the widest variety of air, naval, and ground force arms. Over the last decade, the region has received about 85% of the surface-to-air missiles and some 70% of the heavy and light armor and the supersonic fighters exported. About half the artillery, missile-equipped patrol boats, and military helicopters have been shipped to the region, as well as about 40% of the subsonic combat aircraft and roughly 30% of the major and minor surface warships and other military aircraft. The Near East and South Asia acquired just under one-fourth of the submarines provided during the decade. That the region does not acquire a share of each of these types of arms proportional to the money expended suggests the high level of sophistication (and hence the high cost) of the armaments purchased.

Although almost all states in the region have a rudimentary arms-making capability, Israel, Egypt, and India are developing, with foreign licensing and technical assistance, major weapons or arms industries of their own. Only Israel, however, is emerging as an important supplier, although many of its major arms transfers have been used or refurbished weapons originally produced elsewhere.

Sub-Saharan Africa. In contrast to the Near East and South Asia, the sub-Saharan African states do not -- Soviet sales to Ethiopia excepted -- possess either large or highly advanced arsenals, and much weaponry sold there is refurbished. In dollar values, the region has accounted for a little over 5% of Third World arms agreements concluded in the past few years. Nevertheless, sub-Saharan Africa has acquired about one-quarter of the minor surface warships delivered to the Third World during the past decade, approximately one-fifth of the artillery, and roughly one-eighth of the major surface warships, light armor, and subsonic combat and other types of military aircraft. In other types of weapons, sub-Saharan Africa accounts for 10% or less of the heavy armor, supersonic combat aircraft, military helicopters, and surface-to-air missiles delivered. Less than 5% of the

missile-equipped patrol boats and only 1% of the submarines are transferred to nations of this region.

Nor is there any significant indigenous arms industry, apart from that of South Africa. Because of the U.N. arms embargo of 1977, Pretoria is concentrating upon developing a high-technology military industry to support national arms independence but has not yet emerged as a significant exporter.

Latin America. Once an almost exclusively U.S.-dominated arms market and a large purchaser of used and obsolescent military equipment, Latin America for the last decade has been acquiring the more sophisticated weapons systems primarily from the major West European arms exporters, albeit in small numbers. In recent years, Latin America has accounted for a little over 7.5% of the Third World's arms agreements with the major suppliers. Army materiel purchases, represented by heavy and light armor and artillery, account for 7% or less of the region's acquisitions over the last decade. In naval weaponry, however, Latin America has received nearly 60% of the submarines delivered, nearly one-third of the major and one-fifth of the minor surface warships, and one-eighth of the missile-equipped patrol boats. Latin American purchases account for only about 6%-8% of the supersonic combat aircraft and military helicopters delivered but nearly one-eighth of the subsonic combat aircraft and one-fifth of the other military aircraft supplied to the Third World. Less than 3% of the surface-to-air missiles have been exported to Latin America.

Of the major exporters, the U.S.S.R. is unusual in that it has few customers in the region, namely Cuba and Peru and, most recently, Nicaragua. Moscow is now upgrading the Cuban military forces with new military materiel, most of it far more capable than that possessed by other Caribbean nations. Latin America is also the most important export market for both Israel and West Germany.

Several South American states, notably Argentina and Brazil, are vigorously developing their own domestic and export arms industries. Brazil, though not yet offering a complete range of weapons, is a particularly active arms exporter both within the region and in the Third World.

East Asia. Arms deliveries to East Asia over the past decade reflect the turmoil that has plagued Indochina. The early years reflect not only large U.S. arms supplies to the former Government of South Vietnam but also Chinese and, later Soviet deliveries to North Vietnam. Although a brief slackening in arms deliveries by all suppliers occurred after 1975, the later years of the decade reflect significant Soviet arms sales to Vietnam after the 1978 Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea and the subsequent incursion by China into northern Vietnam. In recent years, East Asia has accounted for about 10.5% of the Third World arms agreements made with the major suppliers.

Over the decade, East Asia has accounted for more than one-third of the subsonic combat aircraft and military helicopters delivered, as well as somewhat less than one-fifth of the supersonic warplanes and over 40% of other types of military aircraft. Just under one-fourth of the Third World's

artillery and about 18% of the heavy armor have gone to East Asia, as well as about one-tenth of the light armor. Similarly, the region's navies have accounted for about one-quarter of the missile-equipped patrol boats and minor surface warships exported, nearly 30% of the major surface warships, and about 17% of the submarines. Only 5% of the surface-to-air missiles have gone to East Asia.

Only China has an important domestic arms industry in East Asia. China's arms industry is unique in that it is the largest producer outside the Warsaw Pact of older weapons of Soviet or modified-Soviet pattern. Beijing has recently begun to export arms in the Third World much more actively than in the past and is seeking Western technology to upgrade its weaponry. Taiwan, North Korea, and South Korea also are vigorously pursuing self-sufficiency in arms, although Taiwan and South Korea remain particularly dependent on outside sources of supply as well as production licenses. Taiwan is not a significant arms exporter. Although South Korea's military exports have consisted largely of "soft" quartermaster items such as uniforms and other personal equipment, both North and South Korea are beginning to export some weaponry.

Outlook

It is virtually impossible to predict what will occur in such a complex and sometimes contradictory mixture of political, economic, social, and emotional factors as is the Third World arms trade. The composition of the weaponry sold may change; although some of the wealthier Third World nations may continue to buy the latest weapons regardless of cost, the poorer states may increasingly seek less complex or secondhand weaponry. Both major and emerging suppliers may strive to tailor a still larger variety of weaponry to Third World requirements.

Some factors may increase the pace of arms buying and selling.

- Several nations developing domestic arms industries, like many smaller established arms exporters, do not have a home market large enough to offset their investments in plants, research, and development and will push to export their first-line weaponry, not only to offset these costs but to reap perceived political benefits.

- Military modernization programs in the supplier nations and in Third World countries with large forces may make available larger quantities of superseded arms to be disposed of at the best possible price to help amortize the cost of new weapons.

- The performance of high-technology weapons in recent conflicts may have whetted Third World appetites for improved or more effective arms.

- In specific instances, war losses will be made up by fresh orders, notably from Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Argentina.

- Political considerations -- including changes of government and the potential, if not the reality, of armed conflict -- may heighten national perceptions of the kind of arms security assistance Third World states believe they will require.

Other factors might slow the pace of the Third World arms trade.

- Several large multiyear arms contracts in the Near East and South Asia still have some time to run, which may delay fresh orders from some of the biggest customers. However, because of production backlogs created by the generally high level of arms orders over the past 3-4 years, weapons deliveries will certainly continue to be brisk for some years.

- Many Third World nations that have already purchased large amounts of arms, particularly advanced types, may find that they face a more time-consuming process than they had thought for training and integrating the new equipment into their armed forces and, in consequence, may limit or slow down their buying.

- Although not the sole driving factor in Third World arms sales, future oil prices will exert a significant influence. If the oil glut continues, net exporting countries -- some of them among the largest arms purchasers -- may cut back on new orders, while net importers may find they have more resources than they had anticipated for some modest military purchases. Rising oil prices, however, would have the reverse effect.

- Continuing inflation and the increasing cost and complexity of conventional arms designed by the major producers primarily for a potential European battlefield may reduce the level of orders for the latest weaponry.

General Third World Arms Trade Data

The attached tables present an estimate of the numbers of major weapons and dollar values of military assistance provided by major world arms suppliers or groups of suppliers to the Third World between 1972 and 1981. They are followed by further data on arms delivered to each major region of the Third World.

Estimated values are first presented in then-year dollar terms and then in constant 1972 dollars to reduce, to the degree possible, the effects of inflation on weapons prices. Dollar estimates for more recent years later may be revised, since major multiyear arms contracts are often modified during their course and because retrospective information sometimes becomes available. These figures should not be interpreted as equating to the cost of the weapons delivered. They represent the value of military agreements in which the cost of weapons is only a part.

Weapons are aggregated into broad categories without regard to performance differences within any given family. The numbers presented (for other than the United States) for each major weapons system delivered in any year represent simply the total of those deliveries which are believed to be reliably reported. Quantities are rounded to the nearest 5, except for naval ships. They should be regarded as minimum estimated numbers, not precise tallies. The term "major weapons" does not include all conventional lethal weapons: Small arms, light automatic weapons, mortars, and artillery of less than 100mm caliber are excluded, as are a few categories of major weapons such as battlefield missile systems, which are exported by a few nations in very small numbers.

Arms Agreements Made by Third World Nations, 1972-81¹

(\$ millions²)

	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	TOTAL	% of TOTAL
Then-year Dollars												
U.S.S.R.	2,350	3,320	5,970	3,670	6,610	9,750	2,920	8,880	14,770	6,630	64,870	27.2
Other European Communist U.S.	200	260	780	420	960	810	640	1,090	940	3,360	9,460	4.0
<i>Weapons</i>	3,710	5,390	7,700	4,420	5,420	3,720	4,520	4,910	5,040	3,310	48,140	20.2
<i>Military Construction</i>	4	1,040	590	4,710	5,460	370	670	1,300	2,000	1,350	17,494	7.3
<i>Other</i>	1,090	1,490	1,240	1,370	1,560	2,330	2,280	2,690	3,440	290	17,780	7.4
Major West European	1,000	2,140	3,840	5,240	2,740	4,840	8,720	6,860	14,480	4,190	54,050	22.7
Minor West European	140	300	440	550	790	600	380	1,160	2,390	970	7,720	3.2
Other	1,010	560	820	1,000	1,410	1,010	1,280	2,400	1,720	7,420	18,630	7.8
TOTAL	9,504	14,500	21,380	21,380	24,950	23,430	21,410	29,290	44,780	27,520	238,144	
Constant 1972 Dollars												
U.S.S.R.	2,350	3,160	5,060	2,840	4,860	6,720	1,880	5,130	7,500	3,060	42,560	26.8
Other European Communist U.S.	200	250	660	330	710	560	410	630	480	1,550	5,780	3.6
<i>Weapons</i>	3,710	5,130	6,530	3,430	3,990	2,570	2,920	2,840	2,560	1,530	35,210	22.2
<i>Military Construction</i>	4	990	500	3,650	4,010	260	430	750	1,020	620	12,234	7.7
<i>Other</i>	1,090	1,420	1,050	1,060	1,150	1,610	1,470	1,550	1,750	130	12,280	7.7
Major West European	1,000	2,040	3,250	4,060	2,010	3,340	5,630	3,970	7,350	1,930	34,580	21.8
Minor West European	140	290	370	430	580	410	250	670	1,210	450	4,800	3.0
Other	1,010	530	690	780	1,040	700	830	1,390	870	3,420	11,260	7.1
TOTAL	9,504	13,810	18,110	16,580	18,350	16,170	13,820	16,930	22,740	12,690	158,704	

¹ "Arms" is an all-inclusive term covering the broad range of military security assistance. It includes new, used, or refurbished conventional lethal weapons (including those capable of delivering both conventional and chemical/nuclear munitions) and nonlethal military support equipment such as radar or military uniforms and accouterments. Also included are military training, arms production or assembly facilities, and military base or fortification construction, although data on these aspects of foreign military programs are especially "soft." Because it is a uniquely large element of American security assistance programs, U.S. military construction is shown separately. Costs of troops from a major supplier country stationed in Third World countries are excluded where it is possible to separate their costs and equipment from other military assistance.

² Estimate rounded to nearest \$10 million except where entry is less than \$10 million. Percentages may not total due to rounding. U.S. data are for fiscal year; other data are for calendar year.

Summary—Conventional Weapons Delivered to the Third World, 1972-81¹

(number of weapons)

	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	TOTAL	% of TOTAL
GROUND WEAPONS												
Tanks/self-propelled guns												
U.S.S.R.	770	2,220	1,500	590	1,075	1,430	1,150	2,435	990	1,060	13,220	41.5
Other European Communist	280	525	215	645	695	435	560	530	340	325	4,550	14.2
U.S.	430	760	1,110	1,030	890	850	930	450	735	255	7,440	23.3
Major West European	205	265	420	210	260	325	275	70	55	110	2,195	6.8
Minor West European	—	—	—	—	45	55	165	150	95	140	650	2.0
Other	700	575	480	255	420	305	130	280	185	455	3,785	11.8
TOTAL	2,385	4,345	3,725	2,730	3,385	3,400	3,210	3,915	2,400	2,345	31,840	
Light armor												
U.S.S.R.	955	1,225	955	1,090	1,340	1,855	2,250	1,915	1,635	1,005	14,225	37.6
Other European Communist	300	30	125	250	95	110	20	—	35	—	965	2.5
U.S.	910	1,060	1,565	905	1,820	2,560	1,275	1,025	2,890	470	14,480	38.2
Major West European	540	185	195	250	600	425	775	930	640	885	5,425	14.3
Minor West European	—	30	50	—	—	—	15	50	55	30	230	0.6
Other	110	130	190	185	320	460	145	800	90	85	2,515	6.6
TOTAL	2,815	2,660	3,080	2,680	4,175	5,410	4,480	4,720	5,345	2,475	37,840	
Artillery (over 100mm)												
U.S.S.R.	730	1,300	1,555	2,190	1,035	2,590	2,100	2,220	1,620	1,060	16,400	30.1
Other European Communist	1,275	545	1,210	245	160	470	545	220	310	590	5,570	10.2
U.S.	1,150	1,170	1,060	1,510	180	375	1,030	595	775	380	8,225	15.1
Major West European	310	360	530	235	125	375	710	160	155	120	3,080	5.6
Minor West European	230	380	355	685	600	1,220	125	455	325	305	4,680	8.6
Other	4,695	1,830	445	1,090	1,340	1,120	1,335	1,310	1,660	1,775	16,600	30.4
TOTAL	8,390	5,585	5,155	5,955	3,440	6,150	5,845	4,960	4,845	4,230	54,555	
NAVAL WEAPONS												
Major surface warships												
U.S.S.R.	2	4	3	3	2	4	6	9	6	7	46	17.8
Other European Communist	—	—	—	3	1	3	2	3	—	1	13	5.0
U.S.	5	14	25	20	7	9	2	7	4	10	103	39.9
Major West European	3	6	6	4	3	6	10	9	8	16	71	27.5
Minor West European	—	1	—	—	1	—	1	1	5	3	12	4.6
Other	—	—	—	—	—	2	2	3	2	4	13	5.0
TOTAL	10	25	34	30	14	24	23	32	25	41	258	
Minor surface warships												
U.S.S.R.	15	6	12	26	4	16	21	38	37	14	189	18.7
Other European Communist	1	4	—	4	—	—	—	—	5	—	14	1.4
U.S.	28	17	62	55	21	6	3	6	19	5	222	21.9
Major West European	29	12	27	62	56	44	12	39	22	20	323	31.9
Minor West European	—	—	—	33	—	2	1	6	10	24	76	7.5
Other	34	18	10	31	13	10	17	26	23	5	187	18.4
TOTAL	107	57	111	211	94	78	54	115	116	67	1,011	
Guided-missile patrol boats												
U.S.S.R.	13	10	7	4	10	11	11	13	11	7	97	64.6
Other European Communist	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
U.S.	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Major West European	1	5	2	—	1	5	7	1	4	9	35	23.3
Minor West European	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	4	—	—	4	2.6
Other	—	—	—	—	2	1	2	3	2	4	14	9.3
TOTAL	14	15	9	4	13	17	20	21	17	20	150	
Submarines												
U.S.S.R.	2	—	7	1	1	—	2	2	1	1	17	23.6
Other European Communist	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
U.S.	5	5	8	3	—	2	1	—	—	—	24	33.3
Major West European	3	1	1	3	4	6	1	1	2	4	26	36.1
Minor West European	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	1	1.3
Other	2	—	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	4	5.5
TOTAL	12	6	18	7	5	9	4	3	3	5	72	

Conventional Weapons Delivered (Continued)

	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	TOTAL	% of TOTAL
AIR WEAPONS												
Supersonic combat aircraft												
	235	395	280	250	310	440	355	525	490	425	3,705	55.8
U.S.S.R.	—	35	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	35	0.5
Other European Communist	70	150	175	220	235	190	160	125	50	165	1,540	23.2
U.S.	65	110	45	45	60	65	60	55	85	35	625	9.4
Major West European	15	—	5	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	20	0.3
Minor West European	90	70	20	125	20	30	90	100	120	40	705	10.6
Other	475	760	525	640	625	725	665	805	745	665	6,630	
TOTAL												
Subsonic combat aircraft												
	55	90	65	20	50	100	20	120	40	10	570	27.6
U.S.S.R.	5	5	—	15	30	30	—	—	—	5	90	4.3
Other European Communist	170	230	115	145	135	115	55	5	15	75	1,060	51.2
U.S.	5	40	10	10	10	5	—	5	35	30	150	7.2
Major West European	—	—	—	5	—	—	—	—	—	—	5	0.2
Minor West European	20	25	30	75	—	10	5	—	10	20	195	9.4
Other	255	390	220	270	225	260	80	130	100	140	2,070	
TOTAL												
Helicopters												
	95	105	60	85	90	70	185	270	190	195	1,345	24.5
U.S.S.R.	—	—	—	—	—	5	10	20	30	35	100	1.8
Other European Communist	550	740	145	120	155	55	30	30	95	15	1,935	35.3
U.S.	170	150	165	245	275	205	250	170	155	145	1,930	35.2
Major West European	—	5	—	20	—	5	5	5	5	5	50	0.9
Minor West European	—	5	25	30	5	5	25	10	5	5	115	2.1
Other	815	1,005	395	500	525	345	505	505	480	400	5,475	
TOTAL												
Other military aircraft												
	15	25	45	25	55	45	80	70	60	90	510	8.8
U.S.S.R.	35	35	30	40	75	40	55	40	50	80	480	8.3
Other European Communist	550	350	240	170	240	290	180	30	50	75	2,175	37.6
U.S.	110	160	145	155	130	60	150	105	95	55	1,165	20.1
Major West European	45	30	30	75	75	15	90	70	105	130	665	11.5
Minor West European	25	25	90	75	65	90	75	90	140	105	780	13.5
Other	780	625	580	540	640	540	630	405	500	535	5,775	
TOTAL												
Surface-to-air missiles												
	1,340	1,900	2,180	2,500	3,650	6,015	920	3,845	600	300	23,250	65.0
U.S.S.R.	—	—	50	50	50	50	50	50	—	—	300	0.8
Other European Communist	400	—	115	870	645	2,340	965	2,780	1,295	480	8,890	24.8
U.S.	210	235	230	125	485	915	25	10	510	40	2,785	7.8
Major West European	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	45	85	—	130	0.4
Minor West European	—	—	180	—	—	—	—	—	—	200	380	1.1
Other	1,950	2,135	2,755	3,545	4,830	9,320	1,960	6,730	2,490	1,020	35,735	
TOTAL												

"Weapons" in this table means major systems, aggregated into broad categories. Ground weapons include heavy armor (light, medium, and heavy tanks and self-propelled guns), light armor (armored personnel carriers, infantry combat and armored reconnaissance vehicles, scout cars), artillery (tube artillery, multiple-rocket launchers, mortars and recoilless rifles over 100mm). Naval weapons include major surface warships (warships of destroyer escort and larger size, tank landing ships, and larger amphibious warfare units) and minor surface warships (patrol escorts and smaller naval vessels, including minesweepers and landing craft). Submarines and guided-missile patrol boats are listed separately. Combat aircraft include bombers, fighters, attack aircraft, and armed trainer/light strike planes. Other aircraft include transports, communications or utility, antisubmarine warfare, and unarmed trainers.

Note: Estimated weapon quantities for all tables are rounded to the nearest 5, except for naval ships. Percentages may not total due to rounding.

Near East and South Asia¹

(number of weapons and regional share [%])

Weapon % of Third World supply for decade	1972-76		1977-81		1972-76		1977-81	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Tanks and self-propelled guns 69.8%								
Suppliers								
U.S.S.R.	4,640	40.5	5,205	48.2	7	87.5	3	33.3
Other European Communist	2,350	20.5	1,960	18.1	—	—	—	—
U.S.	2,525	22.0	2,430	22.5	—	—	1	11.1
Major West European	1,125	9.8	675	6.2	1	12.5	4	44.4
Minor West European	—	—	160	1.4	—	—	1	11.1
Other	810	7.0	360	3.3	—	—	—	—
TOTAL	11,450		10,790		8		9	
Submarines 23.6%								
Supersonic combat aircraft 69.5%								
U.S.S.R.	4,285	43.0	6,500	38.1	1,250	59.8	1,635	64.8
Other European Communist	765	7.6	80	0.4	35	1.6	—	—
U.S.	3,280	32.9	7,210	42.3	470	22.4	430	17.0
Major West European	1,230	12.3	2,280	13.4	200	9.5	240	9.5
Minor West European	—	—	30	0.1	—	—	—	—
Other	395	3.9	920	5.4	135	6.4	215	8.5
TOTAL	9,955		17,020		2,090		2,520	
Subsonic combat aircraft 40.5%								
Artillery (over 100mm) 49.0%								
U.S.S.R.	4,455	34.5	5,115	36.8	210	35.2	150	61.2
Other European Communist	2,070	16.0	1,580	11.3	40	6.7	25	10.2
U.S.	775	6.0	1,015	7.3	290	48.7	35	14.2
Major West European	845	6.5	935	6.7	20	3.3	30	12.2
Minor West European	1,485	11.5	2,120	15.2	—	—	—	—
Other	3,265	25.3	3,115	22.4	35	5.8	5	2.0
TOTAL	12,895		13,880		595		245	
Major surface warships 29.8%								
U.S.S.R.	13	40.6	19	42.2	280	20.8	620	49.4
Other European Communist	4	12.5	8	17.7	—	—	55	4.3
U.S.	2	6.2	7	15.5	285	21.1	15	1.1
Major West European	13	40.6	11	24.4	760	56.5	540	43.0
Minor West European	—	—	—	—	—	—	10	0.7
Other	—	—	—	—	20	1.4	15	1.1
TOTAL	32		45		1,345		1,255	
Minor surface warships 30.4%								
U.S.S.R.	28	15.6	10	7.7	20	3.3	100	9.7
Other European Communist	2	1.1	5	3.8	100	16.6	195	18.9
U.S.	23	12.8	10	7.7	210	35.0	285	27.6
Major West European	96	53.6	56	43.4	155	25.8	200	19.4
Minor West European	2	1.1	25	19.3	80	13.3	125	12.1
Other	28	15.6	23	17.8	35	5.8	125	12.1
TOTAL	179		129		600		1,030	
Guided-missile patrol boats 56.6%								
U.S.S.R.	28	100.0	33	57.8	10,595	80.1	9,495	56.0
Other European Communist	—	—	—	—	150	1.1	150	0.8
U.S.	—	—	—	—	1,695	12.8	5,595	32.9
Major West European	—	—	20	35.0	780	5.9	1,390	8.1
Minor West European	—	—	—	—	—	—	130	0.7
Other	—	—	4	7.0	—	—	200	1.1
TOTAL	28		57		13,220		16,960	
Surface-to-air missiles 84.4%								
U.S.S.R.	28	100.0	33	57.8	10,595	80.1	9,495	56.0
Other European Communist	—	—	—	—	150	1.1	150	0.8
U.S.	—	—	—	—	1,695	12.8	5,595	32.9
Major West European	—	—	20	35.0	780	5.9	1,390	8.1
Minor West European	—	—	—	—	—	—	130	0.7
Other	—	—	4	7.0	—	—	200	1.1
TOTAL	28		57		13,220		16,960	

¹ Countries in this region are Afghanistan, Algeria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Egypt, India, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Nepal, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, North Yemen, and South Yemen.

Sub-Saharan Africa¹

(number of weapons and regional share [%])

1977-81 %	Weapon % of Third World supply for decade	1972-76		1977-81		1972-76		1977-81	
		No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
	Tanks and self-propelled guns 1.3%								
	Suppliers								
	U.S.S.R.	475	62.9	1,140	60.5	—	—	—	—
	Other European Communist	10	1.3	230	12.2	—	—	—	—
33.3	U.S.	10	1.3	25	1.3	—	—	—	—
	Major West European	55	7.2	40	2.1	1	100.0	—	—
11.1	Minor West European	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
44.4	Other	205	27.1	450	23.8	—	—	—	—
11.1	TOTAL	755		1,885		1		—	
	Light armor 12.4%								
	Suppliers								
	U.S.S.R.	910	61.6	1,590	48.9	120	60.0	220	68.7
	Other European Communist	35	2.3	85	2.6	—	—	—	—
64.8	U.S.	30	2.0	50	1.5	—	—	20	6.2
	Major West European	355	24.0	920	28.3	50	25.0	25	7.8
17.0	Minor West European	—	—	85	2.6	—	—	—	—
9.5	Other	145	9.8	515	15.8	30	15.0	55	17.1
8.5	TOTAL	1,475		3,245		200		320	
	Artillery (over 100mm) 19.1%								
	Suppliers								
	U.S.S.R.	1,595	43.1	3,510	52.0	60	60.0	80	69.5
	Other European Communist	105	2.8	515	7.6	10	10.0	5	4.3
61.2	U.S.	20	0.5	255	3.7	—	—	—	—
10.2	Major West European	235	6.3	300	4.4	10	10.0	30	26.0
14.2	Minor West European	90	2.4	55	0.8	5	5.0	—	—
12.2	Other	1,655	44.7	2,110	31.2	15	15.0	—	—
2.0	TOTAL	3,700		6,745		100		115	
	Major surface warships 12.0%								
	Suppliers								
	U.S.S.R.	1	25.0	5	18.5	40	21.0	125	43.1
	Other European Communist	—	—	—	—	—	—	20	6.8
49.4	U.S.	—	—	—	—	5	2.6	—	—
4.3	Major West European	3	75.0	16	59.2	110	57.8	120	41.3
1.1	Minor West European	—	—	—	—	25	13.1	10	3.4
43.0	Other	—	—	6	22.2	10	5.2	15	5.1
0.7	TOTAL	4		27		190		290	
1.1									
	Minor surface warships 23.0%								
	Suppliers								
	U.S.S.R.	24	17.9	45	45.4	20	5.0	70	22.5
	Other European Communist	7	5.2	—	—	10	2.0	35	11.2
9.7	U.S.	—	—	—	—	10	2.0	40	12.9
18.9	Major West European	38	28.3	30	30.3	250	62.5	100	32.2
27.6	Minor West European	31	23.1	13	13.1	100	25.0	40	12.9
19.4	Other	34	25.3	11	11.1	10	2.0	25	8.0
12.1	TOTAL	134		99		400		310	
12.1									
	Guided-missile patrol boats 4.6%								
	Suppliers								
	U.S.S.R.	2	100.0	4	80.0	600	51.5	1,575	99.3
	Other European Communist	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
56.0	U.S.	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
0.8	Major West European	—	—	1	20.0	385	33.0	10	0.6
32.9	Minor West European	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
8.1	Other	—	—	—	—	180	15.4	—	—
0.7	TOTAL	2		5		1,165		1,585	
1.1									
	Submarines 1.3%								
	Supersonic combat aircraft 7.8%								
	Subsonic combat aircraft 10.3%								
	Helicopters 8.7%								
	Other military aircraft 12.3%								
	Surface-to-air missiles 7.7%								

¹ Countries in this region are Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Upper Volta, Zaire, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

Latin America¹

(number of weapons and regional share [%])

Weapon	1972-76		1977-81		1972-76		1977-81	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
% of Third World supply for decade	Tanks and self-propelled guns				Submarines			
	4.1%				58.3%			
Suppliers								
U.S.S.R.	330	41.2	80	15.8	—	—	3	23.0
Other European Communist	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
U.S.	295	36.8	15	2.9	19	65.5	2	15.3
Major West European	165	20.6	55	10.9	10	34.5	8	61.5
Minor West European	—	—	185	36.6	—	—	—	—
Other	10	1.2	170	33.6	—	—	—	—
TOTAL	800		505		29		13	
% of Third World supply for decade	Light armor				Supersonic combat aircraft			
	5.1%				5.8%			
Suppliers								
U.S.S.R.	55	4.0	175	31.2	40	25.8	130	56.5
Other European Communist	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
U.S.	910	67.1	30	5.3	—	—	15	6.5
Major West European	165	12.2	230	41.0	70	45.1	40	17.4
Minor West European	70	5.1	15	2.6	20	12.9	—	—
Other	155	11.4	110	19.6	25	16.1	45	19.5
TOTAL	1,355		560		155		230	
% of Third World supply for decade	Artillery (over 100mm)				Subsonic combat aircraft			
	7.3%				11.8%			
Suppliers								
U.S.S.R.	215	11.3	420	19.9	—	—	5	5.5
Other European Communist	80	4.2	40	1.8	5	3.2	5	5.5
U.S.	610	32.2	1,010	47.8	115	74.1	70	77.8
Major West European	365	19.3	170	8.0	20	12.9	5	5.5
Minor West European	140	7.4	190	9.0	—	—	—	—
Other	480	25.3	280	13.2	15	9.6	5	5.5
TOTAL	1,890		2,110		155		90	
% of Third World supply for decade	Major surface warships				Helicopters			
	29.4%				8.1%			
Suppliers								
U.S.S.R.	—	—	1	2.7	40	16.3	35	17.5
Other European Communist	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
U.S.	33	82.5	5	13.8	120	48.9	35	17.5
Major West European	5	12.5	21	58.3	85	34.6	120	60.0
Minor West European	2	5.0	7	19.4	—	—	—	—
Other	—	—	2	5.5	—	—	10	5.0
TOTAL	40		36		245		200	
% of Third World supply for decade	Minor surface warships				Other military aircraft			
	19.3%				19.1%			
Suppliers								
U.S.S.R.	11	11.5	27	27.0	5	0.1	65	11.2
Other European Communist	—	—	—	—	5	0.1	5	0.1
U.S.	31	32.6	3	3.0	125	23.8	130	22.4
Major West European	52	54.7	35	35.0	165	31.4	75	12.9
Minor West European	—	—	4	4.0	50	9.5	145	25.0
Other	1	1.0	31	31.0	175	33.3	160	27.5
TOTAL	95		100		525		580	
% of Third World supply for decade	Guided-missile patrol boats				Surface-to-air missiles			
	12.6%				2.7%			
Suppliers								
U.S.S.R.	6	66.6	8	80.0	380	85.3	435	81.3
Other European Communist	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
U.S.	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Major West European	3	33.3	2	20.0	65	14.6	100	18.7
Minor West European	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Other	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
TOTAL	9		10		445		535	

¹ Countries in this region are Argentina, Bahamas, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, St. Lucia, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, and Venezuela.

East Asia and the Pacific¹

(number of weapons and regional share [%])

197-81 %	Weapon % of Third World supply for decade	1972-76		1977-81		1972-76		1977-81	
		No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
	Tanks and self-propelled guns 17.8%								
	Suppliers								
	U.S.S.R.	710	19.9	640	30.6	4	40.0	—	—
23.0	Other European Communist	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
—	U.S.	1,395	39.0	750	35.8	2	20.0	—	—
15.3	Major West European	15	0.4	65	3.1	—	—	2	100.0
61.5	Minor West European	45	1.2	260	12.4	—	—	—	—
—	Other	1,410	39.4	375	17.9	4	40.0	—	—
—	TOTAL	3,575		2,090		10		2	
	Submarines 16.6%								
	Light armor 11.2%								
	Suppliers								
	U.S.S.R.	315	12.0	395	24.6	55	9.6	250	46.3
56.5	Other European Communist	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
—	U.S.	2,045	77.9	930	57.9	380	66.6	225	41.6
6.5	Major West European	20	0.8	230	14.3	—	—	—	—
17.4	Minor West European	5	0.2	20	1.2	—	—	—	—
—	Other	240	9.1	30	1.8	135	23.7	65	12.0
19.5	TOTAL	2,625		1,605		570		540	
	Supersonic combat aircraft 16.7%								
	Artillery (over 100mm) 24.4%								
	Suppliers								
	U.S.S.R.	545	5.4	545	16.5	10	2.0	55	21.1
5.5	Other European Communist	1,185	11.8	—	—	—	—	—	—
5.5	U.S.	3,670	36.5	880	26.5	390	76.5	160	61.5
77.8	Major West European	110	1.1	120	3.6	25	4.9	10	3.8
5.5	Minor West European	535	5.3	65	1.9	—	—	—	—
—	Other	4,000	39.8	1,700	51.3	85	16.6	35	13.4
5.5	TOTAL	10,045		3,310		510		260	
	Subsonic combat aircraft 37.2%								
	Major surface warships 28.7%								
	Suppliers								
	U.S.S.R.	—	—	7	18.9	80	5.5	130	27.1
17.5	Other European Communist	—	—	1	2.7	—	—	25	5.2
—	U.S.	36	97.2	20	54.0	1,285	88.3	175	36.4
17.5	Major West European	1	2.7	1	2.7	55	3.7	140	29.2
60.0	Minor West European	—	—	3	8.1	—	—	—	—
—	Other	—	—	5	13.5	35	2.4	10	2.1
5.0	TOTAL	37		37		1,455		480	
	Helicopters 35.3%								
	Minor surface warships 27.2%								
	Suppliers								
	U.S.S.R.	—	—	44	42.7	120	7.3	110	15.9
11.2	Other European Communist	—	—	—	—	105	6.3	30	4.3
0.1	U.S.	129	75.0	26	25.2	1,200	72.9	165	23.9
22.4	Major West European	—	—	16	15.5	135	8.2	100	14.5
12.9	Minor West European	—	—	1	0.1	25	1.5	100	14.5
25.0	Other	43	25.0	16	15.5	60	3.6	185	26.8
27.5	TOTAL	172		103		1,645		690	
	Other military aircraft 40.4%								
	Guided-missile patrol boats 26.0%								
	Suppliers								
	U.S.S.R.	8	50.0	8	34.7	—	—	175	12.2
81.3	Other European Communist	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
—	U.S.	—	—	—	—	335	85.9	1,260	87.8
—	Major West European	6	37.5	3	13.0	55	14.1	—	—
18.7	Minor West European	—	—	4	17.4	—	—	—	—
—	Other	2	12.5	8	34.7	—	—	—	—
—	TOTAL	16		23		390		1,435	
	Surface-to-air missiles 5.1%								

¹ Countries in this region are Bangladesh, Brunei, Burma, China, Fiji, Indonesia, North Korea, South Korea, Malaysia, Nepal, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Thailand, Tonga, and Vietnam.