


The DISAM Annual

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A Journal of International Security Cooperation Management



Building Partner Capacity

The DISAM Journal of International Security Cooperation Management

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The DISAM Journal of International Security Cooperation Management

Welcome to the 4th DISAM Annual Journal of International Security Cooperation Management. We circulate this annual hardcopy publication as a supplement to our Online Journal, which can be accessed at www.disamjournal.org. We sincerely hope the Online Journal is of benefit to you in your daily activities and welcome any feedback you may have for improvement of it or this annual edition at: dsc.wright-patt.disam.list.disam-journal@mail.mil. If you do not already subscribe to the Online Journal, we recommend that you do – to stay abreast of more current SC-related activities. DISAM does its best to post articles in a very timely manner, and we welcome article submissions from all sources within the Community and Enterprise.

The highlight article that we do our best to have in time for each annual publication is the fiscal year recap of the current/upcoming security assistance and security cooperation legislation and policy. That is contained in this edition for FY16. I want to commend Dr. Thomas (“Tom”) Williams for his work on this article. He took over that responsibility from Mr. Ken Martin who retired this past year – who researched and authored the article for many years.

It’s easy to see that there is much more in addition to the traditional authorization and appropriation legislation which we consolidate for you here. We live in a much more complex SC environment as each year evolves. Planning guidance and planning activity – integrating a Total Program Approach (TPA) in support of overarching country programs, ties together a variety of SC programs, vice the more traditional Total Package Approach that we more closely associate with Foreign Military Sales. The focus is on building partner capabilities –the most important task of our Community. I see that as very obvious looking at each article in this edition on its own, and especially taking them collectively.

I won’t attempt to highlight every article here, but as with each annual edition, DISAM attempts to cover various issues facing our community and what a number of organizations are doing to effectively confront them. Also, and most particularly, we have a broad cross-section of thought provoking articles in the “Perspectives” section – with great odds that something is included that is of prime interest to every reader.

With the circulation that our annual receives, I can’t fail to mention DSCA’s Vision 2020 Strategic Plan updated this past October. You can find it and those updates on the DSCA website at <http://www.dsca.mil/strategic-plan-vision-2020/latest-updates>. In conjunction with Vision 2020, DISAM is also in the midst of a Strategic Review – looking at processes and practices to better posture the institute to better educate the SC Enterprise to meet future challenges.

Please let us know if you found this edition particularly helpful to you or to your organization, and provide any recommendations for future editions by contacting gregory.w.sutton.civ@mail.mil.

DR. RONALD H. REYNOLDS
Commandant

Table of Contents

Legislation and Policy

Recap of FY 2016 Security Assistance/Cooperation Legislation	1
By Dr. Thomas N. Williams, Security Cooperation Planning, Programs, and Legislation Function Manager/Associate Professor, Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management	
Security Cooperation Strategic and Operational Guidance:	
Translating Strategy to Engagement	11
By Dr. Daniel A. Gilewitch, Associate Professor, US Army Command and General Staff College	
Force of the Future Looks to Maintain US Advantages	29
By Jim Garamone, DOD News Features, Defense Media Activity	
DOD Extends Technological, Operational Edge Into the Future.....	33
By Cheryl Pellerin, DOD News Features, Defense Media Activity	
Sole Source Acquisitions for Foreign Military Sales Customers.....	35
By Mark H. Alexander, Air Force Materiel Command and William D. Cavanaugh, Defense Security Cooperation Agency	

Security Cooperation Community

Posture Statement of General John F. Kelly, United States Marine Corps Commander, United States Southern Command	39
Senate Armed Services Committee Opening Statement by General Phil Breedlove, Commander, US European Command	63
Statement of General Lloyd J. Austin III, Commander, US Central Command Before the House Appropriations Committee — Defense Committee on the Posture of US Central Command	67
Harris Says North Korea is PACOM’s Biggest Worry, Gives Report on Asia Rebalance.....	79
By Jim Garamone, DOD News Features, Defense Media Activity	
NORTHCOM Commander Discusses Importance of Missions	81
By Jim Garamone, DOD News Features, Defense Media Activity	
Carter Discusses Military Rebalance to Asia-Pacific.....	83
By Jim Garamone, DOD News Features, Defense Media Activity	
Security Enterprise Recalls Successful Fiscal Year	85
By Adrienne Elliot, USASAC Public Affairs	

Perspectives

Holistic Integration of Mil-to-Mil Engagement Doing Better with Less	89
By Colonel Dave Bennett, USA, US Army Security Assistance Command	
Energy Security Requires More Than New Pipelines: Section 2282 Funds and Critical Energy Infrastructure Protection in the South Caucasus	95
By Wayne J. Dahl, CPT, USA, Foreign Affairs Officer (FAO–Eurasia)	
The Whole of Government Approach Demands Interagency Coordination	111
By Ira C. Queen, Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management	
Social Media, Public Opinion, and Security Cooperation in Saudi Arabia	115
By Joshua I. Cummins, Middle East, Central and South Asia Research Assistant Lockheed Martin, Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management	
The Russian Intervention and the Internal Dynamics of Syria	127
By Dr. W. Andrew Terrill, Strategic Studies Institute	
Mitigating Ethical Failure in Security Cooperation	131
By Dr. Carlos Braziel, Joshua I. Cummins, Nicole Tom, Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management, William D. Cavanaugh, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Office of the General Counsel	

FMS Training

What SCOs Need to Know About EUM.....	139
By Jim Toomey, Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management	
US Army Africa Assists with Democratic Republic of the Congo’s National Logistics School.....	141
By Major Noreen Mallory, U.S. Army Africa G-4 Logistics	
SATMO, AMEDD Troops Train Armenian Medics During Historic Mission	143
By Adriane Elliot and Richard Bumgardner, USASAC Public Affairs	
First A-29 Afghan Pilots Graduate: Ready for Combat	147
By Senior Airman Ceaira Tinsley, 23d Wing Public Affairs	
Naval Education and Training Security Assistance Field Activity	149
Mission/Who We Are/What We Do/How We Do It, NETSAFA Website	

Recap of FY 2016 Security Assistance/Cooperation Legislation

By Dr. Thomas N. Williams Jr.
Security Cooperation Planning, Programs, and
Legislation Function Manager/Associate Professor
Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management

Following is a single document providing commentary and summary on security cooperation/assistance programs for the security cooperation community pertaining to the FY 2016 National Defense Authorization Act, Associated Appropriation Acts, and a Misc. 2015 Act

Continuing Resolutions:

Continuing Appropriations Act, 2016, P.L. 114-53, 30 September 2015.

- Until other legislation was enacted, extended FY 2015 authorities and appropriations into FY 2016, through 11 December 2015
- This Act started out as H.R.719.IH “TSA Office of Inspection Accountability Act of 2015.” The continuing resolution language for all 12 appropriations were inserted in order to meet the looming FY 2016 deadline, and can be found starting in Section 101 of the Act.

Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2016, P.L. 114-96, 11 December 2015.

- Until other legislation was enacted, extended FY 2015 authorities and appropriations into FY 2016, through 16 December 2015

Making Further Continuing Appropriations for fiscal year 2016, and for other purposes, P.L. 114-100, 16 December 2015.

- Until other legislation was enacted, extended FY 2015 authorities and appropriations into FY 2016, through 22 December 2015

National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA):

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 (short title), P.L. 114-92, 25 November 2015

- Seven New Security Cooperation Programs Authorized for FY 2016:
 - Section 1207, titled “Authority to Provide Support to National Military Forces of Allied Countries for Counterterrorism Operations in Africa”
 - Purpose: “In General – The Secretary of Defense is authorized in coordination with the Secretary of State, to provide, on a nonreimbursable basis, logistic support, supplies, and services to the national military forces of an allied country conducting counterterrorism operations in Africa” P.L. 114-92 Section 1207(a).
 - Amount: “The aggregate amount of logistic support, supplies, and services provided under subsection (a) in any fiscal year may not exceed \$100,000,000.” P.L. 114-92 Section 1207(c)(2).

- Expiration: “The authority provided by this section may not be exercised after September 30, 2018.” P.L. 114-92, Section 1207(f).
 - Section 1226, titled “Support to the Government of Jordan and the Government of Lebanon for Border Security Operations”
 - Purpose: “In General.—The Secretary of Defense with the concurrence of the Secretary of State is authorized to provide support on a reimbursement basis to the Government of Jordan and the Government of Lebanon for purposes of supporting and enhancing efforts of the armed forces of Jordan and the armed forces of Lebanon to increase security and sustain increased security along the border of Jordan and the border of Lebanon with Syria and Iraq, as applicable.” P.L. 114-92 Section 1226(a)(1).
 - Amount: “LIMITATION ON AMOUNT. – The total amount of support provided under the authority of subsection (a) may not exceed \$150,000,000 for any country specified in subsection (a) in any fiscal year.” P.L. 114-92 Section 1226(b)(1).
 - Expiration: “No support may be provided under the authority of subsection (a) after December 21, 2018.” P.L. 114-92 Section 1226(f).
 - Section 1250, titled “Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative”
 - Purpose: “...support of national-level security forces of Partnership for Peace nations or the government of Ukraine that the Secretary of Defense determines to be appropriate to assist in preserving their sovereignty and territorial integrity against Russian aggression.” P.L. 114-92 Section 1250(b)(2)(B).
 - Amount: “...\$300,000,000 shall be available to the Secretary of Defense,
- in coordination with the Secretary of State, to provide appropriate security assistance and intelligence support, including training, equipment, and logistics support, supplies and services to military and other security forces of the Government of Ukraine... [only \$50,000,000 of which, is available for lethal assistance]“ P.L. 114-92 Section 1250(a).
 - Expiration: “Assistance may not be provided under the authority in this section after December 31, 2017” P.L. 114-92 Section 1250(f).
 - Section 1251, titled “Training for Eastern European National Military Forces in the Course of Multilateral Exercises”
 - Purpose: “The Secretary of Defense may provide the training specified in subsection (b), and pay the incremental expenses incurred by a country as the direct result of participation in such training, for the national military forces provided for under subsection (c).” P.L. 114-92 Section 1251(a).
 - Eligible Countries: “Countries that are a signatory to the Partnership for Peace Framework Documents, but not a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.” P.L. 114-92 Section 1251(c)(1)(A). – And – “Countries that became a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization after January 1, 1999.” P.L. 114-92 Section 1251(c)(1)(B).
 - Definition of Incremental Expenses: “...rations, fuel, training ammunition, and transportation. Such term does not include pay, allowances, and other normal costs of a country’s personnel.” P.L. 114-92 Section 1251(g).
 - Amount: “ANNUAL FUNDING – Of the amounts specified in

- paragraph (2) for a fiscal year, up to a total of \$28,000,000 may be used to pay incremental expenses under subsection (a) in that fiscal year.” P.L. 114-92 Section 1251(d)(1).
- Expiration: “The authority under this section shall terminate on September 30, 2017. Any activity under this section initiated before that date may be completed, but only using funds available for fiscal years 2016 through 2017.” P.L. 114-92 Section 1251(h).
- Section 1263, titled “South China Sea Initiative”
 - Purpose: “The Secretary of Defense is authorized with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, for the purpose of increasing maritime security and maritime domain awareness of foreign countries along the South China Sea” P.L. 114-92 Section 1263(a)(1).
 - Assistance Authorized: “... equipment, supplies, training, and small-scale military construction.” P.L. 114-92 Section 1263(c)(1).
 - Eligible Countries [assistance and training]: “Indonesia, Malaysia, The Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam” P.L. 114-92 Section 1263(b)(1)-(5).
 - Eligible Countries [incremental expenses for training]: “Brunei, Singapore, and Taiwan.” P.L. 114-92 Section 1263(e)(2)(A)-(C).
 - Amount: “IN GENERAL – Of the amounts authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 2016 for the Department of Defense, \$50,000,000 may be available for the provision of assistance and training under subsection (a).” P.L. 114-92 Section 1263(f)(1).
 - Expiration: “Assistance and training may not be provided under this section after September 30, 2020.” P.L. 114-92 Section 1263(h).
 - Section 1279, titled “United States-Israel Anti-Tunnel Cooperation”
 - Purpose: “The Secretary of Defense, upon request of the Ministry of Defense of Israel and in consultation with the Secretary of State and the Director of National Intelligence, is authorized to carry out research, development, test, and evaluation, on a joint basis with Israel, to establish anti-tunnel capabilities to detect, map, and neutralize underground tunnels that threaten the United States or Israel.” P.L. 114-92 Section 1279(a)(1)
 - Amount: “The amount of support provided under this subsection in any year may not exceed \$25,000,000. [Israel must provide an equal amount of support]” P.L. 114-92 Section 1279(b)(4).
 - Expiration: “The authority in this section to carry out activities described in subsection (a), and to provide support described in subsection (b), shall expire on December 31, 2018” P.L. 114-92 Section 1279(f).
 - Section 1533, titled “Availability of Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Fund for Training of Foreign Security Forces to Defeat Improvised Explosive Devices”
 - Purpose: For use “in locations in which the Department is conducting a named operation” P.L. 114-92 Section 1533(c)(1) – OR – “in geographic areas in which the Secretary of Defense has determined that a foreign security force is facing a significant threat from improvised explosive devices” P.L. 114-92 Section 1533(c)(2).
 - Amount: “Of the amounts authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 2016 for the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Fund, or a successor fund, up to \$30,000,000 may be

- available to the Secretary of Defense to provide training to foreign security forces to defeat improvised explosive devices...” P.L. 114-92 Section 1533(a)(1).
- Expiration: “The authority to use funds described in subsection (a) in accordance with this section shall expire on September 30, 2018.” P.L. 114-92 Section 1533(e).
- 19 Existing Security Cooperation Programs had the Following Significant Changes for FY 2016:
 - Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF)
 - Total ASFF funds authorized for FY 2016 is \$3,652,257,000 - P.L. 114-92 Section 4302.
 - Iraq Train and Equip Fund (ITEF)
 - Total ITEF funds authorized for FY 2016 is \$715,000,000 - P.L. 114-92 Section 4302.
 - Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund (CTPF)
 - Total CTPF funds authorized for FY 2016 is \$750,000,000 - P.L. 114-92 Section 4502.
 - Building Capacity of Foreign Security Forces (2282)
 - 2282 FY 2015 funding level authorization has been extended through FY 2016, P.L. 114-92 Section 1206.
 - Syrian Train and Equip Fund (STEF)
 - Total STEF funds authorized for FY 2016 is \$406,450,000 - P.L. 114-92 Section 4302.
 - Support of Special Operations to Combat Terrorism
 - Along with some changes to response and report times the amount of DoD O&M for Special Operations under this authority was increased from \$75,000,000 to \$85,000,000 - P.L. 114-94 Section 1274(a).
 - Non-Conventional Assisted Recovery Capabilities (NCARC) Assistance
 - Along with assigning the primary programmatic and policy oversight to The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict; the program was extended through FY 2018, P.L. 114-92 Section 1271(a)
 - The ceiling for DoD O&M funds available to support NCARC for any fiscal year was raised from \$20,000,000 to \$25,000,000 - P.L. 114-94 Section 1271 (b)(3).
 - No-Cost Transfer of Defense Articles to Military and Security Forces of Afghanistan
 - The authority for this program was extended a year to December 31, 2016, P.L. 114-92 Section 1215(a).
 - “1233” Coalition Support Fund (CSF)
 - The authority for this program was extended through FY 2016, P.L. 114-92 Section 1212(a), and funding levels were set at \$1,160,000,000 - P.L. 114-92, Section 1212(b)(1). Additionally, for portions of this funding to be available to Pakistan the Secretary of Defense must certify, that along with other requirements, that Pakistan is taking demonstrable steps in restricting the movements of militants such as the Haqqani Network along the Afghan-Pakistan border, P.L. 114-92 Section 1212(e) (1)-(3).
 - “1234” Logistics Support for Coalition Forces Supporting Certain U.S. Military Ops.
 - Program “1234” was given a one year extension till December 31, 2016 - P.L. 114-92 Section 1201.
 - “1033” DoD Assistance for C/N Activities by Certain Countries
 - The authority for “1033” was extended through FY 2017, P.L. 114-92 Section 1012(a). Kenya

- and Tanzania was added to list of eligible countries bringing the total number of countries eligible for such assistance up to 41 - P.L. 114-92 Section 1012(b).
- “1021” Unified Counter-Drug and Counterterrorism Campaign in Colombia
 - Program “1021” authority was extended through FY2017, P.L. 114-92 Section 1011.
- Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program
 - Funding was made available for fiscal years 2016, 2017, and 2018, P.L. 114-92 Section 1301(b) and \$358,496,000 was authorized to be appropriated for FY 2016, P.L. 114-92 Section 1302.
- Iron Dome Short-Range Rocket Defense System
 - \$41,400,000 was authorized to be appropriated to the Government of Israel to procure radars for Iron Dome short- rocket defense system, P.L. 114-92 Section 1678(a), with the goal of maximizing the opportunities for the coproduction of such radars by industry in the United States, P.L. 114-92 Section 1678(b)(1).
- Israeli Cooperative Missile Defense Program Codevelopment and Co-production
 - Not more than \$150,000,000 may be provided to the Government of Israel to procure the David’s Sling Weapon System, including coproduction of component parts by industry in the United States, P.L. 114-92 Section 1679(a)(1).
 - Not more than \$15,000,000 may be provided to the Government of Israel for the Arrow 3 Upper Tier Interceptor Program, including the coproduction of component parts by industry in the United States, P.L. 114-92 Section 1679(a)(2).
- Funds will be provided based upon one-for-one cash match made by Israel for the respective system or another matching amount that otherwise meets best efforts, P.L. 114-92 Section 1679(b)(1)(B).
- Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP)
 - CERP was reauthorized for another year, P.L. 114-92 Section 1211(a), and the total amount of Army O&M funds allowed for FY 2016 was set at \$5,000,000 - P.L. 114-92 Section 1211(d)(3).
- “1204” Authority to Conduct Activities to Enhance the Capability of Foreign Countries to Respond to Incidents Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction
 - Authority for program “1204” has been extended to no later than September 30, 2019, P.L. 114-94 Section 1273.
- Non-Reciprocal Exchange of Defense Personnel
 - Authority for this program was extended until December 31, 2021, P.L. 114-92 Section 1204.
- Department of Defense State Partnership Program (SPP)
 - The authority for the SPP has been extended to December 31, 2021, P.L. 114-94 Section 1205(i).
- Four Unique Security Cooperation Areas of Emphasis for 2016:
 - The 2016 NDAA in comparison to those of the last few years has a heavier emphasis on evaluating and assessing the management and effectiveness of DoD security cooperation programs. Three requirements of note are:
 - Section 1202, titled “Strategic Framework For Department of Defense Security Cooperation” Requires, “A methodology for assessing the effectiveness of Department of Defense security cooperation programs in making

progress toward achieving the primary objectives, priorities, and desired end-states identified under subparagraph (B), including an identification of key benchmarks for such progress.” P.L. 114-92, Section 1202(a)(2)(1)(D).

- Section 1203, titled “Department of Defense State Partnership Program” Requires, “Assessment of establishment of Fund – Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) shall jointly submit to the congressional defense committees a report setting forth a joint assessment of the feasibility and advisability of establishing a central fund to manage funds for programs and activities under the Department of Defense State Partnership Program under section 1205 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014, as amended by this section.” P.L. 114-92, Section 1203(f)(1).
- Section 1205, titled “Monitoring and Evaluation of Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid Programs of the Department of Defense” Requires, “In General – Of the amounts authorized to be appropriated by this Act for Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid, the Secretary of Defense is authorized to use up to 5 percent of such amounts to conduct monitoring and evaluation of programs that are funded using such amounts during fiscal year 2016.” P.L. 114-92, Section 1205(a).
- The 2nd unique area of emphasis for Security Cooperation programs in the FY 2016 NDAA are special Restrictions for Support of Groups in Yemen, Syria & Iraq.
 - Yemen: “No amounts authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 2016 for the Department of Defense by this Act may be used to provide security assistance to an entity in Yemen that is controlled by members of the Houthi movement” [under certain conditions a Secretary of Defense national security waiver is possible], P.L. 114-92, Section 1209(a).
 - Syria: In matters related to supporting vetted Syrian opposition the Secretary of Defense will submit a description (90 days after the FY16 NDAA was signed) of the support needed to for the vetted Syrian opposition and how this support will not support “The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), the Jabhat Al-Nusra Front, al-Qaeda, the Korasan Group, or any other violent extremist organization.” P.L. 114-92, Section 1225(a)(3)(A)(i) & “The Syrian Arab Army or any group or organization supporting President Bashir Assad.” P.L. 114-92, Section 1225(a)(3)(A)(ii).
 - Iraq: When providing assistance to groups such as Government of Iraq forces, Kurdish, tribal, or other local security organizations that are opposing ISIS; such assistance will be restricted for groups where there credible information pointing to gross human rights violations and/or the information showing that said group is associated and/or receiving support from the government of Iran. P.L. 114-92, Section 1223.
- The 3rd unique area of emphasis in the NDAA is Excess DoD Property. Three key requirements are:
 - Improvements to the DoD excess property disposal program; specifically the Secretary of Defense must submit a plan to congress

addressing procedures pertaining to the disposal of serviceable items so that such items are not destroyed but provided as eligible excess property for utilization, transfer, or donation to various qualified recipients. P.L. 114-92, Section 344.

- 10 U.S.C. Section 2576a was amended by adding a requirement to create a website providing information on available excess property for transfer to Federal and State Agencies. P.L. 114-92, Section 1052.
- 10 U.S.C. Section 2576a was further amended by adding the use of donated personal property for border security activities to the already approved counterterrorism and counter-drug activities. P.L. 114-92 Section 1052.
- The 4th unique area of emphasis is the security of, the resources for, and recruitment/retention of Afghan women in the Afghan National Security Forces. Some key requirements:
 - “An assessment of the security of Afghan women and girls, including information regarding efforts to increase the recruitment and retention of women in the Afghan National Security Forces” P.L.114-92, Section 1531(c)(1)(A).
 - “...increase the number of female security officers specifically trained to address cases of gender-based violence, including ensuring the Afghan National Police’s Family Response Units have the necessary resources and are available to women across Afghanistan...” P.L. 114-92, Section 1531(c)(1)(B)(ii).
 - “...the development and implementation of a plan to increase the number of female members of the Afghanistan National Army and the Afghanistan National Police and to promote their equal treatment,

including through such steps as providing appropriate equipment, modifying facilities, and ensuring literacy and gender awareness training for recruits.” P.L. 114-92, Section 1531(c)(C).

- “In General – Of the funds available to the Department of Defense for the Afghan Security Forces Fund for fiscal year 2016, it is the goal that \$25,000,000, but in no event less than \$10,000,000 shall be used [for the above mentioned items]” P.L. 114-92, Section 1531(c)(D)(i)

Appropriations Legislation:

Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, P.L. 114-113, 18 December 2015

- 25 Security Cooperation/Assistance Programs funding amounts and significant legislative changes are identified below:
 - Economic Support Fund (ESF)
 - \$4,319M in combined amounts [State budget & Overseas Contingency Operations account] identified for ESF, P.L. 114-113, S/FOAA Div. K, Title III & VIII.
 - Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining and Related Programs (NADR)
 - \$885M in combined amounts (DoS & OCO) identified for NADR, P.L. 114-113, S/FOAA Div. K, Title IV & VIII.
 - International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE)
 - \$1,266M in combined amounts (DoS & OCO) identified for INCLE, P.L. 114-113, S/FOAA Div. K, Title IV & VIII.
 - Peacekeeping Operations (PKO)
 - \$600M in combined amounts (DoS & OCO) identified for PKO, P.L. 114-113, S/FOAA Div. K, Title IV & VIII.

- Foreign Military Financing Program (FMFP)
 - \$6,025M in combined amounts (DoS & OCO) identified for FMFP, P.L. 114-113, S/FOAA Div. K, Title IV & VIII.
 - \$3.1M earmarked for Israel, P.L. 114-113, S/FOAA Div. K, Title IV.
 - \$1.3M earmarked for Egypt; however, 15% of this earmark is withheld until effective steps are made to improve various democratic and human rights issues, P.L. 114-113, S/FOAA Div. K, Title VIII, Section 7041(3)(A).
- International Military Education and Training (IMET)
 - \$108M identified for IMET, P.L. 114-113, S/FOAA Div. K, Title IV
- Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF)
 - \$3,652M identified for ASFF, P.L. 114-113, DoD Div. C, Title IX.
 - \$400M Rescinded for ASFF, P.L. 114-113, DoD Div. C, Title IX, Section 9021.
 - Effective amount is \$3,252M; \$400M less than what was identified in the FY 2016 NDAA.
- Iraq Train and Equip Fund (ITEF)
 - \$715M identified for ITEF, P.L. 114-113, DoD Div. C, Title IX.
- Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund (CTPF)
 - \$1,100M identified for CTPF [this is more \$350M than what was identified in the FY 2016 NDAA], P.L. 114-113, DoD Div. C, Title IX.
 - \$600M may be used to provide assistance to the government of Jordan to support the armed forces of Jordan and to enhance security along its borders, P.L. 114-113, DoD Div. C, Title IX, Section 9012.
- Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI)
 - \$250M identified for USAI [this is \$50M less than what was identified in the FY 2016 NDAA but still includes support for lethal weapons of a defensive nature], P.L. 114-113, DoD Div. C, Title IX, Section 9014.
- Prohibits the use of these funds for the procurement or transfer of man-portable air defense systems, P.L. 114-113, DoD Div. C, Title IX, Section 9016.
- “1233” Coalition Support Fund (CSF)
 - Further affirmed that portions of this fund will not be made available to Pakistan unless demonstrable steps are made showing that Pakistan is cooperating with the United States in counterterrorism efforts (against the Haqqani Network in particular); dismantling improvised explosive device networks; preventing the proliferation of nuclear-related material; protecting judicial independence; issuing visas in a timely manner for United States visitors; and, providing humanitarian organizations access to detainees/internally displaced persons, P.L. 114-113, DoD Div. C, Title IX, Section 9017 (a).
 - Granted the Secretary of Defense the ability, in coordination with the Secretary of State, to waive the restrictions of Section 9017 (a) on a case-by-case basis by certifying in writing to the congressional defense committees that it is in the national security interest to do so; such a report may be classified, P.L. 114-113, DoD Div. C, Title IX, Section 9017 (b).
- Assistance to the Government of Jordan for Border Security Operations
 - “Up to \$600M of the funds appropriated by this Act, from the CTPF, may be used to provide assistance to the Government of Jordan to support the armed forces of

- Jordan and to enhance security along its borders.” P.L. 114-113, DoD Div. C, Title 9012.
- “1004” Additional Support for Counter-Drug Activities and Activities to Counter Transnational Organized Crime
 - \$1,428M in combined amounts (DoD & OCO) identified for program “1004” P.L. 114-113, DoD Div C, Title VI & IX.
 - Israeli Cooperative Programs
 - \$487M provided for various cooperative Israeli programs such as the Iron Dome, Short Range Ballistic Missile Defense [including David’s Sling procurement], & Upper-tier Missile Defense [including Arrow 3 coproduction] P.L. 114-113, DoD Div C, Title VIII, Section 8071.
 - Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid (OHDACA)
 - \$103M for OHDACA, P.L. 114-113, DoD Div. C, Title II.
 - International Disaster Assistance (IDA)
 - \$2,794M in combined amounts (DoS & OCO), P.L. 114-113, S/FOAA Div. J, Title II & VIII.
 - Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP)
 - \$5M in Army O&M funds for CERP, P.L. 114-113, DoD Div. C, Title IX, Section 9005.
 - Defense Health Program
 - “not less than \$8M shall be available for HIV prevention educational activities undertaken in connection with United States military training, exercises, and humanitarian assistance activities conducted primarily in Africa nations” P.L. 114-113, DoD Div. C, Title VI.
 - Combatant Commander Initiative Fund (CCIF)
 - Up to \$15M in DoD O&M P.L. 114-113, DoD Div. C, Title II.
 - Asia Pacific Regional Initiative (APRI)
 - Up to \$15M of Navy O&M funds are available for the Pacific Command to execute Security Cooperation activities, P.L. 114-113, DoD Div. C, Title VIII, Section 8082.
 - Special Defense Acquisition Fund (SDAF)
 - The SDAF that allows the U.S. government to purchase high demand military articles in anticipation of future FMS sales was increased from \$100M to \$900M; which will remain available for obligation until September 30, 2018 P.L. 114-113, S/FOAA Div K, Title VII, Section 7072.
 - Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Account
 - The CTR account had a rescission of \$15M, P.L. 114-113, DoD Div. C, Title VIII, Section 8042.
 - Countering Foreign Fighters and Violent Extremist Organizations
 - Funds appropriated under Title III & IV of the FY 2016 S/FOAA [Bilateral Economic Assistance & International Security Assistance funds] will be used to “counter the flow of foreign fighters to countries in which violent extremists or violent extremist organizations operate” P.L. 114-113, S/FOAA Div K, Title VII, Section 7073(a)(1).
 - Logistical Support to Coalition Forces in Afghanistan and to Counter ISIL
 - DoD O&M funds “may be used, notwithstanding any other provision of law, to provided supplies, services, transportation, including airlift and sealift, and other logistical support to coalition forces supporting military and stability operations in Afghanistan and to counter the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant” P.L. 114-113, DoD Div C., Title IX, Section 9006.

- Iraq Loan Authority
 - “During fiscal year 2016, direct loans under section 23 of the Arms Export Control Act may be made available for Iraq, gross obligations for the principal amounts of which shall not exceed \$2,700,000,000: Provided,... that such loans shall be repaid in not more than 12 years, including a grace period of up to 1 year on repayment of principal.” P.L. 114-113, Other Matters Div. O, Title XI, Section 1101(a).

Other Legislation:

Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015, P.L. 114-74, 2 November 2015

- This Act set the FY 2016 amount for security at \$548,091,000,000 - P.L. 114-74 Section 101(a) and set the FY 2017 amount for security at \$551,068,000,000 - P.L. 114-74 Section 101(a).
- The Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) account for FY 2016 was set at \$14,895,000,000 - P.L. 114-74 Section 101(d)(1)(A) and the OCO account for FY 2017 was set at \$14,895,000,000 - P.L. 114-74 Section 101(d)(1)(B).
- Extended the accumulation of public debt till March 16, 2017, P.L. 114-74 Section 901.

Security Cooperation Strategic and Operational Guidance: Translating Strategy to Engagement

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Any opinions, analysis, recommendations, or conclusions should be attributed to the author, and is not necessary the view of the USCG, DISAM, DSCA, DOD, or the USG

On a hot, dusty morning, Major Nick Thomas was thankful to enter the air conditioned comfort of the headquarters building. He was excited about his new assignment as a desk officer at the Theater Army, responsible for five countries in the AOR. As he sat down with a hot cup of coffee, the Deputy G-5 walked in and said “Nick, you need to quickly get up to speed in this new job. I want you to start by doing a top-down review of the country plans for all your countries. By that, I mean that I want you to review the most recent national strategic and operational level guidance as a first step. Once you understand that context, back brief me on what you learned and we will then take a close look at the individual country plans themselves.” As the Deputy G-5 left his office, Major Thomas scratched his head and sighed, “I wish I had taken that security cooperation elective at CGSOC last year....”

For those unfamiliar with the world of security cooperation, there exists a dizzying array of national security and joint strategy documents that guide security cooperation planning and execution. To someone who does not deal with them on a regular basis, their purpose and the relationship between them can be difficult to understand. The linkages between documents are not well publicized as their purpose occasionally

shifts over time; the rampant use of abbreviations is confusing. Regardless, security cooperation practitioners must understand the flow of strategic guidance through the operational level in order to effectively execute their jobs, and to better understand to what ends their efforts serve the Nation. Theater Campaign Plans and Country Plans are at the heart of security cooperation planning and execution. It is crucial that they are informed by strategic and operational guidance.

This paper reviews selected US strategic and operational documents that guide security cooperation planning and activities. The goal is to explain the purpose of each document; to discuss what roles the document serves in the context of security cooperation; and to explain how they relate to and complement each other. This research provides a primer for understanding the promulgation of strategy from the National Security Strategy to the country plan as it exists in early 2015. It should help both the security cooperation workforce and other actors involved in the field enhance their general understanding of which documents should be considered in security cooperation planning and execution. Note that this research specifically avoids the budget process and budget related documents.

A Caveat: Reports Are Not Strategies

It is important to understand that strategic documents referred to in this paper are written reports of the strategies and not the strategies themselves. For example, the national defense strategy is not embodied completely in the National Defense Strategy document – the strategy is an evolving concept that can and often does change because of changes or anticipation of changes in the global environment. A foreign revolution or the outbreak of war can change US defense strategy overnight (e.g. Cuba, 1959; Iran, 1979; or Libya, 2011). Both major and minor changes to US national level strategy are communicated in reports, press releases, speeches, interviews or other strategic communications that cannot wait for the next

publishing cycle. Strategy reports themselves are simply snapshots in time that characterize current policy in a manner that can be widely disseminated. Because national level strategies are based on American values, attitudes, and beliefs, the ends (national objectives) reflected in these strategies rarely change quickly. Ways (policies) and means (resources) change often.

The National Security Strategy (NSS) *Figure 1)*

The National Security Strategy is derived from the National Security Act of 1947, as amended (most significantly by the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986). These legislative requirements state that the NSS is to be published each year in




Figure 1 - Key national strategic direction and guidance documents. The President issues the National Security Strategy to define national strategic security outcomes and provide strategic direction.

both classified and unclassified forms, and that the president is to submit it to Congress with the budget for the next fiscal year (50 USC 404a and c). In years when the administration changes, two NSS reports are due, with the incoming President responsible to produce the document within 150 days after taking office (50 USC 404a). Ironically, despite the law, US presidents have only periodically fulfilled this obligation. President Reagan published two NSS reports in his eight years in office; President George H. W. Bush, three; President Clinton, seven; President George W. Bush, two; and so far, President Obama has published two reports, with that last dated February 2015.

The NSS document defines national strategic security outcomes and provides strategic direction for all agencies involved in national security. It is purposefully general in content; discussing US global interests, goals, and objectives vital to national security as well as addressing foreign policy, worldwide commitments and the adequacy of US capabilities to carry out the strategy. The NSS is based on enduring American values as expressed by the current administration and as such, ends articulated in the NSS generally do not change dramatically from one administration to another. However, significant changes can occur in ways to achieve national strategic ends. In the 2002 NSS for example, President Bush stated that “the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively in exercising our inherent right of self-defense” (NSS, 2006), which some people viewed as unilateralism (Krauthammer, 2008). In contrast, President Obama has embraced a strategy of “pursuing comprehensive engagement” (NSS, 2010) with other nations, or multilateralism. In the context of security cooperation, the NSS defines the specific national level strategic outcomes that must be achieved and general ways to achieve them. Simply put, the NSS provides national level end states and policies to which security cooperation activities must contribute.

DOD Strategic Documents

DOD is responsible for national defense. As such, it must take strategic direction from the current administration and translate it into priority defense missions and strategic goals for the DOD. The primary documents the DOD uses to convey this information are the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), the National Defense Strategy (NDS), and the National Military Strategy (NMS).

The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and the National Defense Strategy (NDS)

The QDR and the NDS are interlinked. Title X of the US Code requires the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) to deliver a QDR to Congress “every four years, during a year following a year evenly divisible by four” (10 USC 118). To date, there have been five QDRs with the last published in March 2014. The QDR is a top-down, recurring, comprehensive examination of DOD strategy, including force structure, force modernization, infrastructure, and budget plans for the next 20 years (10 USC 118a). The SecDef produces the QDR after close consultation with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). Their intent is to cyclically re-balance DOD strategies, capabilities, and forces to address current conflicts and future threats (QDR, 2012; QDR, 2014).

The NDS informs and complements the QDR and is the DOD’s capstone strategy document. It is unclassified and signed by the SecDef. It is linked to the NSS and informs the National Military Strategy. It provides a framework for other DOD strategic guidance, specifically for campaign and contingency planning, and intelligence and force development. The NDS addresses how the U.S. armed forces will fight and win the nation’s wars and how they will work with partner nations to shape opportunities in order to prevent conflict. Normally, and by law, the NDS is included in the QDR.

Initially in the 1997 and 2001 QDR reports, the NDS was included as a section. However in 2005, Secretary Rumsfeld published a separate NDS document and the 2006 QDR omitted a defense strategy section (but included a section titled “*Operationalizing the Strategy*”). Secretary Gates also released a separate NDS document in 2008. Note that the release dates of these documents are off-cycle with the QDR. Both the QDR report and the NDS document were published every four years, but they were offset by two years; a QDR was published in 2006, the NDS Report in 2008, the next QDR was released in 2010 (actual release date was February 2011). This publication offset was purposeful. Great changes can take place in the world in the space of four years, and it is logical to have a mid-course correction or update published in the interim. The separate NDS report served as an off cycle adjustment for the QDR.

The January 2012 Strategic Guidance Document

Unlike the QDR, a separate NDS document is not legislatively mandated. In the 2010 QDR, Secretary Gates once again added a section addressing the NDS. The Obama administration adjusted that strategy significantly when it published another off-cycle adjustment two years later in 2012. Although this document was titled “Sustaining US Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense”, it seems to have served the same purpose as a separately published NDS. The President signed the forward to this document, and the SecDef signed and released it. It is an off cycle adjustment to the QDR and communicates a shift in strategic policy with a “rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific Region” and a rededication to the Middle East. Two years later, Secretary Hagel once again communicated an adjustment to the National Defense Strategy by including a defense strategy section in the 2014 QDR. It will be interesting to see if another off-cycle adjustment to the NDS will be published

by Secretary Carter in 2016, the last year of the Obama administration.

The National Military Strategy Report (NMS)

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) issues this unclassified document every two years (even numbered years), providing his strategic guidance and vision to all US Armed Forces. The NMS articulates military objectives related to the current strategic environment and aligns ways, means and risk with strategic ends articulated in the NSS. It explains how the military will accomplish defense objectives established in the QDR and looks two to eight years into the future. It is legislatively mandated by Title 10 USC 153 as amended by the National Defense Authorization Act, but the last report was actually published in 2010.

In the realm of security cooperation, the CJCS uses the NMS to communicate his understanding of the capabilities, adequacy and interoperability of regional allies and friendly nations to support US Armed forces in combat or other operations for extended period of time. It also conveys his advice with regard to the security environment and the necessary military actions to protect vital US interests. The NMS therefore, serves as a guide directly from the CJCS for Combatant Commanders (CCDRs) to plan security cooperation activities.

The Chairman’s Strategic Direction for the Joint Force

Similar to the 2012 Strategic Guidance Document that adjusted QDR and NDS guidance, this document serves as the CJCS’s adjustment to the NMS outside the required publication cycle. Released in early February 2012 shortly after the Strategic Guidance Document, the document incorporates changes directed by higher level strategy and explains the Chairman’s policies

and priorities for the joint force. This document is not required by law and appears to be one of the current chairman's methods to communicate guidance off cycle. CJCS Dempsey released another direction document in January 2014.

Unified Command Plan (UCP)

The UCP is a classified document signed by the President and prepared by the CJCS. The UCP is required by Title X of the US Code to be reviewed and updated every two years, at a minimum. The document provides basic guidance to the unified combatant commanders, stating their missions, responsibilities, and force structure, and delineates the general geographical area of responsibility (AOR) for geographic combatant commanders. The UCP also specifies functional responsibilities for functional combatant commanders (JP 1-02, 2014). The

UCP is assessed and modified based on the NSS, NDS, and NMS, as well as the current operating environment and command guidance from the President and senior DOD civilian and military leadership. The last UCP was issued on 8 April, 2011 (UCP, 2011) (Figure 2).

Intermediate DOD Strategic Level Documents (Figure 3)

The Geographic Combatant Commander's (GCC) primary steady state planning document is the Theater Campaign Plan (TCP), which I discuss in detail later in this paper. However, the SecDef and CJCS provide additional definitive guidance beyond national level strategy documents through intermediary documents to direct and guide CCDRs as they develop the TCP and other plans.




Figure 2. Areas of Responsibility in the 2011 Unified Command Plan. The current UCP (issued 8 April, 2011) included a shift in arctic AOR boundaries, disestablishment of USJFCOM, expansion of USSTRATCOM's responsibility to include Global Missile Defense, and giving USTRANSCOM responsibility for synchronizing global distribution operations (UCP, 2011; Feickert, 2013).

The GEF and JSCP are companion documents, developed concurrently on a two year cycle, to provide strategic guidance to theater level joint planners. The GEF builds upon strategic direction in the NSS, QDR and

example, was limited to 100 published copies that were tightly controlled, and subsequent GEFs are available only on classified networks. The GEF directs planning for near-term (two year) operational activities and is developed




Figure 3. Key DOD strategic direction and guidance documents. The JSCP, GEF and GFMIG provide specific strategic guidance for theater level planning and activities

NMS by articulating the strategic objectives that Combatant

Commanders (CCDRs) are expected to attain (focusing 5-10 years in the future).¹The GEF provides CCDRs with policy guidance for planning. Meanwhile, the CJCS issues the JSCP document that actually tasks the CCDRs and Service Chiefs to prepare operation, contingency, and theater campaign plans (3D Planning Group, 2012; OSD, 2012). In other words, the JSCP provides *plan* guidance. One of the major roles of a CCDR is to translate strategic guidance into operational level plans and activities. The GEF and JSCP are essential documents that accomplish that task.

Like the JSCP, the GEF is classified and has limited distribution. The 2010 GEF, for

concurrently with the JSCP and with input from the State Department. Its intent is to provide strategic context to link strategy to operations. The GEF presents global posture and force management priorities, security cooperation guidance, presidential guidance for contingency planning, and incorporates the SecDef’s strategic priorities and policy aims (JP 5-0, 2011). It is a vehicle for the SecDef to translate higher level national security objectives and strategy into DOD priorities and planning direction for the CCDRs and joint planning staffs.

The centerpiece of the GEF is a requirement for CCDRs to develop campaign plans that integrate and synchronize ‘steady-state’ or Phase 0 activities to achieve objectives specified in the GEF. The GEF provides theater strategic

objectives for GCCs, and strategic objectives for functional combatant commanders. It also provides strategic assumptions, prioritized contingency planning scenarios, and global posture and global force management guidance (US Army War College, 2010). The GEF emphasizes steady-state or Phase 0 activities, which are largely security cooperation actions. Perhaps the most critical guidance in the GEF regarding security cooperation activities is its list of global core partners, critical partners, key

and contingency planning guidance for CCDRs. The JSCP expands GEF guidance to include global defense posture, security cooperation, and other steady-state activities. Covering the same two year planning period as the GEF, the JSCP delivers an apportionment construct for use in the Global Force Management

Implementation Guidance (GFMIG) that I will discuss next. In this regard, it articulates the GCC's force requirements to accomplish tasks assigned to them.

Linkage between GEF Objectives and Partners	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Global Core Partners <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Nations or organizations that work collaboratively with or support the US in multiple regions of the globe to achieve common ends. <hr style="width: 50%; margin: 10px auto;"/> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>A nation or organization can fall into any one or all three of the following categories:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Critical Partners <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – A deliberately select group of countries or organizations deemed most essential to a CCDR's ability to achieve a regional or functional strategic end state. • Key Supporting Partners <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Countries or organizations whose supporting capabilities help a command to achieve one or more of the command's strategic end states. • Actors of Concern <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Countries or non-state actors that pose a problem that directly affects a region. 	<p>Example: Fictional GEF Prioritized Theater Strategic Objectives and Partners:</p> <p>Objective 1. Violent extremist organizations do not significantly threaten the US or US interests abroad.</p> <p>Critical Partners: Countries A, B, and C Key Supporting Partners: Countries X, Y, and Z Actors of Concern: Actor M, Country N, Country C</p> <p>Objective 2. The US maintains assured access and freedom of movement in the AOR.</p> <p>Critical Partners: Actor M, Country B Key Supporting Partners: Countries A, Y, and Z Actors of Concern: Country N</p> <p>Objective 3. US partners in the AOR have the capability and capacity to provide for their own security and deter aggression.</p> <p>Critical Partners: Countries A and B Key Supporting Partners: Country C Actors of Concern: Country D, Actor M</p>

Figure 4. GEF objectives and partners. The GEF provides prioritized theater objectives for each AOR and lists which actors influence or must be influenced to achieve them. This provides planners with sufficient guidance to allocate limited security cooperation resources in the TCP.

supporting partners, and actors of concern for each objective (Figure 4).

The JSCP, signed by the CJCS, translates strategic policy from the GEF into guidance for CCDRs and service chiefs so they may prepare operation, contingency, and theater campaign plans (3D Planning Group, 2011). The CJCS uses the JSCP to translate strategic policy objectives from the GEF into specific campaign

Global Force Management Implementation Guidance (GFMIG)

The GFMIG is a classified document, signed by the SecDef, and is produced and updated biennially. Assignment and apportionment tables within the GFMIG are updated annually. This document integrates force assignment, apportionment, and allocation globally using the

apportionment construct from the JSCP (Figure 5). That is to say, the JSCP assigns tasks to the GCCs based largely on strategic policy guidance in the GEF; the GCCs make their plans, then request forces to accomplish the tasks. The GFMIG communicates which forces (both active and reserve) will be available to GCCs to meet the missions and responsibilities required in the JSCP.⁴ Those forces will be assigned, apportioned, or allocated. Therefore, in the context of security cooperation, the GFMIG provides guidance allowing a GCC to obtain forces to support his security cooperation plans as well as any other activities.

stakeholders (OSD, 2012). By definition, a campaign plan is the translation of national strategy into operational concepts (JP 1-02, 2014). Unlike a traditional campaign plan however, of the TCP's main purpose is to provide guidance to coordinate security cooperation and other Phase 0, or steady state activities across an AOR (OSD, 2012). It helps achieve a GCC's theater strategy by coherently and comprehensively integrating directed steady-state activities and contingency operations and activities (JP 5-0, 2011). The TCP takes direction and guidance from all the national strategic level documents as well as the JSCP, GEF, and GFMIG and incorporates the GCC's

Providing Forces
<p>The JSCP groups Joint Forces into three categories:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (1) forces committed to ongoing operations, (2) forces available for planning, and (3) forces apportioned for homeland defense planning. <p>The GFMIG populates the three JSCP categories with active and reserve forces. It communicates assignment, allocation, and apportionment decisions made by the SECDEF and CJCS.</p> <p>The SECDEF <i>assigns</i> forces to CCDRs to meet GCC missions and responsibilities. The SECDEF <i>allocates</i> forces to meet current operational requirements. The SECDEF <i>attaches</i> forces to meet relatively temporary operational requirements. The CJCS <i>apportions</i> forces to CCDRs for planning.</p>
<p>Assigned forces are those placed under GCC combatant command authority to accomplish normal peacetime operations.</p> <p>Apportioned forces are those made available for deliberate planning. They are apportioned in the JSCP for use in developing deliberate plans and may be more or less than the forces actually allocated for execution.</p> <p>Allocated forces are those provided for crisis action. Once allocated to the CCDR, forces become assigned or attached to the receiving combatant commander.</p>

Figure 5. Providing forces. It is important to understand the lexicon of assignment, allocation, attachment, and apportionment and who is responsible for each in order to understand how forces are supplied for security cooperation or other Phase 0 tasks (JP 5-0, Chapter 1, para 14).

The Theater Campaign Plan (TCP) (Figure 6)

The TCP communicates a GCC's theater strategy (a broad statement of a commander's long-term vision for the AOR (JP 5-0, 2011)), and it must therefore be understood by a broad audience that includes the DOD leadership, subordinate military organizations, and external

planning priorities. The TCP identifies theater objectives and lines of effort to accomplish the regional and functional end states specifically delineated in the GEF. It is designed to achieve strategic effect (OSD, 2012).

Typically, the TCP will contain higher level directives and guidance (ends), ways the CCMD intends to achieve its objectives at the

theater level, what resources are required to do so (means), why those resources are critical, and what risks would be incurred if resources are not available (OSD, 2012). However, CCMDs generally do not control the majority of ‘means’, or resources, applied in AORs other than forces assigned to the CCMD (such as the Service Component Commands). Supporting agencies provide the much of the security cooperation and other resources that are used in executing

largely security cooperation activities, often a security cooperation annex is redundant and left out. Regional Annexes may also be included to better organize issues dealing with culturally or geographically similar regions within the AOR, but every TCP includes Country Plans, also known as Country Cooperation Plans (Kloecker, 2014), Country Security Cooperation Plans (CJCSM 3130.01A, 2014), or simply ‘country plans’.




Figure 6. The Theater Campaign Plan and supporting plans. The TCP is the GCC’s steady state plan and contains regional annexes, including Country Plans. Each Service Component establishes their own plans to support the TCP, and those plans reflect institutional initiatives that must be considered by joint planners.

TCPs. The GCC’s TCP therefore, provides a framework to guide these activities and justify resource allocation (OSD, 2012).

TCPs deal with steady state activities (primarily security cooperation, but also other theater shaping actions) and must address posture planning. All TCPs have annexes addressing theater posture planning, and numerous contingency plans (which are branch plans to the TCP). Some GCCs add a separate security cooperation annex, but since the TCP itself deals with Phase 0 activities that are

The Country Plan (CP)

As assigned by the UCP, each GCC has responsibility for an AOR that encompasses numerous countries: the USPACOM AOR includes 36 countries; USEUCOM 51; USAFRICOM 54; USSOUTHCOM 31; USCENTCOM 20, and USNORTHCOM 4 (refer to Figure 2). It is logical to assume that a CP is published for each country that the US engages with in security cooperation activities. The CP is published as part of the TCP, usually as an annex.

While it is ultimately the responsibility of the GCC, it is typically written by a joint staff officer working in the J5 shop. This officer must work closely with the Security Cooperation Office in each country, as well as the Ambassador, other members of the Embassy Country Team, and the Service component commands that provide resources to the GCC. The content of country plans varies across GCCs, but they all share the same purpose, which is to establish country objectives that support the TCP and associated subordinate regional plans (DA PAM 11-31, 2013).

Service Component Campaign Plans

While a GCC has the responsibility to conduct security cooperation activities in his AOR, he often does not have the authority over forces and resources required to execute them. Resourcing security cooperation and other plans falls to the Service Component Commands. In the case of the Army, doctrine clearly states that all security cooperation in an AOR will be “by, with or through the Theater Army” (FM 3-22, 2012). Indeed, the GEF directs services to write their own campaign support plans that focus on service activities to achieve CCDR campaign objectives in security cooperation (DA Pam 11-31, 2012). These are included as annexes to the GCC’s TCP.

Service Campaign Support Plans are guided by Service Plans and are designed to assist the Service Component Commands executing their responsibilities in support of the GCC. They aggregate and validate requirements globally (across all AORs) and allocate service resources as appropriate (FM 3-22, 2013). For example, The Army Plan (TAP) is a service plan. The Army’s senior leadership publishes the TAP annually to explain their intent for how the Army will fulfill its Title 10 obligations in support of defense and national strategies. It is divided into four synchronized and integrated sections titled Army Strategic Planning Guidance (ASPG), Army

Planning Priorities Guidance (APPG), Army Program Guidance Memorandum (APGM), and the Army Campaign Plan (Chipchase, 2012).

The TAP and its subsections provide the strategic framework for The Army Campaign Support Plan. This plan provides a host of institutional initiatives that support and greatly affect ASCC Campaign Support Plans as well as CPs and TCPs. An example of an Army institutional initiative that supports TCPs is the establishment of Regionally Aligned Forces (RAFs) that are intended to ease the Request For Forces (RFF) cycle and more rapidly provide trained and culturally aware soldiers to an AOR to execute security cooperation missions.

Army institutional initiatives as well as those by the other Service Components have influence on planning and execution of the GCC’s TCP and nested CPs. But other agencies exist within the US Government that rightfully have tremendous influence on security cooperation planning and execution, and their guidance must also be considered.

Department of State (DoS) Guidance

DOD does not develop a TCP or CP in isolation. Indeed, in the best Clausewitzian tradition, it can be argued that the CP is simply an extension of diplomacy, which is clearly under the authority of the DoS. As such, CP planners must consider DoS/USAID requirements and input. This is not always easy because, in part, there is a clear cultural difference between DOD and DoS/USAID. Cultural differences between these organizations stem from a variety of things including resource and personnel disparities. DOD for example, has a much larger budget, and a much larger workforce than DoS. DOD planning timelines are relatively short term in focus, while the DoS/USAID planning horizon is usually years out. Finally, the DOD plans using a regional focus, while DoS/USAID planning is country focused. Of course, the mission sets for DOD and DoS differ greatly as well.

This cultural difference is specifically reflected in planning philosophy. In general, DOD planning is objectives-based. The focus of the planning effort is on objectives followed by the identification and allocation of resources to achieve the objectives. DoS planning on the other hand, is resource-based. The focus of the planning effort starts with identifying resources and then allocating available resources to achieve objectives (3D Planning Group, 2012). This is a significant difference. Secretary Clinton had made a tremendous effort to transform DoS/USAID in many areas, including the way these agencies approach planning. The 2010 Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) introduced a planning philosophy change and it was further clarified in the 3D Planning Guide (2012). 3D refers to Diplomacy, Development and Defense. The 3D concept is intended to improve collaboration and synchronization in all of these realms in an effort to achieve unity of purpose and unity of effort among the DOD, DoS and USAID at each level (country, region, global/functional). The Secretary of State's (SecState's) goal is the better understanding of the products and processes each agency uses in planning so as to develop better collaboration (3D Planning Group, 2012). Supporting this effort is the SecState's initiative to replace Bureau and Country Level planning documents with more objective-based strategic plans. The foundation of all these initiatives is found in the DoS/USAID QDDR that will be discussed next.

The Department of State/US Agency for International Development Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) (Figure 7)

Secretary Clinton established the QDDR in 2010 to answer the question "How can we do better?" This foundational document articulates a blueprint for elevating American civilian power to advance national interests and to be a better partner to the DOD and other agencies (QDDR,

2010). The central theme of the document, "leading through civilian power," refers to directing and coordinating the resources of all America's civilian agencies to prevent and resolve conflicts, to help countries lift themselves out of poverty into prosperous, stable, and democratic states, and to build global coalitions to address global problems.

Although the DoS QDDR serves some of the same purposes as the DOD QDR, it is not mandated by law. It does require DoS and USAID to transform their planning philosophy to be more objective-based. As a result of guidance in the QDDR, significant changes to planning documents are occurring at the DoS bureau and country level and these efforts are being followed up by our current SecState, John Kerry. In April, 2014, Secretary Kerry announced and described the launch of the second QDDR effort that builds upon the first, but a specific publication date has not yet been announced (Kerry et al, 2014).

The Department of State/US Agency for International Development Joint Strategic Plan (JSP)

Comparable in scope to the DOD NDS, the JSP identifies the SecState's direction and priorities for both DoS and USAID. It defines the primary aims of US foreign policy and development assistance as well as strategic priorities. Based on direction from the NSS, QDDR, and other national-level guidance and strategies as well as coordination with other interagency actors, the JSP incorporates the SecState's vision and it articulates key priorities, strategies for achieving those priorities, and criteria for measuring results. The JSP also guides the DoS/USAID budget process (3D Planning Process, 2012).

Joint Regional Strategy (JRS), the Functional Bureau Strategy (FBS) (Figure 8)

Prompted by the QDDR, these two new documents represent a major change in how DoS




Figure 7. Key DoS/USAID Strategic Documents. Like DoD, DoS/USAID uses the NSS to provide direction for their security related activities. Also like DoD, DoS/USAID has established a top-down cyclical review of their strategy, missions and goals. These agencies have also established a Strategic Plan similar in purpose to the NDS to guide foreign policy and development.

and USAID view strategy, and the changes they direct were phased in across all bureaus before January 2015. The JRS provides guidance to prioritize diplomatic engagement and resources and respond to unanticipated events within each regional Bureau. The FBS establishes direction and priorities for each functional bureau. Both documents are complimentary to each other and collectively, they replace the Bureau Strategic and Resource Plan (BSRP). Unlike the BSRP, which was an annual document that combined strategy with resourcing and did not include USAID, the JRS and FBS are true joint³ publications published once every three years with an intent to focus planning on strategic objectives rather than available resources. Bureau Chiefs are expected to adjust the content of the document within the three year cycle as the operating environment changes. In a clear break from previous philosophy, a separate Bureau Resource Request (BRR) now accompanies the JRS. Formerly, the BSRP served primarily as a resource document with strategic justification.

Now, strategic objectives and policy drive the strategy, and the resource request is in support.

AORs, Bureaus, and Regions....

I want to mention an interesting and important planning consideration regarding DoS, DOD and USAID at this point because of the additional complexity it adds to the interagency security cooperation planning process. Somewhat analogous to the DOD GCC's Area of Responsibility (AOR), DoS has divided the world geographically into Bureaus. However, the boundaries of the DoS Bureaus do not align with DOD AORs. Therefore, the JRS for each bureau does not align directly with the GCC's TCP, thus adding another layer of coordination for planning that must be accomplished. Similarly, USAID has also divided the world into geographic regions, and these regions do not line up perfectly with either the DOD AORs, or the DoS Bureaus, again adding another layer of complexity with which a planner must




Figure 8. DoS/USAID Operational level documents. The QDDR mandated a significant change in planning philosophy for DoS/AID. As a result, the BSRP and MSRP were replaced with three year strategic plans (published annually) at both the Bureau and Mission levels (Clinton, 2011).

contend. Finally, it should also be understood that DoS has established functional bureaus (e.g. Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement, Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, etc.) somewhat akin to the DOD Functional Commands (e.g. TRANSCOM, USSOCOM, etc.). These Functional Bureaus have, like the DOD Functional Commands, their own strategic plans.

Integrated Country Strategy (ICS)

The ICS is another new document prompted by the QDDR, this time at the Diplomatic Mission level. It replaces the Mission Strategic Resource Plan (MSRP) that was authored by the Chief of Mission (COM) every year in each of the countries having diplomatic relations with the USA. Like the JRS and FBS, the new ICS is a three year document, but it is country specific and contains mission goals and diplomatic strategy for each mission, as well as the security,

justice, and development strategy, if warranted. It is integrated because it requires a whole-of-government planning effort with involvement by mission personnel from DoS, USAID, DOD and other government agencies that operate within the mission (Clinton, 2011). The ICS is supported by the Mission Resource Request (MRR), which, similar to the BRR, is a funding document designed to access funds in support of the strategy.

The ICS is the COM's strategic plan and it therefore has a great effect on security cooperation planning. Virtually no work by the US Government occurs in a country without the Ambassador's consent. Therefore, military-to-military engagements, training, Foreign Military Sales (FMS) or Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) for example, should not be included in the CP without support of the COM.

USAID Country Development Cooperation Strategy (CDCS)

A CDCS is a five-year strategy document (although it may be shorter for countries in transition) that focuses on USAID-implemented assistance and related USG non-assistance tools (CDCS, 2012). The USAID Mission Chief develops the plan for each country where the USAID operates, and this plan must be considered as integral to security cooperation planning and execution. A great deal of synergy could be gained by a CP that complements USAID efforts. The CDCS is often found as an annex to the COM's ICS.

The Country Plan, Revisited (Figure 9)

From the discussion presented so far, it is clear that a myriad of guidance documents from the national level to the country level exists and influences both the TCP and CP. Planners must be aware of this guidance and incorporate it in the development of individual plans. In particular, planners must understand that, despite these plans being GCC planning documents, planners

must take into account many other influences in order to be effective. Not only should plans reflect guidance from DOD, DoS, and other US agencies, but they also must consider the desires of partner nations, a point that cannot be overemphasized (particularly for the CP). Partner nations are sovereign and have their own strategies, capabilities and perceived threats that may or may not coincide with US perspectives. The influence the US may have on another country is inherently limited, and planners must understand the culture, motivation and strategy that a partner nation will follow. There exists only one area in which security cooperation activities can take place and be effective. That is where the partner nation, DoS/USAID and DOD interests overlap. TCP and CP planners must understand this overlap and use it effectively in order to produce coherent and successful plans.

Conclusion (Figure 10)

The TCP and CPs are where all the direction and guidance discussed in this paper must come together in viable plans. In order to develop a realistic and useful concept, planners must




Figure 9. The Country Plan. The CP should be influenced by strategic and operational guidance from DoD, DoS, and other Interagency actors. In particular, CP planners must understand the desires of partner nations in order to be effective. The only area in which successful security cooperation activities can take place is where interests coincide.




Figure 10. Translating Strategy to Engagement. A TCP and CP planner must be cognizant of, and must incorporate guidance from multiple sources. This illustration shows a select few of the critical strategy documents from DoD and DoS/USAID that were discussed in this paper and that must be considered in order to develop a successful security cooperation engagement plan at the country level.

understand and consider guidance from the national and operational levels, the interagency, DoS/USAID, and the wants and needs of actors outside of the USG including the partner nation. In other words, both the TCP and CP have to be well integrated and flexible planning documents. The purpose of this paper is to review selected US strategic and operational level documents that guide security cooperation planning and activities and explain how they relate to and complement each other in order to ultimately provide effective security cooperation. The intent is to assist planners in understanding what key guidance documents they should review as they plan. As important as these documents are, successful planners must understand that the strategies these documents communicate are constantly changing and being refined. Planners must know where to look and what to review in order to gain insight into the translation of strategy

from the national level to security cooperation engagement that takes place at the tactical level. No TCP or CP can be effective if it works at cross purpose with higher level guidance, input from DoS/USAID and other Interagencies, or the partner nation.

About the Author

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Endnotes

1. Strategic end states in the GEF cannot often be achieved in the two-year publication cycle. Therefore, while the document itself focuses on two-year planning period, strategic end states articulated in the GEF have a longer time line.
2. Emergent requirements are time sensitive and are not captured in the GFMIG publication cycle. These requirements are handled by off-cycle adjudication of the Global Force Management Board and published in the Global Force Management Allocation Plan (included as a subsection of the GFMIG), which is updated annually or as needed.
3. Unlike the DoD definition of joint, the word 'joint' is used here as DoS and USAID uses it to mean both DoS and USAID.

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Force of the Future Looks to Maintain US Advantages

By Jim Garamone
DoD News Features, Defense Media Activity

WASHINGTON, Nov. 18, 2015 — “Permeability” is a word that will be heard a lot in relation to Defense Secretary Ash Carter’s new Force of the Future program. Brad Carson, one of the architects of the program and the acting undersecretary of defense for personnel and readiness, spoke about the concept and the program during a recent interview.

DoD officials are looking for permeability between the private and public sector, between the active-duty force and the reserve components and between military and civilian life.

US Military is Superb

The baseline for the Force of the Future is today’s military: it is superb, Carson said. In the past 14 years, DOD has fought two wars, maintained alliances around the globe and responded to humanitarian disasters in Japan, Indonesia, Pakistan, Haiti, Liberia and the United States.

While, technology and systems play a part in American military dominance, it is the people of the department that are the real advantage. “There is no guarantee that will continue in the future,” Carson said. The Force of the Future is designed to ensure DOD maintains its most precious resource: its people, he said.

The program covers a number of different initiatives to ensure the military remains attractive to those who wish to serve. This runs from

putting in place a blended military retirement system to attracting the best and brightest civilian employees. It also seeks to incorporate the best practices from the private sector.

Defense Digital Service

Carson called one of the initiatives, the Defense Digital Service, potentially transformative. The department will bring in technology entrepreneurs for a few months or years to share their product development or project management skills.

“I envision that Defense Digital Services will be mostly made up of tech people who come in from the outside for a very short time,” he said. “It’s quite possible that defense employees will work alongside them, but the core of the DDS will be tech workers, tech entrepreneurs -- skilled IT professionals working at America’s leading companies.” The key is small groups working discrete problems, he said, noting tech companies today use “agile development” as their mantra, employing small teams that get products designed and in use quickly.

Effecting Change

“The only way change ever happens is when small groups are committed to it,” the undersecretary said. “In Silicon Valley they say

any group that can eat more than two pizzas at a time is too large to get anything done.”

The world-shattering products that Americans use in daily life began with a few men and women working on them. “Then the power of the idea, the beauty of the product sells itself,” he said. “And that’s what we envision here. There are great products that we can get DDS to work on. The power of the skills they bring in will help change the culture and have a direct impact on some of the knottiest problems that we have.”

Almost everything the department does now is embedded with information technology, from digitizing and sharing health records to forming databases for documenting sexual assault.

How these teams approach problems will rub off on DOD employees, Carson said. “There are alternative ways to think about problems, there are alternative ways to go about procurement. They will bring in the best practices that they see every day [and] that they take for granted at their companies,” he said.

An example is at Google and Facebook. On their first day, new employees are expected to write code and apply it to products. In DOD, that might not happen for a year. “They are doing things in smaller batches, iteratively, if it fails they recalibrate,” he said. “It’s just a different way to do business -- a better way to do business, I think.”

Coming Initiatives

The blended military retirement system kicks in Jan. 1, 2018. Those on duty before then will continue to be covered by the current retirement system.

“I think the force will find this to be a great benefit to them and it’s a change all for the better,” Carson said. “While those currently serving will not be affected by the current retirement changes, ... if you served less than 12 years, you will have the opportunity to change over into the blended retirement system, [but] no one will be compelled to do so.”

Another initiative is the entrepreneur-in-residence program. This is a pilot program that will embed entrepreneurs inside DOD to examine some chronic problems within the department, Carson said. “I expect they will be working at the intersection of defense policy and business,” he said. “I really envision it that we bring people in who are very creative, who are extraordinarily energetic. And we say, ‘We’re setting you loose. Go find interesting projects you think you might add value to.’ We want people who are divergent thinkers, who can energize the building.”

The Force of the Future will expand the career intermission program. This program allows personnel to take sabbaticals from the military to raise a family, get a new degree or explore other career opportunities. “I don’t envision there will ever be a world where a large portion of the force will take a sabbatical, but I do think you will see some of the most important people who will rise over time to the senior leadership of the services will take sabbaticals,” he said.

Participants would transfer to the individual ready reserve and wouldn’t count against active-duty end strength. They would still be covered under TRICARE, and they would shift year group so promotion potential is not thwarted, he said. Carson added that he would like to see the services experiment with eliminating the “pay back” obligation under the program.

Shifting Between Active-Duty, Reserve Service

The Force of the Future also wants to make it easier for the services and service members to shift back and forth seamlessly between the active-duty force [AC] and the reserve components [RC] and vice versa. “Right now, it’s a very hard thing to do,” he said. “We’d like to make it a world where any service can say, ‘Hey, there are people in the RC that we need to bring them back into the AC.’”

The department wants a two-way street between the private sector and the department. “It’s not a world where you have to come to DOD and spend the next 40 years -- if you want to do that you can,” Carson said. “But you can come in for a year or two and make a big impact, and then go back to the private sector. And then maybe come back again in five or 10 years. That’s the kind of permeability that benefits both the private sector and DOD.”

DoD Extends Technological, Operational Edge Into the Future

By Cheryl Pellerin
DoD News Features, Defense Media Activity

WASHINGTON, December 14, 2015 — The Defense Department’s civilian and military leadership is pursuing a significant and enduring effort to extend its military, technological and operational edge well into the future, Deputy Defense Secretary Bob Work said today.

In a speech at the Center for a New American Security’s National Security Forum, Work noted that this push into the future is driven by a pressing need to modify the defense program to meet evolving threats in the national security environment.

The effort includes new approaches to evaluating and offsetting the conventional strengths of potential adversaries, a commitment to U.S. allies and friends, and a drive to innovate.

The Only Great Power

During the period between 1999 and 2014, Work said, the United States was the world’s only great power and the sole military superpower.

“This gave us enormous freedom of action, but the circumstance is changing” he said, “The unipolar world is starting to fade and we have a more multipolar world in which U.S. global leadership is likely to be increasingly challenged.”

For the United States, Work added, “the most stressing [challenge] is the reemergence of great power competition.”

For the purposes of building a defense program focused on the capabilities of potential adversaries, the deputy secretary said he uses international relations theorist John

Mearsheimer’s definition of a great power -- a state having sufficient military assets to put up a serious fight in an all-out conventional war against the dominant power, and possessing a nuclear deterrent that could survive a first strike against it.

On Their Way

By that narrow definition, Work said, “[and] from a defense program perspective, if Russia and China are not yet great powers, they’re well on their way.

“We’ve been trying for 25 years to include Russia within the European community and we want to partner with it on a wide variety of global issues,” Work said, adding that the United States still seeks both outcomes.

But Russia, he explained, is modernizing its nuclear and conventional forces, sharpening its warfighting doctrine aimed at NATO, rattling its nuclear saber, seeking to undermine NATO and intimidate the Baltic States, and trying to rewrite the international rule book.

As a result, the department is adapting its operational posture, contingency plans and programs to deter further aggression, the deputy secretary said.

The Bottom Line

“China, a rising power with impressive latent military technological capabilities, probably

embodies a more enduring strategic challenge as its ambitions and objectives expand in Asia, [the] Western Pacific, littoral Africa, Latin America and elsewhere,” Work said.

China’s words have been about peaceful rise and about defense, he added, but its actions will be the true test of its commitment to peace and stability in the current international order.

The department continues to pursue military-to-military cooperation and a wide range of confidence-building measures with China “to make sure we never come to blows, but ... we can’t overlook the competitive aspects of our relationship, especially in the realm of military capabilities. And that’s the bottom line,” Work said.

A Focus on Capabilities

DoD focuses on the capabilities of potential challengers, and Russia and China present the United States and its allies and partners with unique and increasingly stressing military capabilities and operational challenges, the deputy secretary said.

The department understands the importance of engaging with potential competitors but it does so cognizant of its central purpose “to reassure our allies and partners ... and to protect U.S. forces and our allies from direct attack,” he added, “and, should deterrence fail, make sure that we are able to roll back any aggression that occurs.”

The best way to prevent great-power competition from becoming great-power conflict, the deputy secretary said, is for the United States to maintain a safe, reliable and secure nuclear arsenal for so long as those weapons exist, coupled with strong conventional deterrent capabilities.

Offset Strategies

The United States has historically strengthened its conventional deterrence by

pursuing a combination of superior technological capabilities and innovative operational and organizational constructs that offset the strengths of its potential adversaries, Work noted.

In the 1950s, the first offset strategy sought to blunt Soviet numerical and geographical advantage along the inner German border by introducing, demonstrating and developing the operational and organizational constructs to use battlefield nuclear weapons, he said.

After the Soviets achieved strategic nuclear parity in the 1970s, the second offset strategy included precision-guided munitions with near-zero miss.

Today, the department is pursuing a third offset strategy that includes the following five kinds of technological advances:

1. Learning Systems
2. Human-machine collaboration
3. Human-machine combat teaming
4. Assisted human operations
5. Network-enabled, cyber-hardened weapons

Deterrent Posture

Work said the first priority in trying to build a strong deterrent posture is “to try to achieve a technological overmatch against potential adversaries.”

The department needs new technological capabilities to try to achieve the technological overmatch important to an offset strategy, the deputy secretary said, but “you need new organizational and operational constructs to make them real and to gain operational advantage.”

Such capabilities also must be demonstrated, Work added, so an adversary can see that any attempt to achieve operational success in the warfighting campaign is likely to fail, even if they were to achieve an initial advantage in time and space.

Sole Source Acquisitions for Foreign Military Sales Customers

By Mark H. Alexander, Air Force Material Command
and William D. Cavanaugh, Defense Security Cooperation Agency

An open and competitive market has long been a characteristic of the western economy established on the shores of North America by the first colonists and carried forward when the 13 colonies established themselves as the United States of America. This competitive system between producers of goods and services leads to better goods and services at the lowest possible costs for the consumers. The United States Government (USG) (and the various sub-components) is a consumer of goods and services and like all consumers seeks the best goods and services at the best price possible. For the purposes of federal acquisitions, the requirement for full and open competition is encapsulated in a public law known popularly as the Competition in Contracting Act of 1984 (CICA).¹

The Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program is one of the many acquisition programs conducted by the USG in furtherance of its national security goals. This program allows the USG to purchase defense supplies and services for eligible foreign governments or International Organizations. This article discusses the rules governing the competition requirements of CICA as it applies to FMS purchases, as well as the guidance and process for supporting a sole source FMS acquisition under the International Agreement exception to CICA.

Background and Law

CICA requires federal agencies to obtain full and open competition when conducting acquisitions for supplies and services.² CICA is based on the public policy that full and open competition drives down cost, improves performance, and decreases schedule.³ Any contract entered into without full and open competition is considered noncompetitive. However, noncompetitive contracts are in compliance with CICA when circumstances permitting other than full and open competition exists. CICA recognizes seven such circumstances, including: (1) only one responsible source for goods or services; (2) unusual and compelling urgency; (3) maintenance of the industrial base; (4) requirements of international agreements; (5) statutory authorization or acquisition of brand-name items for resale; (6) national security; and (7) contracts necessary in the public interest. In most cases, the use of non-competitive procedures via a CICA exception requires a written Justification and Approval (J&A) which documents the basis for using the CICA exception to competition.⁴ If the use of any of the CICA exceptions cannot be supported, then the procurement must comply with the full and open competition requirements of CICA. As stated above, one exception to the requirement

for a written J&A is when the procurement fits within the International Agreement exception to CICA. Before discussing how this exception works, let's discuss the background of foreign military sales.

The FMS program is a non-appropriated program through which eligible foreign governments or International Organizations purchase defense articles, services, and training from the USG, consistent with USG national security and foreign policy objectives and restraints. The primary statutory authorities supporting FMS programs are the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA), as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), as amended.⁵ The FMS program begins when an eligible foreign government or International Organization submits a Letter of Request (LOR) describing its "valid military requirements" for defense articles, services and training.⁶ If the foreign government or International Organization wishes to designate a source to supply the defense articles, services and training, that source designation is typically embedded within the contents of the LOR, but such designation can be submitted separately. The LOR is evaluated and if accepted, the USG, through the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, creates a government-to-government agreement, or government-to-International Organization agreement.⁷ The agreement is documented in a Letter of Offer and Acceptance (LOA) between the USG and the foreign government or International Organization. The purchasing government or International Organization is responsible for paying all costs associated with a sale. Under FMS authority, military articles and services, including training, may be provided from DOD stocks or from new procurement.⁸ The LOA must be signed by a duly authorized individual of the eligible foreign government or International Organization before the assigned US military department can initiate the acquisition process.

The President of the United States may enter into contracts for the procurement defense articles, services and training to eligible foreign governments or International Organizations.⁹ Implicit within the provisions of the AECA is an acquisition preference for US origin defense articles, services and training.¹⁰ It follows from that legal construct that the acquisition of defense articles, services and training will be in accordance with US laws, regulations and procedures.¹¹ If the source of supply is a new procurement, the military department (MILDEP) assigned is authorized to enter into a subsequent contractual arrangement with US industry in order to provide the articles, services or training requested.

CICA contains an express exemption from the requirement to obtain full and open competition if written direction from the FMS customer directs the acquisition from a specific source.¹² Use of this exception to competition is generally referenced in CICA and implementing guidance as the International Agreement exception. The common reasons an eligible foreign government or International Organization cites to forgo full and open competition are established long term relations with US industry, compatibility with existing national defense articles, services and training, or a urgent and compelling need for defense articles, services and training.

Under the International Agreement exception to CICA, the terms of an international agreement or a treaty between the United States and a foreign government or International Organization, or the written directions of a foreign government reimbursing the agency for the cost of the procurement of the property or services for such government, have the effect of requiring the use of noncompetitive procedures. A J&A is not required in the case of a procurement permitted by the International Agreement exception to CICA if the head of the contracting activity prepares a document in connection with such procurement that describes the terms of an agreement, treaty,

or written direction that has the effect of requiring the use of other than competitive procedures.¹³

Discussion

Unfortunately, there are examples of FMS acquisitions which fail to follow these unequivocal legal and procedural requirements, possibly due to not understanding how a valid FMS sole source designation and the CICA exception guidance work together. As a starting point, it is important for anyone involved in a potential sole-source FMS acquisition to read the law, regulations, and guidance in this area together in order to fully understand the requirements and correctly implement an FMS sole source acquisition. In using the International Agreement exception to CICA, the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR) state that the product being obtained must be “from a particular firm as specified in official written direction.”¹⁴ The Department of Defense FAR Supplement (DFARS) also states that an FMS customer may request that a defense article or service be obtained “from a particular contractor.”¹⁵ The Security Assistance Management Manual (SAMM) addresses this issue as well when it notes that acquisitions for FMS purchases must be in accordance with Department of Defense regulations and procedures, and that the purchasing government may submit a request that the defense item or service be purchased from “a specific source.”¹⁶ In such circumstances, the use of other than competitive procedures for the acquisition under the International Agreement exception to CICA must be documented, but it does not require a written J&A.¹⁷

There are several important points to be noted when reviewing the above guidance regarding sole source FMS acquisitions. First, there must be an International Agreement, treaty, or other written direction of a foreign government. When a foreign government or International Organization submits a “valid requirement” for defense articles, the foreign government or

International Organization must clearly state its intent to have such defense articles, services or training acquired from a specific source. In the absence of such statement, a purchasing agency (the assigned MILDEP) cannot make this “specific source” determination itself in order to use the International Agreement exception to CICA. If the FMS customer does not direct a specific source, the purchasing agency must comply with the competitive procedures of CICA, or meet one of the other CICA exceptions, which must be supported by a J&A. In other words, without the FMS customer directing a specific source for the acquisition, the International Agreement exception to CICA is unavailable. Also, while the FMS customer can submit a separate request for a directed source (with reference to the relevant agreement, treaty, or other written direction), such direction cannot be based on some less formal, unwritten “understanding” between the USG and an FMS customer.

Conclusion

The clear language of the statutory and regulatory guidance governing federal procurements states that an international agreement, treaty, or other written direction of a foreign government or International Organization, which directs the procurement of a defense item or service from a particular source, has the effect of requiring the use of other than competitive procedures. In such a case, documentation other than a J&A can be used to justify the use of the International Agreement exception to CICA. However, if there is no international agreement, treaty, or other written direction of a foreign government directing a particular source for a defense supply or service, the purchasing organization must comply with the competitive procedures of CICA, or support the use of another exception to CICA, which must be documented by a written J&A.

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The opinions and conclusions expressed in this article are solely those of the authors and do not reflect the opinion of any department or agency of the US Government, and should not be taken as legal advice or as an exhaustive treatment of the subject.

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4. 10 U.S.C. Section 2304; FAR 6.303-1; DFARS 206.304
5. 22 U.S.C. Sections 2151, et. seq. and 22 U.S.C. Sections 2751, et. seq., respectively. There are other statutory authorities governing the "sales of defense articles and services," primarily under recent Title 10 legislation, however those laws and authorities are beyond the scope of this article
6. Security Assistance Management Manual (SAMM), Chapter 5, paragraph C5.1.1
7. Evaluation Criteria, SAMM, Chapter 5, Table C5.T3
8. 22 U.C.S. Section 2761 and 22 U.S.C. Section 2762, respectively. For the purposes of this article the focus will be on sales of defense articles, services and training from new procurements
9. 22 U.S.C. Section 2762
10. See also, SAMM, Chapter 4, paragraph C4.3.4
11. Department of Defense FAR Supplement (DFARS), Subparts 201.104 and 225.7301(b)
12. 10 U.S.C. Section 2304(c)(4)
13. 10 U.S.C. 2304(c)(4); FAR 6.302-4; DFARS 206.302-4
14. FAR 6302-4(b)(1)
15. FARS 225.73.09(a)
16. SAMM C6.3.1, C6.3.4, C6.3.4.5
17. 10 U.S.C. Section 2304(f)(2)(E); DFARS 206.302-4(c)

Endnotes

1. 10 U.S.C. Section 2304
2. 10 U.S.C. Section 2304(a); FAR 6.302; DFARS 206.302
3. GAO Report – Procurement: Better Compliance With the Competition in

Posture Statement of General John F. Kelly United States Marine Corps Commander United States Southern Command

**Before the 114th Congress Senate Armed Services Committee
12 March 2015**

Introduction

Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed, and distinguished Members of the Committee: I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss US Southern Command's efforts in Central America, South America, and the Caribbean. As I finish my third and likely final year in command, I continue to be impressed by the courage and sacrifice displayed by so many countries in this part of the world. Our friends across the region are committed to winning back their streets, indeed their countries, from criminal gangs and drug traffickers, and doing so while protecting human rights. They are ready and willing to partner with the United States, and they are eager for expanded cooperation and increased learning and training opportunities with the US military. But they are frustrated by what they perceive as the low prioritization of Latin America on our national security and foreign policy agendas, which is especially puzzling given the shared challenge of transnational organized crime.

The drug trade—which is exacerbated by US drug consumption—has wrought devastating consequences in many of our partner nations, degrading their civilian police and justice systems, corrupting their institutions, and contributing to a breakdown in citizen safety. The tentacles of global networks involved in narcotics and arms trafficking, human smuggling, illicit finance, and other types of illegal activity reach across Latin America and the Caribbean and into the United States, yet we continue to underestimate the threat of transnational organized crime at significant and direct risk to our national security and that of our partner nations. Unless confronted by an immediate, visible, or uncomfortable crisis, our nation's tendency is to take the security of the Western Hemisphere for granted. I believe this is a mistake.

Last year, almost half a million migrants¹ from Central America and Mexico—including over 50,000 unaccompanied children (UAC) and families—were apprehended on our border, many fleeing violence, poverty, and the spreading influence of criminal networks and gangs. Assistant Secretary of State Roberta Jacobson testified that the “UAC migration serves as a

warning sign that the serious and longstanding challenges in Central America are worsening.”² In my opinion, the relative ease with which human smugglers moved tens of thousands of people to our nation’s doorstep also serves as another warning sign: these smuggling routes are a potential vulnerability to our homeland. As I stated last year, terrorist organizations could seek to leverage those same smuggling routes to move operatives with intent to cause grave harm to our citizens or even bring weapons of mass destruction into the United States. Mr. Chairman, Members, addressing the root causes of insecurity and instability is not just in the region’s interests, but ours as well, which is why I support President Obama’s commitment to increase assistance to Central America.

These and other challenges underscore the enduring importance of US Southern Command’s mission to protect our southern approaches. We do not and cannot do this mission alone. Our strong partnerships with the US interagency—especially with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the US Coast Guard, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the Departments of Treasury and State—are integral to our efforts to ensure the forward defense of the US homeland. We are also fortunate to have strong, capable partners like Colombia, Chile, Brazil, El Salvador, and Panama, regional leaders and outstanding contributors to hemispheric and international security. Given our limited intelligence assets, interagency relationships and bilateral cooperation are critical to identifying and monitoring threats to US national security and regional stability.

Finally, while I thank the Congress for mitigating some of our asset shortfalls in 2015, the specter of sequestration still hovers over everything we do. Its potential return in FY16 would jeopardize our progress; undermine our credibility and the region’s trust in our commitments and present renewed hardships for our civilian and military workforce. I have already

taken painful steps to implement a mandated 20% reduction in our headquarters budget and personnel, and we have thus far managed to avoid a reduction in force while still protecting our ability to conduct our most important missions. Nevertheless, as the lowest priority Geographic Combatant Command, ‘doing less with less’ has a disproportionate effect on our operations, exercises, and engagement activities. Mr. Chairman, Members, the truth is we are managing to keep the pilot light of US military engagement on in the region—but just barely. This presents more than just risks to our national interests; US Southern Command has accepted risk for so long in this region that we now face a near-total lack of awareness of threats and the readiness to respond, should those threats reach crisis levels.

Security Environment

Transnational Organized Crime. The spread of criminal organizations continues to tear at the social, economic, and security fabric of our Central American neighbors. Powerful and well-resourced, these groups traffic in drugs—including cocaine, heroin, marijuana, counterfeit pharmaceuticals, and methamphetamine—small arms and explosives, precursor chemicals, illegally mined gold, counterfeit goods, people, and other contraband. They engage in money laundering, bribery, intimidation, and assassinations. They threaten the very underpinnings of democracy

Spotlight: Heroin Trafficking

- *According to the National Survey on Drug Use and Health, there was a 37% increase in heroin initiates in the United States between 2008-2012.*
- *In 2012, 51% of all heroin analyzed by the DEA originated in South America, 45% in Mexico, and 4% from Southwest Asia.*

itself: citizen safety, rule of law, and economic prosperity. And they pose a direct threat to the stability of our partners and an insidious risk to the security of our nation.

While there is growing recognition of the danger posed by transnational organized crime, it is often eclipsed by other concerns. Frankly, Mr. Chairman, I believe we are overlooking a significant security threat. Despite the heroic efforts of our law enforcement colleagues, criminal organizations are constantly adapting their methods for trafficking across our borders. While there is not yet any indication that the criminal networks involved in human and drug trafficking are interested in supporting the efforts of terrorist groups, these networks could unwittingly, or even wittingly, facilitate the movement of terrorist operatives or weapons of mass destruction toward our borders, potentially undetected and almost completely unrestricted. In addition to thousands of Central Americans fleeing poverty and violence, foreign nationals from countries like Somalia, Bangladesh, Lebanon, and Pakistan are using the region's human smuggling networks to enter the United States.³ While many are merely seeking economic opportunity or fleeing war, a small subset could potentially be seeking to do us harm. Last year, ISIS adherents posted discussions on

Spotlight: Economic Citizenship Programs

- *Regional economic citizenship programs provide a quick path for foreign nationals to acquire citizenship.*
- *Of concern, these “cash for passport” programs could be exploited by criminals, terrorists, or other nefarious actors to obtain freedom of movement, facilitate entry into the U.S., or launder illicitly gained funds.*

social media calling for the infiltration of the US southern border. Thankfully, we have not yet seen evidence of this occurring, but I am

deeply concerned that smuggling networks are a vulnerability that terrorists could seek to exploit.

I am also troubled by the financial and operational overlap between criminal and terrorist networks in the region. Although the extent of criminal-terrorist cooperation is unclear, what is clear is that terrorists and militant organizations easily tap into the international illicit marketplace to underwrite their activities and obtain arms and funding to conduct operations.⁴ It's easy to see why: illicit trafficking is estimated to be a \$650 billion industry—larger than the GDP of all but 20 countries in the world—and less than 1 percent of global illicit financial flows is currently being seized or frozen.⁵ The terrorist group Lebanese Hezbollah—which has long viewed the region as a potential attack venue against Israeli or other Western targets—has supporters and sympathizers in Lebanese diaspora communities

Spotlight: Narco-Terrorist Profits

Colombian defense officials estimate the narco-terrorist Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) earn an excess of \$3.5 billion in proceeds from illegal mining and extortion.

in Latin America, some of whom are involved in lucrative illicit activities like money laundering and trafficking in counterfeit goods and drugs. These clan-based criminal networks exploit corruption and lax law enforcement in places like the Tri-Border Area of Brazil, Paraguay, and Argentina and the Colon Free Trade Zone in Panama and generate revenue, an unknown amount of which is transferred to Lebanese Hezbollah. Unfortunately, our limited intelligence capabilities make it difficult to fully assess the amount of terrorist financing generated in Latin America, or understand the scope of possible criminal-terrorist collaboration.

Iranian Influence and Islamic Extremist Organizations. Over the last 15 years Iran has periodically sought closer ties with regional governments, albeit with mixed results.

Iranian legislators visited Cuba, Ecuador, and Nicaragua to advocate for increased economic and diplomatic cooperation. Iran's outreach is predicated on circumventing sanctions and countering US influence. Additionally, Iran has established more than 80 'cultural centers' in a region with an extremely small Muslim population. The purported purpose of these centers is to improve Iran's image, promote Shi'a Islam, and increase Iran's political influence in the region. As the foremost state sponsor of terrorism, Iran's involvement in the region and these cultural centers is a matter for concern, and its diplomatic, economic, and political engagement is closely monitored.

Sunni extremists, while small in number, are actively involved in the radicalization of converts and other Muslims in the region and also provide financial and logistical support to designated terrorist organizations within and outside Latin America. Partner nation officials throughout the region have expressed concern over the increasing number of suspected Islamic extremists from the hemisphere who are traveling to Syria to participate in jihad. Some take part in military and weapons training before departing; last year 19 Trinidadian Muslims were detained in Venezuela for conducting training with high-powered weapons. When these foreign fighters return, they will possess operational experience, ties to global extremists, and possible intent to harm Western interests—and they will reside in a region rife with smuggling routes that lead directly and easily into the United States.

Chinese Outreach. As in other regions around the world, China has growing influence in Latin America and the Caribbean. Since 2005, it has provided financing to the region in excess of \$100 billion.⁶ Chinese investment is concentrated in commodities, manufacturing, telecommunications, and construction sectors, including a \$40 billion investment in a Nicaraguan 'alternative' to the Panama Canal by a Chinese company.⁷ In my view, just as we have 'pivoted' to the Pacific, China has

pivoted to the Western Hemisphere. It views good relations with the region as useful for two reasons: to gain access to natural resources and to increase its global influence. China continues to increase its cooperation with regional organizations such as the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) and the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), and leverages its position in BRICS⁸ to advance its interests regionally. Of note, Beijing recently hosted a two-day China-CELAC Forum to discuss opportunities for increasing bilateral partnerships. Although cultural differences often preclude close cooperation, Chinese engagement with regional militaries is gradually expanding, especially with Cuba and Venezuela. This outreach, while not a threat to US interests at this time, does underscore the importance of continued engagement by the US military to maintain our valued security partnerships.

Increased Russian Presence. In contrast, Russian activities in the region are more concerning. Periodically since 2008, Russia has pursued an increased presence in Latin America through propaganda, military arms and equipment sales, counterdrug agreements, and trade. Under President Putin, however, we have seen a clear return to Cold War-tactics. As part of its global strategy, Russia is using power projection in an attempt to erode US leadership and challenge US influence in the Western Hemisphere. Last year and again this year, a Russian intelligence ship docked in Havana multiple times while conducting operations in the Gulf of Mexico and along the east coast of the United States. Russia has courted Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua to gain access to air bases and ports for resupply of Russian naval assets and strategic bombers operating in the Western Hemisphere. Russian media also announced Russia would begin sending long-range strategic bombers to patrol the Caribbean Sea and Gulf of Mexico, in an effort to "monitor foreign powers' military activities and maritime communications."⁹ While these actions do not pose an immediate threat, Russia's

activities in the hemisphere are concerning and underscore the importance of remaining engaged with our partners.

Regional Challenges and Opportunities for US Influence. The United States also faces challenges from regional bodies like CELAC, which deliberately exclude the United States and seek to limit our role in the hemisphere. Other regional organizations such as the Central America Integration System (SICA), however, offer the United States opportunity for engagement. Just this past year, we hosted SICA leaders and asked the Colombian Minister of Defense to share his perspective on Colombia’s success and lessons learned over the past decades. Additionally, ALBA¹⁰ nations like Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia restrict defense ties with the United States and have sought in some cases to eliminate the US military presence from their countries. As one example, in 2014 the Ecuadorian government directed that the US Embassy close its security cooperation office, further restricting defense cooperation between our countries. Despite such complex and evolving regional dynamics and within our current resource constraints, US Southern Command is ready and willing to partner with all regional militaries on issues like respect for human rights, disaster response, and illicit trafficking.

Implications of Venezuelan Instability. Mr. Chairman, Members, our efforts to enhance regional stability are directly connected to our ability to engage. Since 2003, the Venezuelan government has reduced its traditionally close military and defense ties with the United States, and in the course of the past ten years we have witnessed a dramatic decline in the country’s democratic institutions. Venezuela now faces significant economic, social, and political instability due to rampant violent crime and poverty, runaway inflation, serious shortages of food, medicine, and electricity. Human rights abuses by security forces and the government’s continued mismanagement of the country are contributing to an environment of uncertainty,

and large segments of the population say the country is on the wrong track. Additionally, falling oil prices and deteriorating economic conditions could lead the Venezuelan government to cut social welfare programs and its foreign oil subsidy program, PetroCaribe. Further

Spotlight: Venezuela’s Deteriorating Citizen Security

- **According to respected NGO Observatorio Venezolana de Violencia (OVV), Venezuela is the second most violent country in the world.**
- **Venezuela’s homicide rate is now 82 per 100,000; in 1998, the rate was 19 per 100,000.**

cuts to social welfare programs and continued shortages—which seem unavoidable—could likely lead to increased tensions and violent protests, encouraging President Maduro and his party to engage in additional repressive measures against protestors and the opposition. Cuts to PetroCaribe deliveries to its member nations could trigger regional economic downturns, which could elevate the risk of increased migration, especially in the Caribbean.

Command Priorities

The US military plays an important role in addressing these and other challenges to our hemisphere’s security and stability. Despite significant resource constraints, US Southern Command remains postured to contribute to a whole-of-government approach to advancing US interests in the region. This important work is carried out by our command’s most valuable assets: our Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, Coast Guardsmen, and civilian employees. Last year was an active one for US Southern Command, and I am proud of our contributions to the security of Latin America and the Caribbean. Looking to the year ahead, we hope to build on our past achievements and deepen our security

partnerships, as we continue safeguarding the southern approaches to the United States.

Detention Operations. As we begin the thirteenth year of detention operations at Guantanamo, we continue to provide dignified, humane, and lawful care and treatment of detainees. In fact, the only people not treated humanely or having their human rights protected are the guards, especially our female and minority ones, who find themselves in a challenging environment where they regularly confront verbal and physical abuse and ‘splashings’ by many detainees. Mr. Chairman, Members, our guard and medical force is doing a superb job, and our nation should be extremely proud of these young military professionals. They execute a difficult, no-fail mission with honor, integrity, and the utmost professionalism, all within a pressure cooker of unrelenting public scrutiny and fabricated accusations of inhumane treatment and abuse. It is worth reiterating that everything they do—including supporting ongoing transfers, enteral feeding, military commissions, and periodic review boards—is done entirely at the direction of our military chain of command, in execution of US national policy. Like all our men and women in uniform, these young Service members are second to none, and I thank the Congress for sharing that sentiment and for its continued support to our troops stationed at Guantanamo.

We also greatly appreciate congressional support to construct a new dining facility and medical clinic at Naval Station Guantanamo, which will address the health and safety concerns posed by the current facilities. As our service members perform our directed detention mission in an honorable and professional manner, the facilities in which they reside have long exceeded their useful life. Each year we struggle to maintain, repair, or replace obsolete or sub-standard facilities. It is difficult and expensive to mitigate life, health, and safety issues in an incremental, piecemeal manner. Our troops deserve better.

Finally, it is important to note that the strategic importance of US Naval Station Guantanamo Bay is independent of the presence of the Joint Task Force. Its airfield and port facilities are indispensable to the Departments of Defense, Homeland Security, and State’s operational and contingency plans. The Naval Station plays a crucial role in the interception and repatriation of migrants and serves as a critical distribution and staging area for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations. As the only permanent US military base in Latin America and the Caribbean, its location provides persistent US presence and immediate access to the region, as well as supporting a layered defense to secure the air and maritime approaches to the United States.

Countering Transnational Organized Crime. Our efforts to counter transnational organized crime focus on two complementary missions: defending the southern approaches of the United States and supporting partner nation efforts, in coordination with our US interagency partners, to stem the flow of illicit trafficking. In both missions, we rely heavily on support from the DHS, especially the US Coast Guard. Secretary Jeh Johnson and the heroic men and women at DHS deserve enormous recognition working cooperatively across the interagency to help us safeguard our nation’s southern approaches. Secretary Johnson and I both share the conviction that homeland defense does not begin at the ‘one yard line’ of our Southwest border, but instead extends forward, throughout the hemisphere, to keep threats far from our nation’s shores. Along with DHS, we work with the FBI, DEA, and the Departments of State and the Treasury to do exactly that.

While these partnerships are superb at the tactical level, I am frustrated by the lack of a comprehensive US government effort to counter the TOC threat. Nearly four years after the release of the President’s National Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime, interagency CTOC activities in the region—especially in Central America—remain poorly

coordinated and minimally funded. Fortunately, there is growing recognition that the magnitude, scope, and complexity of this threat demand an integrated counternetwork approach. I thank the Congress for recognizing this threat and expanding section 1004 authorities to include CTOC operations, and I fully support efforts to improve interagency coordination on this critical national security issue.

I am hopeful that the new Strategy for US Engagement in Central America will broaden our

Spotlight: Counter Threat Finance

In collaboration with the Department of the Treasury, U.S. Southern Command maps illicit networks, conducts all-source intelligence analysis and production, and works with U.S. and regional partners to support targeted financial measures and U.S. law enforcement efforts.

approach to achieving lasting security in Central America and help reinvigorate our partnerships with the sub-region. As I have often said, we cannot shoot our way out of the CTOC challenge. It will truly take a whole-of-government effort, because Central America's prosperity, governance, and security are intrinsically connected. Economic growth is only sustainable in an environment where democratic values and institutions flourish, citizens feel secure in their communities, impunity is reduced, and civil society and the media can play their rightful roles. President Obama requested \$1 billion in the FY2016 budget for the Department of State and USAID to implement the new Strategy. As Vice President Biden rightly points out, the cost of investing now to address Central America's challenges is modest compared with the costs of letting festering violence, poverty, and insecurity become full-blown crises.¹¹ I fully support the President's efforts to prioritize Central America at this crucial time, and urge Congress to support the President's budget request.

In another positive development, we are seeing significant improvements in regional cooperation. Although we receive a tiny

fraction of the Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) assets we need, our ongoing Operation MARTILLO continues to yield tactical successes thanks to increased contributions by our partner nations and our continued coordination with DEA. The Coast Guard Commandant shares my view that transnational organized crime poses a significant threat to our hemisphere, and he has committed a 50% increase in cutters equipped with ability to land a helicopter, plus a commensurate plus-up in maritime patrol aircraft hours. While the Commandant is doing everything he can to support us, the Coast Guard faces its own limitations, and this increase only translates to an additional two to three cutters, far below the 16 flight-deck equipped vessels required to conduct our detection and monitoring mission. This support, however, comes at a critical juncture for the counterdrug mission, as the US Navy decommissions its frigates and deploys its new Littoral Combat Ships to the Pacific. I would like to go on record here today before the Congress in strong support of the Coast Guard and DHS' efforts to recapitalize their fleet of cutters, some of which are in their fifth decade of service. The Coast Guard and US Southern Command need these replacement cutters as soon as possible to continue the important work of securing our southern approaches.

Additionally, I believe we have a window of opportunity in Central America to capitalize on the region's growing political will to combat criminal networks. Last year the presidents of

Spotlight: Operation MARTILLO

Orchestrated by the Joint Interagency Task Force South, and coordinated with our interagency partners, MARTILLO has resulted in the disruption of over 400 metric tons of cocaine over the past four years, denying drug traffickers \$8 billion in potential revenue.

Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador developed a coordinated plan to address their countries'

endemic challenges. These leaders recognize the magnitude of the tasks ahead and are prepared to address them, but they need our support. They are frustrated, however by conditions on US security assistance—some of which are not even related to military-to-military engagements—and our cumbersome Foreign Military Sales procurement processes, which delay or even hinder cooperation efforts. Unfortunately, these conditions are often placed on governments that most need our help, providing an opening for other actors to successfully conduct outreach to the region. Unlike the United States, some countries place no emphasis on promoting human rights, anti-corruption measures, fair labor practices, and environmental protection as part of their offers of security assistance.

Our president has recognized the importance of supporting our Central American partners, making the region one of his top foreign policy priorities. We are now seeing real progress being made by the three ‘Northern Triangle’ countries. While there are many good examples, the situation is especially encouraging in Honduras, where the government is working hard to combat the drug trade, re-establish governance in remote areas, and take meaningful action to protect human rights. In cooperation with the US Department of Justice, and for the first time in the country’s history, the Government of Honduras extradited seven Honduran nationals wanted to face drug trafficking charges in the United States. The Honduran government also deserves recognition for the establishment of a special investigative unit to combat impunity in Bajo Aguán and to improve citizen security. According to government figures, the 2014 homicide rate dropped to 66.4 per 100,000, a nearly 25% reduction in only two years. Although some groups expressed concerns over the use of the Honduran military in a domestic security role, the government of Honduras has developed a comprehensive strategy to phase out the use of its Military Police of Public Order (PMOP); has increasingly investigated and brought

charges against high-level officials involved in corruption; and is making efforts to swiftly arrest those security forces implicated in human rights abuse. At the request of the Honduran president, the United Nations will open an office of the UN High Commission on Human Rights. Of note, human rights groups have acknowledged to me that Honduras is making real progress in this area.

This is a historical first step, and it simply would not have happened without our superb Ambassador to Tegucigalpa, Ambassador Jim Nealon, who provided help and advice not only to the Government of Honduras, but to the entire US interagency. This is reflective of the close and continuous working relationship all Combatant Commanders have with their respective ambassadors throughout their Area of Operations. It is a team effort, and as a team we are hobbled in our interaction with foreign governments when there is no US Ambassador in the seat, and frankly, the individual foreign partners take offense and are confused regarding US interests in their country and the region. I know there are many reasons why there are often long gaps in coverage, but the fact is the lack of an ambassador handicaps the advancement of US interests. This time last year, we did not have Ambassadors in Colombia, Peru, and Argentina. I am grateful for Congressional action to remedy the lack of Embassy leadership in these countries, and I am hopeful that Ambassador-Designate Mr. Stafford Fitzgerald Haney will be confirmed as Ambassador for Costa Rica without delay.

Finally, I would like to close this section by sharing a few examples of how our counterdrug efforts, conducted in coordination with DEA, are contributing to the region’s overall security. In Guatemala, we provided infrastructure support and over \$17 million in equipment and training to the country’s two interagency task forces along Guatemala’s northern and southern borders. In concert with US Northern Command, we also work with Mexico, Guatemala, and Belize to support Mexico’s Southern Border Strategy.

In Honduras, we helped create a ‘maritime shield’ to deflect drug trafficking off the country’s northeastern coast and are supporting the Honduran government’s citizen security efforts. In the Caribbean, we are prioritizing infrastructure projects designed to improve regional interdiction capabilities; last year we completed construction on new training facilities in the Dominican Republic and an operations center for the Regional Security System. To enhance our partners’ efforts to counter increased drug trafficking in the Caribbean, we provide counterdrug training and support the Technical Assistance Field Teams, comprised of Coast Guard and DOD personnel who provide mentoring and technical assistance to 13 Caribbean nations. This support encourages our partners to be more self-reliant in the maintenance and upkeep of their assets, making them more dependable and capable allies in the CTOC fight. Further south, we are supporting the Peruvian military’s increasingly successful efforts to improve their maritime interdiction capability, strengthen their collaboration with Colombia, and combat the scourge of narcoterrorism that has plagued their country for decades.

Counterterrorism. In 2014, we continued our work with the interagency, US Embassy Country Teams, and our partner nations to counter Islamic extremism, recruitment, and radicalization efforts that support terrorism activities. Working closely with the interagency and partner nations, we also began monitoring the possible return of foreign fighter extremists participating in jihad in Syria. Over the past year our Special Operations Forces (SOF) conducted multiple engagements such as subject matter expert and intelligence exchanges, counterterrorism-focused exercises, and key leader engagements in countries throughout the region. Our Department of Defense Rewards Program yielded successes and offers a model for a low-cost, small footprint approach to counterterrorism. In 2014, this program enabled partner nation authorities to bring 33 members

of terrorist organizations to justice. These, and other counterterrorism cooperation efforts, ensure our partners are able to mitigate terrorist threats before they can destabilize a country or reach the US homeland.

Building Partner Nation Capacity. Our engagement—through our humanitarian and civic assistance programs, defense institution building efforts like the Defense Institution Reform Initiative, and the US Southern Command-sponsored Human Rights Initiative—helps partner nations strengthen governance and development, professionalize their militaries and security forces, and increase their ability to conduct peacekeeping, stability, and disaster relief operations. Our military components are at the forefront of these engagement efforts and perform superb work in strengthening our security partnerships. While we engage on a variety of different issues, I would like to highlight a few of our capacity-building efforts that are making a significant difference in the region.¹²

Support to Colombia. Colombia is a terrific example of how sustained US support can help a partner nation gain control of their security situation, strengthen government institutions, eradicate corruption, and bolster their economy. Colombia’s turnaround is nothing short of phenomenal, and it stands shoulder-to-shoulder with the United States as together we work to improve regional stability. Mr. Chairman, Members, as you know, the United States has a special relationship with only a handful

Spotlight: USS AMERICA Visits the Americas

- In 2014, the USS AMERICA, the Navy’s newest class of amphibious assault ships, conducted a 10-week transit of South America while en route to her homeport.
- USS AMERICA embarked Expeditionary Strike Group THREE (ESG 3) and a Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force (SPMAGTF), which conducted numerous engagement activities during port calls in Colombia, Brazil, Chile, and Peru.
- This transit offered a clear example of U.S. Navy-Marine Corps integration and set the standard for future new ship transits in the region.

of countries throughout the world. These relationships are with countries that we rely on to act as regional stabilizers, countries that we look to for international leadership, countries that we consider our strongest friends and most steadfast allies. Colombia unquestionably plays that role in Latin America. Through the US-Colombia Action Plan on Regional Security, Colombia provides vital assistance to its Central American and Mexican counterparts in the fight against criminal networks. I want to note that every aspect of US collaboration under this Plan, including activities conducted by US Southern Command, is facilitated through US security assistance and governed by the same US laws and regulations—especially those requiring the human rights vetting of units—governing my own personnel.

I fully support the government of Colombia's efforts to ensure that justice and accountability are integral parts of the peace process. We must sustain US support throughout this process and during the post-conflict phase as our closest

Spotlight: USS AMERICA Visits the Americas

- U.S. Southern Command and the Joint IED Defeat Organization work with the Colombian military to counter IED threats.
- Though it remains the #3 country in the world for IED incidents, Colombian casualties from IEDs were down 20% in 2014.

partner works to end a decades-long insurgency. As I have told my Colombian colleagues, the last 50 years were easy compared to what the next five hold in store. Our goal is to ensure Colombia can sustain US-funded programs, and to that end we work with the Defense Institution Reform Initiative to improve the Colombian Ministry of National Defense's strategic planning capabilities. As testament to the enduring strength of our relationship, Colombia wants to partner with the United States for planning and implementation of their Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) process. We are exploring

options to provide verification, advice, and monitoring of these efforts.

Exercise Program. Bilateral and multilateral exercises with partner nations improve staff planning and operations, promote interoperability, and support national security objectives. While the technical skills our partners learn during these exercises are important, the personal relationships that are made are invaluable, binding participating countries together as equal partners and true friends. In 2014, our four operational exercises included INTEGRATED ADVANCE, which exercises our response to various regional contingencies, and FUSED RESPONSE, designed to improve the training, readiness, and capability of Belizean, Brazilian, Canadian, and US special operations forces. We also held four multilateral exercises, including TRADEWINDS, which aims to improve the capability of Caribbean nations to counter transnational organized crime and respond to a natural disaster; PANAMAX, which focuses on the defense of the Panama Canal by a 17-nation multinational force; and FUERZAS ALIADAS HUMANITARIAS, which brings together 11 partner nations and regional humanitarian organizations to improve coordination on disaster response.

Humanitarian and Civic Assistance. As a complement to our multinational exercises, our humanitarian and civic assistance program help demonstrates the United States' enduring commitment to the citizens of Latin America. There are no better symbols of this commitment than our humanitarian exercises and the USNS COMFORT, which returns to the region to conduct humanitarian missions in 11 countries as part of CONTINUING PROMISE 2015.

Our humanitarian mission also helps strengthen governance and partner nation response capacities. In coordination with the US Agency for International Development (USAID), in 2014 we funded the construction of 172 humanitarian projects in the region, building disaster relief warehouses, emergency

operations centers, and emergency shelters. This infrastructure helps increase partner nation capacity to respond to a regional disaster, often without US assistance. Last year, the Government of Haiti successfully responded to flooding in Nord using emergency response facilities constructed under this program. This is a major step and a sign of continued progress in Haiti; in the past, such an event would have required US or outside assistance.

Public-Private Cooperation. US Southern Command remains at the forefront of public-private cooperation, a force multiplier in our exercises, operations, and engagement activities. In 2014, our collaboration with non-governmental and private sector entities yielded over \$10 million in service and gifts-in-kind—such as school furniture and medical equipment—to partner nations in conjunction with our annual exercises. Early this year we held a forum that brought together US and partner nation government officials and private sector leaders to brainstorm ways to improve security and economic investment in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. The forum featured lessons

Spotlight: 2014 Beyond the Horizons and New Horizons Exercises

- *Working alongside partner nation personnel, U.S. military forces provided free medical and dental services to more than 42,000 patients in the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, and Belize.*
- *U.S. forces also constructed 16 new classrooms, a hospital addition, and two healthcare clinics in remotely located communities.*

learned from Colombia and Mexico on the importance of security to economic development and identifying near-term activities to improve the security situation and, by extension, the investment climate in these three countries. To quote Paul Brinkley, who wrote one of the most impressive books I have read on the subject, the greatest element of our national power is our “private-sector economic dynamism.”¹³ I am hopeful American businesses will help advance

our President’s goal of a stable, prosperous, and secure Central America.

Promoting Respect for Human Rights. Mr. Chairman, Members, human rights are fundamental to our capacity-building efforts in the region. During my time as Commander of US Southern Command, I have aggressively worked to promote genuine and concrete respect for human rights throughout Latin America. One of my greatest tools in this mission is actually something pretty simple, and doesn’t cost the taxpayer one penny: open and frank dialogue with both our closest partners and our fiercest critics. Every conversation I have—whether with a president, with a minister, with a chief of defense or his subordinates, with US or regional media outlets, or human rights representatives from Washington to Montevideo—begins and ends with a straightforward discussion on human rights.

I am proud to state that I incorporate meetings and engagements specifically focused on human rights into nearly every one of my numerous trips to the region. I do this because I have long recognized the vital role human rights organizations play in supporting democracy and open societies, strengthening the rule of law, and ensuring that government officials are accountable to their citizens. As I have said before, the US military doesn’t just talk about human rights, we do human rights. We teach it. We enforce it. We live it. The protection of human rights is embedded in our doctrine, our training, and our education, and above all, in our moral code. It is the source of our great strength as a military power, and it is also our best defense against losing legitimacy in the hearts and minds of the people we have taken an oath to protect.

Mr. Chairman, I believe without question that improvement in human rights most often comes when countries have the opportunity to work directly with Americans. Human rights improvements in this region have largely come as a direct result of close and continuous dialogue and engagement by the United States

government. Additionally, because of partner nation interaction with brave and dedicated US law enforcement personnel like the FBI, Customs and Border Protection (CBP), Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), the US Coast Guard and particularly DEA, we have seen a concrete and I believe long-term positive effect on the professionalism of law enforcement institutions in the region. It is what our partners learn in our military and law enforcement training, by the example we show and the attitudes they absorb from us—when they attend our courses, exercises, and in senior officer conferences and seminars, but most powerfully by simply working shoulder-to-shoulder with young American professionals that do human rights, do their duties entirely without thought of corruption, who do not preach while they wave their fingers in the faces of their counterparts, but treat them like equal partners in activities that are in the national security interests of both their nations—that are, together, making a difference.

For our part, US Southern Command's commitment to promoting respect for human rights can be seen in many activities we carry out with our partners in the region, and I am proud to lead the only Combatant Command with a dedicated Human Rights Office. This office also has a long history of providing support and expertise to our partner nation militaries in strengthening their human rights programs and improving their human rights performance. In 2014, US Southern Command sponsored a series of civil-military dialogues in Guatemala and Honduras, two countries facing a ruthless onslaught of transnational criminal activity. These dialogues brought together influential human rights NGOs and key military leaders to discuss shared concerns, including the deployment of military forces in citizen safety missions. I thank the Congress for recognizing the enduring value of this mission, and we deeply appreciate the flexibility to soon provide human rights training to units that might not have been previously eligible to receive it.

Planning for Contingencies. Finally, planning and preparing for crisis and contingency response are essential elements of US Southern Command's mission. Contingency planning and preparation, including exercises like PANAMAX, FUSED RESPONSE, and INTEGRATED ADVANCE, prepares our organization to respond to various scenarios such as an attack on critical infrastructure, Caribbean mass migration, humanitarian crises, natural disasters, or the evacuation of US citizens in the region. We work closely with the Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance (USAID/OFDA) and other interagency and regional partners to monitor events like the increase in Haitian and Cuban migrant flows, the potential spread of infectious diseases like Ebola, and the devastating drought in Central America, all of which could trigger a crisis event. While we stand ready to support US government response efforts should the need arise, mandated budget and workforce reductions limit our ability to rapidly respond to any significant contingency without substantial headquarters augmentation.

Spotlight: 2014 Human Rights Officers Workshop

The 2014 Workshop brought together military, government, and civil society representatives from 14 countries in the hemisphere to discuss the duty of military and security forces in protecting human rights.

Critical Needs and Concerns

Budget Cuts. US Southern Command is grappling with the cumulative effect of the various budget cuts enacted over the past few years. Force allocation cuts by the Services— including troops, ships, planes, Coast Guard cutters, and ISR platforms—are having the greatest impact on our operations, exercises, and security cooperation activities. I fully expect reductions to affect all aspects of our operations and engagements with our partner nations, including capacity-building activities, multinational exercises, information

operations, interagency support, and our ability to respond to crises or contingencies.

Spotlight: Partnering to Promote Ebola Preparedness

- *In coordination with the Pan American Health Organizations, the Department of Health and Human Services, and the Defense Institute for Medical Operations, U.S. Southern Command is providing Ebola preparedness assessments, training, and equipment for partner nations.*
- *We are also working with Ministries of Defense in the region to develop protocols for peacekeepers deploying to Ebola-affected regions in West Africa.*

We are already feeling the impact at our headquarters, where we have implemented a 13% reduction in civilian billets and an 11% reduction in military ones. As an economy of force Combatant Command, these cuts have a disproportionate effect on our daily operations. During last year's capstone exercise PANAMAX, it became clear that resource constraints and manpower reductions are compromising our training and readiness. Fortunately, these limitations were revealed in an exercise scenario and not during a real-world contingency, and we are taking steps to mitigate some of these shortfalls. To that end, we are instituting a Strategic Human Capital Management Plan and have realigned personnel to support our most critical missions. We are also improving our business practices to gain greater efficiencies in our management of mission requirements and application of resources. I want to stress, however, that if sequestration returns in FY16, our ability to support national security objectives, including conducting many of our essential missions, will be significantly undermined.

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Shortfalls. We deeply appreciate Congressional assistance to mitigating some of our chronic ISR shortfalls. Thanks to the support of Congress, we have increased maritime patrol capacity in support of counterdrug operations in the region. We are also thankful to the Congress for recognizing the urgency of the chal-

lenges we face in the region and the importance of adequately sourcing our missions. I continue to be concerned, however, by the long-term consequences of our limited awareness and lack of insight into security challenges in the region. The longer these shortfalls persist, the more difficult it is to track and monitor potential threats to our nation's security, including the growing influence of extra-regional actors, the overlap between criminal and terrorist networks, and signs of potential regional instability. While we recognize that global defense priorities must be adequately sourced, limited tactical ISR allocation and national technical focus is impairing virtually every one of our assigned missions and exposing the southern approaches to the United States to significant risk. Sequestration will compound this challenge; when it comes to sourcing, we are already the lowest priority Geographic Combatant Command, and sequestration will likely eviscerate our already limited ISR capacity.

To mitigate some of these shortfalls, we have successfully employed non-traditional assets in support of our Title 10 detection and monitoring obligations. The Air Force's JSTARS is especially important, providing a detailed maritime surveillance capability that is unsurpassed and increasing the efficiency of wide area surveillance and long-range maritime patrol aircraft. A single JSTARS sortie can cover the same search area as 10 maritime patrol aircraft sorties. The use of these types of assets is a 'win-win' for US Southern Command and the Services; we receive much-needed assets while the Services receive pre-deployment training opportunities in a 'target-rich' environment.

Military Construction. In support of our nationally-directed contingency response mission, we are also seeking \$28 million in funding to construct basic horizontal infrastructure that would be needed to operate migrant camps at Guantanamo in the event of a maritime mass migration. These projects would include the shaping of terrain and installation of drainage and utilities infrastructure. Without

this funding, we will not be able to quickly house the required number of migrants without compromising United Nations' standards and placing severe constraints on current operations at the Naval Station. I look forward to working with the Congress to find a solution to these and other requirements.

Quality of Life and Military Housing. Mr. Chairman, the men and women assigned to US Southern Command are at a huge financial and benefits disadvantage, working and living in one of the most expensive cities in the world and receiving little in the way of adequate compensation. Access to commissary and PX facilities are an integral part of the benefits package guaranteed by law, yet we lack both at our installation. Our assigned personnel receive minimal Cost of Living Allowances for South Florida, even though non-housing expenditures like car insurance are high.¹⁴ This is particularly hard on our junior enlisted personnel. An E-3 receives a mere \$29 for a monthly Cost of Living Allowance, while an E-9 receives \$44; neither amount covers monthly tolls on South Florida's roads.

Given current housing allowances, many of our families cannot afford to live near the Command, and government housing acquired through domestic leasing is both expensive and extremely competitive. The housing situation will become even more challenging for our officer-grade personnel, who will see, on average, approximately 9% reduction in their BAH. I would like to go on record and note that I have serious concerns over the validity of the process used to calculate BAH for our assigned troops. A permanent military housing solution in Doral would allow us to bring our service members and their families into a secure and affordable community close to our facility. We are working with US Army Installation Management Command to find a long-term housing solution for our Service members and their families.

Conclusion

I would like to conclude my testimony with a note of warning and a sign of hope. Two decades ago, US policy makers and the defense and intelligence communities failed to anticipate the collapse of the Soviet Union or the rise of international terrorism. Today, another challenge is in plain sight: transnational organized crime threatens not only our own security, but the stability and prosperity of our Latin American neighbors. As the Congress knows, the United States and our partners worked hard to ensure the Western Hemisphere is a beacon of freedom, democracy, and peace. In the face of the corrosive spread of criminal networks and other threats, we must work even harder to ensure it remains that way.

The good news is we know how to win this fight. Colombia taught us that the key to defeating insurgents is the same as defeating criminal networks: a strong, accountable government that protects its citizens, upholds the rule of law, and expands economic opportunity for all. It taught us that countering illicit trafficking and countering terrorism often go hand in hand. It taught us that US interagency cooperation, coupled with a committed partner, can help bring a country back from the brink—and for a fraction of the cost of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. And above all, Colombia taught us that sustained engagement by the United States can make a real and lasting difference. We have learned these lessons. Now is the time to apply them to the region as a whole. Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.

Endnotes

1. US Customs and Border Patrol, *FY 14 Border Security Report*. According to the CBP, 239,229 migrants from the Northern Tier countries of Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador were apprehended in 2014, representing a 68% increase compared to FY13. 229,178 migrants from Mexico were apprehended, a 14% decrease.
2. Testimony of Roberta Jacobson, Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, Before the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs, United States House of Representatives, November 18, 2014.
3. Texas Department of Public Safety, *2013 Threat Assessment*.
4. According to the Drug Enforcement Administration, twenty-two of the fifty-nine Department of State designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations are linked to the global drug trade.
5. United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime. *Estimating Illicit Financial Flows Resulting from Drug Trafficking and Other Transnational Crimes*. Geneva, 2011.
6. Amos Irwin and Kevin Gallagher. *Chinese Finance to Latin America Tops \$100 Billion Since 2005*. Inter-American Dialogue, April 2, 2014.
7. R. Evan Ellis. *The Rise of China in the Americas*. Security and Defense Studies Review. Volume 16, 2014.
8. Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa.
9. Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, November 12, 2014.
10. ALBA (in its Spanish acronym) stands for the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of our America.
11. Vice President Joseph Biden, "A Plan for Central America." January 29, 2015.
12. A complete list of activities by our military components can be found in the Annex.
13. Paul Brinkley, *War Front to Store Front: Americans Rebuilding Trust and Hope in Nations Under Fire*. New York: 2014.
14. According to the Economic Policy Institute, it takes nearly three times the federal poverty line to cover basic living expenses in Miami.

Annex:
2014 Component Accomplishments

**US Army South (ARSOUTH) Headquarters:
San Antonio, Texas**

- **Security Cooperation:** ARSOUTH conducted 174 security cooperation events with 18 countries in US Southern Command's (USSOUTHCOM's) area of responsibility. These events included: Army-to-Army Staff Talks with key countries, Foreign Liaison Officers assigned to ARSOUTH, Conference of American Armies activities, professional development exchanges on multiple topics, Army commander and distinguished visitor program, and Joint/Combined/Multinational Exercises and Operations. These events represent engagements aimed at building partner nation capabilities with other militaries in the region.

- **Countering Transnational Organized Crime (CTOC):** ARSOUTH conducted numerous CTOC training sessions with the El Salvador Army Intelligence Battalion, the two new Guatemalan Interagency Task Forces (IATF), and two Honduran Brigades associated with border security. These efforts have greatly improved the individual country's capability to disrupt TOC operations and has set the stage for the next training phase in FY15.

- **Intelligence Security Cooperation:** In addition to the El Salvador effort, the ARSOUTH Intelligence Team conducted engagement activities enabling military intelligence capacity building in support of countering transnational threats in Brazil, Colombia, Guatemala, Honduras, Chile, and Peru.

- **Counter Terrorism:** ARSOUTH conducted 20 Subject Matter Expert Exchanges (SMEEs) in ten countries that included over 750 host nation soldiers. The engagements included: Medical, Search and Rescue, Logistics, Force Protection, and Communications.

- **Civil Military Relations:** ARSOUTH conducted Civil Military Relations Professional

Development Exchanges in Brazil, Colombia, Chile, Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador, improving the ability of these countries to conduct inter-organizational coordination during humanitarian assistance/disaster relief operations, and to counter transnational criminal organizations. These exchanges provide a forum for bilateral executive-level information.

- **Humanitarian Assistance Program (HAP):** HAP conducts activities to build partner nation capacity in providing essential services to its civilian population including: responding to disaster and other crises; reinforcing security; and sustaining stability in a host nation or region. ARSOUTH, USSOUTHCOM's HAP construction program manager, completed 19 projects in Belize, Guatemala, Honduras, Panama and Peru, and initiated the planning for nine new construction projects in Belize, Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, and Peru.

- **Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI):** GPOI is a US government-funded security assistance program to enhance international capacity to effectively conduct United Nations and regional peace support operations. ARSOUTH, as USSOUTHCOM's GPOI construction program manager, completed four projects in Guatemala, Paraguay and Peru, with four ongoing construction projects in El Salvador and Guatemala.

- **Reintegration:** ARSOUTH executed a Reintegration operation for the surviving crew members of aircraft BAT 02 following their crash in Colombia, a Post Isolation Support Activity in support of the FBI for an American Citizen held hostage by the FARC in Colombia, and for a repatriated POW from Afghanistan.

- **Conference of the American Armies (CAA):** The Conference of American Armies (20 member nations, 5 observer nations and two International Military Organizations) strengthens relationships and improves interoperability in peacekeeping and disaster relief operations through the creation and implementation of practical initiatives approved by the commanders

of the member Armies. ARSOUTH delegations represented the US Army Chief of Staff at the Transfer Ceremony to Colombia, a 1st Communications Exercise and a Specialized Conference on IEDs in Colombia, a Geospatial Terrain data base Ad-Hoc Committee in Peru, and a Disaster Relief Field Training Exercise in Argentina.

- **Beyond the Horizon (BTH):** The Humanitarian and Civic Assistance Field Training Exercise, BTH Dominican Republic (APR-JUN 14), consisted of five engineer projects, two general medical and one dental exercises (MEDRETEs and DENTRETE), treating over 12,917 patients. 1,468 US troops participated in the exercise and the Dominican military provided 107 personnel. BTH Guatemala (MAR-JUL 14) consisted of five engineer projects, and three general MEDRETEs, treating over 21,000 residents. 1,242 US troops participated and the Guatemalan military provided over 120 personnel.

- **Fuerzas Aliadas Humanitarias (FAHUM):** The Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Command Post Exercise was hosted by El Salvador to build Partner Nation capacity to respond to a major disaster and strengthen military/security force collaboration and cooperation in the region. Participants included 300 from El Salvador, 66 US and 33 from other Partner Nations.

- **PANAMAX 2014:** This year's Joint/Combined operational exercise focused on the defense of the Panama Canal designated ARSOUTH as HQ, Multi-National Forces-South with a total of 380 participants (65 participants coming from 17 Partner Nations). ARSOUTH also hosted the CFLCC with Brazil as the lead country which included 91 participants with 61 of them coming from 12 partner nations (PNs). In addition, ARSOUTH participated in a bilateral exercise with the Government of Panama called PANAMAX – Alpha. Forty US personnel worked with the Panamanians coordinating US

forces assistance during a simulated national disaster.

US Naval Forces Southern Command (COMUSNAVSO) Headquarters: Mayport, Florida

- US Naval Forces Southern Command/US FOURTH Fleet (USNAVSO/FOURTHFLT) employs maritime forces in cooperative maritime security operations in order to maintain access, enhance interoperability, and build enduring partnerships that foster regional security in the USSOUTHCOM Area of Responsibility (AOR).

- **“AMERICA visits The Americas” 2014:** USS AMERICA, lead ship of a new class of amphibious ships for the US Navy, completed an historic transit of the USSOUTHCOM AOR. AMERICA conducted Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) events and completed basic maritime operations while circumnavigating South America. “AMERICA Visits the Americas” served as our best Key Leader Engagement (KLE) opportunity in years, as AMERICA conducted TSC port visits to Cartagena, Colombia; Rio de Janeiro, Brazil; Valparaiso, Chile; and Callao, Peru. AMERICA also flew out distinguished visitors from Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, and El Salvador to visit the US Navy's newest ship while she sailed in the vicinity of those three Partner Nations.

- **Southern Partnership Station (SPS):** SPS is a series of Navy/Marine Corps engagements focused on TSC, specifically Building Partner Capacity (BPC), through Subject Matter Expert Exchanges (SMEEs) with partner nation militaries and civilian security forces. SPS engagements include Community Relations Projects that focus on our partnerships, shared interests, and shared values. 2014 SPS Deployments:

- **SPS Joint High Speed Vessel 2014 (SPS JHSV 14):** USNS SPEARHEAD, lead ship of a new class of ships for the US Navy, built partner capacity while conducting TSC engagements

through the use of Adaptive Force Packages (AFPs) ashore in Belize, Guatemala, Colombia, and Honduras. At sea, SPEARHEAD conducted Detection and Monitoring (D&M) Operations at sea in support of Operation MARTILLO. The success of the Sailors, Marines, Soldiers, Airmen, NCIS Agents, and Civilian Mariners making up the SPEARHEAD Team set a firm foundation for future JHSV and AFP deployments to the USSOUTHCOM AOR. Detailed planning is in progress for SPS JHSV-15.

- **SPS Oceanographic 2014 (SPS OCEANO 14):** In support of USSOUTHCOM's priority Oceanographic, Hydrographic, and Bathymetric requirements, there were multiple engagements with Partner Nation counterparts. With the support of the Naval Oceanographic Office, survey ship USNS PATHFINDER conducted hydrographic surveys in the Western Caribbean, shore-based Fleet Survey Teams conducted hydrographic surveys in coastal waters of Peru and Honduras, and a Light Detection and Ranging aircraft and crew conducted hydrographic surveys in the coastal waters of Honduras. All SPS OCEANO surveys are conducted with the assistance of Partner Nation personnel and equipment, and the hydrographic survey and environmental assessment data is shared to enable safe and effective maritime navigation.

- **Operation MARTILLO:** Seven frigates, JHSV USNS SPEARHEAD, four fixed-wing Maritime Patrol aircraft and two Scientific Development Squadron ONE detachments deployed to support Operation MARTILLO, conducting D&M Operations under the tactical control of Joint Interagency Task Force South, targeting illicit trafficking routes in the waters off Central America.

- **PANAMAX 2014:** Colombia served as Combined Forces Maritime Component Commander (CFMCC) for the annual PANAMAX Exercise, which exercises defense of the approaches to the Panama Canal. The Colombian Navy led a multinational staff of

more than 300 military and civilian personnel from 15 Partner Nations (including the US), all based at USNAVSO/FOURTHFLT Headquarters in Mayport. Now in its 12th year, PANAMAX is designed to train US and partner nation personnel in the execution of stability operations under the auspices of United Nations' Security Council resolutions; provide interoperability training for the participating multinational staffs; and build participating nation capability to plan and execute complex multinational operations.

- **UNITAS 2014:** UNITAS, Latin for "Unity", is the longest-running multinational maritime exercise in the world. Peru hosted the 55th iteration, featuring 14 Partner Nations (including the US), 20 ships, patrol boats, two submarines, seven helicopters, four maritime patrol aircraft, 10 fixed-wing tactical aircraft, and several thousand Sailors. The two-week exercise consisted of a multi-threat, multi-day scenario where participants operated as a multinational force working under a United Nations Security Council Resolution.

- **SIFOREX 2014:** "Silent Forces Exercise," or SIFOREX, is a biennial exercise hosted by Peru that focuses on Anti-Submarine Warfare proficiency against diesel submarines. US participation included USS INGRAHAM, P-8 Poseidon and P-3 Orion Aircraft, and Commander Destroyer Squadron 40 Staff. For the first time, Naval Forces from Brazil and Colombia joined Peru and the US for SIFOREX.

**12th Air Force (Air Forces Southern)
Headquarters: Davis-Monthan AFB,
Tucson, Arizona**

- **Security Cooperation:** Air Forces Southern (AFSOUTH) led 41 security cooperation events in 11 USSOUTHCOM Partner Nations. Engagements focused on communications, aircraft operations and maintenance, ISR, air patrol operations, NVG, aerial port, maintenance, space, cyber, mishap investigation, command and control, space capabilities, close air support, legal,

public affairs, flight medicine capabilities, and a Contingency Airfield Pavements Evaluation. The 571st Mobility Support Advisory Squadron completed 17 air adviser events to Peru, Guatemala, Honduras, Colombia, Chile, and El Salvador, training 241 partner nation military members.

- **Legal:** The AFSOUTH Staff Judge Advocate promoted Law of Armed Conflict adherence and Human Rights Law in 12 legal engagement activities with Colombia, Honduras, El Salvador, Guatemala, Peru, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Uruguay, and the Dominican Republic.

- **NEW HORIZONS 2014 (Belize):** AFSOUTH trained 444 US military personnel in joint/combined/interagency environments, in addition to 8 Canadian medical personnel, 25 Belize Defense Force (BDF) engineers, and over 40 BDF personnel. Personnel built five classrooms, which will accommodate 390 additional students, and one hospital addition. US and Canadian medical personnel treated over 19,000 patients during five medical, surgical, & dental events. SMEEs covered maternal & child health, public health, and biomedical equipment topics. Veterinarian services provided 500+ animal vaccinations.

- **ISR Missions:** AFSOUTH provided command and control for ISR missions in support of USSOUTHCOM priorities. AFSOUTH executed 897 ISR missions and 5,004 flight hours, resulting in over 27,841 images and nearly 13,497 minutes of video. This information assisted in numerous drug trafficking seizures in the SOUTHCOM AOR by the United States and its Partner nations in FY14. AFSOUTH is assisting critical partner nations in CD/CNT efforts and is currently working to enable Air Force operational and ISR capability in both Guatemala and Honduras. AFSOUTH continues to assist both Colombia and Peru in maintaining the strategic initiative against illegally-armed combatants who previously threatened the very existence of those nations.

- **Airlift Missions:** AFSOUTH executed 80 theater airlift missions, moving more than 3,900 passengers and 280 tons of cargo throughout USSOUTHCOM's area of responsibility.

- **Medical Deployments:** AFSOUTH International Health Specialists had 25 global health engagements with partner nations, including aerospace physiology programs in safety, human factors, and hypobaric chambers; also focusing on standards for aeromedical evacuation/patient movement/critical care air transport teams. The AFSOUTH Command Surgeon's directorate hosted nine priority nations for an Aerospace Medicine Symposium.

Marine Corps Forces South (MARFORSOUTH) Headquarters: Doral, Florida

- **Theater Security Cooperation:** In 2014, MARFORSOUTH completed over 88 Security Cooperation events in 27 countries. This resulted in over 750 Partner Nation Marine Corps and Defense Force personnel trained. While continuing to foster long-term relationships based on mutual respect and common values, MARFORSOUTH conducted a variety of key leader engagements throughout the USSOUTHCOM area of responsibility that reinforced our commitment to partner nation leadership. To meet shared security objectives in combatting transnational organized crime, MARFORSOUTH delivered tailor-made training to our partners by establishing persistent presence security cooperation teams in Belize, Guatemala, and Honduras. This was often hand-in-hand with our Colombian Marine Corps partners through the US/Colombia Action Plan.

- **Special purpose Marine Air/Ground Task Force – South (SPMAGTF-S):** Demonstrating the strength of the US Navy and Marine Corps Team, MARFORSOUTH embarked a SPMAGTF aboard the USS AMERICA during its transit through the USSOUTHCOM area of responsibility. This

transit featured MV-22 Ospreys that conducted basic maritime operations at sea and supported strategic-level diplomatic engagements in Colombia, Brazil, Chile, and Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay and El Salvador. Marines, alongside the

US Navy, partnered with other Nation's Sailors and Marines in a variety of theater security cooperation events that included passage-at-sea exercises, SMEEs, tours for partner nation military and civilian personnel, community relations projects, and sporting events.

- **SPS-JHSV 14 – Marine Detachment (MARDET):** In support of US Naval Forces Southern Command/US Fourth Fleet's SPS-JHSV, MARFORSOUTH deployed 45 Marines and Sailors to Belize, Guatemala, and Honduras to provide training in small-unit tactics, and support with engineering, civil affairs, and information operations activities. The MARDET enhanced the SPS-JHSV mission by building partner capacity in riverine infantry integration for 100 partner nation forces, conducting 14 humanitarian assistance and military construction projects and 175 civil-military engagements, and promoting a nation-wide civilian reporting system in Belize.

- **TRADEWINDS Phase II Ground:** The Dominican Republic hosted this JCS-directed exercise for over 250 participants, spanning 15 countries. In partnership with the Dominican Republic Marine Corps and the Canadian Army, US Marines provided logistics, casualty evacuation and medical support while leading classroom instruction and field training. Exercise participants collaborated on countering illicit traffic activity, humanitarian assistance/disaster relief, small arms weapons handling, basic infantry skills, civil affairs, human rights and law enforcement tactics, techniques and procedures.

- **Partnership of the Americas (POA):** MARFORSOUTH, in conjunction with USNAVSO and regional (PNs), conducted a multinational exercise incorporating amphibious ships from Mexico and Chile and eight other partner nation naval infantries. A combined

task force executed a simulated humanitarian assistance/disaster relief operation, successfully demonstrating interoperability and security cooperation while focusing on amphibious staff planning, training and equipping for future peace support operations and humanitarian assistance missions.

- **Security Augmentation Force (SAF):** The SAF is MARFORSOUTH's designated company of Marines that reinforces Diplomatic Missions in the AOR, as required. In close coordination with Department of State, the SAF is postured in CONUS should an Ambassador decide that the local guard force is unwilling, unable, or insufficient to provide security to his mission. While there are currently no high threat posts in the AOR, the potential for a natural disaster or popular unrest are likely for many Embassy locations. MARFORSOUTH deploys its Marine Liaison Element to visit each Embassy, solidifies plans of action with the Country Team, and captures relevant information that will enable SAF in rapidly responding to crisis.

Special Operations Command South (SOCSOUTH) Headquarters: Homestead, Florida

- **Building Partner Capacity:** In 2014, SOCSOUTH maintained small elements in Belize, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, Guyana, Panama, and Peru working with key units to improve ground and maritime interdiction, civil affairs, Military Information Support Operations (MISO), and intelligence capacities. SOCSOUTH used episodic engagements – including 36 Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) events– with multiple Central American, South American, and Caribbean partners to develop US forces' skills and expand partner nation capacity. In Honduras, SOCSOUTH teams and Colombian counterparts helped train over 200 Honduran National Police officers for the new Tigres special response unit as part of

expanded US support to Honduran authorities as they confront sources of insecurity in urban and remote rural areas. In the Andean Ridge, SOCSOUTH continued to partner with Colombia and Peru to confront narco-terrorist insurgencies whose illicit trafficking operations extend throughout the hemisphere.

- **Civil Affairs:** In 2014, 14 civil affairs teams and civil-military support elements engaged nine partner nations to reduce the vulnerability of key populations influenced by transnational organized crime or violent extremism. The teams assisted with counter-recruitment programs and, in many cases, supported partner nations in building civil affairs capacities.

- **Military Information Support Operations:** SOCSOUTH maintained military information support teams in six key partner nations supporting Colombia's Demobilization and Counter-Recruitment Programs, Guatemalan Interagency Task Forces, Panamanian security services' outreach programs in the Darien border region, the DOD Rewards Program, US Government Anti-Trafficking in Persons efforts, and expanded active tip lines to under-governed spaces. These activities supported a broad range of efforts against transnational organized criminal and violent extremist organizations.

- **Intelligence Analytical Support to US Country Teams:** SOCSOUTH provides intelligence and counter-threat financing support to US Country Teams focusing on terrorism, human smuggling networks, and transnational organized crime. In Belize, the Dominican Republic, and Honduras, SOCSOUTH helped develop host nation capabilities and country team support through a number of subject matter exchanges, and mentored them in institutionalizing intelligence pipelines.

- **Building Intellectual Capital:** SOCSOUTH, in conjunction with the Colombian Joint Staff College, conducted five Counter-Terrorism Fellowship Program-funded seminars in Bogota, Colombia during 2014. Approximately 70 subject-matter expert presenters from the

US, Colombia, and other nations collaborated with over 700 participants from 18 Western Hemisphere and NATO countries

- **FUERZAS COMANDO 2014:** FUERZAS COMANDO is a USSOUTHCOM-sponsored, SOCSOUTH-executed multinational exercise encompassing a Special Operations skills competition and a Senior Leader Seminar designed to foster relations and improve cooperation throughout the theater. The 2014 edition of FUERZAS COMANDO was held at Fort Tolemaida, Colombia with 17 Partner Nations participating. Colombia placed first overall, the US placed second, and third place went to El Salvador.

- **FUSED RESPONSE 2014:** SOCSOUTH executes an annual CJCS-directed exercise to validate time sensitive crisis action planning, as well as training, readiness, interoperability and capability of Special Operations Forces in support of regional crises and contingencies. FUSED RESPONSE 2014 was a Joint and Combined exercise held in Belize in conjunction with the Belize Defence Force and featured guest observers from Brazil and Canada to foster stronger relationships and greater interoperability with these fellow Western Hemisphere nations. Involving SOCSOUTH staff and personnel from each of its components, the exercise focused on improving the capabilities of the participant forces and increasing their capacity to confront common threats such as illicit traffic, organized crime, and terrorism.

Joint Task Force Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO) Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

- **Safe and Humane Custody and Control:** JTF-GTMO conducted safe, humane, legal, and transparent custody and control of detainees, including those convicted by military commission. Detainees maintained family contact via mail, telephone calls and, in areas which support this service, videophone conferences coordinated by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). High quality care, to include routine and urgent medical care, was provided to detainees on a 24-hour

basis. General surgical care, dental care, preventative medicine, optometry and mental health services were provided, or arranged, as was targeted specialty care on a recurring basis.

- **Legal and Transparent Operations:** Assessments of detention conditions by the ICRC continued with four visits in 2014. The ICRC verifies compliance with international standards associated with law of war detention (as specified in the Geneva Conventions and other international conventions) and provides confidential advice for suggested improvements to the United States via the Joint Task Force Commander and US Southern Command. Additionally, detainees are granted access to legal representation, and received more than 847 Military Commissions and 273 Habeas attorney visits in fiscal year 2014. Committed to transparency, JTF-GTMO hosted 100 media representatives from 73 domestic and international news organizations and answered hundreds of media queries during the past year. Similarly, JTF-GTMO also hosted numerous Distinguished Visitor visits, including US Senators, Representatives, Service Chiefs and senior DOD, DHS, DOJ and DoS policy makers.

- **Military Commissions:** Support for the Military Commissions process is a priority of JTF- GTMO. These proceedings are open to observation by the media, victim family members, non-governmental organizations and other visitors. In fiscal year 2014, JTF-GTMO supported 14 days of hearings which addressed pre-trial motions in the case of US v. Mohammad, et al., the five individuals accused of coordinating the September 11, 2001 attacks on the US (referred to in the press as “the 9/11 Five”) and 16 days of hearings to address pre-trial motions in the case of US v. Al Nashiri, the alleged USS COLE bomber. Additionally, the Court arraigned and conducted two days of hearings to address pre-trial motions in the case of US v. Al Iraqi, an alleged Al Qaeda commander charged with law of war offenses.

Joint Interagency Task Force South (JIATF-S) Key West, Florida

- **In FY 2014, Joint Interagency Task Force South** contributed to the disruption of 158 metric tons of cocaine worth nearly \$3.2 billion wholesale. This represents 76 percent of the estimated cocaine flow directed towards the US market. JIATF-S executed an integrated defense forward strategy that complimented the ongoing efforts at the US Southwest Border. JIATF-S exercised tactical control (TACON) of US and allied ships and Maritime Patrol Aircraft, along with the Forces Surveillance Support Center’s re-locatable over-the- horizon radar (ROTHR) to detect, monitor and support interdiction of illicit traffic.

- **Operation (OP) MARTILLO** led to the majority of JIATF-S interdictions. Begun in January, 2012, OP MARTILLO has resulted in the disruption of 400 metric tons of cocaine, and the seizure of \$14.4 million in bulk cash and 325 vessels and aircraft. This multi- national operation is intended to deny the Central American littoral routes to illicit traffickers. Approaching its third anniversary, OPMARTILLO is achieving its desired effects of decreased trafficking in the Western Caribbean and Eastern Pacific littorals. This has driven increased activity in the Eastern Pacific non-littoral route, which, as a result of longer distances, provides additional time for US, allied and Partner Nation forces to respond once an illicit trafficking event is detected.

- **Operational Results and Impact:** The bilateral Air Bridge Denial Program with Colombia contributed to a significant reduction in illicit air traffic. JIATF-S documented a 68 percent decrease in illicit air tracks from South America to Central America (primarily Honduras) and detected only two flights into Haiti. In the maritime domain, JIATF-S assessed reductions of 73 percent and 42 percent, respectively, in activity along the Western Caribbean littoral and non-littoral trafficking vectors. JIATF-S also documented a significant decrease in trafficking via “go fast” boats using the littoral routes, which is consistent with the intent of OPMARTILLO. Eastern

Pacific trafficking showed similar trends, with a 48% decrease in the littorals and a 38% increase in the non-littorals, including a recent increase in the use of routes south of the Galapagos.

- **Operation UNIFIED RESOLVE**, the counter illicit trafficking operation supporting Puerto Rico, has improved interoperability between JIATF-S, Coast Guard District 7, Coast Guard Sector San Juan, and the Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Office of Air and Marine's Caribbean Air and Marine Branch in Counter-Illicit Trafficking operations. Real-time information sharing improved OP UNIFIED RESOLVE effectiveness against movements of cocaine to Puerto Rico from the primary Hispaniola vector. This collaborative effort enhanced the effective sharing of resources in today's austere operating environment and resulted in interdiction of 15,342 kg of cocaine destined for Puerto Rico in FY14.

- **Role of Partner Nations:** Fifty six percent of JIATF-S disruptions happened as a result of Latin American partner nation participation. Additionally, 75 of the 204 (37 percent) illicit trafficking events disrupted by JIATF-S were a direct result of the participation of our international allies. The maritime contributions by the U.K., France, the Netherlands, and Canada continued to be significant and will be critical to future operations as US Navy resources continue to be limited.

- **Counter-Transnational Organized Crime/Counter Network Operations:** While focused on its primary mission of detection and monitoring of illicit traffic, JIATFS established counter network and counter threat finance analysis cells to assist law enforcement agencies in dismantling the Transnational Criminal Organizations responsible for the production and shipment of narcotics and for undermining the stability and security of the region.

Joint Task Force-Bravo Soto Cano Air Base, Honduras

- **Joint Task Force-Bravo Summary:** Joint Task Force-Bravo (JTF-Bravo) is a forward-based, expeditionary joint task force operating in the

USSOUTHCOM AOR. Stationed at the Honduran Soto Cano Air Base, JTF-Bravo manages the only strategic, all-weather day/night C-5 Galaxy-capable airfield in Central America. The JTF, in cooperation with our partner nations, executes operations and enables multilateral exercises in support of the USSOUTHCOM priorities of countering transnational organized crime (CTOC), humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR), and building partner capacity (BPC) to promote regional cooperation and security in Central America. JTF-Bravo supports the USSOUTHCOM Commander's objectives in Honduras by executing assigned tasks within OPERATION ESCUDO UNIDO.

- **CTOC Operations:** At the request of the Government of Belize, JTF-Bravo provided aerial reconnaissance and air movement support for Belizean Defense Forces during two separate operations to eradicate 110,000 marijuana plants, 2000 lbs of processed marijuana and 35 lbs of seeds; destroying over 56 million dollars of profits. JTF-Bravo also participated in detection and monitoring operations off the Northeastern coast of Honduras to develop and train Fuerzas Especial Naval (FEN) boat crews, familiarizing them with communication and reporting fundamentals, illicit drug trafficking tactics, and vessel interception techniques. Finally, JTF-Bravo supported the Honduran Army's destruction of 10 illicit airfields in the Gracias a Dios Department by transporting almost 400 troops and 8,500 pounds of demolitions to damage airfields used by drug trafficking organizations.

- **HA/DR Response Operations:** At the request of the President of Honduras, and directed by USSOUTHCOM, JTF-Bravo delivered over 37,000 lbs of immediate lifesaving rations to isolated locations in GaD, which were devastated by severe flooding and heavy winds associated with Tropical Storm Hanna. JTF-Bravo executed 10 medical readiness training exercises, four mobile surgical team exercises, and weekly medical training missions in local municipalities to improve expeditionary readiness and simultaneously provide medical care to CENTAM countries. Over the past year, the JTF treated 15,886 medical patients, 2,407 dental patients,

and 779 surgical patients. JTF-Bravo routinely integrates its SOUTHCOM Situational Assessment Team (S-SAT) with regional partners to participate in natural disaster exercises. The JTF deployed its small response package to El Salvador as a part of Fuerzas Aliadas Humanitarias 2014 (FA-HUM 14), validating tactics, techniques, and procedures for response to natural disasters in the region.

- **BPC and Supporting Partner Nations:** JTF-Bravo conducted numerous BPC and PN supporting events. This included: deploying a Downed Aircraft Recovery Team (DART) to Guatemala to assist in recovering the wreckage from a helicopter crash on 20 August 2014; providing subject matter expertise leading to revision of the Guatemalan aviation safety and standards program; and facilitating the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and Government of Honduras (GoH) repatriation of 85 Honduran families from the US to locations throughout Honduras, by providing limited airfield support to DHS contracted aircraft. Additionally, JTF-Bravo firefighters conducted expertise exchanges with fire departments from Central America. The exchanges reinforced firefighting tactics, techniques, and procedures, enhancing the partner nation's ability to respond and control fire emergencies. The JTF also hosted 54 firefighters from the El Salvador Port Authority at Soto Cano Air Base to conduct annual firefighting certification. Finally, JTF-Bravo coordinated and hosted a Pediatric Disaster Management Course at Soto Cano Airbase, as well as the first ever Advanced Trauma Life Support course in Honduras. Both courses certified Honduran instructors in the respective specialty areas and helped improve Honduran medical capacity.

Senate Armed Services Committee Opening Statement by General Phil Breedlove, Commander US European Command

By EUCOM Media Operation Division
United States European Command
Stuttgart, Germany, April 30, 2015

Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed, distinguished Members of the Committee. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. It is an honor to be here representing the dedicated Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, civilians and families of the US European Command. Thank you for all you do to support them, as they serve the nation.

Compared to just one year ago, Europe faces a very different, and much more challenging security environment. One with significant, lasting implications for US national security interests.

Our top concern is a revanchist Russia.

Russia is blatantly challenging the rules and principles that have been the bedrock of European security for decades. The challenge is global, not regional, and enduring, not temporary. Russian aggression is clearly visible in its illegal occupation of Crimea, and in its continued operations in eastern Ukraine.

In Ukraine, Russia has supplied their proxies with heavy weapons, training and mentoring, command and control, artillery fire support, and tactical-and operational-level air defense, Russia has transferred many pieces of military equipment into Ukraine, including tanks, armored personnel

carriers, heavy artillery pieces, and other military vehicles.

What we have seen over the course of the fight, was that when the Russian proxy offensive ran into trouble, Russian forces intervened directly to “right the course.”

Today on the ground, the situation is volatile and fragile. Russian forces used the opportunities provided by the recent lull in fighting to reset and reposition, while protecting their gains. Many of their actions are consistent with preparations for another offensive.

The hope remains that both parties will fully implement an effective ceasefire as an important step toward an acceptable political resolution of the conflict, one that respects the internationally recognized border.

I am often asked, “Should the United States and others provide weapons to Ukraine?” What we see is a Russia that is aggressively applying all elements of national power—diplomatic, informational, and economic, as well as military. So my view is it would not make sense to unnecessarily take any of our own tools off the table.

But the crisis in Ukraine is about more than just Ukraine. Russian activities are destabilizing neighboring states, and the region as a whole, and

Russia's illegal actions are pushing instability closer to the boundaries of NATO.

We cannot be fully certain what Russia will do next, and we cannot fully grasp Putin's intent. What we can do is learn from his actions. And what we see suggests growing Russian capabilities, significant military modernization, and ambitious strategic intent.

We also know that Putin responds to strength, and seeks opportunities in weakness. We must strengthen our deterrence in order to manage his opportunistic confidence.

At the same time, Europe also faces the challenge of a surge in violent extremism.

European nations are rightly worried about foreign fighters returning home to Europe from the fight in Syria and Iraq, with new skills and malign intent. Attacks like those in France, Belgium, and Denmark are only likely to become more frequent.

Foreign fighters are part of a much broader pattern of insecurity to Europe's south, with roots in the Middle East and North Africa. Transit routes are shared by violent extremists, organized criminal networks, and migrant populations fleeing difficult conditions in Libya and other under-governed places. The spread of instability into Europe, and the transnational terrorism we all face could have a direct bearing on the national security of the US homeland.

EUCOM is working with European nations bilaterally and supporting NATO Alliance initiatives, to meet and counter this new and more complex security environment.

Based on the decisions made at the NATO Wales Summit last year, the Alliance is adapting in order to improve its readiness and responsiveness. The Readiness Action Plan, or RAP, is well underway. Our Allies are stepping up, making significant contributions that give them a real stake in the outcome. The United States will have a key and sustained role to play in supporting and enabling these changes—especially in critical areas that are hardest for our Allies to provide, like lift, sustainment, and

enablers such as intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance.

At the same time, our own US efforts in Europe remain essential. Our leadership is perhaps more important now than at any time in recent history.

Since Russian troops illegally occupied Crimea last year, US forces, under the banner of Operation Atlantic Resolve, have continued to take concerted steps to assure Allies of our commitment to their security and to Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty—the common defense cornerstone of transatlantic security.

EUCOM air, land, maritime and special operations forces have maintained presence in all three of our NATO allies in the Baltics; Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria, as well as in the Black Sea, providing an array of capabilities including airborne, armor, mobile infantry, light fighter, strike-fighter, advanced air, and maritime presence in addition to training, advising, and exercising with host nation forces.

You have made most of this persistent presence possible through your support for the European Reassurance Initiative, or "ERI." The assurance measures it supports enable the Alliance to remain strong and cohesive in this new security environment. In facing both of these serious challenges—to Europe's east and to its south - EUCOM is working closely with many others, our sister COCOMs, NATO partners as well as Allies, and other international organizations including the European Union. There is plenty of work to go around, and our collaboration, and our unity, are essential. EUCOM is also drawing heavily on great new efforts underway in the Department of Defense—not least the Defense Innovation Initiative, which applies cutting edge approaches to some of the toughest challenges in our theater, like anti-access area denial.

The strong threat posed by Russia, and the growing challenge to the south, lead me to three areas where EUCOM could particularly use your help:

First - sufficient persistent forward presence.

Our forward presence in Europe is the bedrock of our ability to assure Allies, to deter real and potential adversaries, and to be postured to act in a timely manner should deterrence fail.

It was our permanent presence in Europe that gave EUCOM the ability to respond immediately after Russian troops illegally occupied Crimea. Soldiers from the 173rd Airborne Brigade in Germany deployed to the Baltic States and Poland within 96 hours of receiving their mission. And our F-15s from Lakenheath, England began flying missions out of Poland within 18 hours of mission receipt.

That same permanent presence ensures that EUCOM can play a full array of essential supporting roles for other Combatant Commands—from neighboring AFRICOM and CENTCOM, to STRATCOM and TRANSCOM.

Rotational presence is not a substitute for permanent forward presence in building relationships or signaling our commitment. A fully funded rotational presence can play an important role in helping meet the requirements in our theater—but only if it is heel-to-toe and properly resourced.

Second—sufficient intelligence support.

Since the end of the Cold War, our nation's community of Russian area experts has shrunk considerably, and intelligence assets of all kinds have been shifted to the wars we've been fighting or to understanding potential future threats.

Russian military operations over the past year, in Ukraine and in the region more broadly, have underscored that there are critical gaps in our collection and analysis. Some Russian military exercises have caught us by surprise, and our textured feel for Russian involvement on the ground in Ukraine has been quite limited.

Earlier indications and warning—and the ability to better understand Moscow's thinking and intent—are absolutely critical for avoiding future surprise and miscalculation, for deterring effectively, and for preparing to respond if required. Getting this right requires more ISR,

high-power analytical support, and appropriate intelligence-sharing with Allies and partners. The same holds true for effectively waging counter-terrorism and counter-ISIL operations in and through the European theater. A small investment in this capability could lead to a large return in our understanding of the complex challenges we face.

Third, and finally, sufficient future resourcing.

In the near term, EUCOM's particular request is for your support for European Reassurance Initiative for Fiscal Year 2016. Your support for ERI in 2015 demonstrated commitment to our Allies, increased our ability to shape the European Theater, and allowed EUCOM to build and sustain the capacity of our Allies and partners.

The request for ERI funding in FY16 builds on this initiative. Key components include: maintaining air superiority presence, participating in NATO exercises, supporting the rotational presences of an Armored Brigade Combat Team, repositioning equipment, funding Global Response Force exercises, fostering SOCEUR engagement with partners, and increasing Guard and Reserve participation across the theater.

We understand that these reassurance measures come at a cost, and in the current budget environment, additional cost means making tough choices. As a result of previous budget constraints, EUCOM has already assumed greater risk to our mission. Specifically, our deployment timelines are longer, our preparations are less robust, and our fundamental ability to deter and defeat in a timely and effective manner is less sure than it was a decade ago.

As Secretary Carter testified recently, further reductions would damage our national security, and have a direct and lasting impact on our ability to protect and defend the nation in and from the European Theater. Meanwhile, the security challenges in and around Europe are growing sharper and more complicated.

Your support for EUCOM's mission, and your tireless efforts to chart a long-term path toward resourcing a strong national defense, are critical steps to ensuring the enduring ability of EUCOM, and DOD, to protect and defend this great nation.

From the dedicated men and women serving in the European Theater, thank you for your time and attention, and I look forward to your questions.

Statement of General Lloyd J. Austin III, Commander, US Central Command Before the House Appropriations Committee—Defense Committee on the Posture of US Central Command

5 Mar 2015

Introduction

We are in the midst of one of the most tumultuous periods in history. There is growing unrest throughout much of the world, while a vast array of malevolent actors seek to capitalize on the increasing instability to promote their own interests. This trend is especially pronounced in the Central Region, where state and non-state actors are in conflict, and the resulting turmoil impacts the affected countries and also directly affects the global economy and the security of the United States. In light of this, the US must continue to exert strong leadership and act vigorously to protect our core national interests in this strategically important region. An effective ‘whole of government’ approach is essential. At US Central Command (USCENTCOM), our aim is to see a positive transformation of the region over time, achieved by, with, and through our regional partners. Despite the challenges that exist in our area of responsibility (AOR), we do

see progress being made in some areas, along with many opportunities. We are confident that our actions in pursuit of these opportunities will continue to produce positive results in the coming days.

Looking ahead, our partners will need to assume a larger share of the burden for providing improved stability in the region. Given the stakes involved, we must keep on assisting them in their efforts. At the same time, we have to find additional methods for dealing with the convergence of compound threats under increasing budget and resource constraints. We must be judicious in our decision-making. Particularly during this volatile period, we cannot afford restrictions or reductions that would degrade our military posture and put our core national interests at greater risk. Simply stated, if we hope to achieve improved security which provides for greater stability and prosperity around the globe, then the Central Region must remain a foremost priority.

A Retrospective Look

This past year has been especially busy for USCENTCOM. In Afghanistan, we completed our transition from combat operations to our train, advise, and assist (TAA) and counter-terrorism (CT) missions. The Afghans are now in the lead for all security operations. They continue to demonstrate significant capability and a strong desire to build upon the progress achieved over the past 13+ years. In recent months, we also saw significant advancements made on the political front as a new unity government was established. President Ashraf Ghani and CEO Abdullah Abdullah have indicated a strong desire to work closely with USG leadership in pursuit of shared objectives. While much work remains to be done in Afghanistan, I am optimistic that developments will continue to trend in the right direction. At the same time, we are focused on the situation in Iraq and Syria. We responded quickly and effectively to the rapid expansion of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in the early summer of 2014. We continue to take the necessary measures to counter this barbaric enemy which operates out of ungoverned and under-governed spaces in both countries. We are currently executing our regional campaign plan to degrade and ultimately destroy ISIL, and we are doing so with the support of a broad Coalition consisting of 62 other countries and organizations. However, as was clearly stated at the outset, this will take time and we must maintain strategic patience.

We also continue to closely monitor Iran's actions. Our diplomats are working diligently to negotiate an acceptable agreement with respect to Iran's nuclear program, and we hope that they will be successful. But, regardless of the outcome of the P5+1 discussions, our relationship with Iran will remain a challenging one, as we are very concerned by their unhelpful behavior in a number of areas. We also are paying especially close attention to the situation in Yemen.

Recent actions by the Huthis and also al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula coupled with the resignation of President Hadi and the subsequent upheaval in the government are cause for significant and growing concern. If the situation continues to erode, and it remains on a negative trajectory now, Yemen could fracture and we could end up losing a key partner in our counter- terrorism (CT) fight and cede additional ungoverned space for our adversaries to operate out of. Meanwhile, we are also watching with interest what occurs in Lebanon, Egypt, Pakistan, and other parts of the region.

Without a doubt these are challenging times. There is a great deal at stake for the US and our partner nations. At USCENTCOM, we remain confident that we have the right strategy in place to safeguard our interests, to effectively address challenges and pursue opportunities, and ultimately to accomplish our mission on behalf of the Nation. That said, we depend upon the authorities and funding provided by Congress to execute our strategy and to do what is required to defend our core national interests at home and around the globe. Without question, our ability to do so and our overall readiness are put at grave risk by the continued reductions made to the defense budget, and specifically as a result of the Budget Control Act. We are in the midst of a tumultuous and unpredictable period. We are constantly responding to unforeseen contingencies and facing multiple threats from a wide range of actors that include nation states and transnational extremist groups. We cannot afford to constrict our ability to do so effectively by maintaining across-the-board spending cuts that severely limit our flexibility and authority to apply critical defense resources based on demand and the current security environment. If Sequestration goes back into effect in FY 2016, we will be increasingly vulnerable to external threats.

USCENTCOM's Mission

USCENTCOM's mission statement is: "With national and international partners, USCENTCOM promotes cooperation among nations, responds to crises, and deters or defeats state and non-state aggression, and supports development and, when necessary, reconstruction in order to establish the conditions for regional security, stability and prosperity."

Strategic Environment. The Central Region is an area rich in history, culture, and tradition. It is one of the most strategically important regions, holding well over half of the world's proven oil reserves and plentiful natural gas deposits, which are crucial to the global energy market.

The US and our partners have core national interests in this part of the world; interests that include the free flow of resources through key shipping lanes; the prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; and, the defense of our homeland against the very real and persistent threat of terrorism and extremism. Unfortunately, it also is an area that is plagued by violence and instability, political discord, economic stagnation, resource shortages (e.g., water), ethnic and religious tensions, and wide expanses of ungoverned or under-governed space. Alone or in combination, these provocative factors often make for a volatile environment that puts our interests and those of our partners at risk. Indeed, when things go badly in the Central Region, it has a clear and sizeable impact on the affected countries and other parts of the globe. For this reason it is an area of the world that merits our continued focus.

Of note, more so than in the past, individuals and groups today are coalescing around ethnic and sectarian issues, rather than national identity. This is fracturing institutions (e.g., governments, militaries) along sectarian lines and creating factional rifts within populations. This growing strain, coupled with other "underlying currents," fuels much of the tension and conflict that is present today across the USCENTCOM AOR.

The principal currents include the growing ethno-sectarian divide; the struggle between moderates and extremists, particularly Islamist-based extremists; rejection of corruption and oppressive governments; and, the "youth bulge," which reflects the many young, educated, unemployed or under-employed and disenfranchised individuals in the region who are ripe for recruitment by extremist groups. To be effective, our approach in dealing with the challenges that exist in the region must address these complex root causes. In particular, the governments and people of the region must bridge the growing ethno-sectarian divide, elevate the voice of moderates, rid governments of corruption, guard against ungoverned and under-governed spaces, and make sure that young people have better opportunities and are able to contribute to society in meaningful ways.

Of course, change will not occur overnight. It will take time to adjust peoples' mindsets and to counter deeply-engrained prejudices. But, it must be done by the governments and people in the region. Only they can bring about enduring, positive change, with our engagement and support. Indeed, we do have a critical role to play in this important endeavor and we must take action where necessary to counter exigent threats. We are helping our partners to build additional capacity and also foster stronger military-to-military relationships. The goal is to enable them to assume a greater share of the responsibility and do what is required to bring about improved stability in the region.

There are a number of challenges present in the Central Region that require our engagement to mitigate the potential negative effects. These include ongoing operations in Afghanistan, our activities in Iraq and Syria in support of Operation Inherent Resolve, and our efforts in a host of other locations in USCENTCOM's AOR. Ultimately, our goal in all cases is to move things in the direction of greater stability and to ensure assured access and freedom of movement, recognizing that a secure, stable, and prosperous

Central Region is in the best interest of the United States and our partners and allies.

USCENTCOM Priorities

Looking ahead, USCENTCOM will remain ready, engaged and vigilant—effectively integrated with other instruments of power; strengthening relationships with partners; and supporting bilateral and multilateral collective defense relationships to counter adversaries, improve security, support enduring stability, and secure our core interests in the Central Region. In support of this vision, the command remains focused on a wide range of issues, activities, and operations, including our priority efforts:

Degrade and ultimately defeat ISIL in order to prevent the further spread of sectarian-fueled radical extremism, and to mitigate the continuing Iraq-Syria crisis.

Continue support to Afghanistan, in partnership with NATO, as a regionally integrated, secure, stable and developing country.

Defeat Al Qaeda, deny violent extremists safe havens and freedom of movement, and limit the reach of terrorists.

Counter malign Iranian influence, while reducing and mitigating against the negative impacts of surrogates and proxies.

Support a whole of government approach to developments in Yemen, preventing Yemen from becoming an ungoverned space for AQ/VEOs; retain CT capacity in the region.

Maintain credible general and specific deterrent capability and capacity to counter Iran.

Prevent, and if required, counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; disrupt their development and prevent their use.

Protect lines of communication, ensure free use of the shared spaces (including the cyber commons), and secure unimpeded global access for legal commerce.

Shape, support, and maintain ready, flexible regional Coalitions and partners, as well as cross-CCMD and interagency US whole-of-

government teams, to support crisis response; optimize military resources.

Develop and execute security cooperation programs, improving bilateral and multi-lateral partnerships, building partnered “capacities,” and improving information sharing, security, and stability.

Critical Focus Areas. While we remain focused on the broad range of challenges present today in the Central Region, there are particular areas that merit a sizeable portion of our attention and resources. These areas are strategically important because of the potential impact on our core national interests and those of our partners. Below are descriptions of the current critical focus areas, along with a listing of some of the key opportunities that we are actively pursuing in an effort to improve stability in USCENTCOM’s AOR.

Protection of Nation States. Historically, nation states have been the dominant players globally. However, in recent years we have witnessed the emergence of transnational extremist groups that desire and, in some cases, demonstrate the ability to operate as major players with unfavorable intentions. In many ways they are attempting to behave like nation states and, in so doing, they threaten the structures, rules, norms, and values that define the sovereignty of our nation-state based international system.

These transnational violent extremist organizations (VEO) are ideologically opposed to and target the nation states of the Central Region. They conduct attacks and terrorize local populaces in an effort to gain power and influence. This, in turn, weakens the nation states and generates increased instability. This is of obvious concern to us, given that nation states are typically anchors for stability across the globe, with some exceptions (e.g., Iran, Syria). Thus, the US has a vested interest in buttressing our partner nations in the Central Region when necessary as part of a larger ‘whole of government’ effort to build regional stability through effective security assistance and support for inclusive governance.

As directed, we intervene to counter external threats, such as al Qaeda and ISIL. While our primary purpose for doing so is to protect US interests, we also take action to allow time and space for the nation states in the region to build sufficient capacity to protect their own sovereignty. And, we support them through our planned regional engagements, our training and exercise programs, and foreign military sales (FMS) and foreign military financing (FMF) programs; all of which are designed to further enhance our partners nations' military capacity.

One of the key opportunities that exist amidst the challenges posed by transnational VEOs is to persuade our partners in the region of the urgent need to build their military capacity so that they are better able to defend their own sovereign territory against such threats. Our regional partners are very concerned about the threat posed by ISIL and other VEOs. More importantly, many in the region recognize that if they do not do something to address the root causes of the growing instability, they can all but guarantee continued political upheaval and anarchy. Again, transformational change can only be achieved by the governments and people of the region.

They must decide that the instability caused by the "underlying currents" merits greater action on their part, and they must do more to address the root causes of many of the problems that exist in their region. We can and will support them; but, they must lead the effort.

Iraq-Syria (Operation Inherent Resolve). We remain highly focused on the crisis in Iraq and in Syria. Since launching its major offensive from eastern Syria into Iraq in early June, ISIL, which is commonly referred to by our partners in the region as "DA'ESH," has largely erased the internationally recognized boundary between Iraq and Syria and has sought to establish a proto state in the deserts of eastern Syria and western Iraq. ISIL's goal is to spur regional instability in order to establish an Islamic Caliphate. To achieve this end, ISIL has employed three primary lines of effort: 1) instill fear and shape the operational

environment using unconventional warfare and traditional terrorist tactics; 2) seize and hold territory; and 3) influence, shape, and define the conflict using sophisticated information operations. Importantly, although significantly degraded in recent months, ISIL still possesses the resources and organizational structure to pose a credible threat to the Government of Iraq (GoI). The erosion of Iraqi and regional stability caused by ISIL places extreme political and economic strain on Jordan, Lebanon, under-governed border areas, and, by extension, the broader Gulf and Levant sub- regions.

That said, ISIL is not a monolith; rather it is a symptom of the larger problems that continue to threaten the Central Region. In particular, the growing divide between ethno-sectarian groups and between religious moderates and radical Islamists, have created ideal conditions for a group like ISIL to take root. Over a period of years the previous government alienated important segments of its society, notably the Sunni and Kurdish populations, which resulted in growing disenfranchisement among these groups. ISIL capitalized on this opportunity and launched a successful blitz into Iraq absent much resistance and with support from local Sunnis who viewed ISIL as a means for bringing about a change in their government. The Sunnis simply refused to fight; and, in so doing, they facilitated ISIL's offensive. The remaining Iraqi security forces were largely incapable of mounting a credible defense against ISIL. After we departed Iraq in 2011, the leadership of the country made a series of poor decisions. Among them was the decision to stop training the security forces, to stop maintaining their equipment, and to assign leaders based on sectarian loyalty rather than competence, merit, and experience. As a result, the security forces' skills atrophied and the condition of their vehicles and weapon systems deteriorated. This precipitated a number of defeats early on in ISIL's push towards Baghdad.

This past September, President Obama announced to the American people that the

United States, with the support of a broad Coalition, would take action to degrade and ultimately destroy ISIL through a comprehensive and sustained counter-terrorism strategy. We are currently in the early stages of our counter-ISIL campaign, Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR). Our military campaign plan is comprised of five key elements. They will be achieved in a logical progression; although many of the efforts will occur simultaneously or near-simultaneously. First, we must counter ISIL in Iraq and Syria. Our intent is to employ a Coalition effort in Iraq to halt the advance of ISIL and to enable the Iraqis to regain their territory and reestablish control over their border. Once we've halted ISIL's advance in Iraq, which we have done, we said that we would need to contain ISIL, and we are doing so with the assistance of our Coalition partners, including Jordan, Turkey, and Lebanon. We are working with them to ensure they have the capacity to secure their sovereign borders. We also said that we would need to enable the moderate Syrian opposition forces through our train and equip efforts. Our goal is to develop a reliable partner that can assist in countering ISIL on the ground inside of Syria. Eventually we want to eliminate ungoverned spaces out of which ISIL and other terrorist groups have been operating by enabling the indigenous security forces to defend their own sovereign territories. Once we do all of these things, we will have defeated ISIL through a combination of sustained pressure, a systematic dismantling of ISIL's capabilities, and by effectively expanding our regional partners' CT capacities.

Our military campaign is having the desired effects. Iraqi security forces, to include Iraqi Army and Counter-Terrorism Services (CTS) forces, Kurdish Peshmerga, and tribal elements, with the support of US and Coalition air operations, have halted ISIL's advance in Iraq. The enemy is now in a "defensive crouch," and is unable to conduct major operations and seize additional territory. We can expect that ISIL will continue to conduct ineffective counter-attacks and

leverage their information operations to amplify the significance of these attacks. However, they are unable to achieve decisive effects. The effort in Iraq continues to represent our main focus. The actions that we are taking now in Syria against ISIL are shaping the conditions in Iraq. Specifically, our precision air strikes are disrupting ISIL's command and control, attriting its forces and leadership, slowing the flow of reinforcements from Syria into Iraq, and interrupting the resourcing of their operations. The more than 2,600 total air strikes conducted in Iraq and Syria over the past several months have been extremely effective.

Of course, the United States is not doing this alone. Our efforts are intended to enable the broader, 'whole of government' approach that is currently underway among various departments and agencies in the US government. Equally important are the contributions being made by our Coalition partners. Indeed, the Coalition represents the strength and cohesion of our campaign. In particular, the active and public involvement of five Arab-led nations, specifically Saudi Arabia, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Qatar, has greatly enhanced the fight and sends a clear message to ISIL and other VEOs that their actions will not be tolerated.

Ultimately, the intent of our regional campaign is not simply to destroy ISIL, although that is a primary objective. Even more importantly, we want to do what we can to help change the conditions inside of Iraq and Syria so that what we see happening there now, does not happen again in the future. The key to doing so is enabling indigenous forces to defend their own borders and provide for the security of their sovereign territory. This is the goal of our advise and assist and build partner capacity efforts currently underway in Iraq, and soon in Syria. We are also working with the Government of Iraq (GoI) to train Sunni tribal elements. Equally important, we are providing, in coordination with the GoI, support for the Kurds who continue to play a significant role in the fight against ISIL.

All that said, the effects of our military efforts will be short-lived if the Iraqis do not effectively address their political problems. The crisis in Iraq will not be solved through military means alone. The Iraqis have a new government and Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi has vowed to be more inclusive of the Sunnis and the Kurds and other minority groups. We are encouraged by the early steps he has taken to reach out to the Sunnis and Kurds and we are urging him to follow through on pledges made in the near-term. This is not a minor issue, as the government cannot succeed long-term without that support. National reconciliation is absolutely critical to the success of the counter-ISIL campaign.

A key opportunity that exists amidst the challenges posed by ISIL is to create conditions that reduce ungoverned spaces and allow for inclusion, security, and good governance in both Iraq and Syria. We pursue this opportunity, in part, by training, advising, and assisting the Iraqi Security Forces, helping them to re-build their capacity, and restructuring them to ensure greater inclusiveness. With your support, we have also have established a program to train, equip and sustain elements of the Syrian moderate opposition. We anticipate that these forces will make important contributions toward degrading and defeating ISIL, and they also will help to guard against ungoverned spaces, protect local populations, and help to create the conditions for a negotiated political settlement to the conflict in Syria that leads to more responsible and responsive governance.

Afghanistan (Operation Freedom's Sentinel). The engagement in Afghanistan remains a top priority. We conducted a successful transition from combat to stability operations, and we continue to help the Afghans to build and mature a capable and sustainable Afghan National Security Force (ANSF). Today, the ANSF consists of approximately 326,000 Afghans. They, not us, are in the lead for all security operations and they are managing to

keep the levels of violence comparatively low across the country.

It is also worth noting that the Afghan National Army (ANA) consistently ranks as the country's most respected institution. This popularity largely reflects the improved quality of life that many Afghans are experiencing now as the country becomes increasingly safer and more stable. In recent years, life expectancy rates for Afghans have improved and the infant mortality rate has declined. Opportunities for Afghan women also have expanded; women now represent one-quarter of the labor force and 28% of the National Parliament. And, education and literacy levels have increased. In 2001, 900,000 Afghans were enrolled in primary and secondary schools. Today, there are more than 8.0 million students enrolled in school; and, 39% of them are females. Unemployment or underemployment has also decreased from 50% to 35%. By almost all metrics, progress in Afghanistan has been significant over the past 13+ years. Numerous polls conducted in 2014 indicate that the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA) enjoys tremendous popular support. Polling reports have shown that more than 80% of Afghans believe their lives are improving. This is positive news; however, there is still much work to be done and the Afghans will need to continue to build upon the progress achieved thus far. They recognize this and clearly demonstrate their intent to do the right things going forward.

The Afghans have the capability to provide for the security of their people and they demonstrate this on a daily basis. However, they do still need some help with sustainment; and, that includes resupply operations, particularly to remote or mountainous areas. They need help with fixed-wing and rotary-wing aviation; and also with intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance support. Additionally, due to the delay in government formation, some key leaders who will see the Afghans through the upcoming fighting seasons have only recently assumed

their new positions. We will need to work closely with them to enable their success and aid them in building additional needed military capacity. We cannot afford for Afghanistan to once again become a safe haven for extremist groups. Increased instability and diminished security would not only affect Afghanistan, but also the Central Asia region as a whole.

Of course, enduring stability in Afghanistan will not be achieved through military means alone. There must be a credible, reliable, and responsive government in place. Fortunately, after a challenging election, Afghanistan has begun to move forward politically under the National Unity Government led by President Ashraf Ghani and CEO Abdullah Abdullah. Both leaders share similar priorities and beliefs, and they have signaled a strong desire to see the government succeed. They also are actively countering corruption, which represents a principal inhibitor of GIROA success. Theirs is not an easy undertaking; however, I do believe that they can be effective together.

There is challenging work ahead for the government and people of Afghanistan. However, as I look at the country, I remain cautiously optimistic that developments will continue to trend in the right direction. We have been in Afghanistan for more than 13 years, representing the longest period of continuous conflict fought by our Nation's all-volunteer force. Together with our Afghan and Coalition partners, we have invested many lives and other precious resources with the goal of improving stability in that country, and we want to do all that we can to preserve those hard-earned gains.

Amidst the challenges posed by the current situation in Afghanistan is the opportunity to foster a strong relationship between the United States and Afghanistan and with other partner nations in the Central and South Asia (CASA) sub-region. In particular, this would contribute to improved Afghanistan-Pakistan relations, which would allow for increased counter-terrorism cooperation in the region, along with

possibilities for reconciliation. President Ghani, CEO Abdullah, and their new government have indicated their strong desire to work with us and to continue to strengthen our partnership in the coming days. Looking ahead, our intent is to maintain a close relationship with the Afghan government and military as we work together to preserve improved security and stability in the region. At the same time, while the size of our footprint will decrease in the coming years, our continued presence in Afghanistan will allow us to maintain much-needed pressure on al Qaeda and other extremist groups.

Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremist Organizations (VEO). As I travel around the region, I routinely hear from senior military leaders that they do not necessarily fear groups like ISIL's military prowess so much as they fear the groups' ideologies. These groups clearly demonstrate their ability to inspire extremist behavior and to recruit individuals in support of their causes.

In recent years, VEOs have increasingly exploited ungoverned or under-governed spaces in USCENTCOM's AOR. The extremists' use of these areas threatens regional security, as well as US core national interests. They are able to plan and launch attacks, undermine local governments, and exercise malign influence from these spaces. At the same time, VEOs and other militant proxies continue to exploit security vacuums in countries experiencing political transitions and unrest, namely Iraq and Syria, Yemen, Egypt, and Lebanon. Chronic instability, disenfranchised populations, and weak regional governments provide new footholds for a resilient and expanding global jihadist movement and an ideal environment for Iran and its allies to aggressively undermine US regional goals.

Of note, ISIL's rise as a competitor to al Qaeda (AQ) has significantly impacted the jihadist landscape. The two groups are now competing for recruits, resources, and publicity. This will likely result in increased terrorist attacks in

the near-term as ISIL, AQ, and other elements attempt to out-do one another.

Meanwhile, the AQ movement is becoming more diffuse and decentralized as compared to pre-9/11. The risk of affiliates and allies operating in more areas and increasingly collaborating and coordinating with one another as a transnational loosely-confederated 'syndicate' is cause for concern. The AQ ideology remains persuasive, attracting and radicalizing susceptible individuals in the region. Thus, it is critical that we maintain our vigilance in countering the group and its narrative.

We must also continue to look for ways to effectively counter ISIL. As noted earlier, ISIL seeks to broaden its reach beyond Iraq and Syria, and will try to leverage regional instability to revive a caliphate stretching from Europe to North Africa to South Asia. ISIL has already received pledges of allegiance from smaller jihadist groups in Yemen, Egypt, Libya and Algeria, and they have inspired lone-wolf attacks in Algeria and the West.

Other extremist groups have leveraged Syria's security vacuum, including the AQ-affiliated Al Nusra Front (ANF). As the civil war in Syria continues, ANF will threaten neighboring states, particularly Israel and Lebanon, where the group has launched anti-Hezbollah attacks. The ongoing Syrian conflict has also created a safe haven for the Khorasan Group, a network of veteran AQ operatives, providing them with territory to plot and train for attacks against the West and the US homeland.

The Iraq-Syria area of operations is the premier destination for jihadist foreign fighters, with over 15,000 coming from around the globe, and particularly Africa, Europe, Asia, and North America. The majority of these fighters are joining ISIL's ranks, although some have joined ANF and other Syrian opposition groups. As these conflicts carry on, returning battle-hardened foreign fighters will pose increasing risk to their home countries, including the United States. We

must sustain our active measures to address this growing threat.

An important opportunity that exists in the Central Region is to limit the overall reach and effectiveness of VEOs, while also reducing the amount of ungoverned or under-governed space in which these groups typically operate. To do so, many of our partners acknowledge the need to counter radical extremists' ideologies, in part by helping to amplify the voice of moderates in the region. They also recognize the need to limit access to ungoverned and under-governed spaces; thereby diminishing the reach and effectiveness of violent extremists operating in the region. By setting the right conditions and helping to promote the efforts of moderate and influential regional leaders, we may achieve significant and lasting improvements. And, these improvements are likely to have pervasive positive effects on the global security environment.

Iran. Iran represents the most significant threat to the Central Region. Our diplomats have been hard at work, trying to reach an agreement with Iran with respect to its nuclear program. The most recent extension allows for continued negotiations through 1 July 2015. While we remain hopeful that the two sides will eventually reach an acceptable deal, it is presently unclear how things will play out. We have to be prepared for what comes next. We will be prepared.

In the meantime, we remain very concerned about Iran's behavior in other areas. Iran continues to pursue policies that threaten US strategic interests and goals throughout the Middle East. In addition to its nuclear program, Iran has a significant cyber capability, as well as the largest and most diverse ballistic missile arsenal in the Middle East. With ranges up to ~2,000 km, Iran is able to strike targets throughout the region with increasing precision using creatively adapted foreign technologies to improve its missile arsenal. It also has increased its anti-access area-denial air defense capabilities. Iran is improving its counter-maritime capabilities (e.g., mines, small boats, cruise missiles, submarines), which

serve to threaten the flow of global commerce in the Strait of Hormuz. Perhaps most concerning, Iran routinely engages in malign activity through the Iranian Threat Network (ITN) consisting of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps-Qods Force, the Ministry of Intelligence and Security, and its surrogates, businesses, and logistics support. Iran also engages in malign activity through support to proxy actors such as Lebanese Hezbollah and Hamas which threatens the sovereignty and security of Israel.

During the past year, the ITN primarily focused on Sunni groups in the Iraq and Syria-based conflict (including the moderate opposition in Syria) by bolstering the Syrian and Iraqi governments and overseeing engagements involving its own militant forces. Iran also maintains the ability to expand the scope of its activities. This is troubling as Iranian malign influence is enflaming sectarian tensions that are all too often exploited by violent extremist elements in the region. Needless to say, our relationship with Iran remains a challenging one. We will continue to pay close attention to their actions, and we will remain steadfast with our regional partners and do what we can to help improve their capacity to counter Iran and mitigate the effects of their malign activity.

One of the key opportunities that exist with respect to Iran is the prospect of an acceptable agreement regarding Iran's nuclear program. If the P5+1 are able to reach a long-term resolution, that would represent a step in the right direction and may present an unprecedented opportunity for positive change in the Central Region.

A Regional Perspective

In many ways our military-to-military relationships continue to represent the cornerstone of America's partnerships with the nation states in the USCENTCOM AOR. Below are synopses of the status of those relationships, along with the current state of affairs in each of the 20 countries, minus Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria,

and Iran which were addressed in the previous section, "Critical Focus Areas" (see pages 8-21):

The Gulf States—The Gulf States have proven to be valuable Coalition partners, engaging in and supporting offensive operations against ISIL and providing the indispensable access, basing and overflight privileges that are critical to the conduct of operations in the region. In recent months, we have seen some improvement in relations between and among the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Qatar after a period of increased tensions. A convergence of interests, namely the need to counter the increasing threat posed by ISIL and other violent extremists groups, has afforded a unique opportunity to strengthen the Coalition and also contribute to improving stability and security in the broader Middle East region. In many ways, ISIL's expansion in Iraq has forced the Gulf States to take more seriously the threat posed by ISIL and other violent extremist groups. As a result, they have begun to take a more proactive approach to countering extremist financing and foreign fighter facilitation. They must maintain their focus and continue to make much-needed progress in these areas. At the same time, we are strengthening our partners' military capacity as part of a collective security architecture designed to deter and, where necessary, counter Iranian hegemonic ambitions. Going forward, we will play a key role in making sure that our partners remain united on common interests and security challenges.

In late January of this year, the **Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA)** saw a smooth transition of power, as King Salman bin Abdulaziz ascended to the throne after the death of his brother, King Abdullah. King Salman comes to power during a very challenging period. The threat from ISIL, particularly along Saudi's northern border, and from al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and the Huthis in the south, has led KSA to take a more proactive role in safeguarding the Kingdom's interests in the region. In particular, KSA's prominent role in the campaign against

ISIL, to include its participation in air operations in Syria and in support of the Syria Train & Equip program, has paved the way for other Arab nations to join the Coalition efforts to counter ISIL. Recognizing the need for enhanced maritime security in the Gulf, the Saudis assumed command of the Gulf Maritime Security Task Force for the first time this year. Their leadership is critically important in demonstrating the cohesion of the Combined Maritime Forces generally and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) nations in particular. Of note, the Saudis have taken a lead role in reconciling the Gulf States. Looking ahead, our continued support of advanced Saudi defense competencies and further improvements in US-Saudi military interoperability are expected to yield positive impacts, which will in turn contribute to greater stability in the region and beyond.

Kuwait remains a long-time partner and strong and reliable ally in the region, providing critical support for US and Coalition troops, vehicles, and equipment deployed in support of Operation Inherent Resolve. In addition to providing a permissive environment for our deployed forces in the USCENTCOM AOR, Kuwait plays a significant role in the retrograde of equipment from Afghanistan. They also continue to provide critical basing and access for US forces and capabilities needed to address future contingencies. The Kuwaitis are committed to advancing regional cooperative defense efforts as evidenced by their role as a key interlocutor between Qatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Bahrain in response to recent tensions, as well as the extensive preparation they have done to host the Eagle Resolve multi-national training exercise in the spring of 2015. The Kuwaitis also have made significant progress towards reconciling the sub-region's long-standing issues with Iraq, leading Gulf Arab diplomatic outreach efforts with the Government of Iraq. The Kuwaitis remain committed to accommodating all segments of their population to preserve internal stability, particularly Sunnis and Shia; and, this has made

them typically measured in their support for Gulf Arab regional initiatives. Overall, Kuwait continues to provide critical support to the US and partner nations while managing these internal political challenges.

Our military-to-military relationship with the **United Arab Emirates (UAE)** continues along its historically positive trajectory. UAE's growing concerns regarding the spread of extremist ideologies and the threat that they pose to UAE's internal security and regional stability prompted the Emirates to take an active role in the counter-ISIL campaign. They continue to demonstrate their value as a strategic partner by proactively addressing some of the region's toughest problems. Their military capability is arguably the best among the GCC states. UAE's is also the most expeditionary military, deploying forces in support of operations in Afghanistan and Syria. In addition to their participation in the ongoing air operations in Syria, UAE also has offered to send forces and personnel to support the military advise and assist mission and one of the four training sites in Iraq. Of note, the Emirates have a much broader definition of extremism and they want to expand the counter-ISIL military campaign to include a wide range of groups they perceive as extremist, from Islamist political groups to Salafi jihadist groups. Going forward, we will look to further strengthen our security cooperation partnership with UAE through continued engagement and through our FMS program.

Qatar remains one of our most stalwart partners in the Gulf, hosting three of our forward headquarters (USCENTCOM, US Air Forces Central Command, Special Operations Command Central) and facilities and providing us with unimpeded access to the region. The Qataris were among the first to offer a site for the Syria Train & Equip program, along with a place to host the now-established Combined Joint Inter-Agency Task Force (CJIATF) headquarters. Qatar also continues to play an active role in the counter-ISIL campaign. Unlike KSA, Bahrain,

and especially UAE, Qatar makes a distinction between Salafi jihadist and political Islamist groups, which creates a challenge in terms of how we approach countering extremist groups in the region. That said, the Qataris' relationships with a wide range of groups, including more moderate elements, could present potential opportunities.

During the past 12 months, the Qatari Armed Forces have concluded extensive FMS equipment purchases and submitted additional requests. All told, 2014 saw the Qataris allocate billions of dollars to arm their forces with cutting edge American weaponry. This show of renewed and expanding cooperation with the US defense industry clearly reflects the Qataris' drive for greater military interoperability with the United States. Future collaboration with Qatar may see the genesis of a partner force that reflects the United States in organization, arms, and training.

We have a long history of cooperation with **Bahrain**, to include hosting the headquarters of the United States Fifth Fleet and Combined Maritime Forces in Manama. Amidst boycotting by opposition members, the Bahraini government held elections in November and December of 2014, which resulted in additional Shia representation. However, there is still significant distrust between the Shia majority and Sunni-led government. The government perceives a direct threat from Shia opposition groups, which it believes are deliberately de-stabilizing the country by attacking the security forces and undermining the economy. The government believes these same Shia opposition groups are influenced and supported by Iran, and that Iran intends to eventually overthrow or supplant it with a Shia government.

Bahrain has been a strong member of the Coalition to counter-ISIL, participating in the initial air strikes into Syria in September of 2014. However, the historically strong relationship between the United States and Bahrain is showing significant strain as the US FMS-hold carries into its third full year. Despite this political challenge, Bahrain continues to pursue the re-supply of

munitions for some of its aviation systems, and it remains firm in its support for US assets at Naval Support Activity Bahrain.

Continue: <http://www.centcom.mil/en/about-centcom-en/commanders-posture-statement-en>

Harris Says North Korea is PACOM's Biggest Worry, Gives Report on Asia Rebalance

By Jim Garamone
DOD News Features, Defense Media Activity

WASHINGTON October 10, 2015 — North Korea and its unpredictable leader are US Pacific Command's biggest worries, Navy Admiral Harry Harris Jr. told the Military Reporters and Editors Association here yesterday. Harris, who has commanded US Pacific Command since May, gave reporters and editors an update on the progress of the military rebalance to the Pacific.

Harris stopped in Washington on his way to the Australia-United States Ministerial in Boston. "The greatest threat that I face on a day-to-day basis is the threat from North Korea, because you have an unpredictable leaders who is in complete command of his country and his military," Harris said. Kim Jong Un is "on a quest for nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them intercontinentally," he said, adding that Un "poses a very real threat to the 28,000 Americans in South Korea, the nation of South Korea, Japan and on and on."

"At some point in the future, as he develops his capability, North Korea will present a very real threat to Hawaii and the rest of the United States," Harris continued. "Now, I have to be ready from a position of strength to deal with North Korea and we are ready to deal ... any time that Kim Jong Un decides to act."

PACOM Area of Responsibility

US Pacific Command has responsibility for US military operations on more than 52 percent of the Earth's surface. "It's the oldest and largest of the geographic combatant commands and responsible for all US military forces from Hollywood to Bollywood and from polar bears to penguins," Harris said.

In the command's area are the three largest world economies. Seven of the world's 10 largest standing armies are in the region, as are five of the seven nations that have nuclear arms. "Most projections place seven out of every 10 people on Earth within the Indo-Asian region by the middle of this century," Harris said.

All these projections and facts prove that the region "matters," the Admiral said. The region fuels growth in the United States and around the world. This is the impetus behind the US government push to pay more attention to the area, he said. "Even though the world gets a vote -- like the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant and Syria -- we continue to make real progress on the rebalance and advancing our interests in the Indo-Asia Pacific," he said.

President Barack Obama announced the rebalance more than four years ago as a whole-of-government approach. Security matters are just one aspect of the program that also includes diplomacy, economic integration and political understandings.

Peace is a Collaborative Process

“The presence of our joint military forces in key locations throughout the region, underpins the rules-based, international order, and provides opportunity to engage with other countries while being positioned to respond to crises,” the Admiral said.

US forces are key to maintaining peace and prosperity in the region, he said, but it now entails a more coordinated and cooperative process. US forces do not impose peace; they work with other nations militaries to increase their capabilities and capacity. US forces constantly exercise with nations of the region and their presence strengthens the ties not only with the United States, but among neighbors.

Harris particularly cited cooperation with two treaty allies -- South Korea and Japan. US engagement with these countries “is the foundation for peace and security in the region,” he said. “Not only do we share common values and common concerns, but we face a common threat in North Korea.” Provocation by North Korea is one reason why Harris welcomes Japan’s decision to play a greater role in regional security. He said he will do all he can to look for ways for South Korea, Japan and the United States to collaborate.

Building the Relationship with China

Harris reiterated that US involvement in the region is not aimed at containing China. The rebalance is about US recognition of the increased importance of the region to Main Street USA. Simply put, security in the region has means prosperity, he said. “It’s in the best

interests of the United States that we continue to embrace and enhance our relationships with everyone in the region including China,” Harris said. “While I’ve been known to be critical of China’s provocative military activities these past two years ... I will also acknowledge when China has been helpful, such as China’s counter piracy efforts off the Horn of Africa and the search for the Malaysian airliner off the coast of Australia.”

The Admiral will meet with Chinese military leaders next month and he will “maximize” these areas of cooperation and agreement, while trying to work through areas where the United States and China disagree, he said. Harris is prepared to continue the conversation with Chinese leaders. “Obviously one of the topics of on-going discussions is my continuing concern with what I call China’s ‘sand castles in the sea’ in disputed waters of the South China Sea,” he said. “Militarization by any claimant in the area makes it harder to resolve disagreements diplomatically.”

Harris will not discuss future operations in his area of responsibility, but he referred reporters to his testimony before the Senate earlier this year. “To reaffirm our ironclad commitment to international law, I think we must exercise freedom of navigation operations throughout the region and throughout the globe,” he said.

He also said he told a regional chiefs of defense meeting -- which included China -- at his headquarters in Hawaii two weeks ago that the United States “will continue to fly and sail and operate anywhere—anywhere that international law allows.”

NORTHCOM Commander Discusses Importance of Missions

By Jim Garamone
DOD News Features, Defense Media Activity

WASHINGTON October 8, 2015 — Navy Admiral Bill Gortney said he has a mission set that ranges “from tracking Santa to thermonuclear war.” Gortney commands both US Northern Command and the North American Aerospace Defense Command. Both commands are based in Colorado Springs, Colorado, and are responsible for defending the continent from attack. And while NORAD radars look for enemy missiles and aircraft, they also “track” Santa Claus for children around the world each year.

But while there are whimsical moments, the missions Gortney commands are deadly serious. The Admiral spoke at the Commanders Series at the nonprofit Atlantic Council “think tank” here yesterday. Gortney said sequestration represents the most dangerous threat to his commands. “I firmly believe that,” he said.

This is, he said, because NORTHCOM and NORAD don’t own forces. Most of the forces for the commands come from the services and are paid and maintained by the services, the Admiral said. Under sequester, the services’ cuts come mostly from operations and maintenance accounts, precisely the money needed to provide combatant commands with the trained and equipped service members they need. Sequestration also affects the civilian agencies that NORTHCOM supports -- law enforcement, customs, and the Coast Guard.

Threats from State Actors

Gortney told his interlocutor -- New York Times journalist Eric Schmitt -- that his commands agree with the intelligence community’s assessment that North Korea has the ability and technology to put nuclear weapons “on rockets that can range the homeland.”

His question is when or why would North Korean leader Kim Jong Un use nuclear weapons. “No one really understands the Great Leader,” Gortney said with his tongue firmly planted in cheek. “I look longingly for the predictability of the Great Leader’s father.” His father -- Kim Jong Il -- was only marginally more predictable. “But we’re ready for him,” Gortney said. “We’re ready 24-hours-a-day if he’s dumb enough to shoot something at us.”

In the Admiral’s aerospace defense mission, the big threats are Russian long-range aviation and cruise missiles from submarines and surface platforms. “It’s a bit of a challenge for us because for 57 years, NORAD has been in a defensive crouch, where Soviet and Russian aviation would have to come into our battlespace and we would deal with them there,” he said.

But Russia has qualitatively a much better military than the quantitative military the Soviet Union had, the Admiral said. “They have a much different doctrine, and you are seeing that much better quality military and doctrine being played out as a whole of government approach in Ukraine

and now Syria,” he said. The quality is playing out in threats to the United States as well. “They have read our play book and they are fielding cruise missiles that are very accurate at very long ranges, to the point where they [don’t have to] leave Russian airspace and launch conventional or nuclear warheads at targets and critical infrastructure in Canada, the Pacific Northwest,” Gortney said. “[This is a] very difficult mission set for us, as it forces us to catch arrows instead of going to where we can shoot the archers.”

Ballistic Missile Defense

As NORTHCOM’s commander, Gortney has responsibility for ballistic missile defense. He said his command is prepared to deal with anything that might come out of North Korea. “In 2017, we’ll have 44 missiles in the ground, mostly in Alaska,” he said. “The problem is we’re on the wrong side of the cost curve. We postured to shoot down not very expensive rockets with expensive rockets.”

The bullet hitting a bullet scenario is very expensive, Gortney said. The United States needs technology and capabilities that operate at different parts of the cycle – to stop an enemy from launching, or to get weapons in the boost phase rather than relying on the bullet-on-bullet end game, he said.

The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant

The most dangerous threat to the homeland is thermonuclear war, the Admiral said. It is something that must be prepared for, but it is unlikely, he said. The most likely outside threat to the homeland is the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant. “The danger comes from their very sophisticated social media campaign that seeks to radicalize young people in the West,” he said. Gortney said those people who try to contact the group for advice on how to launch an attack give law enforcement an opportunity to detect them and may be dealt with. But those

who are “just in receive mode” cannot be traced, he said.

ISIL motivates citizens to attack fellow citizens. He surmised that was the case in Chattanooga, Tennessee, over the summer when a radicalized young man attacked a Navy and Marine Corps recruiting station killing five service members. Chatter on the network since caused Gortney to raise the force protection condition at installations around the country. ISIL is successful at radicalizing these people due to their narrative and the perception that they are trying to bring about the Caliphate. “It is a war of the words,” he said. “The fact is we have not yet been able to counter that narrative. That someone actually believes that’s a better way of life than the one that they have in the United States or Canada or Australia, really confounds me.”

Countering the narrative must be done at the grass-roots level, the Admiral said. Parents, friends, clergy, schools, governmental and nongovernmental assets must be used to defeat the hateful ideology, he said.

Carter Discusses Military Rebalance to Asia-Pacific

By Jim Garamone
DOD News, Defense Media Activity

WASHINGTON, November 6, 2015 — The Asia-Pacific will be the economic driver for the world in the years to come, and that is why rebalancing the US military to the region makes such sense, Defense Secretary Ash Carter said today at Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam in Hawaii.

“It is the single part of the world that will be most consequential for the future,” Carter told the joint service audience inside a hangar.

Carter said Asia is growing and becoming more prosperous because of the sacrifices American service members made to preserve the peace. “For 70 years now ... the single-most important factor that has kept the peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region ... is the pivotal role of American military power,” he said. “What the rebalance means is we intend to do that going forward.”

Historic Role

Carter told service members that they are the heart of the rebalance and that they are playing a role in history.

Service members asked Carter about China and its growing role in the region. The secretary said it was natural that China would seek to play as large a security role as it does an economic one. But China is not the only country in the region that is playing a larger part in security affairs.

“Japan is increasing its defense role out here, so is India,” he said. “Many, many countries are asking us to work with them because they want to be part of this regional architecture that keeps the peace. And we welcome all of them, to include China.”

The US policy is not one of division or exclusion, the secretary said. “Our policy is one of inclusion,” he said.

Employ Diplomacy to Solve Issues

Carter called on all countries claiming land in the South China Sea to solve their problems diplomatically. “For our part,” he said, “the United States will continue to fly, sail and operate anywhere international law permits [from the] South China Sea to the Arctic.”

There are many challenges in the region, the secretary said. He said the United States will continue to watch China, but American leaders are also concerned about North Korea and Russia. He also mentioned the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, saying the United States must defeat that “evil movement.”

Carter also told service members there is progress on the budget front, noting he is pleased with the two-year budget agreement.

Security Enterprise Recalls Successful Fiscal Year

By Adrienne Elliot
USASAC Public Affairs

The US Army Security Assistance Command closed fiscal 2015 with \$20.5 billion in new business, making it yet another successful year in foreign military sales.

The command, which develops and manages the Army's security assistance programs and FMS, is managing more than 5,247 FMS cases valued at \$171.9 billion in 144 countries.

USASAC is divided into regionally aligned Combatant Commands that cover every continent in the world providing the potential sale of equipment, spare parts, maintenance, training and simulation, technical documentation and facilities. The COCOMs consist of:

CENTCOM, with \$15.3 billion in new business and 1,915 active cases totaling \$126 billion. There are 17 countries in the CENTCOM region. Over the last year, CENTCOM has been consistent with spikes due to high dollars sales, including aircraft, armor and air defense materiel. CENTCOM has averaged \$6.5B in sales each of the last five years. UH-60M Black Hawk helicopters were a big seller in 2015 as well as Apache and Patriot PAC-3 missiles.

USASAC accelerated provisions of arms and ammunition to counter the Islamic State and the Levant offensive in Iraq. Beginning on Jan. 6, 2014, in response to Prime Minister Maliki's request to Vice President Biden for assistance,



Photo by Michelle Miller

USASAC closed out the fiscal year with \$20.5 billion in new foreign military sales and is managing more than 5,247 FMS cases valued at \$171.9 billion in 144 countries. Divided into regionally aligned Combatant Commands, USASAC operations cover every continent in the world, giving it its nickname, the "Army's Face to the World."

the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, USASAC, and the Life Cycle Management Commands worked tirelessly to successfully fulfill the prime minister's request for expedited support. That support continued through 2015 through the Iraq Train and Equip Fund where the US government has committed \$1.3 billion in aid to support counter-terrorism operations and helping build partner capacity.

AFRICOM, with \$1.6 billion in new business and 568 active cases totaling \$2.4 billion. There are 32 countries in AFRICOM, whose primary tools for implementing US strategy are posture,

presence, programs, exercises, engagements and operations.

In North and West Africa, the US is addressing growing threats from Al-Qaida affiliates and adherents, a growing Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant presence, and Boko Haram. FMS sales to Africa significantly increased and the two largest FMS cases ever for Africa were implemented this year, including M1A1 tanks with a value of \$971.5 million to Morocco and UH-60M Black Hawk aircraft to Tunisia with a value of \$405 million.

EUCOM, with \$1.4 billion in new business and 1,410 active cases totaling \$15.2 billion. There are 41 countries in EUCOM.

Top FMS cases include Turkey's \$2.9B for Patriot missile firing units, GEM-T missiles and PAC-3 missiles, followed by the United Kingdom's AH-64E aircraft purchase at \$2.4 billion and CH-47D aircraft to the Netherlands for a total of \$797 million.

PACOM, with \$1.3 billion in new business and 927 active cases totaling \$23.5 billion. There are 22 countries in PACOM.

FMS case highlights include the Indian Air Force purchase of AH-64E Longbow Apache helicopters, a hybrid case valued at \$932 million. The AH 64E helicopters will improve India's capability to strengthen its homeland defense and deter regional threats. It also increases India's defensive capability to counter ground-armored threats and modernize its armed forces. PACOM also contributed to various countries for United Nations' Missions and Peace Keeping Operations by supplying defense articles such as Up Armored Humvees, Night Vision Devices and generators. Values in excess of \$4 million from the Global Peace Operations Initiative funds were provided for these efforts.

SOUTHCOM, with \$193 million in new business and 320 active cases totaling \$2.5 billion. There are 29 cases in the SOUTHCOM region.



Photo by Michelle Miller

Nearly 13 years to the day that two 18th century cannons were placed at Security Assistance Command's headquarters at Fort Belvoir, VA, the cannons were reunited with the USASAC headquarters building as part of the command's 50th anniversary celebration at Redstone Arsenal July 21. The 3.2-caliber smooth bore projectile cannons are of Spanish origin. One was cast in 1792 at Seville, Spain, and the other was cast a year later in Manila, Philippines, then part of Spain's empire. They were employed to protect the harbor at Manila as part of the Spanish Water Battery along the Esplanade. The United States took possession of the weapons in 1901 as part of the Distribution of Guns stemming from the Spanish-American War of 1898.

The Mexico Secretariat De La Defensa Nacional (SEDENA) purchase of UH-60M Black Hawks and High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles. Even though SEDENA's case for UH-60M, valued at \$584 million, was implemented in FY14, it carried significantly impacts for FY15 which involved support from many agencies within the Army Security Assistance Enterprise to accelerate the delivery schedule and support countries request to expedite deliveries of UH-60M between October and December 2015, to support ongoing Mexican Army and Air Force operations. SEDENA purchase of Humvees valued at \$271 million have deliveries ongoing which contribute to the Mexican military's goal of updating its capabilities, while



Photo by Michelle Miller

USASAC Command Sgt. Maj. Dana S. Mason Jr., left, and Commander Maj. Gen. Mark McDonald participate in the organization's 50th anniversary celebration at Redstone Arsenal. During the ceremony, from a videotaped message to the USASAC workforce, Army Materiel Command's Commander Gen. Dennis L. Via said, "Your organization is 'The Army's Face to the World' by providing cutting-edge equipment and training to help our allies strengthen their defensive capabilities, deter aggression, achieve regional stability and promote democratic values. USASAC has helped shape the operational environment around the world more than any other Army organization."

significantly increasing its capability to provide in-country troop mobility and security.

Fiscal 2015 also marked leadership changes for USASAC. Command Sgt. Maj. Rodger Mansker relinquished command and welcomed Command Sgt. Maj. Dana S. Mason Jr., the organization's second command sergeant major. USASAC also welcomed its new chief of staff, Col. Phillip Chambers, following Col. Lawrence Fuller, who retired after 30 years of service. Chambers came to Redstone Arsenal from Saudi Arabia, where he served as the deputy for the Office of the Program Manager, Saudi Arabian National Guard in Riyadh. OPM-SANG a subordinate command of USASAC, welcomed its new deputy, Col. David Matthew Fee, and Sgt. Maj. Michael James Mingle.

USASAC celebrated its 50th anniversary July 19 with ceremonies at its current Redstone Arsenal headquarters and its original headquarters in New Cumberland, Pennsylvania. Serving the nation for more than a half-century USASAC remains "The Army's Face to the World," employing more than 860 personnel at Redstone Arsenal; New Cumberland; Fort Belvoir, Virginia; Fort

Bragg, North Carolina; and Riyadh, Saudi Arabia and in various geographic locations throughout the globe in support of its worldwide mission.

Fiscal 2015 was another banner year for USASAC, and the command will continue to build partner capacity, support engagement strategies of combatant commanders and strengthen US global partnerships in support of America's national strategy.

Holistic Integration of Mil-to-Mil Engagement Doing Better with Less

By Colonel Dave Bennett, USA
US Army Security Assistance Command

The following article was originally published in the Army *FAO Journal of International Affairs*. You can subscribe to the FAO Journal or search for other articles of interest in their archives at: <http://www.faoa.org/FAO-Journal-Archives>]

Army Foreign Area Officers (FAOs) strive to epitomize the “soldier-diplomat” qualities of the FAO ethos. At the same time, most Army FAOs have internalized certain habits picked up during their command and staff time in operational units. These habits are typical of the Type A, combat arms officer, characterized by working longer, harder, and striving to accomplish more in a short amount of time: “If soldiers in my unit march 10 miles with a 40-pound ruck, then as leader I should march further and carry more weight to show my dedication. Or maybe my unit should execute more marches than our sister units so that we can distinguish ourselves.”

“If my predecessor came in at 0700 and worked until 1930 while producing so many products per week, I should come in even earlier and depart later than she did, and produce more products, to show our office’s improvement.”

Such an attitude is admirable for a mid-level leader, but might not necessarily be the right approach for a FAO down range. In a profession dominated by type-A personalities and incentivized by the short-term Officer Evaluation Report (OER), suggesting that “less is better” is considered anathema to the driven Army officer. But the FAO should consider all courses of action, and when it comes to Military-to-Military (MTM) events, less usually is better.

In a seminal scene from the movie “Jerry Maguire,” the title character has a late-night epiphany, and writes, “Suddenly it was all clear. The answer was *fewer* clients, *less* money, caring for them, caring for ourselves.”

Within days this honesty, clarity, and a resulting new mission statement earn him a down-sizing at the hands of his less-than-amused management.

Acknowledging that we live in a cynical world, I intend to show that exactly such an approach can be a smarter way of doing business for the Foreign Area Officer (FAO). This paper will show how doing less, but doing it in a smarter, more integrated way that favors long-term results, is a better course of action for Military-To-Military (MTM) events.

MTM events are exchanges paid for by Warsaw Initiative Funds (WIF) through the post-Soviet Partnership for Peace (PfP) program. They are usually information exchanges designed to familiarize our new Partner Nations (PNs) with US military tactics, techniques, and procedures. PN militaries can decide whether they would like to pursue a new capability based on US materiel, training, and best practices. If a PN shows interest in a capability presented during an MTM exchange, the PN can pursue the capability through other Security Cooperation (SC) tools. These tools include training or

matériel acquisition that a PN can purchase under Foreign Military Sales (FMS), or receive under grant through Foreign Military Financing (FMF), as well as training and education it can receive under International Military Education and Training (IMET) programs. Joint exercises can also be selected to ensure the PN is adequately trained on the new capability and solidify the relationship between the PN and the US

A few years ago, my position at US Army Central's (ARCENT's) Civil and International Military Affairs, Central and South Asia branch, allowed me to get a close-up view of how MTM events are planned and executed. Our branch officers sponsored, planned and executed scores of exchanges with our Central Asian PNs each year. Interestingly, these MTM events tended to grow in number each year, but justification for this growth was debatable. Our PNs were not necessarily gaining any new capabilities, and as the number of MTM events increased, several shortcomings with the program became clear.

For example, WIF-funded MTM events are forbidden by law to provide training. Ironically, PNs tend to value any ancillary training they can get out of an MTM event above all else, which lends itself to a legalistic conflict of intent. MTM event funding also tends to be stove-piped in terms of planning and budgeting. MTM program event planners tend to regard their own events as projects unto themselves, rather than one tool in a kit bag that includes much more robust and appropriate SC tools for acquiring a significant new capability. At our higher headquarters' MTM planning conferences, other SC tools typically were not mentioned at all, opening the door for a disjointed approach in which SC tools did not nest together or apply to common objectives. **The greatest irony is that MTM events tend to be planned and executed in a vacuum, and yet, on their own, MTM events cannot lead to any lasting or meaningful PN capability.** Their role is to serve as an opening conversation-starter for other SC tools that are actually designed to deliver a capability.

Despite these drawbacks, the culture among my ARCENT desk officers was one in which MTM event growth was a source of pride. It was one of the few ways that short-term "progress" could be demonstrated on the annual OER. Since coordinating and executing quality MTM events was hard, generating more such events must be a good thing, desk officers reasoned. Not surprisingly, the number of ARCENT-sponsored events with our Central Asian countries consistently grew each year. They increased to a point that our branch was having difficulty ensuring quality execution. A manageable number of events was roughly one per month; three every two months, at most. But in some cases, our events grew to three or four times that number—clear evidence of quantifiable accomplishment, from an OER bullet point of view. While this approach seemed to serve desk officers well in the short term, it did not contribute to optimal engagement with our PNs in the long term.

I left that job having learned a lot, but frustrated at my inability to change our office's cultural mindset. As luck would have it, I became Chief of the Office of Military Cooperation (OMC) in one of ARCENT's Central Asian countries a couple years later. By now MTM events for the country, including not just ARCENT's, but those of all sponsoring proponents, had grown to nearly 150 per year. Army officers were clearly not the only Type-A personalities susceptible to "more is better" thinking. Our office was now expected to help plan, coordinate, facilitate travel for, execute, and analyze the effects of roughly three events every work week!

Our Ministry of Defense (MOD) counterparts in the department responsible for international cooperation quietly suffered under "event fatigue," wary of disappointing their American counterparts. They were clearly overwhelmed with US MTM events, though they never would admit it. From their perspective, we were just one PN of many for whose events their office was responsible. Yet as happens in most Central

Asian militaries, our hosts had sensed how important these ballooning events *seemed* to their American counterparts, so their natural politeness made them reluctant to say anything negative on the matter. Fortunately for them, they were not alone in their frustration. From our point of view too, it was virtually impossible to facilitate all of these events to ensure quality execution, much less satisfactory movement along a program's Line of Effort (LOE) towards a desired end state.

Rather than blindly execute all these events, or even increase their numbers, our office decided we should conduct a thorough analysis of all the events on the calendar to determine their status. What were the LOEs, goals, objectives and end states of each program? Was PN interest strong enough that our counterparts had designated an officer point of contact for each LOE? Was a new capability that did not exist before part of the plan? Were the stated objectives of the LOE more specific than just "improve 'X'?"

A former colleague and Regional Affairs Specialist (RAS = Air Force FAO), Col Michael McCarthy, used to point out that strategic objectives must be mutual, and that FAOs need to work to find the strategic "sweet spot" that ensures PN buy-in for a line of effort. After reading through dozens of event descriptions whose objectives proclaimed "improve the capabilities of unit X," I decided Col McCarthy's explanation of what made an objective worthwhile warranted further expansion. Ideally, objectives should not only be mutual, but also **achievable, measurable**, and, most elusive of all, **meaningful**. Event objectives that were Mutual, Achievable, Measurable and Meaningful, or "MAMM," were very hard to find in our MTM plan. Our office's Locally Employed Staff (LES) admitted that the events they had been conducting for years amounted to iterative, "self-licking ice cream cones." Conversations on each program followed a familiar pattern:

"What's the background with these mountaineering events?"

"Well, each year a squad of our experts visits their mountain battalion for an information exchange."

"Okay, and what capability is that leading to?"

"Well, our (US) guys share information with them about the latest mountaineering techniques."

"Right, but what new capability is that leading to? Are they going to establish a schoolhouse? Would they like our help developing a curriculum? Are they going to buy any of our equipment or incorporate any of our training techniques? What is the desired end state?"

"I'm not sure about all that, but I do know that these events are important."

"Are they? Why?"

"Our proponent has executed these events for years, which fosters a good relationship."

"So let's see...a squad of our guys meets with a squad of their same guys each year; we have no desired end state, goals or objectives other than 'improve mountaineering,' our PN has no plans to open any IMET or FMS cases that will lead to a MAMM objective, and both sides are content with this?"

"Correct."

Armed with this information, we next met with our counterparts at MOD for a frank discussion about the MTM program of events. We explained that MTM exchanges were not supposed to be an end unto themselves, but rather an introduction to set the stage for meaningful capacity development via other tools. The outcome of these familiarization events was supposed to lead to much more than just personal and institutional relationships among the visiting units. Both sides needed to agree on a MAMM objective; a goal that actually improved their military's capacity in a specific, mutually beneficial way; a goal that could be measured objectively; a goal that was more significant and meaningful than simply "let's improve." **The mil-to-mil event itself was supposed to be the opening salvo in this line of effort; a precursor**

to other programs that should not be repeated blindly for years on end.

Our PN colleagues were initially shocked that we were having this discussion, but did not take long to warm to the news that it would be okay to reduce the number of events we had agreed to execute. They even admitted that many lines of effort were not MAMM for them at all; their side had only agreed to continue the program because they sensed our desire to continue conducting the exchanges. For example, several LOEs addressed fundamental ways the US conducts basic military functions, such as Logistics, Military Police, Personnel, and Public Affairs. These events had already occurred for several years, but had never progressed beyond the “information exchange” level. Some honest broker talk was in order.

“So, I see that over the last four years, we have presented many exchanges addressing how we conduct Logistics, Military Police, etc. What do you think? Would you like our help developing a new capability in any of these areas based on what you’ve seen?”

“Frankly...we are not empowered to change our Soviet-established approach to these functions...at least not at this time. The exchanges were interesting, but as far as a desire to change how we conduct such processes...those decisions are still years away.”

“Then would it be okay if we put these events on hold for now?”

“Yes, absolutely!”

By carefully re-examining not just individual events, but their underlying purposes, we achieved several beneficial results.

- We decreased the number of events significantly, making both ourselves and our PN counterparts happy by curing much of the event fatigue.
- We shifted the now-lighter load on our LES from event management to program analysis
- We saved the US taxpayers hundreds of thousands of dollars annually

- We ended up with a much closer and more meaningful mil-to-mil relationship that would actually lead to a meaningful new capability

The new objectives we established with our hosts were truly MAMM, and if an objective or nested event proved deficient in any MAMM area, we agreed not to pursue it.

The number of lines of effort may have decreased, but the surviving LOEs were much more compelling and of higher quality. By shedding programs that both sides sensed were not leading anywhere meaningful, we freed ourselves to focus qualitatively on programs that did. Instead of twenty LOEs out of synch and with no link to FMF or IMET, we wound up with six to ten LOEs that we could carefully integrate with FMF, IMET, and other SC tools. Each LOE represented the entire kit bag of a Security Assistance Officer’s arsenal. Consequently, the new LOEs received higher-level attention, dedicated POCs, and the event quality improved greatly.

The best news was that, unlike in the movie, no pink slips were waiting in our office the following week. Communicating up, down and sideways from the outset was critical. We had to convince not only our Defense Attaché’s Office, but also our headquarters at Central Command and all the event-sponsoring proponents to ensure we were on the same page. Each had to agree or at least acknowledge the new direction for MTM events, even if it meant their offices might make fewer trips to Central Asia. Fortunately, our immediate boss, the Senior Defense Official/ Defense Attaché (SDO/DATT), was completely on board. He not only had vast experience as a former OMC Chief and possessed plenty of common sense, but he had come to the same conclusions about MTM TTPs on his own. Moreover, he had watched one of his capacity-building programs take nearly a decade to come to fruition, only culminating years after he had left. Therefore, he knew the value of establishing meaningful objectives, integrating SC tools to

achieve them, and understood that the process took time. With his advocacy, many event proponents even began to adopt a more holistic approach to their mi-to-mil exchange programs on their own, leading to more coordinated and meaningful capacity development with other countries in our area of responsibility.

The jury is still out on how much benefit there is to having fewer, more focused MAMM objectives and better nested and integrated events, but the prognosis is promising. Our PN colleagues felt so good about our new bilateral direction, they agreed to apply their own national funds towards several new lines of effort. This was a huge coup, since it was the first time any Central Asian country had ever volunteered to self-fund Security Cooperation with the US. This mutual ownership led to an immediately visible increase in pride over our new bilateral relationship, as both sides pointed to a Strategic Partnership rather than the hackneyed *transactional* relationship dominated by “what can you give us?”

In our case, it really did turn out that the right answer was *fewer* events, *less money* being spent, in order to cooperate with our partners better, while still *taking care of our own* objectives. Given the current environment of shrinking SC resources, this “less is better” model might warrant consideration in other assistance areas as well.

About the Author

Colonel Dave Bennett grew up in Moses Lake, WA and is a 1988 West Point graduate. He is an Air Defense Artillery officer and Eurasian FAO. He holds a Master’s Degree in Slavic Linguistics from the University of Washington, and served as a Russian instructor at West Point. Following the terrorist attacks on September 11th 2001, Dave deployed to the Kyrgyz Republic, where he served as US Embassy Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan’s first permanent Security Assistance Officer. His assignments have included a

deployment to Baghdad, Iraq; Chief, Central and South Asia (CASA) Branch, 3rd Army/US Army Central (ARCENT); The Joint Staff J-5 Country Desk Officer for Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, Slovakia, and Turkey; a deployment to Afghanistan as the deputy in the Communication Fusion Cell, Strategic Communications Directorate, International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF) HQs; Chief, Office of Military Cooperation, US Embassy Astana, Kazakhstan; and New START Treaty Inspection Team Chief at the Defense Threat Reduction Agency. Since July 2013 he has been the Director, EUCOM, AFRICOM, and Canada Regional Operations at US Army Security Assistance Command at Redstone Arsenal, Alabama.

Energy Security Requires More Than New Pipelines: Section 2282 Funds and Critical Energy Infrastructure Protection in the South Caucasus

By Wayne J. Dahl, CPT, US Army
Foreign Affairs Officer (FAO—Eurasia)

Energy security has become a key watchword in defining the contemporary security landscape—especially in Europe. Several energy disputes with Russia in the last decade serve as poignant examples of European energy insecurity. The 2006 Russia-Ukraine gas disagreement halted the delivery of 100 million cubic meters of gas to Europe; in 2007, the Russia-Belarus energy clash directly affected Germany's economy; and Ukraine siphoned gas from its pipeline to Europe in an attempt to leverage European households against Russia during a row with Gazprom over gas prices in 2009.¹ Consequently, energy security concerns permeate current defense analysis as European leaders seek methods to increase energy security vis-a-vis Russia. Pipeline construction in the southern energy corridor—traversing the South Caucasus—provides one of the greatest opportunities to enhance European energy security; however, future energy projects will likely never be realized if transit states do not demonstrate the ability to protect new pipeline infrastructure against attack. Thus, the U.S. Government (USG) should seek to bolster Critical Energy Infrastructure Protection (CEIP) capabilities in the region with available security assistance programs. This article will analyze

the strategic significance of the southern energy corridor and CEIP capabilities in the South Caucasus and Turkey in order to highlight CEIP best practices and provide recommendations for CEIP improvement and U.S. security assistance programs that can be utilized to bolster CEIP and encourage continued western investment and political support for energy projects in the region.

Strategic Context

An undiversified energy supply is the most significant cause of energy insecurity in Europe. The European Union (EU) currently imports 50% of its energy and over 40% of EU gas imports come from Russia. As EU hydrocarbon imports increase to over 85% by 2035, the EU will remain the world's largest energy importer; Russia will likely supply most of this increases gas demand.² Dependence on Russian energy in Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia is absolute as these nations receive 100% of their natural gas from Russia. Bulgaria, Slovakia, and Hungary purchase over 80% of their energy from Russia, while Poland, Austria, and Slovenia are dependent on Russia for over 50% of their

gas.³ This level of dependence is disconcerting because the Kremlin has a history of linking gas prices to political subservience.

Moscow has used gas disruptions and price disputes or threatened to impose these sanctions over forty times since the collapse of the Soviet Union—reflecting the Kremlin’s willingness to use its hydrocarbon assets for political blackmail.⁴ Some analysts argue that Russia’s energy dominance was a key factor in EU inaction during the 2008 conflict in Georgia.⁵ Additionally, as EU dependence on hydrocarbon imports grows, leaders believe they may fall victim to energy blackmail or Russian intervention in EU energy markets.⁶ This concern is not unwarranted, especially in light of Gazprom’s recent warning to the EU concerning possible gas disruptions. On September, 24, 2014, Russian Energy Minister, Aleksandr Novak, affirmed during an interview with the German newspaper *Handelsblatt* that the Russia would halt EU gas deliveries if it supported Ukraine with natural gas exports.⁷ Currently, 58% of all Russian natural gas exports to Europe flow through Ukraine; and Ukrainian pipelines are currently at risk from fighting in eastern Ukraine, terrorist attacks, and energy blackmail.⁸ Thus, seeking alternative energy producers and transport routes is the EU’s best means to temper Russian energy influence.

Why the Southern Energy Corridor Matters

The Southern Energy Corridor—the pipeline systems from Azerbaijan through Georgia into Turkey—holds great potential to deliver Azeri and Caspian energy resources directly to Europe. Currently, the Southern Energy Corridor is comprised of two pipeline systems—the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline and Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum (BTE) natural gas

pipeline (see Figure 1). The BTC pipeline is 1776 KM—making it the longest oil pipeline in the world. It transports a daily supply of one million barrels—1.2 percent of the world’s oil production—from Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan to Turkey and European markets.⁹ The BTE pipeline is 691KM and its 2014 daily average throughput was 18.3 million cubic meters.¹⁰ Although these pipelines traverse rugged terrain and are located near zones of conflict, pipelines remain the most efficient and cost effective means to transport hydrocarbons from the Caspian to Europe. Pipeline transport is less expensive than sea and rail hydrocarbon shipments and pipelines are more reliable. Consequently, 95% of oil shipments through the region are transported via the BTC pipeline.¹¹




Figure 1¹²

The Southern Energy Corridor will continue to increase in significance to Europe because the South Caucasus region is the closest viable alternative market to Russian natural gas. The proximity of hydrocarbons in this region is important because the EU relies on pipelines to import natural gas. The Southern Energy Corridor also holds the possibility of delivering hydrocarbons from Turkmenistan, Iran, and Iraq—enabling the Caspian region to “compete with Russia in terms of energy supply to world

markets.”¹³ This actuality has galvanized EU support for developing an energy bulwark against Russia via new pipeline projects through the South Caucasus. In a May 2015 interview, the head of the EU Delegation to Azerbaijan, Malena Mard, affirmed the EU’s need to diversify energy suppliers and its support for the Southern Gas Corridor over competing Russian gas projects—like Turkish Stream.¹⁴ Therefore, the EU is working to promote alternate supply routes to Europe through the South Caucasus—such as the Trans-Anatolia Natural Gas Pipeline project (TANAP) from Azerbaijan through Turkey to Southeastern Europe and the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) from Azerbaijan to Turkey and onward to Greece and Italy (see Figure 2). Azeri gas is expected to directly reach European markets before 2020. Yet, developing pipeline projects in the South Caucasus requires financial backing and the sustained political will of western states.¹⁵

Incidentally, the United States is one of the strongest monetary and political supporters of developing the Southern Energy Corridor. U.S. energy strategy in the region focuses on

diminishing Russia’s coercive influence on Central and Eastern European NATO Allies. In 2013, the U.S. State Department declared, “The BTC pipeline is a major success for the U.S. goal of enhancing and diversifying global energy supplies.”¹⁷ Additionally, U.S. diplomacy was central to the completion of the BTE gas pipeline, which is an essential energy source for the proposed TANAP and TAP projects.¹⁸ In May 2015, the U.S. Special Envoy for Energy Affairs, Amos Hochstein, visited Greece to stress the importance of diversifying energy providers to Europe and rejecting Russian proposals to develop gas pipelines to Greece—via the Turkish Stream. During this visit, Hochstein affirmed that the TANAP and TAP projects “fulfill the trifecta of what is energy security: new source, new supply, and new route.”¹⁹

Despite the recent show of support for the TANAP and TAP pipelines, these projects remain politically complex because Gazprom has been working to develop competing projects and the Kremlin has been lobbying individual nations, such as Greece and Bulgaria, to pull their support from EU energy projects. The EU has successfully

blocked the development of the South Stream pipeline through Southeastern Europe; however, Russia has answered this setback by proposing the Turkish Stream pipeline—which crosses the Black Sea into Turkey and connects into the Nabucco West pipeline to Europe and the TAP system to Greece. Gazprom’s decision to develop the costly and technically difficult Turkish Stream pipeline is as much political as it is economic.

Likewise, for Tbilisi and Baku, the political implications of the BTC and




Figure 2¹⁶

BTE pipelines and future energy projects are as significant as the economic implications of these projects. Dr. Euguen Kogan, defense expert and research associate at Kadir Has University, asserts that Georgia and Azerbaijan “will continue using energy and the accompanying pipeline projects in order to protect their sovereignty from large neighbors, especially Russia.”²⁰ The BTE and BTC pipelines have already empowered Baku to drift from Moscow’s sphere of privileged interest towards the west.²¹ Additionally, the BTC and BTE projects can foster stronger relationships between Azerbaijan and Turkey despite Russia’s efforts to stymie this development. Alexandros Petersen, geopolitical energy specialist, agrees that the energy ties, long term economic investment in the region, and geopolitical importance of the Southern Energy Corridor locks Baku, Tbilisi, and Ankara “into a process of Western integration that has the potential to affect their political and foreign policy orientations.”²² Despite political benefits to the west, security concerns limit infrastructure investment in the region because western investment in the TANAP and TAP projects hinges on the perception of regional stability and security of these pipelines.

Role of CEIP

CEIP is truly a transnational security concern because it requires the effort of many nations—not only the nation where the infrastructure is located. Yet, CEIP is an often overlooked factor of Energy Security (ENSEC) that warrants examination in the South Caucasus and Turkey. Hasan Alsancak, Director of Energy Security at BP p.l.c, affirms, “Despite its critical and integral role in the sector, energy infrastructure security is often neglected in policy circles and academic studies.”²³ Conversely, the Alliance is concerned with the vulnerability of energy networks in Europe

and infrastructure located beyond its territory. The Southern Energy Corridor is important to NATO because upstream infrastructure—not located on Allied territory—is traditionally more vulnerable to terrorist attacks and disruption; and non-state actors are the greatest global threat CEIP.²⁴ Approximately 70% of the 9,930 energy infrastructure attacks committed from 1980 through 2011 were perpetrated by non-state actors using explosives (see Figure 3); 80% of these attacks were correlated with ongoing regional conflicts.²⁵ Consequently, the United States and NATO should focus CEIP efforts in regions with ongoing conflicts, such as Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia, or Eastern Ukraine. NATO Allies may also be susceptible to infrastructure attacks as part of a prelude to hybrid warfare. Therefore, the NATO ENSEC Center of Excellence (COE) affirms that contributing to the protection of critical energy infrastructure is one of NATO’s crucial roles in the realm of energy security.




Figure 3²⁶

CEIP must be a significant consideration in developing the South Energy Corridor. If an attack is executed on existing pipelines, then investor confidence will be shaken. Lack of investor confidence threatens investment in the nascent TANAP and TAP projects. In the event of a pipeline attack, Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Turkey would also lose critical revenue from the sale and transport of hydrocarbons. In addition to the economic consequences that transit states face, downstream economic interests are impacted by pipeline disruptions as well—further eroding investor confidence in energy transit states. As a result of the attack on the BTC pipeline prior to the 2008 Georgia War, the pipeline was shut down for ten days at a loss of \$300,000/day downstream.²⁷ BP also shut down the Baku-Supsa pipeline that leads to the Black Sea because Russian ships blockaded the port terminal during the 2008 war. Additionally, BP chose to shut off the BTE pipeline during the 2008 war. Consequently, the only operational pipeline in Azerbaijan was transporting oil to Russia.²⁸

Protecting energy infrastructure is important to governments in the South Caucasus because it provides a means of defending national sovereignty vis-a-vis Russia. Ariel Cohen, a leading expert with the U.S. Institute for the Analysis of Global Security, asserts that “controlling strategic energy corridors from the Caspian Sea to the Black Sea and beyond” was a key impetus for the 2008 Russo-Georgian War. This conflict not only allowed Russia to maintain physical control of key transit pipelines from Central Asia, but ensured that the west viewed the Caucasian region as too unstable a market to continue energy infrastructure investment to bypass Russia.²⁹ Jeffrey Mankoff, former adviser on U.S.-Russia relations at the U.S. Department of State, affirms that Russia’s military action “has only reinforced Russian dominance in the energy sphere, raising the stakes for countries in the region that would seek to escape its grip.”³⁰ As a result, the original Nabucco pipeline project

lost investor backing and western political support. The Nabucco consortium nearly folded and significantly curtailed its new pipeline to Southeastern Europe. Currently, the TANAP system will nearly follow the proposed route of the original Nabucco pipeline and tie into the Nabucco West system. This South Caucasian and Turkish endeavor to develop independent energy routes vis-a-vis Russia will impact the future trajectory of the region. If the South Caucasus, especially Georgia, fail to escape from Russian dominance, the “result would mean the consolidation of Russian geo-strategic supremacy of the Caucasus and, with it, a complete Russian monopoly over trans-Eurasian energy and trade flows.”³¹ The BTE and BTC pipelines have already strengthened Baku’s and Tbilisi’s positions against Moscow’s coercive influence, but the ability to protect future energy projects is critical to maintaining investor confidence until these projects come online.

CEIP in the Southern Energy Corridor

Illegal tapping, vandalism, cyberattacks, and terrorism are four significant threats to regional energy infrastructure; however, the greatest security concern is pipeline routes, which run in close proximity to conflict zones in each country: the Nagorno-Karabakh line of conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia, South Ossetia in Georgia, and Kurdish regions in Turkey.³² This concern is poignant in light of the July 2015 southward expansion of South Ossetia’s border, which absorbed portions of the Baku-Supsa Pipeline.³³ Each country is responsible for pipeline security on its territory, and each government is financially liable to energy companies for losses incurred due to attacks. Thus, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey have all implemented CEIP programs; however, each country utilizes different tools to protect its energy infrastructure.

In order to protect the Azeri portion of the BTC/BTE pipelines, the Government of Azerbaijan established the State Special Protection Service (SSPS), which is a specialized agency in Azerbaijan's Ministry of Internal Affairs (MOIA) that provides 24-hour monitoring and patrolling of pipeline infrastructure with BP training and support. The SSPS protects pipeline infrastructure while BP is responsible for security of the pipeline terminal at Sangachal. In addition to Baku's partnership with BP, the Department of State has employed the Anti-terrorism Assistance Program to increase Azerbaijan's infrastructure protection capabilities. Using this fund, the Regional Security Office has trained with the SSPS approximately 2-3 times per year (20 people per class) and focused on airport security, pipeline security, and major event coordination. The classes have been taught by contractors, often former police chiefs or security personnel. However, the U.S. Embassy in Azerbaijan no longer has funding to continue this training program. Despite this cancellation of this program, Washington and Baku still cooperate in the CEIP sphere.

Perhaps the most successful USG CEIP coordination in the region has been Azerbaijan's Maritime Critical Energy Infrastructure Protection Working Group (MCEIPWG), which began in 2013. This working group meets three to four times per year and provides a forum for myriad Azerbaijani government agencies and industry representatives that are responsible for CEIP in the Caspian Sea to discuss security concerns and work towards coordinating efforts in this arena. The working group still remains an essential vehicle for interagency coordination in Baku. Currently, the participants of the MCEIPWG are working towards drafting a joint action plan to further delineate roles, responsibilities and coordination mechanisms during crisis response in the Caspian. While U.S. Department of Energy initiatives have lost steam in the region, Department of Defense (DoD)

engagement through the MCEIP working group has continued to maintain momentum.

As a transit country, the government of Georgia believes that it is the most vulnerable to diversionary attacks in the region. Additionally, the Georgian government strives to maintain a robust pipeline security program to avoid blame from Azerbaijan or Turkey in the event of an infrastructure attack. Tbilisi's legal responsibility and financial liability led to the creation of the Strategic Pipeline Protection Department (SPPD). Like the SSPS in Baku, the SPPD is a "specialist government agency," within the Georgian MOIA, which partners with BP to provide security to energy pipelines. BP trains, equips, and partially finances this 700 member organization.³⁴ Although there are currently no U.S.-Georgian security cooperation programs in the CEIP arena, BP's role in training the SPPD and SSPS cannot be overstated.

BP has provided critical security and policing training courses including: command and control, tactical surveillance and search operations, winter operations, remote area rescue training, use of fire arms, map reading, first aid, and human rights awareness. In Georgia, BP has trained the SPPD in the proper use of force and use of lethal and nonlethal weapons.³⁵ In addition to training, BP's approach to pipeline security significantly bolsters the effectiveness of regional infrastructure protection. In Azerbaijan and Georgia, BP has enacted a multi-layered "holistic" security program. At the first layer, BP employs community liaison officers to engage the local populace and enfranchise their support in providing intelligence and protecting the pipelines. The second layer is the use of local security to execute horse-mounted patrols along the pipeline route; the final layer is the use of hardened infrastructure, physical obstacles, and technological systems to prevent and monitor attacks on the pipeline network.³⁶ Despite BP's successful training and protection programs in Azerbaijan and Georgia, BP does not have a formal relationship with the Turkish

government as BOTAS, Turkey's state owned energy company, is responsible for the pipeline sections in Turkey. Additionally, the Turkish government has not expressed interest in signing a security agreement with industry; Ankara also has not established a specialized civilian organization to protect its infrastructure and utilizes Gendarmerie forces.³⁷ Consequently, the level of infrastructure security within Azerbaijan and Georgia far exceed that of Turkey.³⁸

The Turkish government must improve its CEIP measures. Energy infrastructure in Turkey has been attacked over fifty times since 1980.³⁹ After the BTC pipeline came online in 2006, this network has been attacked nine times; every incident occurred in Turkey.⁴⁰ One of the most well-known BTC pipeline explosions transpired on August, 5, 2008—merely days before the 2008 Georgia War began. Ankara's official explanation was a Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) attack on the pipeline—as the PKK claimed responsibility for this incident. However, U.S. intelligence officials believe the explosion was the result of software planted into the pipeline system, which deactivated safety protocols and increased pipeline pressure until it caused an explosion. These intelligence analysts also assert that Russia likely committed the cyber-attack and sabotage.⁴¹ This incident presents the possibility that the Russian government targeted the Southern Energy Corridor with cyber capabilities in advance of military action against Georgia. Still, the PKK remains the greatest threat to regional energy infrastructure as this group has attacked pipelines in Turkey on numerous occasions for political purposes as well.⁴² Consequently, Turkey's BOTAS should follow BP's model for community outreach and partnership with state agencies responsible for infrastructure protection. Despite the poor security situation in Turkey, opportunities for CEIP cooperation and improvement exist in the region.

Recommendations for CEIP Improvement

Information sharing is often one of the greatest shortfalls concerning CEIP because governments do not want to admit their vulnerabilities and capability shortfalls—even within NATO. However, there is room for optimism in the South Caucasus. Baku, Tbilisi and Ankara identify weakness and threats through joint CEIP exercises. Since 2006, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey have conducted an annual trilateral exercise called “Eternity.” “Eternity” is a computer-based staff exercise that rehearses coordination and command and control procedures following disruptions to critical energy infrastructure. Although the MOIA plays the lead role concerning infrastructure attacks or disaster response, military officials from Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey have attended the exercise since 2011. In 2014, 48 service members from these countries participated in “Eternity.” The key goals of the exercise are to increase strategic cooperation regarding CEIP of pipelines with the eventual goal of establishing a multinational brigade to protect pipelines in the South Caucasus.⁴³ Developing a multinational CEIP working group, based on the model of Baku's MCEIPWG, could serve as an initial step in creating this multinational CEIP brigade. Additionally, the CEIP working group would provide an information sharing forum for Turkey to participate as it does have the BP relationship for information exchange that Azerbaijan and Georgia share.

To build CEIP interoperability and possibly a multinational CEIP brigade, the governments in the Southern Energy Corridor should strive to transition “Eternity” from a computer-based staff exercise to an infrastructure protection exercise with forces from participating civilian and military agencies. A large-scale infrastructure protection exercise will more effectively stress the communication infrastructure between civil and military units and will test the interoperability of

these agencies, as well as their standing operating procedures, while separated by time and distance and working through the friction of cooperating during a crisis situation.

In light of Russian resurgence, the United States should seek to deepen cooperation in all possible sectors, including energy security. Energy projects have enabled Baku and Tbilisi to strengthen their foreign policy vis-à-vis Moscow; however, Michael Cecire, associate scholar at the Foreign Policy Research Institute in Philadelphia cautions, “What is clear is that the days of taking Georgia’s pro-Western consensus for granted are quickly coming to a close. Russian influence is resurgent across its periphery, from Eastern Europe to the Caucasus to Central Asia, and Georgia remains a long-coveted prize.”⁴⁴ In addition to existing security assistance programs, Washington should examine opportunities to cooperate in the realm of CEIP in order to bolster this capability against possible Russian sanctioned attacks and as a demonstration of support to the region.

In the past, the USG has officially expressed interest in developing ENSEC capabilities in Georgia—to include CEIP. The 2009 U.S.-Georgia Charter on Strategic Partnership outlines bilateral ENSEC goals, which include “increasing the physical security of energy transit through Georgia to European markets.”⁴⁵ In 2013, U.S. Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel stated that energy security is an important aspect of U.S. cooperation with Georgia. Yet, there are no security assistance or cooperation programs in the realm of energy security between the USG and Country of Georgia.⁴⁶ Currently, the MCEIPW conferences in Baku are the only CEIP cooperation in the region. A recent change in Title 10 Security Cooperation Funding could invigorate U.S. cooperation in this field.

Section 2282 Funds, “Building Capacity of Foreign Security Forces,” provide the best method to bolster U.S. CEIP cooperation in the South Caucasus and Turkey. The official authority that governs 2282 Funds—10 U.S. Code 2282

from Section 1205, NDAA, FY2015, P.L. 113-291—was authorized on December 19, 2014. This authorization replaces and codifies Section 1206 Funds, “General Train and Equip” (NDAA FY06), with several distinctions. First, Section 2282 is a permanent authorization and does not need to be renewed by Congress annually. Second, the focus of the Section 2282 shifts from supporting partner nation deployments to Afghanistan (Section 1206) to building the capacity of a country’s national military forces and national-level security forces to conduct counterterrorism (CT) operations. Third, U.S. forces are no longer required to be a participant in the activities or programs that are being funded. Section 2282 Funds may be used to provide equipment, supplies, training, defense services and small-scale military construction. To utilize these funds with non-MoD organizations, CT must be the focus of the operation or functional responsibility of the unit. Although Section 2282 is a Title 10 authorization, the U.S. DoD is not the most effective entity to execute CEIP cooperation in the region.

The area for greatest cooperation likely lies between other USG entities, such as the Embassy RSO, FBI, or Export Control and Related Border Security (EXBS) and partner nation MOIAs. CEIP and CT capabilities, preparation, training, and prevention overlap significantly. Thus, CT training in the region can bolster national CEIP capabilities. The FBI office in Tbilisi is in a unique position to effectively facilitate CT training and capability development in Georgia because the FBI office has already developed relationships and access with the Georgian MIOA. Additionally, FBI representatives at the U.S. Embassy in Tbilisi have expressed interest in training with the MOIA to bolster CT capabilities; however, the FBI has no funds allocated for training or partner nation capabilities development.

The SPPD and Georgia MOIA effectively react to the aftermath of an infrastructure attack and effectively provide physical security to

Georgian pipeline networks, but the criminal investigation of terrorist attacks and prevention of these attacks is lacking. Thus, developing Georgia's criminal investigation techniques would be a beneficial initial step. Few personnel within the MOIA actually conduct CT investigations; Georgia's cyber investigation capabilities are nascent as well. Cyber capabilities in the South Caucasus are important in light of the possible Russian cyber-attack on the BTC pipeline in 2008. Section 2282 Funds could be used to provide cyber investigation equipment, biometric equipment for criminal CT investigations, forensics training, and training in detecting and investigating terrorism financing and money laundering. Currently, the Georgian MOIA lacks the capacity to track terrorism financing in order to prevent future terrorist attacks or limit organized criminal activity. Therefore, the goal of U.S.-Georgian cooperation in relation to CEIP should be building the MOIA CT capacity through training and equipping the MOIA agencies responsible for tracking and investigating terrorist networks and activities in the region. Additionally, the FBI office in Tbilisi can utilize experts from outside the FBI to conduct training in investigation techniques in the fields of CT, cyber, financial crimes, counter narcotics investigation, and forensics to showcase how the USG relies on interagency collaboration to effectively counter terrorist threats.

Section 2282 Funds could also be used to train the SSPS or MOIA in Azerbaijan. The RSO office in Baku has a historical training relationship with the SSPS; however, there is currently no funding for the RSO to continue this training program. The Regional Security Office in Baku affirms that the SSPS requires training in conducting investigations, adhering to rules of evidence, and increasing cyber capabilities to track money laundering and illicit networks. Thus, the FBI or RSO offices utilizing Section 2282 Funds can significantly enhance CT capabilities in Georgia and Azerbaijan—particularly in the field of investigation and prevention—to complement

the physical security training BP already conducts with the SSPS and SPPD.

In Turkey, Section 2282 Funds should be used to train the Turkish Gendarmerie to bolster CEIP capabilities and enhance overall CT capabilities of this unit. The initial training should focus on basic CEIP programs that BP has provided to the SSPS and SPPD: command and control, tactical surveillance and search operations, winter operations, remote area rescue training, use of fire arms, map reading, first aid, and human rights awareness. The RSO office in Ankara could be an effective USG entity to coordinate this training and identify potential trainers in the United States with law enforcement or security backgrounds. Additionally, 2282 Funds could be used to conduct CT investigation and cyber investigation training through the FBI or EXBS sections in Ankara.

Conclusion

Protecting the Southern Energy Corridor is paramount to U.S. and NATO interests because these pipelines serve as the primary conduit to the closest alternative source to Russian energy resources—namely Caspian hydrocarbons. Moreover, if Baku, Tbilisi, and Ankara cannot display the ability and political will to effectively protect the nascent TANAP and TAP projects, then western investment and political support for these projects will likely dry up—similar to the original Nabucco project that fell victim to western divestment. Consequently, the USG should seek to bolster CEIP capabilities in the region with available security assistance programs. Yet, there are areas for optimism in the South Caucasus.

The Turkish government and Turkish energy companies should base their relationship and security policies on the BP model, which has effectively trained and equipped BP's MOIA partners in Georgia and Azerbaijan. Additionally, NATO Allies should seek to develop successful relationships with industry based on the BP

model. While NATO can partner with the SPPD, the SSPS, and Turkish Gendarmerie, the goal of U.S.-Georgian CEIP cooperation should be building the MOIA CT capacity through training and equipping MOIA agencies responsible for tracking and investigating terrorist networks and activities in the region. In Azerbaijan, the USG can utilize the training relationship that already exists between the RSO and SSPS to resume training CT capabilities as well. In Turkey, training with the Gendarmerie must focus on basic CEIP capabilities in addition to CT investigation programs. The USG should utilize Section 2282 Funds through non-DoD entities, such as the RSO, FBI or EXBS, to provide cyber investigation equipment, biometric equipment for criminal CT investigations, forensics training, and training in detecting and investigating terrorism financing and money laundering. Section 2282 Funds are a significant boon to “whole of government” CT development with partner nations because agencies that currently do not have budgets for training, such as the FBI or RSO offices, can now work with their partner nation counterparts to bolster CT capabilities. Moreover, 2282 Funds can be utilized to train and equip most organizations, not only MoD units, with a CT portfolio. While each respective Office of Defense Cooperation (ODC) and country team must utilize the 2282 Funds independently, NATO can bolster CEIP in Armenia, Georgia, and Turkey simultaneously.

The governments in the South Caucasus and Turkey could partner with the NATO ENSEC COE in order to increase utility of the “Eternity” exercise and expand this key leader exercise to include units from the MOIA and MoD. These enhancements will likely increase the interoperability of MOIA and MoD units in Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey in the field of CEIP. Expanding the “Eternity” exercise could also help these nations establish a multinational brigade to protect pipelines in the South Caucasus—one of the stated goals of the “Eternity” exercise. Moreover, creating a

regional CEIP working group—similar to Baku’s MCEIPWG model—would be an effective first step to establishing an interoperable, multinational CEIP brigade that can tie into the “Eternity” exercise. Thus, utilizing the NATO ENSEC COE to expand the “Eternity” exercise warrants further investigations.

Developing new pipeline routes through the Southern Energy Corridor is significant to the future of European energy security, but these projects may never reach fruition without western support and CEIP partnership. Sustained partnership and support will increase transnational cooperation in the South Caucasus, enable Europe to affectively diversify energy suppliers and pipeline routes, and empower Tbilisi and Baku to continue to drift westward from Moscow’s “sphere of privileged interest” during an era of Russian resurgence.

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The Whole of Government Approach Demands Interagency Coordination

By Ira C. Queen
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Any opinions, analysis, recommendations, or conclusions should be attributed to the author, and is not necessary the view of the USCG, DISAM, DSCA, DOD, or the USG

Recently the Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security at the Atlantic Council conducted an analysis of the Geographic Combatant Commands. The Task Force that undertook this endeavor was a mixture of retired senior military officers, diplomats and academics; all of which had experience working at or with various Geographic Combatant Commands. As part of their process, they met with and interviewed many former Geographic Combatant Command Commanders, Ambassadors, and National Security Advisors. The result of their study was a document entitled “All Elements of National Power Moving Toward a New Interagency Balance for US Global Engagement”.

The reason they undertook this study was to make recommendations that would help improve interagency coordination, at the Geographic Combatant Command level, in order to improve foreign and defense policy execution with our allies and partners. Having seen firsthand how disjointed some attempts to implement foreign and defense policy were implemented, I am very glad a group of senior leaders undertook this study, and I hope our government will do something to implement a process that will improve interagency coordination and coordination between our allies and partners. However, this would be no small undertaking.

Having worked at a Geographic Combatant Command, at an Embassy, and for the

Department of State, I have experienced how difficult interagency coordination can be as well as how difficult it is to find out what different countries and organizations are doing with a ‘recipient’ country. Not only are most of the US organizations internally stove-piped, most of the interagency is stove-piped from the rest of the government. Furthermore, most countries will not tell you what they are doing with a ‘recipient’ country and the ‘recipient’ country will not tell you what they are receiving or from whom; they want to receive all the resources they can. This leads to a lot of redundancy and waste of resources; thus, the topics brought out in their study need to be taken seriously, so that we, as a nation, can try to find ways to implement a better system that allows us to coordinate activities with ‘recipient’ nations.

While working in the J5 at European Command and as the Chief of the Office of Defense Cooperation in Bucharest, I witnessed time-after-time how the different Component Commands and organizations failed to coordinate the training of their personnel in or with a host nation as well as a myriad of other military-to-military contact events. Well-meaning officers and NCOs worked tirelessly with different host nations to arrange needed training or military-to-military contact events without knowing other officers and NCOs from another US military organization were

planning similar or even repetitive events with the host nation; a lot of times, these activities were not even coordinated with the US military personnel at the Embassy in country. This was not intentional but caused by a lack of training and understanding. Unfortunately, too many of our officers and NCOs are assigned duties of this nature without receiving the proper training. Too many times in my career, I have learned of training, humanitarian assistance, or military-to-military contact events being cancelled at the last minute, after months of planning, because they did need not meet the goals or objectives outlined in the Geographic Combatant Command Country Plan for that country. Most countries gladly and willingly want to work with the US military, but assume that we all know each other and that we are coordinating amongst ourselves; why would they need to de-conflict our activities with them?

Unfortunately, this lack of synchronization is not limited to the US military. While working for the Department of State, I was constantly running into other agencies that were involved in activities similar to mine, with a 'recipient' country. Not all the time, but enough times to really frustrate me, I would try to find out what the other agency/organization was planning with the 'recipient' country but the other agency/organization was reluctant to share that information. It was as if they were afraid that by us working together their funding would get cut and they would be out of job. At the time, these different agencies/organizations were all involved in Counter Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs but were all conducting their activities independently with the 'recipient' nations, not coordinating their activities. These agencies/organizations were from across the executive branch and for whatever reason, just did not think it important to coordinate their activities with each other—even though they were all operating out of the same embassy. Since there was so little coordination at the embassy level, you can imagine how much coordination was taking place at the regional level.

While I paint a bleak picture, there is hope on the horizon. Recently, steps have been taken to start improving the interagency coordination, but there is still a long way to go.

Impressed with the way the Department of Defense went through the process of the Quadrennial Defense Review, how it provided a strategic plan that forced hard decisions about priorities, and made sure those priorities were reflected in the budget, in 2010 the Department of State and US Agency for International Development issued the first Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR). This was a way to start directing and coordinating the resources of all of America's agencies at the different embassies so that they could advance our national interests and better partner with the US military.

While still not fully implemented, the QDDR calls for the development of Joint Regional Strategies (JRSs) – three-year documents jointly developed by the Department of State and USAID regional bureaus, which identify US foreign policy and development priorities for a given region. It also calls for Integrated Country Strategies (ICSs) – three-year documents developed by an embassy's Country Team, which identify US foreign policy and development priorities for that specific country. Although the JRS and ICS do not focus on military matters, the Security Cooperation Office (SCO) at each embassy does have input into the ICS; in fact, it is their responsibility to make sure the DOD equities are included in the ICS. The JRSs and ICSs are very similar in nature to the Geographic Combatant Command Theater Security Cooperation Plans and Country Campaign Plans, except they include all agencies that have activities in the region/country. Also, just as the different US Military Functional Combatant Commands have worldwide plans, the different functional bureaus inside of the Department of State have Functional Bureau Strategies. As mentioned, this process is not yet fully implemented, but all of the ICSs should be completed soon.

I would also like to point out that USAID has a document entitled “USAID Policy Framework 2011-2015” that provides their staff and partners worldwide with information on their core development priorities, and from this document, for some countries, USAID develops a Country Development Cooperation Strategy (CDCS). The development priorities for a ‘recipient’ country are to be included in the ICS along with the goals, objectives, strategies and policies for every agency/organization at the Embassy.

Having personally experienced disjointed and uncoordinated actions, I am very glad that one of the things that is emphasized in training at DISAM is that all personnel involved in any type of Security Cooperation need to read not only the Theater Campaign Plan and Country Campaign Plan for the region and countries they are working with, but also read all of the Department of State, USAID and other agency/organization documents mentioned above. In fact, the personnel working at the Embassy Security Cooperation Office are supposed to be heavily involved in helping to write the ICS and the Mission Resource Request (MRR).

Another example of forward movement is the ‘Interagency Directorates’ at all of the Geographic Combatant Commands and US Special Operations Command. While the names, staffing levels, and exact composition of each ‘Interagency Directorate’ are different, they all have the same function: to bring in a wide range of perspectives from the many different agencies and organizations outside of the Defense Department. They are all staffed by military members, DOD civilians, and agency partners from throughout the federal government, so they can better execute operations. A few of the organizations and agencies that are represented in these directorates are as follows:

- Department of State
- Department of Treasury
- Department of Energy

- Drug Enforcement Administration
- Customs and Border Protection
- US Agency for International Development
- Immigration and Customs Enforcement
- Department of Justice
- Federal Bureau of Investigation

These ‘Interagency Directorates’ embody a ‘whole of government’ approach. Their staffs can reach out to entities within and outside of the US Government, including academia, think tanks, non-governmental organizations, private businesses and international organizations. In addition, more and more military officers and NCOs are being assigned to work alongside interagency partners within the National Capitol Region. While we have already made some organizational changes, the biggest issue still seems to be in making sure personnel are properly trained and educated and that a ‘cultural’ change takes place within the interagency.

Luckily, the US is not the only country to realize the ‘whole of government’ approach is the only way to move forward. Many countries have taken this approach: the British call theirs the ‘Cross-Whitehall Approach’. The first Cross-Whitehall Conflict and Stabilization Lessons Event took place on 9 November 2010. This event brought together personnel from across the Whitehall conflict lessons community and included representatives from their interdepartmental agency known as the Stabilization Unit (Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Department for International Development and Ministry of Defense) as well as other government departments. Also, there are several studies out on how some of our allies have moved forward, with varying degrees of success, all of which could serve as lessons learned as we move even further toward improving out interagency coordination.

Finally, there is even more good news. In April 2013, President Obama signed Presidential Policy Directive-23 (PPD-23); US Security Sector Assistance Policy. This policy was crafted with the aim of improving the ability of the US to help allies and partner nations build their own security capacity. PPD-23 outlines the fact that the US must pursue a new approach to enable partner nations to provide security for their own people. PPD-23 outlines the goals for Security Sector Assistance, but more importantly, it provides guidelines for all government agencies to ‘plan, synchronize, and implement security sector assistance through a deliberate and inclusive whole-of-government process that ensures alignment of activities and resources with our national security priorities.’(PPD-23 fact sheet). These guidelines emphasize consistency, transparency, synchronization and coordination across all US government organizations. It emphasizes the regional and functional strategies as well as the country strategies mentioned earlier. While PPD-23 has not yet been fully implemented, steps have been taken to start synchronization and coordination across all US Government organizations.

The Department of State, in coordination with other agencies involved in Security Sector Assistance, has developed a plan to implement the strategic planning process described in PPD-23. This plan includes how the Department of State will incorporate interagency assessments, planning, and evaluations into existing and projected interagency planning processes, and outline how key interagency stakeholders will participate and coordinate in each stage of the process. In fact, in March 2014, the Department of State and Department of Defense provided a joint update to Congress on Security Sector Assistance (SSA) PPD Implementation. Through the course of the briefings, it came out that overall, Congress is supportive of Security Sector Assistance investments, but they want to make sure that program dollars are being applied in a synchronized manner across departments

and agencies, but they also want to make sure we are effectively measuring how well these investments are being implemented.

As you can see, there are some steps already being taken toward improving interagency coordination, but as the Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security at the Atlantic Council points out, there is still a long way to go. They provide a lot of valuable information and propose several things we could do to move forward, but, in my opinion, none more important than changing our interagency culture. Until we implement serious efforts to change the interagency culture, we are not going to see the effects we desire. In order to achieve this cultural change, we need to increase personnel exchanges between different agencies and enact reforms and/or legislation such as those that helped create our military joint structure. Also, we need to establish some type of training mechanism that will allow us to “strengthen Security Sector Assistance workforce skills and knowledge of, and capacity for, the full range of Security Sector Assistance activities in the United States Government”. (SSA PPD Implementation Guidance). Thus, we need to enhance training and education programs, which promote interagency cooperation and support for Security Sector Assistance requirements.

About the Author

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Social Media, Public Opinion, and Security Cooperation in Saudi Arabia

By Joshua I. Cummins

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“In just 10 years, I have seen young people become very brave, and I wonder what will happen in the next five years. I think a lot will happen.” -Waleed Abu Alkhair, Saudi civil rights lawyer and activist (Time Magazine, 2012)

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has been experiencing a variety of cultural and social changes over the past decade. There has been a small relaxation in some religious laws, a push for more rights for women, and even an increase in popularity of the United States. A recent study of public opinion in the Middle East over the last 10 years highlighted an interesting case in Saudi Arabia. While Saudi public opinion of the US was in 2003 among the lowest of the study, it ranked among the highest in 2012 (Cummins, 2012). This poses the questions of what has caused these changes in culture and attitudes in Saudi Arabia that have not occurred in other Middle Eastern or Arab countries and how these changes affect US Security Cooperation and overall relations with the United States.

Is it the wide use of social media by the youth population in Saudi Arabia that has caused these changes? Currently, Saudi Arabia is experiencing a youth bulge with nearly 70 percent of the population being 30 years old or younger. (Holmes, 2012) Is it a result of the Arab Spring movement which has spread throughout the Middle East since December 2010? Or

could the change be linked to the King Abdullah Scholarship Program (KASP), which has sent a record number of Saudi students to the United States for their education?

This article analyzes the different types of social change occurring in Saudi Arabia over the last decade including the relaxation of religious laws, the increase in rights for women, and the improving public perception of the United States. This article then examines the role of social media and the KASP on the youth population in Saudi Arabia and determines how this change affects US-Saudi relations. Research was performed in Saudi Arabia by conducting interviews with Department of State personnel at the US embassy in Riyadh and with Security Cooperation personnel at Eskan Village in Riyadh. Research was also conducted in the United States by interviewing and performing survey research on Saudi Arabian students currently studying in the US.

Cultural and Social Change in Saudi Arabia

One of the most delicate aspects of change in Saudi Arabia is the relaxation of religious laws, which are overseen by the Commission for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice, Saudi Arabia’s religious police, which are also known as the mutaween. The mutaween

enforce the separation of men and women, strict dress codes, the observance of daily prayers, and other aspects of Sharia law (Al-Sharif, 2014). The mutaween are known for their oppressive restrictions on Saudi citizens, especially women. In 2002, 15 girls burned to death after the mutaween obstructed efforts to let the girls leave a burning building because they were dressed inappropriately (BBC, 2002). In 2007, nearly a dozen mutaween entered a 28-year-old man's home and beat him to death after they suspected he might be in possession of alcohol (Human Rights Watch, 2007). The mutaween have also tried to restrict internet use, and in 2004 attempted to ban camera phones. However, this was unsuccessful as Saudi Arabia is currently third highest in the world in smart phone usage (Al-Sharif, 2014). The slow process of reining in the mutaween began when King Abdullah took the throne in 2005. By 2012, he had appointed the moderate Sheikh Abdulatif al-Sheikh to be head of the mutaween (Said, 2014). Al-Sheikh has reformed the mutaween by restricting private funding, outlawing the confiscation of phones and personal items, and impeding the ability of the mutaween to chase or physically harm citizens (Hilleary, 2013). He also is in the process of relaxing the religious laws that require businesses to close for nearly 45 minutes during prayer time. Instead, business owners will be allowed to pray inside their business in lieu of walking to the nearest mosque (Said, 2014). However, these reforms have not stopped the mutaween from enforcing their harsh interpretation of Islam. In 2013, two brothers ages 22 and 24, died after their car was forced off a bridge in Riyadh by the mutaween because the boys were playing loud music from their vehicle (Al-Sharif, 2014). In 2014, a British man and his wife were beaten by the mutaween outside a mall in Riyadh after they withdrew money from a female-only ATM (Elwazer, 2014). However, both of these events were caught on camera by cell phones and quickly went viral, which has led to a public outcry and lawsuits against the mutaween. This leaves the Saudi

government in a tough situation as it attempts to balance between public disapproval of the mutaween and a backlash from the conservative religious leaders.

Similarly to religious laws, women's rights were a delicate area of reform for King Abdullah after he ascended the throne in 2005. Under King Abdullah, Saudi Arabia has opened its first co-educational university, clamped down on domestic violence, and appointed the first female cabinet member (Ambah, 2005). Women have also been granted the right to vote on the Shura Council, which is the national body that advises the government and helps with writing laws (Holmes, 2012). More Saudi women are graduating college than men and are being encouraged to enter the workforce. Mixed-gender workplaces are also becoming more common, which is something that would have been unheard of 10 or 20 years ago (Butters, 2009). In what became known as the "lingerie movement," King Abdullah enacted a law in 2011 that stated that women were to replace men in all lingerie shops. This also became the first time that it was legal for women to work in retail stores. Katherine Zoepf (2013) writes, "After the King's decree on lingerie shops, in June, 2011, the Ministry of Labor ordered shops specializing in cosmetics, abayas, and wedding dresses, along with the women's sections of department stores, to begin shifting to all-female Saudi sales staffs as well. The process was called 'feminization.'" However, women's rights activists are dissatisfied with the slow pace of reforms. Women are still prohibited from studying, traveling, working, or even receiving medical treatment unless they receive permission from their male guardian (Human Rights Watch, 2013). Saudi Arabia is the only country in the world where women are unable to drive (Zoepf, 2013). In December 2014, two women were arrested at the Saudi-UAE border when Ms. Al-Hathloul attempted to defy the law by driving into Saudi Arabia (Batrawy, 2014). The two women were held for over two months and transferred to a terrorism court before


finally being released (Mackey, 2014). Women also remain restricted from certain jobs, must wear the long black abaya and a headscarf, and in more conservative areas women are required to wear the niqab, which reveals nothing but their eyes (Zoepf, 2013). As with religious reforms, King Abdullah remained wary of a backlash from religious conservatives who continue to take a hard stance against allowing more rights for women in Saudi Arabia.

Public Opinion in Saudi Arabia

Another change that is occurring in Saudi Arabia is public opinion of the United States. A recent study observed public opinion of the United States in five Middle Eastern countries over a 10-year period while analyzing US foreign policy and found an interesting case in Saudi Arabia (Cummins, 2012). While public approval of the US was among the lowest in the early years of

the study (4 percent approval in 2003 and 2004), the study showed some of the highest approval levels in 2012 (62 percent approval). (See Figure 1 below for the year-by-year numbers) Bivariate analysis was performed on US foreign policy indicators and survey data from several Middle Eastern countries including Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates. (See Figure 2 below for the regional year-by-year numbers) Of the countries, Saudi Arabia had the lowest approval numbers in 2002, 2004, and 2005. However, this changed when Saudi Arabia had the second highest approval in 2007 and 2010. Saudi Arabia was second to Lebanon, which has a significant Christian population that tends to hold much more favorable views of the United States. Saudi Arabia also witnessed the highest approval numbers of the study in 2009, 2011, and 2012.

Figure 1 - Saudi Arabia's Public Approval of the U.S. From 2002-2012



Source: The year-by-year numbers are aggregate means of available Zogby, Pew, and Gallup polling data and represent the percentage of those that indicated favorable views of the United States.

Figure 2: Regional Public Approval of the U.S. Data From 2002-2012

	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
EGYPT	15	13	4	14	22	15	12	33	15	5	14
JORDAN	27	6	10	27	10	20	17	22	19	10	18
LEBANON	34	29	20	37	28	47	32	38	36	23	34
MOROCCO	30	6	11	34	7	15	26	36	13	12	13
PAKISTAN	10	13	21	23	27	16	19	13	17	11	12
SAUDI ARABIA	14	4	4	9	12	40	13	41	24	30	62
TURKEY	35	15	30	23	12	9	12	14	17	10	15
UAE	11	9	14	28	34	N/A	22	36	22	12	28

Source: The year-by-year numbers are aggregate means of available Zogby, Pew, and Gallup polling data. The numbers represent the percentage of the public population that indicated favorable views of the United States. For comparison reason, Saudi Arabia’s approval percentages are highlighted. N/A represents years in which there was no available polling data in that county.

When analyzing the survey data, the obvious question became, “Does US foreign policy affect public opinion of the US in Saudi Arabia?” The study concluded that in 2003 and 2004, the US military intervention in Iraq played a large role in increasing anti-Americanism in Saudi Arabia (Cummins, 2012). Both of those years, Saudi public support for the US was at 4 percent, its lowest of the 10-year study. Therefore, one might conclude that foreign policy has played a role in the recent increase in positive views of the United States in Saudi Arabia. This was most likely the case in 2009 with the election of President Obama after his famous Cairo speech, which led to increases in public approval of the US across the Middle East. However, US foreign policy in the Middle East has been counter to Saudi interests over the past few years. This started when the US called for Egyptian president, Hosni Mubarak, to step down in February 2011. This move shocked and frightened the Saudi government, which was closely allied to Mubarak and saw him as a stabilizing force in the region (Zogby, 2014). Furthermore, the Saudi Arabian government criticized the US for being slow to act when it came to the civil war in Syria. The Saudis have been one of the biggest

opponents to Syrian president, Bashar Assad, and has criticized the US for its reluctance to engage the Syrian dictator. The Saudi government even went so far as to boycott its seat on the United Nations Security Council in opposition to the US-Russia deal to remove Assad’s chemical weapons in 2013 (Worth, 2013). To compound this tenuous relationship, Saudi Arabia was even more disconcerted when it learned that the US was decreasing its economic sanctions on Iran in light of a possible nuclear deal in 2014 (Gause, 2014). Although this resentment might not trickle down to the public population in Saudi Arabia, it certainly does not appear that US foreign policy has improved public views of the US in Saudi Arabia since 2011. So if not foreign policy, then what has led to these changes in culture and public opinion? Some scholars point to wide uses of social media and the KASP, which has led to thousands of students studying in the United States

The Role of Social Media

Another aspect of Saudi culture that has changed dramatically in the last decade – and that might also be contributing to more change –


is the use of social media. Websites like Twitter, YouTube, and Facebook are extremely popular in Saudi Arabia and remain very accessible through computers and smart phones. Jacob Templin (2012) from Time Magazine writes, “Saudis are some of the most active social-media users in the Arab world. According to a recent study by the Dubai School of Government, Saudi Arabia has more Twitter users than any other nation in the region, with around 400,000. They also have around 4 million people on Facebook, second only to Egypt.” This gives young Saudis an avenue for dissent against their government (Holmes, 2012). This is the same dissent that built up in countries like Egypt, Libya, and Syria and eventually led to mass protests, coups, and civil wars. Any sort of public demonstrations or protests remain strictly prohibited in Saudi Arabia, but social media gives young Saudis a way to peacefully vent their frustrations. Social media has played a key role in public issues such as the criticism of the mutaween and women’s rights. After the mutaween forced a car with two brothers off the road, killing both of them in 2013, thousands of Saudis took to social

media to express their outrage. It even forced the head of the mutaween, Sheikh Abdulatif al-Sheikh, to issue a public apology and denounce the actions taken by his religious police (Al-Sharif, 2014). Women also used social media to protest the ban against driving. In all, about 60 women participated in the protest, and many uploaded videos of themselves driving on social media sites such as YouTube (The Guardian, 2013). When one woman was arrested after she posted her video, Saudis quickly went to her defense on Twitter and Facebook, posting more than 30,000 comments within a day of the arrest (MacFarquhar, 2011). It remains illegal for any Saudi to go out on the street and gather several people in a group, but now Saudis can immediately share their ideas with thousands of people on the internet through social media.

The King Abdullah Scholarship Program

A contributing factor to this cultural change could be the rapidly increasing number of Saudi students who are studying in the United States. Over the past 10 years the number of Saudi

Figure 3: Number of Saudi Arabian Students Studying in the U.S. from 2002-2014



Source: These year by year numbers were compiled by the Institute for International Education in their yearly publication, “Open Doors Fact Sheet: Saudi Arabia.” The yearly figures reflect the number of Saudi Arabian students who traveled to the United States in that year on a KASP student visa.

students in the United States has increased by nearly 500 percent (Institute for International Education, 2014). In 2003, only 3,521 Saudi students traveled to the US to study abroad, but in 2014 there were 53,919 who came to the US for their studies. (See Figure 3 for the year-by-year numbers.) This is a dramatic increase that could be having effects on Saudi society. Is it possible those students who travel to the US for their education return to Saudi Arabia with improved views of the US? Saudi students who travel to the US for their education make American friends, wear American clothes, and shop at American malls, which could explain the influx of American brands and stores appearing throughout the country. Taylor and Albasri (2014) write, “KASP is clearly impacting Saudi Arabia. The alumni are bringing their experiences from the United States back to Saudi Arabia and trying to recreate them. The impact that the exposure of American culture has on these students will have an impact on the future of Saudi Arabia.” (p. 117). The KASP could also lead to improved public opinion of Saudi Arabia in the United States as many American students befriend their Saudi classmates (Knickmeyer, 2012). Figure 4 below displays the comparison between the number of Saudi students entering the US and

public opinion of the US in Saudi Arabia before and after 2007.

Figure 4 displays the possible causal relationship between the KASP and public opinion of the US in Saudi Arabia. As is shown, both numbers are significantly higher after 2007 when an influx of Saudi students begins to flood the United States. This theory has also been practiced by the US military for decades. The International Military Education and Training (IMET) program has worked to bring military personnel from around the world to the US for training and education. Miles (2011) writes, “IMET is a State Department security-assistance program, managed by the Defense Department’s Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), to provide professional military training and education to US allies.” This has allowed the US to build strategic partnerships with personnel from partner nations who are rising stars in their respective militaries and who often come into leadership positions in the future. Through the IMET program, they are exposed to the American way of life and ideals, democratic values, respect, individual and human rights, and belief in the rule of law (Miles, 2011). This creates much more positive views of the US military and the US in general, which go a long

Figure 4: Potential Impact of KASP on Public Opinion percentages

	Mean from 2002-2006	Mean from 2007-2014
<i>Public Opinion of the U.S.</i>	8.60%	33.14%
<i>Saudi students in the U.S.</i>	3,951.60	25,194.75

Source: The public opinion numbers were averages of the available Zogby, Pew, and Gallup survey results for the years listed. The Saudi student numbers were averages from the Institute for International education’s yearly publication, “Open Doors Fact Sheet: Saudi Arabia” for the years listed.

way in building important relationships. Is it possible that the KASP is doing for the civilian population what the IMET program has done for the military population?

Discussion of Survey Results of Saudi Students Studying in the USA

To test this theory, research was conducted at Wright State University in Dayton, Ohio to gauge the views of Saudi Arabian students living in the United States. Wright State ranks fifth in the United States in Saudi student enrollment (Taylor and Albasri, 2014). Anonymous Likert scale surveys were dispersed to fifty-five Saudi Arabian students, asking them to self-report on their views of the United States prior to and after leaving Saudi Arabia for the US. The survey also asked students to report their gender, age, and indicate how long they have lived in the US. It included a comment section to allow students to explain why their views of the US changed. The Likert scale surveys were coded from 1 to 5, with 1 indicating “very unfavorable” views of the US and 5 indicating “very favorable” views of the US. The aggregate mean for Saudi students’ views of the US increased from 3.76 (before coming to the US) to 4.05 (after coming to the US). After studying in the US, only 7 percent of Saudi students indicated negative

views of the US (somewhat unfavorable and very unfavorable), while 51 percent indicated “somewhat positive” views, 33 percent indicated “very positive” views, and 9 percent indicated “no opinion.” Another interesting finding was the difference in gender. The aggregate mean for male respondents’ views of the US after studying in the US was 3.97 while the aggregate mean for female respondents’ views of the US after studying in the US was 4.33. The comparison of means between males and females before and after studying in the US is displayed below in Figure 5. When asked to report their views of the US after studying in the US, 42 percent of females indicated “very favorable”; 50 percent of females indicated “somewhat favorable”; and 8 percent of females indicated “no opinion.” When asked to report their views of the US after studying in the US, 27 percent of males indicated “very favorable”; 54 percent of males indicated “somewhat favorable”; 9 percent of males indicated “no opinion”; 5 percent of males indicated “somewhat unfavorable,” and 5 percent of males indicated “very unfavorable.”

Overall, students reported higher approvals of the US after leaving Saudi Arabia to live in the US. While the differences between views before coming to the US and views after coming to the US are not colossal, they do show a positive change. It is also interesting that Saudi women reported higher approval levels than Saudi men.

Figure 5: Comparison of Saudi Arabia Student Perceptions

Saudi Arabia Student Views of the U.S.		
	Males	Females
<i>Before</i>	3.67	4.08
<i>After</i>	3.97	4.33
<i>Difference</i>	0.3	0.25

Source: These numbers were derived from the independent anonymous survey research performed at Wright State University.

This could be attributed to the vast difference in women's rights between the US and Saudi Arabia. When given the chance to write comments on why their opinion of the US might have changed, many students cited the difference in laws, food, and fashion as causing positive changes. Many wrote that they were surprised by the amount of taxes in the US, and others wrote that they were surprised by how friendly people are in the US. When asked why his opinion of the US changed, one male simply responded by writing "girls and freedom."

The US-Saudi Relationship

How does this change occurring in Saudi Arabia affect its relationship with the United States? The simple answer is that it most likely does not affect the relationship. Before some of these cultural changes and when views of the US were very poor, the United States' relationship with the Saudi government remained strong. Since the 1940s, the US has seen Saudi Arabia as a strategic partner in the Middle East. Its vast oil reserves and strategic location in the Middle East made Saudi Arabia a strong ally against Soviet influence during the Cold War and a staunch ally in the War on Terror since September 11, 2001 (Cordesman, 2010). This is reflected in the Security Cooperation partnership between the United States and Saudi Arabia. Since 1950, the United States has been Saudi Arabia's leading defense supplier with Saudi Arabia's accounting for nearly 20 percent of global US Foreign Military Sales (FMS) deliveries amounting to \$62.7 billion US dollars (Blanchard, 2010). Since 2010, the Obama Administration has notified Congress of over \$86 billion in proposed arms sales with Saudi Arabia, which include fighter aircraft, helicopters, armored vehicles, missile defense systems, and related equipment and services (DSCA: Major Arms Sales, 2014). Saudi Arabia has a robust and complicated Security Cooperation partnership with the US. There are three separate Security

Cooperation organizations in Saudi Arabia: the United States Military Training Mission (USMTM) was established in 1953 and works primarily with the Saudi Ministry of Defense and the Saudi Armed Forces under the authority of USCENTCOM (Blanchard, 2010). The Office of Program Management – Saudi Arabia National Guard (OPM-SANG) was established in 1973 and bilaterally trains, operates, and supplies the Saudi Arabian National Guard under the administration of the United States Army Security Assistance Command (USASAC). The Office of the Program Management – Ministry of Interior – Facilities Security Forces (OPM-MOI-FSF) was created in 2008 to ensure infrastructure protection including border security, civil defense, and coast guard operations and is administered by the Department of State and the US military (Blanchard, 2010).

Although the social changes and public opinion in Saudi Arabia might not directly affect the US-Saudi relationship, it could still play an important role. Blanchard argues that Saudi Arabia's domestic political situation with regard to issues such as human rights, religious freedom, and cultural change might be more important to the US-Saudi relationship than ever before (Blanchard, 2014). Cummins and Braziel (2014) also draw the connection between public opinion of the United States in the Middle East and Security Cooperation. When public opinion of the United States is positive, Security Cooperation Officers (SCO) have more access to their counterparts and can more easily develop strong relationships. Conversely, when anti-Americanism is high it can lead to "delays in decision-making, a lack of access, or even put the SCOs life in danger." (Cummins and Braziel, 2014) Therefore, positive increases in public opinion of the US in Saudi Arabia will only help to strengthen the US-Saudi relationship.

Conclusion

King Abdullah passed away at the age of 90 on January 23, 2015. His death came at a delicate time for Saudi Arabia as the kingdom is dealing with the freefalling price of oil, the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), and the call for domestic reforms (Dreazen, 2015). It is unclear in what direction the newly crowned King Salman bin Abdulaziz will take the country. Will King Salman look to appease the youth and move ahead with social reforms, or will he consolidate his power with religious and social conservatives in the country? No matter what King Salman enacts domestically, it appears that the US-Saudi relationship will remain relevant for the foreseeable future.

The research suggests that significant changes are occurring in Saudi Arabia. There does not appear to be one overlying cause, but instead an amalgam of factors such as the widespread use of social media, regional unrest, and the influx of Saudi students traveling to the United States. Public opinion polls in Saudi Arabia show that public opinion of the US in Saudi Arabia has significantly increased over the past 10 years, and surveys of Saudi students in the US suggest that the KASP could be playing a valuable role in this change. What does this possible change mean for the United States? It is unlikely we will see any huge shifts in the US-Saudi relationship, especially in the realm of Security Cooperation, which has been very strong since the 1950s. However, social changes and public opinion of the US can affect a SCO's ability to perform his or her job. Therefore, positive views of the US in Saudi Arabia could lead to more access and more security for SCOs as they live and work in the kingdom. A positive view of the US also means that fewer Saudis will join anti-American terrorist groups such as al Qaeda or ISIS. In 2001, 15 of the 19 9/11 hijackers were Saudi Arabian citizens, and many were in the US on student visas (9/11 Commission Report, 2004). Nearly 15 years later, thousands of young Saudi Arabian

citizens are studying in US colleges, and many are making American friends and returning to their country with positive views of the United States.

The opinions and recommendations expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of Lockheed Martin Corporation.

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The Russian Intervention and the Internal Dynamics of Syria

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The views expressed in this Strategic Insights piece are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. This article is cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.

The Syrian civil war began in March 2011 and has claimed nearly 250,000 lives so far. After over 4 years of internal fighting, the Kremlin has decided to expand its role in this conflict by moving combat aircraft and some ground troops to Syria to support the Bashar al-Assad government. These actions seem like a clear prelude to a direct Russian combat role, although the scope of such an effort is not yet clear. It has started with a limited number of air strikes against the opposition forces fighting Assad. Additionally, Russia is providing the Syrian army with new weapons supplies which that army seems to be absorbing very quickly. The United States has expressed concern about the deployment and is facing the question of how seriously it seeks to oppose increased Russian involvement in this war, and what, if anything, to do about it.

Some strategic context is necessary when addressing this problem. The Russians have intervened in the Syrian civil war to bolster the Assad regime at a time when things are going badly for that government. Since March 2015, various Islamist opposition groups have scored

a series of combat victories. Assad is being battered in the north, east, and central part of the country. The Islamic State's (IS) capture of Palmyra/Tadmor in May gives the organization an important strategic foothold about 130 miles northeast of Damascus. Assad, in an unusual display of frankness, stated in June that his military had become less capable because it had been weakened by desertions and defections.¹ This is a serious problem for him since he leads a regime dominated by his Alawite minority sect, which is only 12 percent of the population at most. Some majority Sunni Muslims, as well as non-Alawite minorities such as the Christians and Druzes, favor the regime over the Islamist opposition, but there is still a tremendously limited manpower pool from which Assad is able to replenish the ranks of his military. On several occasions, the regime managed to avoid significant military defeat only through the actions of the Lebanese Shi'ite militia, Hezbollah, which has deployed around 10,000 militiamen in Syria to support Assad, with around 3,000 operating at any one time.²

In establishing its own policy, the United States is confounded by a lack of potential Syrian allies for influencing the situation. Currently, Syria's dominant internal players are the Assad regime, IS, the Nusra Front (which is aligned with al-Qaeda), and other jihadists and Islamists. Some militant Islamist groups fighting the government are not considered jihadists because they are not

clear advocates of international terrorism and do not proclaim the revolution in Syria as an early step in a more far-reaching global program. They also do not have massive numbers of foreign fighters in their ranks, unlike the jihadist organizations. One of the largest and most important of these groups is Ahrar al-Sham (Free Men of Syria).³ Its leader, Hashim al-Shaikh, has acknowledged close battlefield coordination with the Nusra Front, but has indicated that he would like Nusra to distance itself from al-Qaeda central. This statement is vaguely positive, but not nearly enough reassurance to require even a second look at Ahrar al-Sham as a potential ally. Consequently, Washington lacks powerful potential allies in the northern part of Syria, beyond the Kurdish rebels whose strength is mostly confined to their own region. Things are slightly better in the south where there are a few important nonideological/nonjihadist groups, some of whom have members trained in Jordan with the assistance of the United States.⁴ Unfortunately, jihadist groups operate in the south as well. The nonideological groups are important, but they are nowhere near as significant to Syria's future as IS, Nusra, and the other extremists. Moreover, the nonideological groups are not clearly pro-Western or pro-democracy, and it is not clear if they will forcefully resist the jihadist agenda over time.

Washington currently supports a political solution to the war in Syria which does not involve jihadists or Assad but could allow some of the dictator's former associates to participate in a future government. The Russians clearly support Assad, but they have stated that they are willing to work with Syria's "healthy" opposition to find a political solution.⁵ These statements may be propaganda or, more promisingly, Moscow may be indicating some realism about the impossibility of turning the clock back to a pre-2011 concept of the Syrian state. The Russians have also stated that their military actions are to be targeted directly against IS and other jihadists, whom they view as a serious threat. Russian

Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has stated that supporting the Syrian regime is indispensable to defeating IS.⁶ His colleague, Russian First Deputy Director of Federal Security Sergei Smirnov, has stated that about 2,400 Russian nationals are fighting with IS, and these individuals eventually may pose a terrorism threat to Russia.⁷ Some Russian concerns appear to overlap with U.S. interests, with the greatest differences being over the future role of Assad. The United States is also unhappy to see an expansion of Russian influence in Syria, but this is a double-edged sword for Moscow. Saudi Arabia and most of the other Gulf Arab monarchies fervently detest Assad and will consider Russian efforts to support him to be a direct confrontation against their foreign policy priorities. Relations between Russia and the Gulf could remain poisoned for decades over this decision.

The Russian intervention in Syria therefore is not necessarily a major setback for U.S. policy, but it can evolve into one. Thus, Washington needs to be certain that the Russians understand the type of actions that the United States would consider especially provocative and damaging to bilateral relations. In this regard, Russian aircraft would have no business bombing Kurdish forces, which are fighting IS in areas long abandoned by the Assad regime. Moscow also needs scrupulously to avoid bombing the organizations they themselves have identified as "healthy" and thereby important to a political solution. Moreover, neither the United States nor the Israelis like the idea of Russian aircraft and a strong air defense network so close to Israel. Russia has already agreed to coordinate its military actions with Israel, and it needs to pay strong attention to this obligation.⁸

The United States has only a limited capability to pressure the Russians to withdraw from Syria, but even if this were possible, it may not be the right move. Assad is a vicious dictator, but his one redeeming characteristic is that the IS jihadists are worse. If the regime were to collapse, the war would continue between

competing Syrian factions, with IS threatening to emerge as the dominant player in ever larger parts of the country. IS crimes already include mass executions of prisoners and civilians, drowning prisoners in cages, beheading Western hostages, destroying, and pillaging antiquities on what the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization calls an “industrial scale”—executing children, burning prisoners alive, establishing a sexual slavery system based on the oppression of non-Muslim women, and attempting to eradicate various non-Muslim minorities. If Russian actions prevent the Assad government from collapsing at this time, that may be a tragedy. But an IS takeover of most of the country would be a bigger tragedy. Under these horrific circumstances, the best course for the United States may be to try to build on common ground with the Russians and unrelentingly push for a political solution that marginalizes and defeats the jihadists, but also gets rid of the worst aspects of the Assad dictatorship (including Assad himself). Such a result is probably years, if not decades, away, but no other solution seems possible, so it may be time for a pragmatic reaction to the Russian intervention.

About the Author

Dr. W. Andrew Terrill joined the Strategic Studies Institute in October 2001, and is SSI’s Middle East specialist. Prior to his appointment, he served as a Middle East nonproliferation analyst for the International Assessments Division of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). In 1998-99, Dr. Terrill also served as a Visiting Professor at the U.S. Air War College on assignment from LLNL. He is a former faculty member at Old Dominion University in Norfolk, VA, and has taught adjunct at a variety of other colleges and universities. He is a retired U.S. Army Reserve Lieutenant Colonel and Foreign Area Officer (Middle East). Dr. Terrill has published in numerous academic journals on topics including nuclear proliferation, the

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Endnotes

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Mitigating Ethical Failure in Security Cooperation

By Dr. Carlos Braziel, Joshua I. Cummins, Nicole Tom
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Any opinions, analysis, recommendations, or conclusions should be attributed to the author, and is not necessary the view of the USCG, DISAM, DSCA, DOD, or the USG

Introduction

The Department of Defense (DOD) has been harmed by numerous ethical failures in the recent past. Although these issues can be attributed to a small percentage of those serving in the military, failure to correct them early and effectively could further erode the moral fabric of the force charged with the duty of protecting the United States from external aggression. All DOD employees including members of the Security Cooperation (SC) workforce, and those employed by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) are expected to take their ethical responsibilities seriously. As will be stated elsewhere in this article, given the nature of their work, members of the SC workforce, such as Security Cooperation Officers (SCOs), may find their adherence to ethical principles tested in a variety of occasions. This article will attempt to remind SCOs of their commitment to ethical behavior by exploring the various ethical rules, laws, and regulations pertinent to security cooperation.

Discussion

Competence and character are not mutually exclusive.... They are woven together—they must be” (Chuck Hagel, 2014 as cited in Burns, 2014).

Over the last several years, DOD has faced great scrutiny for the recent number of publicized ethical failures in its ranks. Some of the ethical failures that have caught the eye of the media run the gambit from junior to mid-level military members cheating on exams all the way to senior military leaders falsifying records and abusing power. In August 2013, the Washington Post ran a story about a US Army three-star general who, as Whitlock (2013) points out, improperly received gifts from a South Korean citizen during his tenure as commander. The story detailed how the general illegally accepted gold-plated Montblanc pens, an expensive leather briefcase, and “failed to report a \$3,000 cash gift to a member of his family from” an “unnamed South Korean benefactor” (Whitlock, 2013). Several months later, NBC News ran a story about three US Navy officials accused of accepting gifts of luxury travel, cash, concert tickets and even prostitutes “from a foreign defense contractor in exchange for classified and internal Navy information” (Bratu, 2013).

In the words of Grassgold and Eich (2014), the examples highlighted above, “and other forms of egregious personal behavior, have led to several top military officials being relieved of their commands.” The previous examples also have many high-ranking executive branch

officials, including the current Secretary of Defense, Chuck Hagel, perplexed and concerned about the nature and scope of these ethical lapses in the military. Sources who have previously worked closely with high ranking officials in the military point out that “a culture has developed in which some believe they are above the law” (Nye, 2012). Conversely, some experts say these violations should only be attributed to a very small percentage of the military population (Tilghman, 2014).

However, other experts believe this may be more of an institutional problem, which lies in “poor training, toxic command climates, flawed personnel policies and deeper cultural issues...” (Tilghman, 2014). Hagel’s concerns prompted the appointment of Navy Rear Admiral Margaret “Peg” Klein to serve as the ethical czar for the Department of Defense. As ethics czar, Klein will coordinate “the actions of the Joint Staff, the combatant commands and the military service, she will work directly with the service secretaries and chiefs on the Defense Department’s focus on ethics, character and competence in all activities at every level of command with an uncompromising culture of accountability” Garamone, 2014, para. 3). In addition to Klein’s appointment, the Joint Chiefs reviewed numerous ethical violations of senior military leaders and are implementing aggressive measures to avert future instances of critical judgment lapses. In the words of A. E. Major (2014), “their preliminary findings included that ‘we need to... reinforce that [ethics] training more frequently in an officer’s career’” (p. 58).

More important than ever, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), the DOD agency responsible for managing the SC workforce, must be vigilant in protecting itself when interacting with US industry and partner nations. The men and women who serve in the SC community are often required to cultivate relationships with a variety of organizations and individuals in order to support US foreign policy. In the execution of their duties, SCOs are

expected to maintain professional relationships, uphold the public trust, and put the SC mission before personal gain by adhering to ethical principles, regulations and laws.

The vast majority of members in the SC community have the highest commitment to ethical standards. However, when a member of the community fails to comply with these standards, his or her conduct can call into question the integrity of the work done, not just by that member, but also by the SC community as a whole.

Gifts

A common issue that will arise when SCOs are working abroad is the ethical question of accepting gifts. The act of gift giving can be essential to developing business relationships in some cultures across the globe. From time to time, SCOs are occasionally offered gifts from vendors and foreign governments. It is, however, important to note that in some circumstances, an act that is well-intentioned could be misconceived as an attempt to either bribe or influence SCOs. The DOD preferred method for handling gifts is for federal employees to simply refuse them in order to avoid the appearance of impropriety (Deputy Secretary of Defense, 2003). However, this can be a complicated issue when a SCO is presented a gift by a foreign government - whereby the act of refusing it can potentially damage the relationship between the US and the partner nation. Congress recognizes the importance of gift giving in diplomacy and has consented to federal employees accepting gifts from foreign governments to avoid embarrassing the US government (United States Code, Title 5, 2006). In order to avoid the appearance of impropriety, while balancing the need for relationship development with the host nation counterparts, it is imperative that SCOs understand the following common exceptions for accepting gifts from prohibited sources:

- \$20/\$50 Rule: 5 CFR § 2635.204(a)
- \$375 Rule: 5 CFR § 2635.204(l); DOD 1005.13; 5 USC 7342
- Per Diem Rule: 5 CFR § 2635.204(i)

\$20/\$50 Rule

According to the US DOD Standards of Conduct Office (2012), the most applicable rule for SCOs accepting gifts is 5 CFR § 2635.204(a), otherwise known as the “20/50 rule.” The 20/50 rule states:

An employee may accept unsolicited gifts having an aggregate market value of \$20 or less per source per occasion, provided that the aggregate market value of individual gifts received from any one person under the authority of this paragraph shall not exceed \$50 in a calendar year (US DOD Standards of Conduct Office, 2012).

This rule applies when receiving gifts from sources defined as “prohibited,” that is a source seeking official action, with whom the SCO is doing business, or with whom the US government is doing business (Standards of Ethical Conduct for Employees of the Executive Branch (Exceptions), 2014). This rule states that SCOs may accept unsolicited gifts valued at \$20 or less, “provided that the total value of gifts under this provision from any one person or organization does not exceed \$50 in a calendar year” (United States DOD Standards of Conduct Office, 2012). The SCO cannot settle the surplus value over \$20 to receive the award or present. In order to accept the gift, it must be valued at \$20 or less, or the SCO must purchase the gift for the entire amount [Standards of Ethical Conduct for Employees of the Executive Branch (Exceptions), 2014].

\$375 Rule (Fair Market Value in US Dollars) [Foreign Government]

Another important rule that SCOs should be aware of is the \$375 rule [Standards of

Ethical Conduct for Employees of the Executive Branch (Exceptions), 2014]; Deputy Secretary of Defense, 2003; United States Code, Title 5, 2006; US DOD Standards of Conduct Office, 2012). This rule applies when accepting gifts from the host nation government or the SCO’s military counterparts. Essentially, this rule states that SCOs may accept gifts that do not exceed the fair market value in the US of \$375. This rule applies to multiple gifts given on the same occasion, including gifts to the SCO’s spouse or family members. Gifts exceeding \$375 must be returned to the donor, retained for use within the DOD component, or forwarded to GSA for a utilization decision or disposal. The SCO may also decide to purchase the gift for their Fair Market Value (US DOD Standards of Conduct Office, 2012). For example, if a SCO receives a sword from the host nation valued at \$450, the SCO cannot decide to purchase the sword for the difference between \$375 and the fair market value. Instead, the SCO must purchase the sword for the entire Fair Market Value of \$450. The SCO will work with their ethics officer in each case and write a check to the US Treasury if they choose to keep a gift valued at more than \$375.

Per Diem Rule

Next, we have the Per Diem Rule, which is also referred to as Rule 5 CFR § 2635.204. In basic terms, this particular rule points out that SCOs assigned to duty in the host nation or on official travel may accept gifts from local host nation business representatives based on the following criteria:

1. The market value of the total cost for the gifts (e.g. food, refreshments, and entertainment) in the host nation does not exceed the US per diem rate for the local area.
2. Non-US citizens or members of the host nation government are attending the event.

3. Attendance is part of SCO's official duty to gather/share information and promote US industry.
4. The local business vendor or someone other than the host nation government is funding the food, refreshments or entertainment for the event.

For example, a representative for a US defense contractor is invited to attend a dinner with a local host nation business representative seeking to form a partnership with the US company. As part of his/her official duties, the SCO may accompany the US defense contractor to the dinner just as long as to the market value of both the food and entertainment does not exceed the per diem rate for that foreign locations. As a precaution, SCOs should forward all pertinent information (i.e. location, cost, participates, entertainment) to their Ethics Counselor for a legal determination before agreeing to attend the dinner or meeting.

Other Exceptions

SCOs are permitted to accept modest food and refreshments such as coffee, donuts, and light snacks as a form of hospitality to expedite meetings. For meals made available pursuant to an agreement between the US Government and an organization or foreign government, the value should be deducted from the daily per diem rate (US DOD Standards of Conduct Office, 2012). For events with greater than 100 attendees, SCOs are permitted to officially accept free attendance when participating as a speaker or when the gift of attendance was not given by the event sponsor [Standards of Ethical Conduct for Employees of the Executive Branch (Exceptions), 2014].

SCOs may also personally accept free attendance if they are not speaking at the event, if it is attended in a personal capacity, the leave is authorized, and they are not spending appropriated funds [Standards of Ethical Conduct for Employees of the Executive Branch

(Exceptions), 2014]. An example that would be most appropriate in this case is that where an aerospace company “that is a prohibited source sponsors an industry wide, two-day seminar for which it charges a fee of \$400 and anticipates attendance of approximately 400 people” (Authenticated US Government Information – GPO, 2013, p. 581). As the Authenticated US Government Information - GPO (2013, p. 581) further points out, “an Air Force contractor pays \$2,000 to the association so that the association can extend free invitations to five....officials designated by the contractor” including a SCO. The SCO, in this case, “may not accept the gifts of free attendance...because the contractor specified the invitees and bore the cost of their attendance” (Authenticated US Government Information – GPO, 2013, p. 581). In this example, “the gift of free attendance is considered to be provided by the company and not by the sponsoring association” (Authenticated US Government Information – GPO, 2013, p. 581). As the Authenticated US Government Information - GPO further points out, “had the contractor paid \$2,000 to the association in order that the association might invite any five Federal employees,” a SCO “to whom the sponsoring association extended one of the five invitations could attend if his participation were determined to be in the interest of” the US government. The SCO “could not in any case accept an invitation directly from the non-sponsor contractor because the market value of the gift exceeds \$375” (Authenticated US Government Information – GPO, 2013, p. 581).

Official Travel and Resources

SCOs must also be cognizant of the ethical issues involved with traveling. SCOs can take travel offerings from foreign governments for travel taking place (in its entirety) outside of the US if acceptance is in line with the interests of the US government (US DOD Standards of Conduct Office, 2012). Certain rules also apply to the use of first or premium class travel. SCOs are only

permitted to partake in premium class air travel for specified, limited circumstances. SCOs may only accept premium class air travel if it is obtained as an accommodation upgrade through redemption or frequent traveler benefits, if it is the only accommodation available, or if the mission requires it and it is approved by the designated premium travel approving authority for the SCO.

For example, a SCO may be expected to partake in premium class air travel if he or she is accompanying a minister of a foreign government on official travel. Authorization of premium class air travel should be made in advance of the actual travel; however, if this is not possible then written approval must be obtained from the appropriate authority. When traveling for official duty, SCOs should use US air carriers whenever possible, but SCOs may use foreign air carriers when air travel is provided under a bilateral or multilateral agreement. SCOs are encouraged to exercise prudence when participating in foreign travel for official purposes. Any additional expenses outside of the scope of official duty or official travel are the SCO's financial responsibility and are not chargeable to the US government (US DOD Standards of Conduct Office, 2012).

Post Government Employment

Another issue SCOs must be conscious of, which falls under rule 5 CFR § 2635.502(e) and 5 CFR § 2635.604(a), is the issue of post government employment. SCOs may wish to seek employment after retiring from a US government position, but they must be aware of the rules that apply.

A SCO begins seeking employment when he or she directly or indirectly engages a prospective employer in employment negotiations, through unsolicited communication about possible employment, or by responding to unsolicited communication about possible employment in a way other than a rejection (Standards of Ethical Conduct for Employees of the Executive Branch

(Personal and Business Relationships), 2014; Standards of Ethical Conduct for Employees of the Executive Branch (Disqualification While Seeking Employment), 2014). While seeking employment, a SCO must participate in full disclosure by notifying his or her supervisor or ethics counselor. SCOs should also be aware of the representational prohibitions that may apply. After leaving government service, SCOs should never act for other entities or represent them to the US government with regard to specific issues they personally handled while on active duty (United States Code, Title 18, 2006). The following section outlines the restrictions SCOs may face when seeking employment after government service.

Lifetime Ban

Although SCOs rarely fall in this category, they may face a lifetime restriction in representing an entity in front of a federal agency in which they have participated personally and substantially in contracting matters while in the performance of their official duties (United States Code, Title 18, 2006). Thus, the lifetime ban includes matters in which the SCO approved contract statement of works; prepared and developed solicitations; evaluated contract bids, negotiating contract prices; participating in source selection or approving contract awards. An example of an individual that would fit this category is former SCO who was also a contracting officer responsible for preparing a statement of work for a contract associated with a particular foreign military sales case. Since the SCO participated "personally" and "substantially" in this matter, the SCO's knowledge and influence can provide an unfair advantage if they represent a US defense contractor in front of the US government for this particular contract. However, this lifetime ban does not prohibit former SCOs from working for a different division defense contractor that or "behind-the-scenes" without violating any US disclosure laws.

Two-Year Ban

For two years, after leaving government service, SCOs should not act for another entity or represent the entity to the US government with regard to specific issues or matters that were pending under their official responsibility during their one year period prior to leaving federal service (United States Code, Title 18, 2006). For example, a SCO that was appointed as a contracting officer representative (COR) for a particular contract of a foreign military sales case would fall in this category[1]. Since the responsibility for monitoring the US contractor's performance was a part of the SCO's official duty as a COR, he or she is prohibited from representing the U.S contractor in front of the US government for at least two years.

One-Year Ban

For one year after leaving a senior SCO position (0-7 & above), SCOs may not act for any other entity, with the view of influencing, before the agency they worked for in the past, any official undertaking (United States Code, Title 18, 2006). Due to their senior rank, their mere presence while representing the US defense contractor in front of the US government could result in an inappropriate influence on existing government employees. Therefore, a one-year cooling off period is required.

Conflicts of Interest

Other issues that may arise are conflicts of interest. This, in basic terms, occurs when a SCO personally (and markedly) engages in an official capacity in an undertaking, which has a direct or predictable impact on a SCO's personal, and/or family's financial interests (Code of Federal Regulations (5 CFR 2635.402(b) (i), 201)). SCOs may not accept or demand compensation for performance of official duties and must remain impartial during performance of official duties with either the host nation

government or with private companies. SCOs should also avoid the appearance of impropriety and should notify their supervisor and ethics counselor of approved personal relationships with prohibited sources and themselves, family members, or close friends (US DOD Standards of Conduct Office, 2012).

Conclusion

There are numerous resources available to help SCOs with understanding the vast majorities of ethical rules, policies, and laws. First, the DOD "Standards of Conduct Office" website, which has been cited in the references section of this text, provides a repository of ethics policies, training programs and guidelines for implementing regulations for Army, Navy, Air Force, and DOD agencies.

Second, the Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management (DISAM) has developed an online learning guide to assist the SC community in understanding the various ethical rules and regulation when dealing with international partners and vendors. The DISAM "Ethics for SCOs" online learning guide cannot cover every ethical situation SCOs may experience during their assignments; however, it provides a solid foundation to help them through an issue and make an ethically sound decision that places the interest of the US Government in the forefront.

Lastly, the Ethics Counselor at the Security Cooperation Office or at the CCMD is always a good resource for advice. Ethics Counselors are trained to provide counseling to SCOs and provide written determinations and personal briefings to all incoming and departing SCOs.

Ethical lapses by any member of our community will never be tolerated. As a SCO, you are expected to maintain the highest standards of ethics and integrity in both your professional and personal conduct. Even the perception of impropriety can derail a career and, more importantly, cause the loss of our credibility with the public. Remember, as long

as you include ethics and integrity in the center of your everyday actions, you will protect the credibility of relationships with our international partners and uphold the public trust.

About the Authors

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What SCOs Need to Know About EUM

By Jim Toomey
Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management

Recently, I attended a tri-geographic combatant command (GCCMD) end-use monitoring (EUM) conference in Garmisch, Germany. Aside from enjoying the summer rains and beer, I was able to come away with almost sixteen pages of notes derived not only from the formal presentations but also from informal conversations with security cooperation organization (SCO) folks present. In this simple and hopefully concise article, I hope to share some of the insights I learned there as well as reinforce some of the fundamentals that all SCO personnel should know about EUM.

First and foremost, as Chuck Handal, the Deputy for EUM at the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), emphasized at the beginning of the training, there is really only one official source of EUM policy in DOD: that single source is Chapter 8 of the Security Assistance Management Manual (DCSA Manual 5105.38-M). Chapter 8 is useful for SCOs because, in addition to citing general responsibilities, program goals, legal requirements, etc., it also provides more practical information on how to request both programmed and out-of-cycle funding for enhanced EUM (EEUM) duties, explains compliance assessment visit (CAV) inspection criteria, and describes the procedures foreign partners must follow to request third party transfers and demilitarize US equipment.

Second, the training in Garmisch helped to clarify certain aspects of end-use monitoring that SCOs are often a bit fuzzy on. For example,

although US-sourced night vision devices (NVDs) are generally considered to be articles that require enhanced (or more stringent) monitoring, older generations of NVDs, produced in 1990 or earlier that do not provide thermal imaging capabilities, are not subject to EEUM; similarly, any NVDs that are mounted on a defense platform (i.e., integrated into a vehicle), are also not subject to EEUM. In addition, although SCOs are expected to account for and ensure the physical security of most EEUM items, which are defined in Table C8.T4 of the SAMM, communications security (COMSEC) equipment is the primary responsibility of the National Security Agency (NSA). Moreover, DOD's EUM responsibilities are not limited to just those items transferred via the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) process; our Golden Sentry program also mandates that SCOs provide monitoring and verification on any and all other items furnished by DOD, regardless of the means or channel, and SCOs may also be called upon to assist the Department of State and Department of Commerce with their separate EUM programs.

Third, discussions at the conference with individual SCO reps showed that some EUM managers, even after DISAM training, still didn't fully understand the differences between routine and enhanced EUM. Routine end-use monitoring applies to all articles and information/technology transferred by DOD to foreign parties that is not subject to EEUM. Although

this technically means that everything down to lab equipment and tents should be periodically inspected, routine checks should be focused on certain major systems, such as tanks, other ground vehicles, aircraft, warships, crew-served weapons, firearms, and those platform-mounted NVDs I mentioned earlier. Routine monitoring is more informal than EEUM, requiring quarterly verification of just a few routine items in a partner's inventory by basic sight checks, reporting by other US Government (USG) personnel, or even open source reports, such as pictures of equipment that show up in local newspapers. By contrast, enhanced monitoring requires 100 percent inventories of items within 90 days of delivery plus regular inspections (at least annually) of all EEUM items, and the inspections are normally done exclusively by US citizens using more thorough procedures, such as serial number checks and inventories of all sub-components accompanying an item or system. Last but not least, since EEUM may require looking at millions of items spread out throughout a large foreign country, these duties can be funded or supported by DSCA using SA Admin or T-20 funds; on the other hand, routine checks are conducted at no cost to the USG, and are expected to be performed in the course of other SCO duties.

Finally, the training also revealed new requirements on the horizon for SCOs. As a quick example, routine EUM in the past could be documented via hard copy reports kept on file at the SCO; however, there is a looming change to the SAMM that will very soon require all routine checks to be annotated in electronic reports via the Security Cooperation Information Portal (SCIP).

So as not to put my readers to sleep, I'll end my sermon on EUM here, but not before mentioning that further assistance is available to you if you need help. DISAM, of course, offers a plethora of in-residence and online courses that can provide initial or refresher training on EUM.

DSCA's Directorate for Security Assistance is also available for information, advice, and guidance on everything from CAV schedules to expense codes for EEUM funding requests (see John Oswald at john.a.oswald2.civ@mail.mil). For general SCIP-related issues, there's the SCIP Help Desk at dsca.sciphelp@mail.mil. And, depending on the issue, other agencies or individuals, such as State Department's Office of Regional Security and Arms Transfer (PM/RSAT), the Defense Technology Security Administration (DTSA), and your COCOM EUM program manager, are always available to support the SCO.

About the Author

Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) James Toomey is an associate professor at the Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management (DISAM). During his military career, he served as a Sub-Saharan African (48J) Foreign Area Officer (FAO) for the Army for nearly fourteen years, with tours of duty at five U.S. embassies overseas, including service as a Defense Attaché in Haiti and Liberia, as the Chief, Central Africa Branch at the U.S. European Command (EUCOM), as the first Chief of the Office of Security Cooperation for South Sudan, and as the first Senior Defense Official/Defense Attaché in Djibouti. He holds four degrees related to international business/political affairs, including master's degrees from Columbus State University and the University of Florida, where he also obtained a certificate in African studies.

US Army Africa Assists with Democratic Republic of the Congo's National Logistics School

By Major Noreen Mallory, USA
US Army Africa G-4 Logistics

VICENZA, Italy -- Recently, the Democratic Republic of Congo National Logistics School graduated its fourth class since 1983. US Army Africa and several international organizations were involved in the curriculum and instruction at the school in Kinshasa, DRC.



More than 600 graduates from all corners of the DRC and branches of the military including Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior security forces participated in the six month program of instruction.



The DRC Logistics School Initiative started with a shared vision between the leadership of the DRC, US Department of State and the European Union. The combined effort for this institutional build began in November 2014. According to Don Brown, a senior contractor, the DRC, US State Department, EU partner nations, US Army Training and Doctrine Command and US Army Africa teams worked to design an institution that would form the foundation for a new generation of DRC logistical leaders and increase the DRC's Land Forces readiness posture.

The DRC identified and consolidated talented individuals from all branches of the military to support the pilot program. EU participants contributed to the infrastructure, providing the facilities, building and furniture. The US Department of State and its contracting representative the Crisis Response Company worked with the commandant and cadre of the logistics school to develop the program of instruction and the course curriculum.

USARAF's Directorate of Logistics acted as the lead integrator, providing the overall concept, planning, coordination, oversight and subject matter expertise focusing on designing a sustainable institution. Support for the school came from several organization

including the Army Logistics University, the Army's Regionally Aligned Force, 3rd Brigade 1st Infantry Brigade from Fort Bliss, Texas. The RAF provided a six person Institutional Logistics Assistance Team known as an ILAT.

The ILAT worked with the DRC National Logistics School to assist cadre, instructors and



commandant with every facet of the schools development, management and execution.

Sgt. 1st Class Antonio Flores provided non commissioned officer guidance at the tactical level with the school's cadre and students. ILAT members also assisted DRC cadre by providing subject matter experts in food service, transportation, ammunition, maintenance, armament repair, fuel supply operations and supply management. Flores stressed the 'train as you fight' approach to training, constantly reminding Congolese soldiers "What you learn here are the foundations of your skills. Learn it, remember it and master it."

Congolese cadre provided instruction through classroom lectures, hands-on and practical exercises dedicated to expanding student's abilities to conduct various sustainment operations in austere environments. The ILAT also assisted with the refinement of course



instruction, teaching techniques and developing enduring academic institutional policies.

After six months of intensive classroom and hands-on training, students held a graduation ceremony attended by representatives of the DRC's National Congress and director of Military Operations, USARAF, the US Department of State, European Union and numerous senior military leaders. The event culminated with 612 graduates conducting a pass and review.

The DRC intends to conduct two iterations of the logistics school per year for the next several years in order

to build continuity within its forces. The next iteration of the logistics school will start July 2015, where the DRC cadre, US Department of State, international partners and the USARAF ILAT will continue their collective efforts to develop a sustainable and enduring logistics institution.



SATMO, AMEDD Troops Train Armenian Medics During Historic Mission

By Adriane Elliot and Richard Bumgardner
USASAC Public Affairs



Capt. Chris Hudson (left), Mobile Training Team Leader from the US Army Security Assistance Training Management Organization, along with US Ambassador Richard M. Mills, Jr. (center) and the Armenian Minister of Defense Seyran Ohanyan (right), observe Armenian medics as they demonstrate combat lifesaving techniques before the official graduation ceremony for 12 Armenian Army medics. These 12 medics completed the US Army's 68W, Health Care Specialist, and then a modified Army Basic Instructor Course, which certifies them as the first instructors for the newly formed Armenian Combat Medic School in Yerevan, a first of its kind for the Armenian Armed Forces. (Photo by Master Sgt. Efreem Dicochea, AMEDDCS)

US Soldiers made history this summer by bringing the Army's Health Care Specialist School and Army Basic Instructor Course (ABIC) to the Armenian Armed Forces.

Mobile Training Teams (MMTs) from the US Army Security Assistance Training Management Organization (SATMO) at Fort Bragg, NC, and the Army Medical Department Center & School (AMEDD) out of Fort Sam Houston, TX, deployed to Yerevan, Armenian's capital, June 2 to Sept 2.

"The overall goal was to establish a combat medic school within the Armenian military," said Capt. Chris Hudson, the MTT officer in charge. "We taught the entire 68Whiskey Advanced Individual Training (AIT) course-Day One through graduation-to the Armenian medics."

Hudson said AMEDD instructors provided Armenian soldiers the same level of training US troops receive to become qualified health care specialists. The Armenian students, who are expected to stand up their military's first combat medic school in January, learned to administer



FC Victor Miranda, from the 232d Medical Battalion at Fort Sam Houston, trains Armenian students on the Sked Basic Rescue System. Miranda and four other medic instructors traveled to Armenia to provide US Army's 68W, Health Care Specialist, training to 12 Armenian medics. After medic training these newly qualified Armenian medics completed a modified Army Basic Instructor Course which certified them as the initial instructors for the newly formed Armenian Combat Medic School in Yerevan, a first of its kind for the Armenian Armed Forces. (Photo by Capt. Chris Hudson, SATMO)

emergency medical treatment to battlefield casualties; prepare patients for evacuation to next level of care, manage equipment and supplies for patient care; and many other skills that has made the US military a leader in saving lives on the battlefield.

“This enables the 12 Armenian instructors to develop their own program of instruction for medic training that will best suit their needs in the future and will be a great force multiplier for generations to come,” said Master Sgt. Efre Dicochea, AMEDD’s Advanced Training Branch Chief instructor who served as the MTT NCOIC.

Helping a partner nation build a program as complex as a combat medic school from the ground up meant teaching in phases. After AMEDD successfully completed Phase One of the training, a four-man SATMO MTT arrived to teach Phase Two—the modified ABIC. Upon completion of ABIC, students become qualified Army instructors.

According to Hudson, being an expert combat medic is one thing; being an instructor and teaching others how to be a medic is a different story.

“It was the train-the-trainer methodology,” said Hudson. “The Armenians will now be trainers and subject matter experts, able to establish their school and have the capacity to train 50-60 medics at a time.”

ABIC Instructor Sgt. 1st Class Romeo Santos said he benefitted greatly from the experience, learning as much from the students as he instructed.

“We’ve definitely made lasting friendships with the students,” said Santos. “They gave us their time and patience, and the cultural gap really didn’t exist after the first day.”

Fellow ABIC instructor Sgt. 1st Class Johnny Gonzales agreed, and said everyone benefits on the battlefield from shared knowledge.

“It’s the continuity of care,” said Gonzales. “Whoever gets injured, or whatever medic comes upon them—either Armenian or US Soldier—that

person would receive quality care right on point of injury.”

Hudson, an Engagement Branch team leader with SATMO, accompanied both training teams to Armenia. Having conducted five previous MTT deployments, Hudson provided the transitional expertise and continuity.

Phase Three of the training, slated for 2016, will deploy US observer/controllers to evaluate the first class of Armenian medics at their new school.

“These troops will probably be a part of NATO peacekeeping forces and in order to deploy units for NATO missions, they must train to NATO standards, so they’ll have a corps of medics that are NATO qualified,” said Hudson.

The benefit to the US Army is an increased interoperability that is the trademark of security assistance operations. For SATMO, deploying MTTs like this showcase their motto: “Training the World, one Soldier at a Time.”

SATMO is a subordinate organization to the US Army Security Assistance Command (USASAC), headquartered at Redstone Arsenal, AL.

First A-29 Afghan Pilots Graduate: Ready for Combat

By Senior Airman Ceaira Tinsley
23d Wing Public Affairs



MOODY AIR FORCE BASE, GA. -- A new era for the Afghan Air Force began today with the first graduation of eight A-29 Super Tucano pilots.

The 81st Fighter Squadron graduated the first class of combat-ready attack pilots, Dec. 18, here.

“The extraordinary dedication of these pilots and the sacrifices these graduates have made will help establish a secure, stable and unified country,” said US Air Force Col. John Nichols, 14th Flying Training Wing commander. “They are enabling the future of Afghanistan, a future that will be decided by the Afghans themselves.”

Even though the 81st FS was reactivated in January 2015, the students began their

classroom training in February and launched their first A-29 training sorties in March.

“I stood on this stage 11 months ago to reactivate this perilous squadron,” said Nichols. “We had three planes, a handful of motivated Airmen and no students. Now less than a year later, we are graduating our first class.”

According to Nichols, this graduation is the first step in fulfilling the requirement from the International Security Assistance Force to conduct training outside of Afghanistan.

These pilots are the first of 30 who will be trained by the 81st FS over the next three years. “We are here this morning to graduate eight Afghan patriots who will execute a vitally important mission,” Nichols added. “That mission, simply stated, is to help build the future of Afghanistan. This graduation marks the first step in this monumental undertaking.”

After about 337 training days, the pilots are ready just in time as the Afghan Air Force’s current light air support aircraft, the Mi-35 attack helicopter, reaches the end of its service life in January 2016.

“I’m just so proud of the Afghan pilots and even prouder of the instructors who were able to

make them fighter pilots in less than a year,” said US Air Force Maj. Gen. James Hecker, 19th Air Force commander. “Pilot training takes two to three years, depending on which aircraft they are going to but they had to push it up because they need to get over there and get in the fight.”

“When they get back there, we know that there is an ongoing fight that is mainly US led, as far as in the air,” Hecker added. “Now they are going to be up in the air with us helping their Afghan soldiers who are on the ground.”

Although the graduation marks the end of the Afghan students’ training journey, the mission will continue through advisory support in Afghanistan.

“Today does not mark the end, but the beginning of our continued friendship between the 81st Fighter Squadron and the 355th Fighter Squadron,” said Lt. Col. Jeffrey Hogan, 81st FS commander. “Please know that we are shoulder-to-shoulder with you and we look forward to many years of working together. Soon we will be flying together over the skies of your homeland. Shortly thereafter, you will be in combat defending your nation but most importantly, you will defend that soldier or commando on the ground.”

As the ceremony came to a close, Nichols left the graduates with a few parting words.

“To those charged with securing the skies over Afghanistan, I congratulate you.” said Nichols. “You have honored your country through your selfless actions, you have honored your families through your perseverance and the future of both will be better because of your dedication.

“You will now have a powerful vote in the governance of your country through the air arm of Afghanistan’s defense forces,” Nichols added. “We all want to improve the world for our family, our children, and our grandchildren ... it is clear to me that you are no different.”

Naval Education and Training Security Assistance Field Activity

Mission/Who We Are/What We Do/How We Do It

[Courtesy NETSAFA Website]

NETSAFA is the US Navy's agent for international education and training. NETSAFA coordinates training support to international governments and international organizations. As a field activity of the Naval Education and Training Command (NETC), NETSAFA serves as a focal point for all security assistance training program issues, coordination and advice within the US Navy.

NETSAFA is an integral part of Navy International Programs Office (Navy IPO); therefore, NETSAFA works with and through the Navy IPO chain of command. NETSAFA is committed to providing world class customer training support first and foremost and will work to assure the best training support for our international partners through Navy, other government institution and organizations, and private industry providers.

HOW TO REQUEST NAVY TRAINING

1. Initial country program requests for Navy training should be presented at the annual Security Cooperation Education and Training Working Groups (SCETWG) sponsored by the Unified Commands. This allows advance planning and maximum flexibility to accommodate country requests.

2. The Navy will make every effort to accommodate country requirements as long as space is available in the course requested.

3. Requests for out of cycle training and changes to training programs should be addressed to the appropriate NETSAFA Country Program Manager. Messages, phone calls, fax, and email are acceptable. These requests should include course title, location, MASL number, grade of student to attend, and funding/programming information.

4. Host Nations can view and search on-line for all services training available using the I-SAN web. An I-SAN web account for the Host Nation may be obtained by the Security Cooperation Officer (SCO). Additionally, this catalog is available online at the NETSAFA website at <https://www.netsafa.navy.mil>.

5. For training not found in this catalog, contact the appropriate NETSAFA Country Program Manager to discuss potential solutions to meet requested training.

Country/Region Managers – 850-452-xxxx
(See Ext. below)

DSN: 459-XXXX - Fax: (850) 452-2953
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