

# The **DISAM** **Annual**

Annual, Vol. 2

A Journal of International Security Cooperation Management



**SECURITY  
COOPERATION:  
A GLOBAL  
OUTREACH**

# ***The DISAM Journal of International Security Cooperation Management***

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# ***The DISAM Journal of International Security Cooperation Management***

Welcome to the second *DISAM Journal of International Security Cooperation Management*. We circulate this annual hard copy publication as a supplement to our online journal, which can be accessed at [www.disamjournal.org](http://www.disamjournal.org). We hope the online journal is a benefit to you in your daily activities and welcome any feedback you may have for improvement at: [DISAM.Journal@disam.dsca.mil](mailto:DISAM.Journal@disam.dsca.mil). We had hoped to be able to provide greater detail in the article on security assistance legislation and policy; however, the lack of an approved FY 14 budget has limited the values presented to that of the proposed Presidential budget request as developed by the US State Department. Since this is at least a starting point for the year, we did not want to delay getting the word out any further.

Also, we have included a copy of an interview with the recently retired Director of DSCA, VADM William Landay, who departed his post on 6 September 2013. As the Director with three years of experience in that position, he is uniquely positioned to provide insights on the current and future state of our security cooperation and assistance programs. This interview was originally published in the DSCA publication *Defense Solutions for America's Global Partners*. There are a number of excellent articles that members of the community may want to read through in that publication, which can be viewed online at <http://www.defensemedianetwork.com/stories/defense-security-cooperation-agency-defense-solutions-for-americas-global-partners-premiere-edition>.

There is also a very informative article from the *American Forces Press Service* where Gen Carter Ham (USA, Ret) describes how AFRICA Command is helping grow partner nations' capabilities, and another wherein Gen Ham and ADM James Stavridis (USN, Ret) praise the State Partnership Program's contributions to the Combatant Commands.

We hope you will find our topical articles on the Security Cooperation Information Portal (SCIP), FMS Logistics Communication, and a number of training articles authored by our DISAM faculty of interest and benefit in your daily activities. Also, please take a look at the article on Lessons Learned/Best Practices—this can provide the SC community a significant tool to optimize organizational goals and learn from past activities in a variety of areas—FMS cases, Joint Exercises, Humanitarian and Disaster Relief just to note a few. We welcome any lessons learned/best practice inputs from the field in hopes of circulating them to assist other organizations better their processes/practices.

Finally, we have a wide variety of topics in the “Perspectives” section with something of interest to all in our community—from a review of *The Heart of Islam: Enduring Values for Humanity*, to “French Defense Exports...,” to “Hints for the Security Cooperation Officer” and “Civilian Diplomatic Attire.” Please let us know if you found this edition particularly helpful in your organization, in addition to any recommendations for future editions: [Gregory.sutton@disam.dsca.mil](mailto:Gregory.sutton@disam.dsca.mil).

DR. RONALD H. REYNOLDS  
Commandant



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# Fiscal Year 2013

## Security Cooperation Legislation

By Kenneth W. Martin  
Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management

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**Please note that this summary is not legal advice and may not be relied on for official purposes. The reader should confer with one's assigned general counsel for any related legal analysis or advice.**

### Introduction

Each year, *The DISAM Annual* publishes a summary of the legislation that impacts US security assistance, security cooperation, and other related international programs. This report is intended to alert all security assistance and security cooperation community members to the collective changes or continued requirements in legislation that will influence program planning and implementation for the coming years. As has been done in the past, the report is in outline form, with key topics highlighted to facilitate locating specific statutory references.

This article does not include the funding allocations for FY2013 security assistance pending a required discretionary spending report by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to the congressional appropriations committees. This year's appropriations legislation was finally enacted as the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2013, P.L.113-6, 26 March 2013. DOD appropriations for FY2013 was included as Division C of P.L.113-6 as a "complete appropriation" and the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs appropriations (S/FOAA) for FY2013 was included in Title VII, Division F of P.L.113-6 as a continuing resolution for the entire year based on FY2012 appropriations. As a reference, this FY2012 appropriation is the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act (S/FOAA), 2012, Division I, P.L.112-74, 23 December 2011, which was included *The DISAM Annual*, volume 1. However, final security assistance funding for FY2012 and proposed funding for FY2014 can be viewed within a 200-page Secretary of State Executive Summary distributed on 10 April 2013 and be viewed on the Department of State website: [\[www.state.gov/documents/organization/207305.pdf\]\(http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/207305.pdf\). Late passage and enactment of P.L.113-6 precluded inclusion of any detailed FY2013 funding.](http://</a></p></div><div data-bbox=)

The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), Fiscal Year 2013, was enacted on 2 January 2013 as P.L.112-239. No foreign affairs or foreign relations authorization acts were passed and enacted for FY2013.

The following three pieces of legislation are to be further summarized in this article as they related to US security assistance and security cooperation. The highlights of the three laws are provided:

- National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), Fiscal Year 2013, P.L.112-239, 2 January 2013
  - ◊ Authorizes \$211,000,000 in Missile Defense Agency funding to be used for the Israeli Iron Dome program
  - ◊ Extends Section 1021, NDAA, FY2005, authorizing assistance during FY2013 to Colombia to combat narcotics trafficking and terrorism
  - ◊ Extends Section 1022(d), NDAA, FY2004, authorizing assistance to law enforcement agencies during FY2013 conducting counterterrorism activities
  - ◊ Authorizes the transfer of surplus MRAPs and spare parts to non-profit US humanitarian demining organizations
  - ◊ Authorizes the provision of small-scale military construction under the "Section 1206 BPC" program and extends the entire authority through FY2014
  - ◊ Extends Section 1207(f), NDAA, FY2010, authority for non-reciprocal exchange of foreign defense military or civilian personnel through FY2016
  - ◊ Replaces the expired 1207(n), NDAA, FY2012, authority for BPC counterterrorism forces in East Africa and Yemen with Section 1203, NDAA, FY2013, BPC assistance

- through FY2014 or until the “1207” Global Security Contingency Funds (GSCF) is fully operational
- ◇ Authorizes the use of not more than \$508,000,000 in FY2012 or FY2013 Air Force O&M to support operations and activities of the Office of Security Cooperation–Iraq (OSC-I)
  - ◇ Also authorizes OSC-I to conduct non-operational, institutional training activities during FY2013
  - ◇ Extends Section 1234, NDAA, FY2008, authorizing not more than \$450,000,000 in logistical support during FY2013 to coalition forces in Afghanistan
  - ◇ Authorizes the use of up to \$200,000,000 in DOD O&M to support the Commanders’ Emergency Response Program (CERP) in Afghanistan
  - ◇ Authorizes DOD, with concurrence of DOS, to transfer already in-country, no longer needed, non-excess defense articles and related services to Afghanistan military and security forces to be exercised by 31 December 2014
  - ◇ Extends Section 1233, NDAA, FY2008, authority to use DOD O&M to reimburse key cooperating for logistical and military support in connection with US military operations in Afghanistan
  - ◇ Extends the DOD Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund (PCF) authority through FY2013
  - ◇ Amends Section 1513, NDAA, FY1999, for the removal of satellites and related items from the USML
  - ◇ Authorizes US participation as staff members of Headquarters EURCORPS
  - ◇ Authorizes US participation the European Air Transport, Air-to-Air Refueling and other Exchanges of Services (ATARES) program
  - ◇ Authorizes the pilot program through FY2015 on Special Defense Repair Fund (SDRF)
  - ◇ Authorizes the FY2013 Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program to be funded at \$519,111,000
  - ◇ Authorizes the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) to be funded.
- Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2013, Division C, P.L.113-6, 26 March 2013.
    - ◇ Earmarks \$30,000,000 in defense-wide O&M for the Combatant Commander Initiative Fund (CCIF)
    - ◇ Appropriates \$108,759,000, but with a rescission of \$35,000 to be applied, for the Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid (OHDCA) program
    - ◇ Appropriates \$519,111,000, but with a rescission of \$166,000 to be applied, for the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program
    - ◇ Earmarks not less than \$8,000,000 of Defense Health Program appropriations for HIV prevention educational activities in connection with US military training, exercises, and humanitarian assistance activities conducted in African nations
    - ◇ Appropriates \$1,159,263,000, but with a rescission of \$370,000 to be applied, for the DOD drug interdiction and counter-drug activities
    - ◇ Continues the prohibition of no DOD funds to be used to approve or license the sale of F-22A aircraft
    - ◇ Continues the prohibition of DOD funding any training program involving a unit of a nation’s security forces or police if the Secretary of Defense has received credible information from the Secretary of State of gross human rights violations being committed
    - ◇ Authorizes the transfer of not more than \$200,000,000 in DOD O&M during FY2013 to the DOS Global Security Contingency Fund (GSCF)
    - ◇ Authorizes the use of FY2013 DOD appropriations for the Israeli Cooperative Program
    - ◇ Authorizes the transfer of up to \$15,000,000 in Navy O&M to the USPACOM Asia Pacific Regional Initiative (APRI) program
    - ◇ No FY2013 appropriations for DOD, IMET, FMFP, EDA, PKO, or “1206 BPC” or DCS licenses are to be made available for Chad, Yemen, Somalia, Sudan, Democratic Republic of the Congo, or Burma to support military training or operations that include children soldiers
    - ◇ Earmarks not more than \$1,650,000,000 in FY2013 OCO DOD O&M for payments to reimburse key cooperating nations providing

support to US military forces in Operation Enduring Freedom

- ◇ Appropriates \$325,000,000 in DOD FY2013 OCO funding for the Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund (AIF)
- ◇ Appropriates \$5,124,167,000 in DOD FY2013 OCO funding for the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF)
- ◇ Authorizes not more than \$200,000,000 in Army O&M to fund the Commander's Emergency Response Fund (CERP) in Afghanistan
- ◇ The DOD Afghanistan Resources Oversight Council (AROC) is to approve the financial and activity plans for any ASFF project in excess of \$50,000,000, any CERP project in excess of \$5,000,000, and all AIF projects
- ◇ Authorizes up to \$508,000,000 in Air Force O&M for use of DOD to support the funding of operations and activities of the OSC-I and security assistance teams.
- Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs (S/FOAA), [for FY2013], Title VII, Division F, P.L.113-6, 26 March 2013
  - ◇ Continues FY2012 security assistance funding levels into FY2013 as follows (includes any rescissions to be applied):

<b>Program</b>	<b>Appropriations</b>
Economic Support Fund (ESF)	\$3,001,745,000
International Narcotics Control & Law Enforcement (INCLE)	1,061,100,000
Non-Proliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining, & Related Programs (NADR)	509,113,000
Peacekeeping Operations (PKO)	302,818,000
Foreign Military Financing Program (FMFP)	5,210,000,000
International Military Education & Training (IMET)	105,788,000

- ◇ However, the Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funding levels for FY2013 (no rescissions are to be applied) are slightly modified as follows:

<b>Program</b>	<b>Appropriations</b>
Economic Support Fund (ESF)	\$3,119,896,000 (vice 2,761,462,000)
Non-Proliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining, & Related Programs (NADR)	120,657,000 (no change)
Peacekeeping Operations (PKO)	81,000,000 (no change)
Foreign Military Financing Program (FMFP)	1,102,000,000 (no change)

- ◇ The Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund (PCCF) is to receive no funding in FY2013.
- ◇ Amends Section 451, FAA, authorizing up to \$100,000,000 in assistance for unanticipated contingencies during FY2013.
- ◇ Authorizes FY2013 funding assistance for the purpose of demilitarizing or disposal of cluster munitions.
- ◇ Requires consultation with Congress prior to funding any promotion of democracy or protection of human rights in Syria.
- ◇ The Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund (PCCF) is to receive no funding in FY2013.
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- ◇ Authorizes FY2013 funding assistance for the purpose of demilitarizing or disposal of cluster munitions.
- ◇ Requires consultation with Congress prior to funding any promotion of democracy or protection of human rights in Syria.

### Reference Sources

The following abbreviated titles will assist in identifying principal sources of information used in this article. The laws and associated congressional reports can be viewed at the Library of Congress “Thomas” web page located at <http://thomas.loc.gov>.

- SAMM: *Security Assistance Management Manual*, DSCA 5105.38-M, 3 October 2003, with changes. It is maintained electronically and can be viewed on the DSCA web page at <http://www.dca.mil/samm/>.
- FAA: Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, Public Law (P.L.) 87-195, 4 September 1961 [22 U.S.C. 2151, et seq.].
- P.L. 87-510: Migration and Refugee Act of 1962, P.L. 87-510, 28 June 1962 [22 U.S.C. 2601]
- AECA: Arms Export Control Act, as amended, P.L. 94-329, 30 June 1976 [22 U.S.C. 2751, et seq.].
- P.L. 96-8: Taiwan Relations Act, P.L. 96-8, 10 April 1979.
- P.L. 96-533: Peace Corps Act, Title VI, P.L. 96-533, 16 December 1980.
- P.L.99-177: Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, Title II, P.L.99-177, 12 December 1985.

- P.L. 99-239: Compact of Free Association, P.L. 99-239, 14 January 1986.
- P.L. 99-415: Anglo-Irish Agreement Support Act of 1986, P.L. 99-415, 19 September 1986.
- P.L. 101-179: Support for East European Democracy (SEED) Act of 1989, P.L. 101-179, 28 September 1989.
- P.L. 101-510: National Defense Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1991, P.L. 101-510, 5 November 1990.
- P.L. 102-484: National Defense Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1993, P.L. 102-484, 6 October 1992.
- P.L. 102-511: Freedom for Russia and Emerging Eurasian Democracies and Open Markets (FREEDOM) Support Act (FSA) of 1992, P.L. 102-511, 24 October 1992.
- P.L. 103-160: National Defense Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1994, P.L. 103-160, 30 November 1993.
- P.L. 104-164: To amend the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and the Arms Export Control Act to make improvements to certain defense and security assistance provisions under those Acts, to authorize the transfer of naval vessels to certain foreign countries, and for other purposes, P.L. 104-164, 21 July 1996.
- P.L. 104-201: National Defense Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1997, P.L. 104-201, 23 September 1996.
- P.L. 105-85: National Defense Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1998, 18 November 1997.
- P.L. 105-261: National Defense Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1999, 17 October 1998.
- P.L. 106-113: Making Consolidated Appropriations for the Fiscal Year ending September 30, 2000, and for Other Purposes, P.L. 106-113, 29 November 1999.
- P.L. 106-429: Making Appropriations for Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs for the Fiscal Year ending September 30, 2001, and for Other Purposes, P.L. 106-429, 6 November 2000.
- P.L. 107-115: Kenneth M. Ludden Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, Fiscal Year 2002, P.L. 107-115, 10 January 2002.
- P.L. 108-136: National Defense Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2004, P.L. 108-136, 24 November 2003.

- P.L. 108-287: Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2005, P.L. 108-287, 5 August 2004.
- P.L. 108-375: Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2005, P.L. 108-375, 28 October 2004.
- P.L. 109-163: National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, P.L. 109-163, 6 January 2006.
- P.L. 109-364: National Defense Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2007, P.L. 109-364, 17 October 2006.
- P.L.109-469: Office of National Drug Control Policy Reauthorization Act of 2006, P.L.109-469, 29 December 2006.
- P.L. 109-472: Department of State Authorities Act of 2006, P.L. 109-472, 11 January 2007.
- P.L. 110-116: Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2008, Division A, P.L. 110-116, 13 November 2007.
- P.L. 110-161: Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2008, Division J, P.L. 110-161, 26 December 2007.
- P.L. 110-161: Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, 2008, Division L, P.L. 110-161, 26 December 2007.
- P.L. 110-181: National Defense Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2008, P.L. 110-181, 28 January 2008.
- P.L. 110-417: Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, P.L. 110-417, 14 October 2008.
- P.L.110-457: Child Soldiers Prevention Act of 2008, Title IV, P.L. 110-457, 23 December 2008.
- P.L. 111-08: Department of State, Foreign Operation, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2009, Division H, P.L. 111-08, 11 March 2009.
- P.L. 111-32: Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009, P.L. 111-32, 24 June 2009.
- P.L. 111-73: Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009, P.L. 111-73, 15 October 2009.
- P.L. 111-84: National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, P.L. 111-84, 28 October 2009.
- P.L. 111-88: Further Continuing Resolution, 2010, Division B, P.L. 111-88, 30 October 2009.
- P.L. 111-117: Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2010, Division F, P.L. 111-117, 16 December 2009.
- P.L. 111-118: Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2010, Division A, P.L. 111-118, 19 December 2009.
- P.L. 111-383: Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2011, P.L.111-383, 7 January 2011.
- P.L.112-10: Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2011, Division A, P.L.112-10, 15 April 2011.
- P.L.112-10: Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2011, Division B, Title XI, P.L.112-10, 15 April 2011.
- P.L.112-74: Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2012, Division A, P.L.112-74, 23 December 2011.
- P.L.112-74: Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2012, Division I, P.L.112-74, 23 December 2011.
- P.L.112-81: National Defense Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2012, P.L.112-81, 31 December 2011.
- P.L.112-239: National Defense Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2013, P.L.112-239, 2 January 2013.
- P.L.113-6: Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2013, 26 March 2013.
- P.L.113-6: Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2013, Division C, P.L.113-6, 26 March 2013.
- P.L.113-6: Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2013, Division F, P.L.113-6, 26 March 2013.
- P.L.113-6: Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs, [Continuing Resolution for 2013], Title VII, Division F, P.L.113-6, 26 March 2013.

### **Legislation for Fiscal Year 2013**

#### **National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), Fiscal Year 2013, P.L. 112-239, 2 January 2013**

- HR4310 was introduced in the House on 29 March 2012 to be later reported out of the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) on 11 May 2012 with H.Rpt. 112-479 and with H.Rpt. 112-479, Part II, on 15 May 2012. The House passed the bill on 18 May 2012.

- HR4310 was discharged by the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) on 4 December 2012 with amendments. No accompanying SASC report was filed. The Senate passed the amended bill on 12 December 2012. A conference was held and reported out on 18 December 2012 with H.Rpt. 112-705. The House and Senate approved the conference report on 20 and 21 December 2012 respectively.
- HR4310 was enacted on 2 January 2013 as P.L.112-239 with Division A being the DOD authorization for FY2013.
  - ◊ Division B was the military construction authorization.
  - ◊ Division C was the Department of Energy National Security Authorizations and Other Authorizations.
  - ◊ Division D provided the Funding Tables.

### **Division A—Department of Defense Authorizations**

#### **Title II – Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation**

#### **Subtitle C – Missile Defense Programs**

#### **Section 221 – Prohibition on the Use of Funds for the MEADS Program**

- No funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act or otherwise made available for FY2013 may be obligated or expended for the medium extended air defense system (MEADS).

#### **Section 222—Availability of Funds for Iron Dome Short-Range Rocket Defense Program**

- Of the funds authorized to be appropriated for FY2013 for research, development, test, and evaluation, defense-wide, and available for the Missile Defense Agency, \$211,000,000 may be provided to the Government of Israel for the Iron Dome short-range rocket defense program.

#### **Section 223—Authority for Relocation of Certain AEGIS Weapons Systems Assets between and within the DDG-51 Class Destroyer and AEGIS Ashore Programs in order to meet Mission Requirements**

- The Secretary of the Navy may transfer AEGIS weapon systems equipment with ballistic missile

defense capability to the Director of the Missile Defense Agency for the use by the Director in the AEGIS Ashore System for installation in the country designated as “Host Nation 1.”

### **Title X—General Provisions**

#### **Subtitle B—Counter-Drug Activities**

#### **Section 1008—Extension of the Authority to Establish and Operate National Guard Counterdrug Schools**

- Amends Section 901(c), Office of National Drug Control Policy Reauthorization Act of 2006, P.L. 109-469, 29 December 2006, originally authorizing the Secretary of Defense to prescribe regulations for the Chief of the National Guard Bureau to establish and operate, or provide financial assistance to the States to establish and operate not more than five “National Guard counterdrug schools.”
  - ◊ The Western Regional Counterdrug Training Center, Camp Murray, WA, replaces The National Interagency Civil-Military Institute (NICI), San Luis Obispo, CA as one of the five schools.
  - ◊ The four remaining training schools authorized by Section 901(c) include:
    - » The Multi-Jurisdictional Counterdrug Task Force Training (MCTFT), St. Petersburg, FL
    - » The Midwest Counterdrug Training Center (MCTC), Johnston, IA
    - » The Regional Counterdrug Training Academy (RCTA), Meridian, MS
    - » The Northeast Regional Counterdrug Training Center (NCTC), Fort Indiantown Gap, PA
- The purpose of these schools is for the National Guard to provide training in drug interdiction and counterdrug activities and drug demand reduction activities by federal, state, local, and foreign counter-drug/counter-narcotics law enforcement agencies IAW Section 1004, NDAA, FY1991, as amended, P.L. 101-510, 5 November 1990.
- Further, authorizes the Secretary to expend no more than \$30,000,000 for these five schools in any fiscal year.

**Section 1010—Extension of Authority to Support Unified Counterdrug and Counterterrorism Campaign in Colombia**

- Amends Section 1021, NDAA, FY2005, as amended, P.L. 108-375, 28 October 2004, authorizing DOD to provide assistance to Colombia during FY2013 (vice FY2012) to combat both narcotics trafficking and terrorism.

**Section 1011—Extension of Authority for Joint Task Forces to provide Support to Law Enforcement Agencies Conducting Counter-Terrorism Activities**

- Amends Section 1022(b), NDAA, FY2004, as amended, P.L. 108-136, 24 November 2004, authorizing DOD to provide support to law enforcement agencies during FY2013 (vice FY2012) conducting counter-terrorism activities.

**Subtitle F—Miscellaneous Authorities and Limitations**

**Section 1053—Authority to Transfer Surplus Mine-Resistant Ambush-Protected (MRAP) Vehicles and Spare Parts**

- Authorizes the transfer of surplus MRAP vehicles and spare parts to non-profit US humanitarian demining organizations for purposes of demining activities and training of such organizations.
- The transfer is to be made on a loan basis with the costs of operation and maintenance of the vehicles to be borne by the recipient organization and any other conditions as determined by the Secretary of Defense as being appropriate.
- The congressional defense committees are to be notified in writing not less than sixty days prior to transfer of such vehicles or spare parts.

**Section 1063—Report on Strategic Airlift Aircraft**

- Note: less than ninety days after enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit a report to Congress to include, inter alia,
  - ◊ An assessment of the feasibility and advisability of obtaining a Federal Aviation Administration certification for commercial use of each of the following: (1) commercial variant of the C-17A, retired C-17A, and retired C-5A aircraft.

- ◊ A description of all actions required, including any impediments to such actions, to offering retired C-5A or retired C-17A aircraft as excess defense articles (EDA) to US allies or for sale to Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) carriers.
- ◊ A description of the actions required for interested allies or CRAF carriers to take delivery of such aircraft, including the actions, modifications, or demilitarization necessary for such recipients to take delivery of such aircraft, and provisions for permitting such recipients to undertake responsibility for such actions.

**Title XII—Matters Relating to Foreign Nations**

**Subtitle A—Assistance and Training**

**Section 1201—Modification and Extension of Authorities Relating to Program to Build the Capacity of Foreign Military Forces**

- Amends Section 1206(b)(1), NDAA, FY2006, as amended, P.L.109-163, 6 January 2006, to also authorize the provision of small-scale military construction activities.
  - ◊ Not more than \$750,000 may be obligated or expended under a small-scale construction program, and
  - ◊ Not more than \$25,000,000 may be obligated or expended under all small-scale construction programs.
- The DOD \$350,000,000 annual “**Section 1206**” program is extended through 30 September 2014 (vice 2013).

**Section 1202—Extension of Authority for Non-Reciprocal Exchanges of Defense Personnel between the US and Foreign Countries**

- Amends Section 1207(f), NDAA, FY2010, P.L. 111-84, 28 October 2009, authorizing by agreement the non-reciprocal exchange of foreign defense ministry military or civilian personnel by extending the authority through 30 September 2016 (vice 2012).

**Section 1203—Authority to Build the Capacity of Certain Counterterrorism Forces in Yemen and East Africa**

- Essentially replacing the now expired Section 1207(n), NDAA, FY2012, P.L. 112-81, 31 December 2011, authority to the Secretary of Defense, with Secretary of State concurrence, to enhance:
  - ◊ The ability of the **Yemen Ministry of Interior** Counter Terrorism Forces to conduct counterterrorism operations against al Qaeda and its affiliates in the Arabian Peninsula,
  - ◊ The capacity of national military forces, security agencies serving in a similar defense function, other counterterrorism forces, and border security forces of **Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Kenya** to conduct counterterrorism operations against al Qaeda, al Qaeda affiliates, and al Shabaab, and
  - ◊ The capacity of national military forces participating in the **African Union Mission in Somalia** to conduct counterterrorism operations against al Qaeda, al Qaeda affiliates, and al Shabaab.
- Authorized assistance is to include the provision of equipment, supplies, training, and minor military construction.
  - ◊ Value of minor construction provided to Yemen in a fiscal year may not exceed \$10,000,000, or
  - ◊ Value of minor construction provided to Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, and to countries participating in the African Union Mission in Somalia in a fiscal year may not exceed \$10,000,000.
- In general, DOD O&M for this program in a fiscal year may not exceed \$75,000,000 (\$150,000,000 in total) for:
  - ◊ Yemen, or
  - ◊ Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Kenya, and to countries participating in the African Union Mission in Somalia.
- The congressional armed services, foreign relations, and appropriations committees are to be notified not later than thirty days prior to providing this assistance.
- This authority is to expire the earlier of either:
  - ◊ The date on which the Global Security Contingency Fund (GSCF) authorized by

Section 1207, NDAA, FY2012, P.L. 112-81, 31 December 2011, achieves full operational capability, or

- ◊ 30 September 2014.

**Section 1204—Limitation on Activities under State Partnership Program (SPP) Pending Compliance with Certain Program-Related Requirements**

- No SPP activities are to be carried out after 28 February 2013 until the Secretary of Defense submits the final regulation required by Section 1210(a), NDAA, FY2010, P.L. 111-84, 28 October 2009, to the congressional armed services and foreign relations committees regarding the use of DOD funds to pay the costs incurred by the National Guard in conducting SPP activities.
  - ◊ DODI 5111.20, **State Partnership Program (SPP)**, was promulgated on 14 December 2012 by USD(P).

**Subtitle B—Matters Relating to Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan**

**Section 1211—Authority to Support Operations and Activities of the Office of Security Cooperation in Iraq (OSC-I)**

- Amends Section 1215(c), NDAA, FY2012, P.L. 112-81, 31 December 2011, authorizing the use of not more than \$508,000,000 in USAF, FY2012 or FY2013 O&M, to support operations and activities of OSC-I and security assistance teams in Iraq.
- Also provides a new Section 1215(f) in NDAA, FY2012, authorizing the Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, to authorize OSC-I to conduct non-operational training activities during FY2013 in support of the Iraqi MoD and Counter Terrorism Services personnel in an institutional environment.

**Section 1216—Extension and Modification of Logistical Support for Coalition Forces Supporting Certain US Military Operations**

- Extends Section 1234, NDAA, FY2008, as amended, P.L. 110-181, 28 January 2008, authorizing the use of not more than \$450,000,000 in FY2013 DOD O&M to provide supplies,

services, transportation (including airlift and sealift) and other logistical support to coalition forces supporting US military and stabilization operation in now just Afghanistan. Former authorities included Iraq.

### **Section 1218—One-Year Extension of Authority to use Funds for Reintegration Activities in Afghanistan**

- Amends Section 1216, NDAA, FY2011, as amended, P.L. 111-383, 7 January 2011, extending the Afghanistan Reintegration program authority through FY2013, limiting the funding to \$35,000,000 (vice \$50,000,000) in DOD O&M, and amending the funding closure to “obligate at the close of 31 December 2013” (vice “ultimize at the close of 31 December 2012”).

### **Section 1219—One-Year Extension and Modification of Authority for Program to Develop and Carry Out Infrastructure Projects in Afghanistan**

- Amends Section 1217, NDAA, FY2011, as amended, P.L. 111-383, 7 January 2011, to authorize the use DOD O&M for the Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund (AIF) as follows:
  - ◊ Up to \$400,000,000 in FY2012 funding to be available through FY2013, and
  - ◊ Up to \$350,000,000 in FY2013 funding to be available through FY2014.

### **Section 1221—Commanders’ Emergency Response Program (CERP) in Afghanistan**

- Amends Section 1201, NDAA, FY2012, P.L. 112-81, 31 December 2011, authorizing the use of up to \$200,000,000 (vice \$400,000,000) in DOD FY2013 O&M funding for CERP in Afghanistan.

### **Section 1222—Authority to Transfer Defense Articles and Provide Defense Services to the Military and Security Forces in Afghanistan**

- Authorizes the Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, to transfer non-excess defense articles from DOD stocks without reimbursement, and provide defense services in connection with such transfers to the military and security forces of Afghanistan.

- The aggregate replacement value of all such defense articles transferred and the provided defense services in any fiscal year may not exceed \$250,000,000.
- Defense articles eligible for transfer are to include those that:
  - ◊ Were present in Afghanistan as of the date of the enactment of this Act (2 January 2013),
  - ◊ Immediately before transfer were in use to support operations in Afghanistan, and
  - ◊ Are no longer required by US forces in Afghanistan.
- Any transfers are subject to the authorities and limitations of Section 516, FAA, except:
  - ◊ Section 516(b)(1)(B)—DOD funds are not to be expended in regard to the transfer
  - ◊ Section 516(e)—DOD funds are not to be expended for crating, packing, handling, and transportation
  - ◊ Section 516(f)—Advance 30-day notification of significant military equipment (SME) or articles valued \$7,000,000 (original acquisition cost) or more
  - ◊ Section 516(g)—Aggregate value of articles to be transferred may not exceed \$450,000,000.
- No articles may be transferred or services may be provided under this authority until fifteen days after a report to the congressional armed services, foreign relations, and appropriations committees is provided by the Secretary of Defense describing the DOD equipment and other properties in Afghanistan. This report is to include, inter alia,
  - ◊ An assessment of the ability of Afghanistan to sustain the costs associated with receiving, possessing, and using the articles to be transferred, and
  - ◊ A determination and certification by the Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, that the transfers are in the US national interest, and the articles are required by Afghanistan to build its capacity to restore and maintain peace and security in that country.
- Afghanistan units eligible to receive these articles are to include national army, air force, navy, and guard forces; police forces; and border security forces.
  - ◊ Nongovernmental or irregular forces (such as private militias) are specifically not included.

- This authority may not be exercised after 31 December 2014.
- This authority is in addition to the Section 516, FAA, grant EDA authority, and not to be counted in the annual aggregate worldwide ceiling value of Section 516(g), FAA, for \$425,000,000.

**Section 1227—Extension and Modification of Authority for Reimbursement of Certain Coalition Nations for Support Provided to US Military Operations**

- Amends Section 1233, NDAA, FY2008, as amended, P.L.110-181, 28 January 2008, in the use of FY2013 DOD O&M funding to reimburse key cooperating nations for logistical and military support provided by those nations in connection to US military operations in Afghanistan.
- The value of this authority for FY2013 is not to exceed \$1,650,000,000 with the amount for Pakistan not to exceed \$1,200,000,000.
  - ◊ Additionally, none of this funding or prior fiscal year funding is to be used for reimbursement to Pakistan for claims of support when the ground lines of supply through Pakistan were closed.
  - ◊ No funding may be used for reimbursements to Pakistan until the Secretary of Defense certifies to the congressional armed services committees that Pakistan:
    - » Is maintaining security along the ground lines of communications (GLOC) through Pakistan to Afghanistan, and
    - » Is taking demonstrable steps to:
      - ◆ Support counterterrorism operations against various militant extremist groups in Pakistan,
      - ◆ Disrupt the conduct of cross-border attacks from bases in Pakistan against US, coalition and Afghanistan security forces located in Afghanistan, and
      - ◆ Counter the threat of IEDs to include their flow into Afghanistan.
    - » This certification may be waived by the Secretary if certified, with justification, to be in the US national security interests.

**Section 1228—Extension and Modification of Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund (PCF)**

- Amends Section 1224(h), NDAA, FY2010, as amended, P.L. 111-84, 28 October 2009,

extending the DOD program authority for counterinsurgency assistance to Pakistan security forces through FY2013.

- No PCF funding is to be provided until the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of State, certifies to the congressional armed services and foreign relations committees that Pakistan is making significant efforts to counter IEDs and is cooperating with the US in countering terrorism.
  - ◊ This certification may be waived if the Secretary, in consultation with the Secretary of State, that it is in the US national security interests to do so.

**Subtitle E—Satellites and Related Items**

**Section 1261—Removal of Satellites and Related Items from the US Munitions List (USML)**

- Amends Section 1513, NDAA, FY1999, P.L.105-261, 17 October 1998, for the removal of **satellites and related items** from the USML, required by section 38, AECA.
- Accompanying but separate from the submission to Congress of the first notification after the date of the enactment of this Act under Section 38(f), AECA, requiring a thirty day congressional notification prior to the removal from the USML, the President is to provide a determination that the removal is in the US national security interests.
- No satellites or related items may be exported, re-exported, or transferred, directly or indirectly, to:
  - ◊ The governments of the Peoples' Republic of China or North Korea, or any government that is a state sponsor of terrorism,
  - ◊ Any entity or person in or acting for or on behalf of such government, entity, or person, or
  - ◊ May be launched in the country of such government, or as part of a launch vehicle owned, operated, or manufactured by such country or any entity or person in or acting for or on behalf of such government, entity or person.
- The President may waive such export or transfer prohibition on a case-by-case basis if not later than thirty days before doing so, the President:
  - ◊ Determines it is in the US national interest to do so, and

- ◊ Notifies the appropriate congressional committees of such determination.
- Any license or other authorization to export satellites and related items to a country with respect to which the US maintains a comprehensive arms embargo shall be subject to a presumption of denial.

**Section 1264—End-Use Monitoring of Certain Satellites and Related Items**

- As a result of moving satellites and related items from the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) USML and being subject the Export Administration Regulations (EAR, the President [Secretary of Commerce] shall provide for the end-use monitoring of such satellites and related items.

**Subtitle F—Other Matters**

**Section 1274—Administration of the American, British, Canadian, and Australian Armies’ Program**

- Authorizes the Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, to enter into agreements with Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom land forces program known as the **American, British, Canadian, and Australian Armies’ Program**.
- Any required funding for US participation shall be made from DOD O&M.
- Any agreement under this program shall expire not later than five years after enactment of this Act.

**Section 1275—US Participation in Headquarters EUROCORPS**

- The Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, may authorize participation of members of the armed forces as members of the staff of **Headquarters EURCORPS** for the purpose of supporting the NATO activities of the NATO Rapid Deployable Corps EUROCORPS.
  - ◊ Not more than two armed forces members may participate as members of the headquarters staff until Secretary of Defense submits a report to the congressional armed services committees with the following:
    - » Certification that participation of more than two members is in the US national interests,

- » Any benefits to be gained by the participation of additional members,
- » Description of participation plans for the additional members to include grades and posts to be filled, and
- » Description of the costs associated with the additional participation.
- DOD O&M funds are available to pay the US share of operating expenses of the headquarters and to pay the costs of armed forces member participation.
  - ◊ No funds may be used under this Section to fund the pay or salaries of armed forces who participate as members of the staff of the NATO Rapid Deployable Corps.
- For the purpose of this Section Headquarters EURCORPS refers to the multinational military headquarters, established on 1 October 1993, which is one of the High Readiness Forces (Land) associated with the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps of NATO.

**Section 1276—DOD Participation in European Program on Multilateral Exchange of Air Transportation and Air Refueling Services**

- The Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, may authorize the participation of the US in the **Air Transport, Air-to-Air Refueling and other Exchanges of Services program (ATARES Program)** of the Movement Coordination Centre Europe.
- Participation is limited to reciprocal exchange or transfer of air transportation and air refueling services on a reimbursable basis or by replacement-in-kind or the exchange of transportation or refueling services of equal value.
- US balance of executed flight hours may not exceed 500 hours and the US balance of executed flight hours for air refueling may not exceed 200 hours.
- The US participation in ATARES shall be IAW a written arrangement entered into by the Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, and the Movement Coordination Centre Europe.
  - ◊ The agreement is to include detailed equitable cost sharing or other arrangement

- ◇ Any unequal exchange or transfer of air transportation or refueling services shall be liquidated not less than once every five years.
- ◇ US equitable share of operating expenses of the Movement Coordination Centre Europe and the ATARES consortium may come from DOD O&M.
- The authority in this Section shall expire five years after first entering into a written agreement.

**Section 1285—Pilot Program on Repair, Overhaul, and Refurbishment of Defense Articles for Sale or Transfer to Eligible Foreign Countries and Entities**

- Authorizes the Special Defense Repair Fund (SDRF) to repair, overhaul, or refurbish in-stock defense articles in anticipation of sale or transfer of such articles to eligible countries or international organizations under law.
- For initial funding, the following shall be credited to the SDRF:
  - ◇ Not more than \$50,000,000 from amounts authorized to be appropriated for FY2013 Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) as determined by the Secretary of Defense may be reprogrammed.
  - ◇ Any collection from the sale or transfer of defense articles from DOD stocks that were repaired, overhauled, or refurbished with the SDRF that are not intended to be replaced in which the sale or transfer is made pursuant to Section 21(a)(1)(A), AECA, , the FAA, or another provision of law.
  - ◇ Notwithstanding Section 37(a), AECA, any cash payment from the sale of DOD stocks repaired, overhauled, or refurbished with SDRF tha are intended to be replaced.
- The total amount in the SDRF at any time may not exceed \$50,000,000.
- SDRF may not pay for storage and maintenance of such articles or pay any other costs associated with the preservation or preparation for sale or transfer.
- Any sale or transfer of articles repaired, overhauled, or refurbished by the SDRF shall be IAW the AECA, FAA, or another provision of law authorizing such sale or transfer.
- The authority for the SDRF shall expire on 30 September 2015.

**Title XIII—Cooperative Threat Reduction**

**Section 1301—Specification of Cooperative Threat Reduction Programs and Funds**

- **Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) programs** are programs specified in Section 1501, NDAA, FY1997, P.L. 104-201, 23 September 1996 [50 U.S.C. 2362 note].
- Specified CTR programs include the following with respect to states of the former Soviet Union (FSU):
  - ◇ Programs to facilitate the elimination, and the safe and secure transportation and storage, of nuclear, chemical, and other weapons and their delivery vehicles.
  - ◇ Programs to facilitate the safe and secure storage of fissile materials derived from the elimination of nuclear weapons.
  - ◇ Programs to prevent the proliferation of weapons, weapons components, materials, and weapons-related technology and expertise.
  - ◇ Programs to expand military-to-military and defense contacts.
- Specified CTR programs include the following with respect to states outside the former Soviet Union:
  - ◇ Programs to facilitate the elimination, and the safe and secure transportation and storage, of chemical or biological weapons, weapons components, weapons-related materials, and their delivery vehicles.
  - ◇ Programs to facilitate safe and secure transportation and storage of nuclear weapons, weapons components, and their delivery vehicles.
  - ◇ Programs to prevent the proliferation of nuclear and chemical weapons, weapons components, and weapons-related military technology and expertise.
  - ◇ Programs to prevent the proliferation of biological weapons, weapons components, and weapons-related military technology and expertise, which may include activities that facilitate detection and reporting of highly pathogenic diseases or other diseases that are associated with or that could be utilized as an early warning mechanism for disease outbreaks that could impact the Armed Forces of the US or allies of the US

- ◇ Programs to expand military-to-military and defense contacts.
- The CTR Program is often referred as the “Nunn-Lugar Program.”

**Section 1302—Funding Allocations**

- Of the \$519,111,000 authorized to be appropriated to DOD for FY2013 CTR programs, the following amounts may be obligated for the purposes specified:
  - ◇ Strategic offensive arms elimination—\$68,271,000
  - ◇ Chemical weapons destruction—\$14,630,000
  - ◇ Global nuclear security—\$99,789,000
  - ◇ Cooperative biological engagement—\$276,399,000
  - ◇ Proliferation prevention—\$32,402,000
  - ◇ Threat reduction engagement—\$2,375,000
  - ◇ Activities designated as other assessments/administrative costs—\$25,245,000.

**Title XIV—Other Authorizations**

**Subtitle A—Military Programs**

**Section 1404—Drug Interdiction and Counter-Drug Activities, Defense-Wide**

- Funds are authorized to be appropriated for DOD for FY2013 for expenses, not otherwise provided for, for Drug Interdiction and Counter-Drug Activities, Defense-Wide, as specified in the funding table in Section 4501 of this Act—\$1,025,263,000.

**Section 1406—Defense Health Program**

- Funds are authorized to be appropriated for DOD for FY2013 for the Defense Health Program, as specified in the funding table in Section 4501 of this Act—\$32,620,718,000.

**Title XV—Authorization of Additional Appropriations for Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO)**

**Subtitle A—Authorization of Additional Appropriations**

**Section 1507—Defense Health Program**

- From funding table in Section 4502 of this Act—\$993,898,000.
- Section 1508—Drug Interdiction and Counter-Drug Activities, Defense-Wide

- From funding table in Section 4502 of this Act—\$469,025,000.

**Subtitle B—Financial Matters**

**Section 1522—Special Transfer Authority**

- Upon a national interest determination by the Secretary of Defense, FY2013 OCO funding not to exceed \$3,000,000,000 may be transferred to another FY2013 OCO authorized program. This authority is in addition to the transfer authority provided under Section 1001 of this Act.

**Subtitle—Limitations and Other Matters**

**Section 1531—Afghanistan Security Forces Fund**

- Funds available to DOD for the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) for FY2013 shall be subject to the conditions contained in subsections (b) through (g) of Section 1513, NDAA, FY2008, as amended, P.L. 110-181, 28 January 2008.
- Section 1531(c)(3)(F) requires as a part of the Secretary of Defense semi-annual Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF) certification that there is a mechanism in place sufficient to:
  - ◇ Account for the transfer of any USG-owned, contractor-acquired defense articles to the APPF, and
  - ◇ Conduct end-use monitoring, of such defense articles, including an inventory of the existence and completeness of any such defense articles.

**Section 1533—One-Year Extension of Project Authority and Related Requirements of Task Force for Business and Stability Operations in Afghanistan**

- Amends Section 1535, NDAA, FY2011, as amended, P.L. 111-383, 7 January 2011, which authorized a task force for business and stability operations in Afghanistan to carry out project to assist the US Forces – Afghanistan and the US Ambassador in Afghanistan to reduce violence, enhance stability, and support economic normalcy in Afghanistan through strategic business and economic activities.
  - ◇ Funding may not exceed \$150,000,000 in FY2012 except that not more than 50 percent may be obligated until the Secretary of

Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of State, submits the Report on Implementation of Transition Action Plan (TAP) required by amended Section 1535(a)(7), NDAA, FY2011, and

- ◇ Funding may not exceed \$93,000,000 in FY2013 except that not more than \$50,000,000 may be obligated until the TAP report is submitted.

**Section 1534—Plan for Transition in Funding of US Special Operations Command from Supplemental Funding for Overseas Contingency Operations to Recurring Funding under the Future-Years Defense Program**

- Not less than ninety days after enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense is to submit a report to the congressional armed services committees regarding the plan to transition USSOCOM funding from the OCO budget to the recurring DOD operations budget.

**Division D—Funding Tables**

**Title XLI—Procurement**

- Sections 4101-4102

**Title XLII—Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation**

- Sections 4201-4202

**Title XLIII—Operation and Maintenance**

- Sections 4301-4302

**Title XLIV—Military Personnel**

- Sections 4401-4402

**Title XLV—Other Authorizations**

- Sections 4501-4502

**Title XLVI—Military Construction**

- Sections 4601-4602

**Title XLVII – Department of Energy National Security Programs**

- Section 4701

**Defense of Defense Appropriations Act, 2013, Division C, P.L. 113-6, 26 March 2013**

- Introduced on 25 May 2012 as HR5856 and referred to the House Appropriation Committee (HAC). Immediately approved by the HAC and reported out with H.Rpt. 112-493 of 25 May 2012. Approved by the House on 19 July 2012 and forwarded to the Senate. The Senate Appropriations Committee (SAC) approved and reported out with S.Rpt. 112-196 of 2 August 2012. No further action was taken by the 112th Congress.
- On 3 March 2013, HR933 was introduced as the Department of Defense, Military Construction and Veterans Affairs, and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act, 2013. The House approved the bill on 6 March 2013 and forwarded to the Senate. The bill was approved by the Senate on 20 March 2013 with amendments. The House approved the Senate version of HR933 now entitled the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2013. The bill is organized as follows:
  - ◇ Division A—Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2012
  - ◇ Division B—Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2013
  - ◇ Division C—Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2013
  - ◇ Division D—Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2013
  - ◇ Division E—Military Construction and Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2013
  - ◇ Division F—Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2013
    - » Title I—General Provisions
    - » Title II—Energy and Water Development
    - » Title III—Financial Services and General Government
    - » Title IV—Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies
    - » Title V—Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education, and Related Agencies
    - » Title VI—Legislative Branch

- » **Title VII—Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs**
- » Title VIII—Transportation and Housing and Urban Development, and Related Agencies

◊ Division G—Other Matters

- The 113th Congress HR933 was enacted on 26 March 2013 as P.L. 113-6.

### **Division C—Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2013**

#### **Title II—Operation and Maintenance**

##### **Operation and Maintenance, Defense-Wide**

- Appropriates \$31,862,980,000 for Defense-Wide O&M, with not more than \$30,000,000 to be used for the Combatant Commander Initiative Fund (CCIF) for use as authorized by 10 U.S.C. 166a.
  - ◊ A rescission of \$10,283,000 is to be applied to non-OCO DOD O&M.

##### **Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid**

- Appropriates \$108,759,000 for **OHDCA** to be available through 30 September 2014 for programs authorized by 10 U.S.C. 401, 10 U.S.C. 402, 10 U.S.C. 404, 10 U.S.C. 2557, and 10 U.S.C. 2561.
  - ◊ A rescission of \$35,000 is to be applied to ODCA

##### **Cooperative Threat Reduction Account**

- Appropriates \$519,111,000 for cooperative threat reduction (CTR) assistance for the republics of the former Soviet Union (FSU) with appropriate authorization by DOD and DOS, and to countries outside of the FSU.
  - ◊ A rescission of \$166,000 is to be applied to the CTR

#### **Title VI—Other Department of Defense Programs**

##### **Defense Health Program**

- Appropriates \$32,715,304,000 for medical and health care programs of the DOD, with not less than \$8,000,000 shall be available for HIV prevention educational activities undertaken in connection with US military training, exercises,

and humanitarian assistance activities conducted primarily in African nations.

- ◊ A rescission of \$10,457,000 is to be applied to non-OCO Defense Health Program.

##### **Drug Interdiction and Counter-Drug Activities, Defense**

- Appropriates \$1,159,263,000 for DOD drug interdiction and counter-drug activities.
  - ◊ A rescission of \$370,000 is to be applied to non-OCO Drug Interdiction and Counter-Drug Activities, Defense.

#### **Title VIII—General Provisions**

##### **Section 8002—Compensation to DOD non-US Citizen Employees**

- During FY2013, provisions of law prohibiting the payment of compensation to, or employment of, any person not a citizen of the US shall not apply to DOD personnel.
- Salary increases granted to direct and indirect hire DOD **foreign national employees** funded by this Act shall not be at a rate in excess of the percentage increase authorized by law for DOD civilian employees whose pay is computed under the provisions of 5 U.S.C. 5332, or at a rate in excess of the percentage increase provided by the appropriate host nation to its own employees, whichever is higher.
- This section shall not apply to DOD foreign service national employees serving at US diplomatic missions whose pay is set by the Department of State under the Foreign Service Act of 1980.
- The limitations of this provision shall not apply to DOD foreign national employees in the **Republic of Turkey**.

##### **Section 8011—Humanitarian and Civic Assistance**

- Within the funds appropriated for the operation and maintenance of the armed forces, funds are hereby appropriated pursuant to 10 U.S.C. 401 for **humanitarian and civic costs** under 10 U.S.C., chapter 20. Such funds may also be obligated for humanitarian and civic costs incidental to authorized operations and pursuant to 10 U.S.C. 401. These obligations shall be reported as required by 10 U.S.C. 401(d).

- Funds available for operation and maintenance shall be available for providing humanitarian and similar assistance by using Civic Action Teams in the **Trust Territories of the Pacific Islands (TTPI) and freely associated states of Micronesia** pursuant to the Compact of Free Association authorized by P.L. 99-239.
- When determined by the Secretary of the Army that such action is beneficial for graduate medical education programs conducted at army medical facilities located in Hawaii, the Secretary may authorize the provision of medical services at such facilities and transportation, on a non-reimbursable basis, for civilian patients from **American Samoa, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, Palau, and Guam.**

#### **Section 8021—Contributions from the Government of Kuwait**

- During FY2013, DOD is authorized to incur obligations not to exceed \$350,000,000 for purposes specified in 10 U.S.C. 2350j(c) in anticipation of receipt of contributions only from the government of **Kuwait**. Upon receipt of such contributions, the funding shall be credited to the appropriations or fund which incurred such obligations.

#### **Section 8025—Congressional Defense Committees**

- For the purposes of this Act, congressional defense committees include the armed services committees of the House (HASC) and Senate (SASC) and the appropriations subcommittees for defense of the House (HAC-D) and Senate (SAC-D).

#### **Section 8038—F-22A Advanced Tactical Fighter**

- No FY2013 DOD funds may be used to approve or license the sale of the F-22A advanced tactical fighter to any foreign government.
- DOD may conduct or participate in studies, research, design and other activities to define and develop a future export version of the F-22A that protects classified and sensitive information, technologies and US war fighting capabilities.

#### **Section 8042—Assistance for the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea**

- No funds appropriated or otherwise made available in this Act may be obligated or expended for assistance to the **Democratic People’s Republic of Korea** unless specifically appropriated for that purpose.

#### **Section 8045—Drug Interdiction or Counter-Drug Activities**

- No funds available to DOD for any fiscal year for **drug interdiction or counter-drug activities** may be transferred to any other US department or agency except as specifically provided in an appropriations law.
- No funds available to the CIA for any fiscal year for drug interdiction or counter-drug activities may be transferred to any other US department or agency except as specifically provided in an appropriations law.

#### **Section 8049—Defense Funding for the Transfer of Defense Articles or Services to another Country or International Organization**

- No FY2013 DOD funds may be obligated or expended to **transfer defense articles or services** (other than intelligence services) to another country or international organization for below specified activities unless the defense and foreign relations committees are notified 15 days in advance of the transfer.
  - ◊ The specified activities include any international peacekeeping, peace-enforcement or humanitarian assistance operation, or similar U.N. activities under an authority of the U.N. Security Council resolution or any other **international peacekeeping, peace enforcement, or humanitarian assistance operation.**
- This notification shall include a description of the transfer, value of the transfer, a statement whether the inventory requirements of all elements of the US armed forces, including the reserve components, for the type of transfer have been met; and whether the items to be transferred will have to be replaced. If replacement is required, how does the President propose to provide the funds for such replacement.

## **Section 8056—Procurement from Foreign Sources**

- The Secretary of Defense, on a case-by-case basis, may waive with respect to a foreign country each limitation on the procurement of **defense items from foreign sources** provided in law, if determined that the application of the limitation with respect to that country would invalidate cooperative programs entered into between DOD and the foreign country, or would invalidate reciprocal trade agreements for the procurement of defense items entered into under 10 U.S.C. 2531, and the country does not discriminate against the same or similar defense items procured in the US for that country. This Section applies with respect to:
  - ◊ Contracts and subcontracts entered into on or after enactment of this Act, and
  - ◊ Options for the procurement of items that are exercised after such enactment date under contracts that were entered into before such enactment if the option prices are adjusted for any reason other than the application of this waiver authority.
- This waiver authority does not exist for certain listed items.

## **Section 8057—Training with Foreign Security Forces or Police**

- No FY2013 DOD funds may be used to support any **training program involving a unit of the security forces or police** of a country if the Secretary of Defense has received credible information from the Department of State that the unit has committed a gross violation of human rights, unless all necessary corrective steps have been taken.
- The Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of State, shall ensure that prior to a decision to conduct any such training, full consideration is given to all credible information available to the Department of State relating to human rights violations by foreign security forces.
- The Secretary of Defense, after consultation with the Secretary of State, may waive this prohibition if determined that such waiver is required by extraordinary circumstances.
- The congressional defense committees are to be notified not more than fifteen days after

such waiver describing the extraordinary circumstances.

## **Section 8068—Transfer of DOD Funds to the Global Security Contingency Fund**

- During FY2013, not more than \$200,000,000 in DOD O&M funding may be transferred to the **DOS Global Security Contingency Fund (GSCF)**.
- This authority is in addition to any other transfer authority available to DOD.
- The Secretary of Defense shall, not fewer than thirty days prior to making transfers to the GSCF, notify the congressional defense committees in writing with the source of funds and a detailed justification, execution plan, and time line for each proposed project.

## **Section 8070—Israeli Cooperative Programs**

- \$429,736,000 in FY2013 appropriations for Procurement, Defense-Wide and Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation shall be for Israeli Cooperative Programs.
  - ◊ \$211,000,000 shall be provided for the procurement of the Iron Dome defense system to counter short-range rocket threats.
  - ◊ \$149,679,000 shall be for the Short Range Ballistic Missile Defense (SRBMD).
    - » Of which \$39,200,000 shall be for production activities of SRBMD missiles in the US and in Israel to meet Israel's defense requirements consistent with each nation's laws, regulations, and procedures.
  - ◊ \$74,692,000 shall be available for an upper-tier component to the Israeli Missile Defense Architecture.
  - ◊ \$44,365,000 shall be for the Arrow System improvement Programs including development of a long range, ground and airborne, detection suite.

## **Section 8084—Asia Pacific Regional Initiative Program**

- Up to \$15,000,000 in funding appropriated under Operation and Maintenance, Navy may be made available for the **Asia Pacific Regional Initiative (APRI) Program** for the purpose of enabling the Pacific Command to execute Theater Security Cooperation activities such as humanitarian assistance and payment of incremental and

personnel costs of training and exercising with foreign security forces.

- This funding made available for this purpose may be used, notwithstanding any other funding authorities for humanitarian assistance, security assistance, or combined exercise expenses.
- None of this funding may be obligated to provide assistance to a country that is otherwise prohibited from receiving such assistance under any other provision of law.

### **Section 8115—Non-Support of Military Training or Operations that include Child Soldiers**

- No funds made available by this Act for IMET, FMFP, EDA, assistance IAW Section 1206, P.L.109-163, issuance [of export licenses] for DCS of military equipment, or PKO for the countries of **Chad, Yemen, Somalia, Sudan, Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Burma** may be used to support any military training or operations that include child soldiers as defined by the Child Soldiers Prevention Act of 2008, Title IV, P.L.110-457, 23 Dec 2008.

### **Title IX—Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO)**

- FY2013 rescissions are not to be applicable to OCO appropriations.

### **Operation and Maintenance**

#### **Operation and Maintenance, Defense-Wide**

- An additional amount of \$7,714,079,000, of which not to exceed \$1,650,000,000 to remain available until 30 September 2014 for payments to **reimburse key cooperating nations** for logistical, military, and other support, including access, provided to the US military operations in support of Operation Enduring Freedom, and post-operation Iraq border security related to the activities of the Office of Security Cooperation in Iraq, notwithstanding any other provision of law.
- Such reimbursement payments may be made in such amounts as the Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, and in consultation with the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, may determine, in his discretion, based on documentation determined by the Secretary of Defense to adequately account for the support provided,

and such determination is final and conclusive upon the accounting officers of the US, and following fifteen days following notification to the appropriate congressional committees.

- These funds may be used for the purpose of providing **specialized training and procuring supplies and specialized equipment and providing such supplies and loaning such equipment on a non-reimbursable basis to coalition forces** supporting US military operations in Afghanistan, and fifteen days following notification to the appropriate congressional committees.

### **Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund**

- \$325,000,000 for the **Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund (AIF)** to remain available until 30 September 2014.
  - ◇ Such funds shall be available to the Secretary of Defense for infrastructure projects in Afghanistan, notwithstanding any other provision of law, which shall be undertaken by the Secretary of State, unless the Secretaries of State and Defense jointly decide that a specific project will be undertaken by DOD.
  - ◇ Any projects to be funded shall be jointly formulated and concurred in by the Secretaries of State and Defense.
  - ◇ Funds may be transferred to the Department of State for purposes of undertaking projects shall be considered economic assistance under the FAA for purposes of making available the administrative authorities contained in the FAA.

### **Afghanistan Security Forces Fund**

- \$5,124,167,000 for the **Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF)** to remain available until 30 September 2014.

### **Other DOD Programs**

#### **Defense Health Program**

- An additional \$993,898,000 for the **Defense Health Program**, which shall be for operation and maintenance.

#### **Drug Interdiction and counter-Drug Activities, Defense**

- An additional \$469,025,000 for the **Drug Interdiction and Counter-Drug Activities, Defense**, to remain available until 30 September 2014.

## **General Provision—This Title**

### **Section 9005—Commander’s Emergency Response Program**

- Not to exceed \$200,000,000 of Operation and Maintenance, Army may be used, notwithstanding any other provision of law, to fund the **Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP)** in Afghanistan.

### **Section 9009—Afghanistan Resources Oversight Council**

- No funds provided for ASFF may be obligated prior to approval of a financial and activity plan by the **Afghanistan Resources Oversight Council (AROC)** of the DOD.
  - ◊ The AROC must approve the requirement and acquisition plan for any service requirements in excess of \$50,000,000 annually and any non-standard equipment requirements in excess of \$100,000,000 using ASFF.
- Additionally, the AROC must approve all projects and execution plan under AIF and any project in excess of \$5,000,000 from CERP.
- The DOD must certify to the congressional defense committees that the AROC has convened and approved a process for ensuring compliance with the requirements in this Section and accompanying report language for the ASFF, AIF, and CERP.

### **Section 9011—Task Force for Business and Stability Operations**

- Up to \$93,000,000 of Operation and Maintenance, Army may be obligated and expended, notwithstanding any other provision of law, for the purposes of the Task Force for Business and Stability Operations, subject to the direction and control of the secretary of Defense, with concurrence of the Secretary of State, to carry out strategic business and economic assistance activities in Afghanistan in support of Operation Enduring Freedom.

### **Section 9012—Office of Security Cooperation in Iraq**

- Up to \$508,000,000 of Operation and Maintenance, Air Force may be used by the Secretary of Defense, notwithstanding any other provision of law, to support USG transition

activities in Iraq by funding the operations and activities of the **Office of Security Cooperation in Iraq (OSC-I)** and security assistance teams.

- To the extent authorized under the NDAA, FY2013 [Section 1211], the operations and activities that may be carried out by OSC-I may, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, include non-operational training activities in support of Iraqi Ministry of Defense and Counter Terrorism Service personnel in an institutional environment to address capability gaps, integrate processes relating to intelligence, air sovereignty, combined arms, logistics and maintenance, and to manage and integrate defense-related institutions.

### **Section 9013—Rescissions**

- Inter alia, \$1,000,000,000 in **Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF)**, 2012/2013, is rescinded.

### **Section 9014—Reimbursement to the Government of Pakistan**

- No funds appropriated or otherwise made available by this Act under Operation and Maintenance, Defense-Wide, for payments under Section 1233, NDAA, FY2008, P.L. 110-181, 28 January 2008, for **reimbursement to Pakistan** may be available unless the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of State, certifies to the congressional appropriations committees that the government of Pakistan is:
  - ◊ Cooperating with the US in counterterrorism efforts against the Haqqani Network, the Quetta Shura Taliban, Lashkar e-Tayyiba, Jaish-e-Mohammed, al Qaeda, and other domestic and foreign terrorist organizations, including taking steps to end support for such groups and prevent them from basing and operating in Pakistan and carrying out cross border attacks into neighboring countries,
  - ◊ Not supporting terrorist activities against US or coalition forces in Afghanistan, and Pakistan’s military and intelligence agencies are not intervening extra-judicially into political and judicial processes in Pakistan,
  - ◊ Dismantling improvised explosive device (IED) networks and interdicting precursor chemicals used in the manufacture of IEDs,
  - ◊ Preventing the proliferation of nuclear-related material and expertise,

- ◇ Issuing visas in a timely manner for US visitors engaged in counterterrorism efforts and assistance programs in Pakistan, and
- ◇ Providing humanitarian organizations access to detainees, internally displaced, persons, and other Pakistani civilians affected by the conflict.
- This certification may be waived, in coordination with the Secretary of State, on a case-by-case basis by certifying, with justification, in writing to the congressional appropriations committees that it in the national security interest to do so.

## **Division F—Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2013**

### **Title I—General Provisions**

#### **Section 1101—Continuation of Applicable FY2012 Appropriations Acts**

- Section 1101(a)(6) applies the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act (S/FOAA), 2012, Division I, P.L. 112-74, 23 December 2011, being continued through FY2013 as the S/FOAA for FY2013.

#### **Section 1102—Availability of Appropriations**

- Appropriations made by Section 1101 shall be available to the extent and in the manner that would be provided by the pertinent appropriations Act.

#### **Section 1104—No New Projects**

- No appropriations of funds made available or authority granted pursuant to Section 1101 shall be used to initiate or resume any project or activity for which appropriations, funds, or other authority were not available during FY2012.

#### **Section 1105—Funding Conditions and Limitations**

- Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Division F, the requirements, authorities, conditions, limitations, and other provisions of the appropriations Acts referred to in Section 1101 shall continue in effect through the date specified in Section 1106.

#### **Section 1106—Funding Availability**

- Unless otherwise provided for in this Division F or in the applicable appropriations Act, appropriations and funds made available and authority granted pursuant to this Division F shall be available through 30 September 2013.

#### **Section 1113—Spending, Expenditure, or Operating Plan for FY2013**

- Not later than thirty days after enactment of this Division F, The Department of State and US Agency for International Development (USAID), among others, shall submit a **spending, expenditure, or operating plan** for FY2013 to the congressional appropriations committees.
- This plan is to be submitted detailed at the program, project, and activity level. For foreign assistance programs funded in Title III [bilateral economic assistance], Title IV [International Security Assistance], and Title VIII [Overseas Contingency Operations/Global War on Terrorism]; the plan is to be detailed at the country, regional and central program level, and for any international organization.

### **Title VII, Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs (S/FOAA) [FY2013 Continuing Resolution]**

#### **Section 1701—Contributions for International Peacekeeping Activities**

- Amends the same program under Title I, Division I, P.L. 112-74, to \$2,006,499,000 (vice \$1,828,182,000).
  - ◇ A rescission of \$642,000 is to be applied to the FY2013 contributions for international peacekeeping activities.

#### **Section 1702—Economic Support Fund (ESF)**

- While continuing the total **Economic Support Fund (ESF)** at \$3,001,745,000, amends the same program under Title III, Division I, P.L.112-74, a new proviso: Not less than \$325,400,000 in under this ESF heading shall be transferred to, and merged with, funds appropriated under the heading Development Assistance.
  - ◇ A rescission of \$961,000 is to be applied to the FY2013 non-OCO Economic Support Fund.

## **Section 1703—International Security Assistance**

- The FY2012 funding level for **International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE)** remains unchanged for FY2013 at \$1,061,100,000.
  - ◊ A rescission of \$340,000 is to be applied to the FY2013 INCLE program.
- While continuing the FY2012 **Non-Proliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs (NADR)** funding level at \$590,113,000 for FY2013, amends the funding to remain available until 30 September 2014.
  - ◊ A rescission of \$189,000 is to be applied to the FY2013 NADR program.
  - ◊ Amends the NADR sixth proviso with: That funds made available for demining, conventional weapons destruction, and related activities, in addition to funds otherwise made available for such purposes, may be used for administrative expenses related to the operation and management of demining, conventional weapons destruction, and related programs.
- The FY2012 funding level for **Peacekeeping Operations (PKO)** of \$302,818,000 remains unchanged for FY2013. However, the earmark for payment of assessed expenses of international peacekeeping **activities in Somalia** is amended to \$161,000,000 (vice \$91,818,000) to remain available through 30 September 2014 (vice 2013).
  - ◊ A rescission of \$97,000 is to be applied to the FY2013 PKO program.
- The FY2012 funding level for **Foreign Military Financing Program (FMFP)** of \$5,210,000,000 remains unchanged for FY2013. However, the earmark for Israel is amended to \$3,100,000,000 (vice \$3,075,000,000) and the amount for **Israel** for offshore procurement is amended to \$815,300,000 (vice \$808,725,000).
  - ◊ A rescission of \$1,667,000 is to be applied to the FY2013 FMFP program.
- The FY2012 funding level for **International Military Education and Training (IMET)** of \$105,788,000 remains unchanged for FY2013.
  - ◊ A rescission of \$34,000 is to be applied to the FY2013 IMET program.

## **Section 1704—Zeroing out of Certain Accounts**

- Inter alia, amends the funding leveling of **Assistance for Europe, Eurasia, and Central Asia** (vice \$626,718,000); and the **Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund (PCCF)** (vice \$850,000,000) to zero for FY2013.

## **Section 1706—Miscellaneous S/FOAA Changes for FY2013**

- Section 1706(b) amends Section 7034(f), S/FOAA, FY2012, to \$100,000,000 (vice \$50,000,000) authorizing the use of up to \$100,000,000 for assistance in during a fiscal year for **unanticipated contingencies** IAW Section 451, FAA.
- Section 1706(c) amends Section 7054(b), S/FOAA, FY2012, authorizing an exception for military assistance for cluster munitions if “such assistance, license, sale, or transfer is for the purpose of **demilitarizing or disposing of such cluster munitions.**”
- Section 1706(c) amends Section 7063, S/FOAA, FY2012, authorizing the Secretary of State to waive the prohibition of US assistance to **Uzbekistan** for six month periods through FY2014 (vice FY2013) if determined to be in the US national security interest and is necessary in obtaining access to and from Afghanistan.
- Section 1706(e) amends:
  - ◊ Section 7070(a), S/FOAA, FY2012, prohibiting Global Health Programs, Economic Support Fund, and International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement funding assistance (vice Assistance for Europe, Eurasia and Central Asia) to the government of an **Independent State of the FSU** if that government directs any action in violation of the territorial integrity or national sovereignty of any other Independent State of the FSU.
    - » However, per section 1706(g), ESF may be used, notwithstanding any other provision of law, for assistance and related programs for countries identified in Section 3(c), Support for Eastern European Democracy (SEED) Act of 1989, P.L. 101-179, 28 September 1989, and Section 3, FREEDOM Support Act (FSA) of 1992, P.L. 102-511, 24 October 1992.

- ◇ Section 7072(a), S/FOAA, FY2012, likewise is amended regarding the same programs for the government of the Russian Federation if in violation of discrimination against religious groups or communities, freedom of expression, assembly, and press or due process within the Federation.
- Section 1706(i), amends Section 7041(h), S/FOAA, FY2012, requiring the Secretary of State to consult with the congressional appropriations and foreign relations committees prior to funding any assistance for the promotion of democracy and protecting human rights in **Syria**.
- Section 1706(j) further amends the fifth proviso under ESF, Title III, S/FOAA, FY2012, authorizing the use of ESF for the cost of loan guarantees for **Jordan**.

**Section 1707—Amendments to Title VIII, Overseas Contingency Operations / Global War on Terrorism, S/FOAA, FY2012, Division I, P.L. 112-74, 23 December 2012**

- FY2013 rescissions are not to be applicable to OCO appropriations.
- Section 1707(e) amends the following FY2012 accounts for FY2013:
  - ◇ International Disaster Assistance —\$774,661,000 (vice \$150,000,000)
  - ◇ Migration and Refugee Assistance —\$1,152,850,000 (vice \$229,000,000)
  - ◇ **Economic Support Fund (ESF)**—\$3,119,896,000 (vice \$2,761,462,000)
  - ◇ The following FY2012 OCO accounts remain unchanged:
    - » **Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs (NADR)**—\$120,657,000
    - » **Peacekeeping Operations (PKO)** —\$81,000,000
    - » **Foreign Military Financing Program (FMFP)**—\$1,102,000,000.
    - » No IMET funds were appropriated for OCO in FY2012 under this Title.

**Section 1708—Funding for Jordan**

- Provides a new Title VIII, Section 8006, S/FOAA, FY2012, stating that funds appropriated by this Title shall be made available for **Jordan**, in addition to amounts otherwise made available by this Act.

**Division G—Other Matters**

**Section 3001—Rescissions**

- The following rescissions (reductions) are to be applied:
  - ◇ Non-security categories:
    - » Divisions A and E – 2.513 percent
    - » Division B – 1.877 percent
  - ◇ Security categories – 0.1 percent
- These rescissions are not to apply to amounts designated by Congress for Overseas Contingency Operations/Global on Terrorism or for Disaster Relief
- Within thirty days after enactment of this Act, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) is to submit a report to the congressional appropriations committees specifying the account and amount of each rescission to be made.
  - ◇ This rescissions report was submitted by the OMB on 25 April 2013.

**Section 3002—Sequestration**

- Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, if, on or after the enactment of this Act, a sequestration is ordered by the President, the reductions in each discretionary account under such other shall apply to the amounts provided in this Act and shall be in addition to any reductions required by Section 251(c) of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, Title II, P.L. 99-177, 12 December 1985.

**Section 3004—Discretionary Spending Limits**

- If, for FY2013, the amount of new budget authority provided in appropriations Acts exceeds the discretionary spending limits set forth in Section 251(c)(2), P.L.99-177, on new budget authority for any category due to estimating differences with Congressional Budget Office (CBO), the OMB shall increase the applicable percentage of rescissions for the budget authority for any discretionary account in both the non-security and security categories for FY2013.
  - ◇ This is not to amounts designated by Congress for Overseas Contingency Operations/Global War on Terrorism or the amount made available by Division F of this Act for Social Security Administration, Limitation on Administrative Expenses for continuing

disability reviews under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act, and for the cost associated with conducting redeterminations of eligibility under Title XVI of the Social Security Act.

- Within thirty days of enactment of this Section, OMB shall submit a report to the congressional appropriations committees specifying the account and amount of each rescission made pursuant to this Section.
  - ◊ The OMB rescissions report of 25 April 2013 provided the required data and applied an overall rescission (or reduction) of .032 percent of the following security cooperation applicable non-Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) security-categorized programs as follows:

Program	Reduction
DOD O&M, defense-wide	\$10,283,000
DOD Drug Interdiction and Counter-Drug Activities	37,000
DOD Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Account	166,000
DOD Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid (OHCA)	35,000
DOS International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE)	340,000
DOS Peacekeeping Operations (PKO)	97,000
DOS Economic Support Fund	961,000
DOS Non-Proliferation, A/T, Demining, Related Programs (NADR)	189,000
DOS International Military and Education (IMET)	34,000
DOS Foreign Military Financing Program (FMFP)	1,67,000

### Conclusion

This article for FY2013 included a summary of three pieces of legislation that impacted US international programs especially those of security assistance and security cooperation. FY2013 security assistance funding allocations were not available at the time of publication of this article. The Secretary of State did publish an executive summary on 10 April 2013 to include actual funding allocation by program, by country for FY2012 and proposed funding for FY2014.

The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), Fiscal Year 2013, was one of the last pieces of legislation passed by the lame duck 112th Congress and was enacted on 2 January 2013. Major items in this law included:

- Authorization of small-scale military construction within the “Section 1206 BPC” program

- Continued DOD support for counterterrorism operations in East Africa and Yemen until the “1207 GSCF” program becomes operational
- Authority for OSC-I to provide non-operational training during FY2013 to Iraq but in an institutional environment
- Authority to establish a program for the transfer of no longer needed, already in-country, non-excess defense articles to Afghanistan before 31 December 2014
- Authority to remove satellites and related items from the USML.

All twelve required appropriations for government operation during FY2013 were included by the new 113th Congress into a single piece of legislation, the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations

Act, 2013, P.L.113-6, 26 March 2013, essentially half way into the fiscal year. The Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2013, was Division C of P.L.113-6 to include the following major items:

- Authority to transfer \$200,000,000 of DOD O&M during FY2013 to the DOS GSCF
- Authority to transfer \$429,736,000 in DOD FY2013 funding for use in the Israeli Cooperative Program
- Earmarking of up to \$1,650,000,000 in FY2013 DOD OCO O&M funding for reimbursement to key cooperating countries providing support to US forces in OEF
- Appropriation of \$5,124,167,000 in DOD OCO for the ASFF.

The Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs appropriations act (S/FOAA) for FY2013 was provided as Title VII, Division F, P.L.113-6, a continuing resolution through the rest of the fiscal year using the funding levels and guidance provided within S/FOAA, 2012, Division I, P.L.112-74, 23 December 2011.

- The security assistance funding levels for FY2013 are initially the same as for FY2012. The only exception was that S/FOAA OCO funding for ESF is increase to \$3,119,896,000. The OMB has yet to provide direction regarding the actual program funding levels.
- The Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund (PCCF) is to receive no new funding in FY2013
- Amends Section 451, FAA, authorizing up to \$100,000,000 in assistance for unanticipated contingencies during FY2013.

Finally, the Secretary of State executive summary of 10 April 2013 addressing program funding levels to be requested for FY2014 includes the following:

- Economic Support Fund (ESF)—\$5,458,254,000
- International Narcotics Control & Law Enforcement (INCLE)—\$1,473,727,000
- Non-Proliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining, & Related Programs (NADR)—\$616,125,000
- Peacekeeping Operations (PKO)—\$347,000,000
- International Military Training & Education (IMET)—\$105,573,000
- Foreign Military Financing Program (FMFP)—\$5,956,959,000.

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## About the Author

Ken Martin has been at DISAM for over twenty-five years as an associate professor for the management of security cooperation. In addition to teaching, his duties include being the security cooperation programs functional manager and a contributing author for the annually republished DISAM “greenbook,” *The Management of Security Cooperation*. He is a retired US Navy surface warfare officer. His education includes an undergraduate degree in the field of economics from the Illinois Institute of Technology in Chicago and a master’s degree in administration from Central Michigan University.

# Interview with VADM Landay: “Defense Solutions for America’s Partners”

By J.R. Wilson

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Defense Security Cooperation Agency

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The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) plays a key role in US foreign relations, national security, and global security, yet may be one of the least known and understood parts of the Department of Defense (DoD).

DSCA’s mission is to provide timely and effective direction, supervision, and oversight of Security Cooperation (SC) programs in support of US national security and foreign policy objectives. In so doing, DSCA seeks, through its established security cooperation and other activities, to enhance US influence in all regions of the globe, carry out US national security strategy, and promote military interoperability with foreign partners.

These programs include training and education; disaster relief; and helping friendly nations acquire the right military equipment to meet their security needs. All of that is often coordinated with DoD, State, US military regional combatant commands (COCOMs), recipient nations, individual US military services, allies, US industry, Congress, and more.

As DSCA’s director since August 2010, Vice Adm. William E. Landay III is responsible for coordinating all of the agency’s efforts, including working to ensure and balance the needs and requirements of one of the most diverse sets of “stakeholders” facing any military leader. He recently discussed the DSCA operations with senior writer J.R. Wilson.

**J.R. Wilson: From a broad-brush philosophy perspective, what are DSCA’s primary objectives in support of the security of the United States and US military across the globe?**

**Vice Adm. William E. Landay III:**

We’re primarily responsible for overseeing and managing the majority of Security Cooperation programs for DoD. Security Cooperation has four primary goals, and we focus on ensuring all those goals are accomplished.

First, it provides support for countries to enable them to be able to secure their own borders against all threats, including terrorism.

Second, to ensure interoperability between US military forces and those of our partner countries. We know, today and in the future, we will operate together, and the ability to do so is critical. That includes equipment that can communicate with other [equipment], how each of us operates, training doctrine, etc. So the training piece is just as important as the equipment.

Third, is developing military-to-military cooperation. Through that we build an understanding of each other and a confidence in how both operate, so when we do come together we can accomplish our missions.

Finally, support the larger US effort to build relationships with other countries. For us, that is mostly on the military side.

**How did DSCA support to the unique challenges in Iraq and Afghanistan affect the overall defense Security Assistance process?**

What Iraq and Afghanistan did for the FMS [Foreign Military Sales] process was put a demand for urgency and flexibility into the system that probably did not exist as strongly in the past. We were directly supporting combat operations and the country’s ability to conduct combat operations, so we had to make the system work faster and be more responsive.

We have been able to do that throughout the system for other nations, as well. So the system today is much more responsive, flexible and capable than even in the 2005–06 time frame.

How does DSCA interface with DoD as a whole?

Taking FMS as a great example of that, it, and Security Cooperation in general, are really focused on building and maintaining relationships between countries and militaries. So much of our involvement is consistent with the goals, strategies, and strategic

objectives of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy and the Joint Chiefs.

However, much of what we do is providing equipment, goods, services, capabilities, which we do through the DoD acquisition process.

#### **How does DSCA work with the COCOMs?**

Our primary focus there is the regional COCOMs. Their goals and objectives, their theater Security Cooperation plans and their efforts to build relationships with each country in their region provide the framework which we work to support. In addition to routine discussions on a daily basis at the staff level, I generally go at least twice a year to all COCOMs and sit down with their senior leadership to make sure we understand what their requirements are. We also have a program where the COCOMs identify key SC cases that are their highest priority and we bring the DSCA and service implementing agencies together monthly to ensure their cases are being executed satisfactorily.

#### **What is the nature of DSCA's connection with the State Department?**

State has the US government responsibility for broad oversight for all Security Assistance programs. There are some additional programs for which DoD has primary responsibility, but most are overseen by State. So we execute for the State Department, and under its authority, programs such as FMF [Foreign Military Financing], FMS, IMET [International Military Education and Training], etc.

We have a very tight connection with them—primarily through their Political-Military Affairs [Pol-Mil] bureau—in terms of making sure we comply with their guidance, provide input on how we see the system can be used or modified, work with them to notify Congress when required on a sale, etc.

#### **Does that also apply to ambassadors and envoys?**

Yes, we work closely with our Security Cooperation Offices in the embassies as well as the country teams. I always meet with them whenever I visit a country. We also sit down with the ambassador to ensure we are working together on their goals and what they are trying to accomplish in that country. We fund a Security Cooperation Office in almost every embassy. Their charter is to work directly with the country and the embassy on SC cases and issues.

#### **What is DSCA's relationship with the individual armed services?**

They are critical key partners. Through them we execute the Security Cooperation programs in terms of providing equipment, training, services, etc. So the services and other implementing agencies are the engines that drive these programs because, in the end, they provide the capabilities we are offering to these countries.

They also have their own goals in each nation and region, so we take aboard service objectives, as well. But it really is the tight linkage we have in terms of executing the programs; we could not do this without the efforts of the services.

#### **What about working with allies?**

Quite frankly, that relationship generally occurs more through the COCOMs, State and OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense], who build the strategy for a region and how the US will work with our foreign partners in an area. Our job is to support their strategies.

#### **How does DSCA interface with nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)?**

Humanitarian assistance is a major program area within DSCA. There is a wide range of humanitarian efforts and programs we support. We often work those in partnership with NGOs and other relief agencies. Under our Disaster Relief authorities, when a disaster does occur such as the earthquake in Haiti, our disaster relief organization, working closely with USAID and other government agencies as well as NGOs and other relief agencies, determines how best to support the needs of that nation. Often that is providing transport of relief materials. So we work with them to determine how the US can help, then work with our services to determine how best to execute that assistance.

#### **What is the working relationship with the host nations themselves?**

They have a lot of input. They set the requirements, tell us what they need, and when and how they plan to use it. In most cases, they also provide the money. In some cases, the US government will provide equipment and resources, but for the vast majority, the host nation comes to us with their needs and funding, seeking to partner with us to meet their needs. So we work very closely with them.

**What changes to Security Assistance are you seeing/anticipating as the US focus begins to shift to Africa and Asia/Pacific?**

Because Security Cooperation is about building partnerships, we already have many programs that are underway in those areas. Our emphasis is on trying to build on existing programs and relationships, maybe expand or broaden them, but ultimately to maintain and build on programs we have been maintaining in the past; and at the same time, where opportunities exist to develop new relationships or renew previous ones, we will work to do so.

**What is the nature of Security Cooperation efforts in Latin America—and what changes are taking place or anticipated there?**

Again, I don't believe there will be any significant changes. The US and certainly DoD, through many of its Security Cooperation initiatives, has had a robust presence in parts of Central and South America for some time. Much of that has been driven by issues such as counter-narcotics, or illicit trafficking, and I expect us to continue putting a strong emphasis on those. As some of those nations' militaries continue to develop, we will expand our Security Cooperation and assistance programs to support their needs.

**Overall, how important is building partner capacity (BPC)—even with those who are not traditional US partners—to the national security of the United States?**

It's very important. Part of the reason we want to build partnership capacity—which is ensuring those nations have the ability to secure their own borders against a variety of threats—is that it shows up in a number of ways, not just military, but enabling a more stable economy, attracting new business to come in as the area is more stable, which improves global trade. So even if they are not traditional partners or major military partners, building partner capacity has advantages to the US in a number of areas—not just in terms of military aid, but building relationships and helping other parts of the global economy to work there as well; all of which is in our best interests.

**And to enhancing interoperability with US forces in maintaining a global military presence, from training exercises to coalition combat operations?**

In this world of coalition operations, it is absolutely critical. The one thing we know is the US military by itself is not going to be in a position to address every issue around the world and does not desire to address issues alone. So we will operate with partners, whether in combat operations such as Afghanistan and Iraq, or counterpiracy off the coast of Somalia or counternarcotics or counterterrorism.

To effectively operate together requires being able to talk with each other, understand each other, and know how each country operates. So, as a result, a lot of our Security Cooperation efforts are not just focused on equipment, but also training and education. We are most effective when we go the same schools together, and exercise together, building camaraderie between militaries and individuals. So when we do come together for an operation, we have the confidence to know we can work together to address the mission.

**How are the concept and processes of BPC changing—and where do you see that going through the end of this decade and beyond?**

I have seen a lot of changes, mainly as the US government has focused more and more effort into the area of Security Cooperation and Building Partner Capacity, recognizing there is much more we need to do than we were doing in the past. So, we have seen a growth in programs and authorities to specifically go after areas of Security Cooperation and BPC that we were not able to do in the past. That includes greater flexibility and responsiveness to address individual nation issues.

**How will NATO's "smart defense" concept and cap on member nation defense budgets affect Security Assistance efforts, especially in Eastern Europe?**

There are a couple of areas there. In Eastern Europe, there are opportunities for us to work with them to help develop or modernize their capabilities as they move into the next generation of equipment, whether it is US or NATO-origin equipment that obviously enhances interoperability.

As budgets get tighter, we expect to see countries looking to partner with other countries to provide a capability or focus on niche elements of Security Assistance. As a result, we must be prepared to support both individual country capacity requirements as

well as multi-country initiatives. Since our FMS system has been primarily a bilateral process, we are working to adapt to this new reality.

**If tighter budgets among our major allies reduces their role in global Security Assistance, what do you expect FMS, FMF, IMET, and other DSCA efforts to look like through the next decade?**

I think they will continue to be very highly regarded and sought after. Certainly FMF and IMET are US-funded security assistance programs, which will see pressure from our own budget challenges. We are working very hard with State, the services, and other agencies to define, as well as possible, the benefits we derive from those programs, which I think are clearly seen in terms of BPC and building relationships; and I think we will continue to see them as key parts of our Security Cooperation efforts as we go forward.

**How are you changing or expecting to modify those efforts with respect to poorer nations, which often have far more basic needs?**

Those are key components of building BPC. People tend to get enamored with the big dollar sales and programs, but we have established thousands of programs with more than 224 nations and international organizations around the world, from very well-off nations to those just starting to emerge or who are just developing professional militaries. So we are able to tailor our cooperation efforts across a wide range of needs. Often those initiatives start with training, helping them build institutions within the country, outfit their militaries—all of which are often just as important to building our relationships as selling a country a ship or an aircraft.

For example, a program we began last year involved sending ERGTs [Expeditionary Requirements Generation Teams] to sit down early in the process with nations, especially [a nation] trying to determine what capability it needs and how much money it will have. We also bring in the State Department and other agencies to help determine what might meet a country's needs without going with the most expensive solution. In the past, nations had to figure that out pretty much by themselves, but now we bring all our people in to sit down with their best people to determine what they want to accomplish—rather than what they might like to buy.

**While many people think of Security Assistance only in terms of military equipment, what are the scope and intent of DSCA's Humanitarian and Disaster Relief and efforts to help deal with land mines?**

Humanitarian and Disaster Relief is a DoD program, with projects generally coming out of embassy country teams and the COCOMs, who make proposals for efforts to help a given nation address its humanitarian needs. That can range from building roads to equipping hospitals, digging wells, and in some cases helping a country put in place the ability to coordinate their response to a disaster before the disaster occurs.

It is very powerful when we help a nation support itself.

When it is in response to a disaster, it's a bit different—how can we provide support, including to NGOs and other relief agencies. Typically, that is money on our part, funding military disaster relief and helping facilitate those efforts.

We have three warehouses around the world with emergency meals and supplies we can tap into as needed.

On mine action, we have a school under DSCA to teach countries that are dealing with mines strewn about from previous conflicts how to find and eliminate those mines. We don't find or eliminate them ourselves, but train them on how to do so and how to train others in their own countries.

One of the areas that we have been focused on as a result of our efforts to support Security Cooperation efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan is how we can deliver equipment more quickly to our customers—a key component of our effort to be more flexible and responsive.

To meet countries' equipment requests, we use the existing DoD acquisition system and processes. Because the US tends to have longer range planning and budgeting time lines, that process does not always support a partner country's needs. So we looked at ways we might be able to get the equipment to them quickly, even if we could not speed up the acquisition process. We found that in many cases we knew the requirement was coming, but would wait until we received the formal request before we would even begin actions with the acquisition program managers. We thought that if we could identify items that were going to be bought and could start the procurement

process even as the formal requests were being developed, we could potentially take months off of the time it would take to get the equipment to the country. Obviously if a country did not make the formal request, we would have equipment we needed to find a buyer for, but we thought if we emphasized high- volume items that multiple countries were expected to buy, we would be able to manage that issue. So we focused specifically on high-demand items such as radios, spare parts, small arms, body armor, etc., and implemented the Special Defense Acquisition Fund. While we are in our first year of this effort and much of the equipment is still in production, we have already had three cases where we were able to significantly improve our ability to meet a country's needs through this process.

**Any final thoughts?**

All of our Security Cooperation programs are vitally important to our ability to build strong relationships with our partner nations. Through the efforts of many people in DSCA, the services and other agencies, we have been able to improve the flexibility and responsiveness of our execution of those programs. We have improved response time, driven down the cost of doing business and improved the countries' insight in to the progress of their cases. These are significant achievements and I am very proud of the people who worked so hard to meet our customer and stakeholders expectations. While we have come a long way, we are not done and the team is off looking at even more innovative ways to improve our performance. This is incredibly important work, and the US Security Cooperation team is proud to play such an important part in building strong relationships between the US and the rest of the world.



# AFRICOM Helps Partner Nations Grow Capability, [Gen] Ham Says

By Karen Parrish  
American Forces Press Service

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WASHINGTON, March 15, 2013—Now in its fifth year, US Africa Command brings “markedly increased” capabilities to its mission of defending US interests and developing regional militaries, the command’s leader told Congress today. During a House Armed Services Committee hearing, Army Gen. Carter F. Ham said both positive progress and emerging threats have this year demonstrated Africa’s strategic importance to the United States and its allies.

In prepared testimony, Carter said AFRICOM staffs work closely with the State Department and the US Agency for International Development to train African militaries and support development. “Our integrated approach seeks to address the greatest near-term threats to our national security while simultaneously building long-term partnerships and fostering regional cooperation,” he said.

Ham explained the command focuses on five major areas: countering violent extremist organizations; strengthening maritime security and countering illicit trafficking; strengthening defense capabilities; maintaining strategic posture; and preparing for and responding to crises. Countering terrorism is the command’s highest priority and will remain so for some time, he added.

The general said three violent extremist organizations are of particular concern in Africa: al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb, or AQIM, active in northern and western Africa; Boko Haram in Nigeria; and al-Shabaab in Somalia. “The growing collaboration of these organizations heightens the danger they collectively represent,” he said. “Of the three organizations, AQIM, which exploited the instability that followed the coup d’état in Mali and seeks to establish an Islamic state in northern Mali, is currently the most likely to directly threaten US national security interests in the near term.”

Ham said AFRICOM is aiding French and African military operations against AQIM and other terrorist organizations in northern Mali. “We are supporting

French efforts with information, airlift, and refueling, and are working with the Department of State to support the deployment of West African forces to the African-led International Support Mission to Mali,” he said. “Recently, we began unarmed, remotely piloted aircraft operations from Niger in support of intelligence gathering efforts in the region.”

Ham told committee members French, Malian, and AFISMA forces have driven AQIM fighters from population centers, but eliminating the group as a long-term threat will require restoring Malian governance and territorial integrity, reconciling with northern indigenous groups and establishing security. Ham noted AQIM is not solely a Malian challenge, but is spread across the Sahel region of north-central Africa south of the Sahara Desert and requires a regional approach to effectively address the threat. AFRICOM, the State Department and USAID work to support regional counter-terrorism efforts under the umbrella of the Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership, Ham added.

The partnership involves 10 northern and western African nations and the United States, he said, and aims to develop partner militaries’ counter-terrorism capabilities and build regional cooperation against AQIM and related extremist groups.

In Nigeria, AFRICOM is partnering with Nigerian forces to counter Boko Haram’s campaign of violent attacks focused in the northern part of the country, Ham said. “If pressure on Boko Haram decreases, they could expand their capabilities and reach to pose a more significant threat to US interests,” he cautioned.

The general said al-Shabaab has been greatly weakened in Somalia by the operations of African Union Mission in Somalia, Ethiopian and Somali forces. “While al-Shabaab is less effective, the group is still dangerous and capable of conducting unconventional attacks to disrupt AMISOM operations and the newly formed Somali government,”

Ham said. Somalia is on a positive path, he added, but warned that “focus must be maintained on Somalia to sustain security progress made to date.” Ham said he believes AFRICOM’s efforts to counter violent extremist organizations are having a positive impact.

“Our African partners are demonstrating strengthened capabilities and are increasingly cooperating with other nations to address shared security challenges, including supporting African Union and United Nations operations and programs,” he said. “The leadership of the African Union and the Economic Community of West African States in addressing the security challenges in Mali is indicative of the growing willingness and capability of Africans to address African security challenges.”

The African continent presents a complex and fluid set of challenges and opportunities, Ham concluded. “At US Africa Command, we will continue to engage with our African partner militaries to strengthen their skills and capabilities, so they are better able to address shared security concerns and are able to contribute to regional stability and security,” he said.

# The Call Letter: CAD/PAD Purchase via FMS

By Orlando Vilches  
Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management

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Every year in July, the Air Force Security Assistance and Cooperation (AFSAC) Directorate (AFSAC-D) sends out a call letter to all countries participating in the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program with the United States Air Force (USAF). This call letter is an invitation and will reach them via their foreign liaison office or command country manager; it is highly anticipated. The event advertised in this letter is not what you might expect; it is not a social event. Nonetheless, it is an invitation none of them would want to miss.

Once a year, countries are invited to join the USAF in its annual purchase of Cartridge Actuated Devices and Propellant Actuated Devices (CADs/PADs). If you are not familiar, CADs/PADs are relatively small explosive devices that are used to safely eject items — or pilots — from missiles or airplanes in the event of an emergency.



Figure 1: Photo of Thunderbird no. 6 ejection at Mt. Home airshow in 2003 [Photo by SSgt Bennie J. Davis III, USAF]

Several years ago while doing some FMS consulting, I received such a letter. I entered this world of CAD/PAD without a full appreciation for how complex it was, and paid the price in frustration and headaches. Later on, when I had the chance to do

some research, I was astonished at the complexity of it and swore one day to write an article on the subject. I came to the conclusion back then that an ounce of information would have saved me a ton of frustration. With that in mind, in this article I intend to document the FMS annual CAD/PADs procurement cycle, and suggest some ideas that might alleviate some frustration for both newcomers and seasoned CAD/PAD customers.

Most customers are very familiar with the invitation letter and the process to submit requisitions, but there is so much more to the story. I have identified and documented several components to this process that should be understood by those who intend to take part in it. I will address what is in the invitation letter, describe the process in general terms, define the participants and their roles, and explain a few factors that add complexity to the process. I also gathered a few suggestions from the process owners, which, if heeded, will undoubtedly make any customer a more effective and efficient participant.

## **The Invitation Letter**

The invitation letter actually is a package containing six attachments:

- a. Annual Buy Schedule:** A simple list of all major events and deadlines related to the annual buy. It also includes a note that warns of several undesirable situations that can complicate the process. The warning includes what could happen if the customer misses the requirements submission deadline. Also, how prices and deliveries are affected if the total combined requirement quantity for a single item falls short of a minimum procurement quantity (MPQ). Finally, it also addresses the possibility of no bids for a specific item.
- b. Requirements Information:** as its name indicates, this document describes important considerations related to a country's submitted requirements:

1. How to take into consideration lead-times and deadlines
  2. Implications of quality forecasting
  3. Accounting for cataloguing data in particular Quantity Unit Pack (QUP) and use of alternate NSNs
  4. Submission process expectations such as formats and confirmation notices
  5. Agreed upon conditions for the use of USAF stock
  6. Cancellations rules
  7. Funding of non-mission capable supply (NMCS) conditions
- c. CAD/PAD forecasting:** This is a basic guide for how to conduct requirements computations while taking into consideration the service and shelf life of the item. It includes examples.
- d. Transportation:** A short couple of paragraphs describing options to transport these explosives, such as the Defense Transportation System or pilot pick up, and how either should be documented in the LOA via the appropriate delivery term code.
- e. Temporary Service Life Extension Request:** A one-page document including the format and the instructions to request a temporary life extension recommendation.

**f. CAD/PAD Spreadsheet:** Comprehensive document listing all the National Stock Numbers (NSNs) available for purchase this year. They are organized by weapon system, which helps the customer focus their search. Among other things, it includes the NSN, nomenclature, part number, estimated unit cost based on last purchase, lead time, shelf life and service life. This spreadsheet is put together by the Joint Program Office (JPO) once a year with the information provided by vendors at the time the contracts are let.

**Process**

In very general terms, the process goes something like this: the invitation letter goes out each year around July. Each participating country goes through a requirements computation process and determines their CAD/PAD requirements for the present purchase cycle before March. Participating countries will ensure that there is an FMS case or case line in place with sufficient funds to cover those requirements. This step could involve creating a new case or amending an existing one. Considering the time it takes to get a new case or an amendment fully implemented, it is in a country's best interest to submit the LOR several months ahead of the February deadline. With the case or line in place, the countries forward their requirements to AFSAC-D before March.




Figure 2: Depiction of the CAD/PAD purchase cycle developed by author

The CAD/PAD case managers at AFSAC-D combine all FMS requirements and enter them into the Security Assistance Management Information Systems (SAMIS), which is the legacy FMS information management system at AFSAC-D. The consolidated list of requirements is then forwarded to the CAD/PAD Joint Program Office (JPO) at Hill Air Force Base (HAFB) Utah; the JPO resides within the Munitions Directorate at HAFB.

Items Managers at JPO collect those FMS requirements and merge them with USAF requirements. Jennifer Struhs, head of the requirements office at JPO, estimates that for the 2012 purchasing cycle, the value of FMS requirements will be near 50 percent of the total procurement cost; the balance will represent USAF requirements. Historically, FMS requirements have fluctuated between 20 and 40 percent of total value. By April, the total requirement computations including FMS and USAF are finalized, and JPO will forward the entire package to the base contracting office or other applicable procurement agency.

Contracting officers at base contracting (PK) or other applicable procurement agency will start the procurement process. This involves publishing invitations for bids, receiving proposals, selecting providers, and finalizing contracts. These newly established contracts will define the real unit price of the items and the expected delivery dates (EDD).

Starting in July, price and delivery data will be relayed by contracting back to JPO to create the new excel spreadsheet that will go to AFSAC-D. AFSAC-D in turn will attach it to the other documentation discussed earlier and publish next year's invitation letter; this signals the start of a new procurement cycle. In case you didn't notice, the invitation letter contains last year's procurement prices. Considering that customers base their requirements computations on those prices, it is understood that those values will not cover the cost that will be established when the current year's requirements are negotiated and included in new contracts. To prevent a funding shortage which could derail the entire effort, AFSACD encourages countries to include an additional 20 percent of the estimated cost in the case or line to cover any price increases and other contingencies.

What is left of the present cycle is neither minor nor short. Contract administrators, item managers, line managers and engineers at JPO, command country managers at AFSAC-D, and the country representatives will stay busy tracking progress, acceptance of lots, and eventual delivery of the

CADs/PADs to final destination. For those items with a lead time of twenty-four or thirty-six months, four or more years could pass before actual delivery. In the meantime, another cycle has started. Thus, at any one point, there could be three cycles at different stages of execution.

### **Participants**

By looking at the process, the key players become evident. They include the customers, AFSAC-D, the CAD/PAD Joint Program Office, contracting, and vendors. Now let's consider their specific roles and how they can potentially impact the entire outcome.

- a. **Customers:** the customer's role can't be overemphasized. They are the reason the invitation goes out. Their involvement in the annual buy ensures all participants, including USAF, benefit from economies of scale. It is their responsibility to provide accurate requirements; those requirements will define the process' potential for success. While there is always a chance for an unforeseeable circumstance to affect the process later on, it is virtually impossible to recover from a faulty start resulting from an inaccurate requirements computation. There are commercial products as well as support from the JPO to assist customers. The objective is to ensure they are comfortable with their ability to compute requirements accurately.
- b. **AFSAC-D:** the CAD/PAD section publishes an updated version of the invitation letter every year and ensures all potential participants receive a copy. Case managers and Country Program Directors work together to ensure a case or a line is available to finance the purchase. If they see a potential problem such as insufficient funds or an expired or expiring case, they will inform the country immediately. Their prompt actions give customer the time needed to submit a new LOR and have the document implemented ahead of the March requirements submission deadline. AFSAC-D accepts the customer's requirements, loads them into SAMIS, and prepares a package sorted by NSN to be sent to JPO at HAFB. Later, they will receive from the JPO the actual contracted prices and Estimated Delivery Date (EDD) information; with that data they will publish the invitation letter for the next cycle. Occasionally, they may have to work emergency amendments when case or line funding proves inadequate to cover price increases.

**c. Joint Program Office (JPO):** JPO resides in the Munitions Division at HAFB. In this organization you will find item managers, engineers, equipment specialists, contracting officers, country line item managers (IMs), transportation specialists, and program managers. Individuals from both Navy and USAF, civilians and contractors, come together to make it all happen—truly the heart of the entire operation. It all starts with item managers combining both FMS and USAF requirements, then passing them to base contracting for final procurement. IMs as well as country case line managers will be tracking those purchases as well as purchases from the two previous cycles. When contracts are awarded and pricing and delivery data are agreed upon, IMs will enter that data into their information systems, which in turn will feed into AFSAC-D’s SAMIS. Additionally, country case line managers will constantly keep the information current and make updates in SAMIS for command country managers and customers to see.

The focus of engineers is to ensure proper fit, form, and function; to that end they work closely with vendors throughout the cycle to ensure the requirements are technically adequate and that final products can pass the acceptance inspection. Additionally, they conduct the surveillance program, which entails performing tests on CADs/PADs taken from operating systems. The results are then compared to original test data.

The data collected from these tests are eventually used to make final decisions on temporary service life extension requests.

Equipment specialists work hand-in-hand with the rest of the team to ensure technical support for each weapon system. Their tasks are many and varied. Program managers lead weapon systems focus teams and make recommendations on a variety of issues including temporary service life extensions, abatement plans, and lot acceptance. An entire article could easily be written to provide a fair coverage of what goes on at the Munitions Division at Hill AFB.

**d. Contracting:** Contracting officers at base contracting and other procurement agencies receive requirements from JPO and, in accordance with federal acquisition regulations, select vendors and award contracts to satisfy requirements. Contracting officers convey the prices and EDD established in the contracts back to JPO.

**e. Vendors:** Vendors are those companies that compete for the contracts, produce CADs/PADs, provide samples for acceptance testing, and deliver items as required by the contracts. Any issues that could impact the vendor’s process such as availability of raw materials, faulty mixtures failing an acceptance test, and delays in manufacturing, will have an unavoidable and significant ripple effect resulting in delivery delays. Vendors work closely with JPO to ensure that, at the first sign of problems, JPO can develop and deploy abatement plans.

NSN	Nomenclature	DOD	Part Number	QTY	Est Unit Cost	QT	Proc Lead Time
1377-00-403-4827ES	INITIATOR, PROPELLANT (JAU-8/A25)	M758	117317373	2	\$941.42	1	30
Remarks:							
1377-00-607-0306ES	REMOVER, AIRCRAFT (M4)	M251	8595439	1	\$6,878.73	1	36
Remarks:							
1377-00-845-1058ES	INITIATOR, CARTRIDGE (M26)	M710	8597941	2	\$1,031.03	1	24
Remarks:							
1377-01-044-0367ES	SQUIB, ELECTRIC	MT41	30903823	6	\$106.23	1	18

Figure 3.A screen capture of the CAD/PAD Excel Spreadsheet from JPO.

## Key Factors

By now there is no question that the annual CADs/PADs purchase is a very complex process. There are many factors that contribute to its complexity and while trying to look at each one in detail may prove exhausting, we can certainly consider the most significant ones. A short list includes timings, transportation, zero spare inventories, and yearly price volatility.

- a. **Timings:** lead times and expiration dates are time-associated issues that complicate the management of CADs/PADs.

First let's consider at lead times. The screen capture below, of the excel spreadsheet from JPO included in the invitation letter, helps to illustrate the point. The lead-time column is highlighted by the downward pointing arrow and varies anywhere from eighteen to thirty-six months.

The lead time clock starts when the customer's requirements are entered into SAMIS by CAD/PAD case managers at AFSAC-D. These requirements are entered by mid-March of each year. Let's consider the cycle that started March of 2012. For items with the shortest lead time (18 months), the customer can expect vendors will be ready to start shipments somewhere around September 2013. Deliveries related to this cycle will continue on for those items with longer lead time stretching until March 2015. This assumes everything goes as planned, and for the most part, this is exactly what will happen.

On the topic of expiration dates, we need to consider that each CAD/PAD has both a shelf life and a service life. Shelf life is based on the manufacturing date and is tracked by lots. Service life is based on the date the item is actually installed in the system. The service date needs to be tracked by the customer as they are the only ones who will know when the CAD/PAD is installed in the system. You can see how things can get complicated as items from the same lot, originally having the same shelf life and service life, will end up with different expiration dates based on the date they are installed in the aircraft. In summary, a country's CAD/PAD purchase plan must cover many significant dates over a period of years. A country needs to coordinate their maintenance schedule, replacement dates, and budgets over five or more years to ensure continuous system availability.

- b. **Transportation:** The formal lead time ends when the accepted lots are at the vendor dock or shipping facility; however, the items are not yet in the customer's hands, so there is an informal lead time from that point until the CADs/PADs arrive in country. If we were talking about most other spare parts, we could consider that time as largely irrelevant, since the parts could be loaded in the next commercial vessel destined for the country. However, it's not that simple for CADs/PADs. Two issues that impact the transportation of CADs/PADs are the special handling required for explosives, and the diminishing frequency of MILAIR missions.

A country moving explosives from CONUS has many restrictions to deal with. These restrictions limit how and by what entities these items are transported. They can't be shipped via a traditional package handler as you would many other spares. If countries are using freight forwarders or plan a pilot pick up, a Competent Authority Authorization letter is required for each NSN. These are permits issued by the Department of Transportation, and allow a country representative to coordinate the transportation of explosives within CONUS. If the vessels transporting CADs/PADs will transit in any other country, the customer must secure similar permits from those countries' Competent Authorities.

In the past, the Defense Transportation System (DTS) alleviated this transportation burden by moving CADs/PADs on space available MILAIR missions. However, in the last few years DTS missions have been reduced and almost disappeared from some regions, leaving the customer to seek new ways to transport CADs/PADs. In many instances CADs/PADs can't be shipped with other sensitive, explosive, or flammable materials; justifying a flight or ship for a partial load is just a small measure of the difficulty a country has to overcome when securing transportation. In the end, it all translates into further delays for the items to reach their destination.

- c. **Zero spare inventories:** When the contracting officers at Hill AFB conclude negotiations, the providers begin the intricate process of creating the volatile explosive mixtures that will allow them to make enough CADs/PADs to match the

production required for that year's order. There is no incentive for vendors to produce additional items. First, it is understood the annual order includes all users, foreign and domestic, so no additional orders are expected. Even if vendors wanted to produce additional units, which of the nearly 2,400 NSNs would they bet will have additional requirements above and beyond the annual buy? Thus, additional production would almost certainly lead to financial loss for the vendors. As a result, each CAD/PAD produced has a purpose and an owner; there is no spare inventory. If after the orders are placed for that year, a customer discovers it will have a shortage, there is no way to accommodate the extra requirement. In the event of shortage, JPO along with the USAF Global Ammunition Control Point POC will go to extremes to formulate a solution. Without spares inventory though, solutions tend to be costly and time consuming.

**d. New contract and prices every year:** Earlier it was mentioned that new contracts are negotiated and awarded every year. New and higher prices for each item result, as vendors need to account for higher costs of labor and raw material. There are also other less obvious factors that could send prices soaring from one year to the next. Some of these include diminishing manufacturing resources (DMR), shrinking FMS requirements, and lower demand from US sources that fail to meet minimum order quantities. DMR is addressed in greater detail by Mr. Barton Chess in the 2012 edition of *The DISAM Annual*.<sup>1</sup> The other two factors are related, and discussed below.

When we say FMS only or non-standard systems, we are referring mainly to older aircraft already retired from the US military inventory. They may still be operated by FMS customers, however. The FMS-only fleet shrinks every year as some users find themselves retiring a few planes to be able to support the operational units remaining in their own inventories. Others users will retire their entire fleet and get out of the market permanently. The consequence is a smaller global fleet, resulting in a smaller demand for certain CADs/PADs unique to these systems. Lower demand clashes with the need of the vendor to meet a minimum order quantity to remain profitable. As a direct result of this conflict, prices may increase 3, 4 and even ten times from one

year to the next. During my time as a consultant, I saw the unit price of certain CADs/PADs increase from a couple of hundred dollars to several thousand dollars in one year. No amount of planning can account for this price volatility, even with the 20% safety margin recommended during cost planning.

The customer then faces a short fuse situation where it needs to secure significant additional funding, along with a case modification quickly enough to remain in the purchase cycle. Both AFSAC-D and country line managers work closely with customers who find themselves in such an ordeal to ensure their requirements remain part of the purchase cycle. The munitions country line managers and Command Country Managers will work with AFSAC-D to process the modification under emergency priority protocol, and JPO will negotiate with vendors to provide the additional time needed.

The worst case scenario in such a situation is for the customer to decide to cancel a requirement. It is very possible that a cancellation from one customer may force a re-negotiation of the contract, potentially delaying deliveries and generating additional price increases for other customers. Because a delay in delivery has such a significant impact on a country's operation and budget, steps are taken to avoid cancellation-driven delays. There is a warning on the invitation letter clarifying that cancellation requests may not be honored if they will result in delays to other users.

### **Suggestions**

Because going through a steep learning curve was so painful as a newcomer to this world of CADs/PADs, I wanted to provide some suggestions to help both new and seasoned users to be more efficient and better prepared to handle the curve balls this process may throw at them. I asked Jennifer Struhs, based on her extensive experience and present trends, what a customer could do to maximize their chances of success in the CADs/PADs process. Here is what she suggested: Good requirements computations, benchmark USAF procedures, process temporary extensions early, track deliveries frequently, and finally, maintain good communication.

Good requirements computation. In order to do an accurate requirements computation, it is necessary to track when the items will expire. Remember, CADs/PADs can expire based on shelf life or service life. Expiration dates, whatever they are based on,

are the main factors to consider when planning replacement times. This tracking information is an integral part of the requirements computation. To help with this burdensome tracking and projection process, there are sophisticated commercial software products available in the market. Additionally, JPO is ready and willing to provide assistance in this area to customers who request it. An accurate requirements computation is the right way to start the process, and guarantees the best chance for success.

**Benchmark USAF procedures.** The idea here is that the USAF has excellent CADs/PADs management techniques, and customers could benefit from adopting some of them. The USAF is constantly evaluating and adjusting their maintenance schedule to coincide both with the expiration and delivery of their CADs/PADs. For example, it is not rare to see scheduled maintenance delayed or accelerated by weeks if feasible, to coincide with CAD/PAD deliveries. A major period of inspection and/or maintenance is adjusted to coincide with the replacement of CADs/PADs, reducing labor and down time of the aircraft.

**Process temporary extensions early.** Sooner or later, a customer will discover a gap between the expiration date and the delivery date. The correct response is to process a request for a temporary extension. Those requests are routed via AFSAC-D to JPO, where the case line manager, engineers, technicians, and program managers will work together and study relevant data to come up with a final solution. Allowing as much time as possible for this to happen is always best, so customers should submit an extension request the moment they realize a gap issue is imminent. Early submission ensures JPO has the appropriate time to complete the review and provide a solution. Additionally, in the event an extension cannot be granted, early submission ensures time for all interested parties to work on an abatement plan.

**Track deliveries frequently.** This suggestion goes hand in hand with the previous one. The earlier a customer detects a problem, the sooner they can start working a solution. As soon as the item managers at JPO receive information that may impact an item's availability, they will contact the country line manager, who will enter notes in SAMIS. These notes become available immediately to those customers who are tracking their requisitions. The country line manager also submits updated spreadsheets with current status to the CCM at AFSAC-D. As in the

previous suggestion, identifying a delay in deliveries should trigger a protocol of actions to abate its impact. A customer's early and constant tracking helps them have a better replacement schedule plan, triggering quicker reactions to contingencies and leading to less downtime for their aircraft.

**Maintain good communication.** Maintaining good communication channels in FMS is important, but it is vital when it comes to the CAD/PAD process. An expired or unavailable item can ground a plane or a fleet. With that in mind, AFSAC-D and JPO not only understand the need for a good dialog, but actually encourage it and look for ways to improve it. A significant effort to improve communication is the user's conference that takes place around May of every year at the College of Southern Maryland. Here, all significant issues affecting the CAD/PAD program are briefed in detail to customers.

### **Conclusion**

The annual call letter goes out to FMS customers around the world and invites them to join the US Air Force in its annual CAD/PAD procurement cycle. The process itself is extremely complex and laden with challenges. However, FMS customers are not left alone to deal with these complexities. First, within AFSAC-D, the customer has their CCM and case managers assisting them with requirements submission and case development in time to meet deadlines. Second, the customer has the entire JPO staff to ensure those requirements are passed to qualified vendors via contract, progress is tracked, and deliveries completed. Country line managers at Hill AFB, will respond to customer inquiries and inform the customer of the latest status of their CADs/PADs purchase.

**Avoid frustrations!** We've all been faced with difficult and unexpected situations. Being familiar with the entire process of purchasing CADs/PADs via FMS, understanding its strengths, weakness, and critical milestones should prevent "blindside" moments. To help the customer make better decisions, several ideas have been suggested, including generating a solid requirement computation, processing temporary extensions early, tracking deliveries early and often as a way to provide early warning of delays, and finally, maintaining good communication.

In the CAD/PAD procurement cycle, a customer could face many difficulties, I submit that an informed

customer can avoid many of those problems and react quickly and efficiently to those that cannot be avoided.

### **Notes**

1. Barton D. Chess, “The Impact of Diminishing Manufacturing Sources on FMS Logistics Support,” *The DISAM Annual* (2012): 95–96.
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### **About the Author**

Orlando E. Vilches is an instructor or Security Cooperation Management with the Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management (DISAM). He retired from the Air Force after twenty years of service in 2007 with final assignment as logistics instructor at DISAM. After retirement, he became an FMS consultant for the Chilean Air Force. Mr. Vilches entered civil service as a Command Country Manager at AFSAC and was responsible for the FMS programs of Colombia, Chile, Uruguay and El Salvador. In June 2010, he returned to DISAM as instructor and deputy Seminar Director for Western Hemisphere. He holds a bachelor’s degree from Southern Illinois University and a master’s degree from Troy State University. The author wishes to express his gratitude to AFSAC and the Munitions Directorate at Hill AFB and in particular to Mrs. Jennifer Struhs whose support made this article possible.

# Security Cooperation Information Portal (SCIP)

By John O'Connor  
Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management

## Introduction

Did the US Air Force receive my country's latest Letter of Request (LOR)? When is the US Navy going to complete the development of the Letter of Offer and Acceptance (LOA)? Is there a way that I can track a requisition to determine when the material will be shipped, and to also get specific details on the shipment once it occurs? Is there a way to develop metrics reports (e.g., implemented cases, open offers, Anticipated Offer Date performance, etc.) for all my cases of interest? Is there a system to manage my End Use Monitoring (EUM) responsibilities?

Answers to these questions and many other related ones can be obtained with a Security Cooperation Information Portal (SCIP) account. This article provides an overview of the SCIP system with details on how it can provide case management support to authorized users. For many of those users (e.g., Foreign Purchasers, United States Security Cooperation Organizations—SCOs, Geographic Combatant Commanders—GCCs, etc.), SCIP will be the primary, if not only, automated means to obtain

such answers for the cases of interest that they are managing or involved with. For other users, it will augment additional systems that they have access to with important data and reports that they need to effectively manage the Security Cooperation cases for which they are responsible.

## System Description

SCIP (<https://www.scportal.us/home/>) is a secure, controlled, unclassified US Department of Defense (DoD) web-based computer information system that provides authorized users with access to Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and Building Partner Capacity (BPC) programs case-related data and reports to support management responsibilities for those cases. All USG personnel (including Locally Employed Staff—LES, and contractors), and Foreign Purchasers (including their authorized Freight Forwarders) that have job responsibilities requiring access (i.e., need to know) to the SCIP system information are eligible to obtain SCIP accounts. DSCA's policy is that "USG personnel and SCOs are encouraged to become familiar with SCIP's full capabilities."




Figure 1: SCIP Authoritative Data Sources

The SCIP data extracts are obtained (automatically for most of the data) from multiple authoritative DoD and US military department (MILDEP) financial and logistic systems (See figure 1 for reference). The majority of data is updated daily via a batch process at 0700 US East Coast time. Refresh status indicators and info are provided to users in the Case Info Community to document the date/time of the last data refresh from those systems. Depending on the data being sought and the user's permissions, having a single SCIP account can save time from having to obtain that data from each individual source system. SCIP became operational in 2003 and has been significantly expanded and improved upon since then. SCIP system access is available world wide from any computer (i.e. does not have to be from a USG or DoD domain) as long as there is adequate internet access and an active authorized SCIP user account.

**Functionality**

SCIP capabilities, applications, and reports are separated by tabs into different “communities.” See figure 2 for reference. Some of the SCIP communities are only authorized for USG users. A brief description of each community (and the related capabilities and applications) follows.




Figure 2: SCIP Community Menu Bar

**Home Community**—The first page users see when they successfully logon to SCIP. Like all the SCIP communities, there are announcements to inform the user of all the recently completed and planned changes to that community. Users can use the community navigation bar (figure 2) at the top of the web page to navigate to any of their authorized communities.

**Case Information Community**—Provides a query capability to view all FMS and BPC case information that the user has been authorized to have access to. SCIP displays region, country, or case data of interest depending upon the application and filter options that the user chooses. The application is chosen by the user via the Case Information menu bar. Each community has a unique menu bar (located directly below the Community navigation menu bar and available once the desired community is selected) that provides the user with the capability to select their desired community application or report. In the Case Information Community, some of those applications include real-time metrics (that can be quickly exported to a PowerPoint slide if desired), data inputs (requisitions, supply discrepancy reports [SDRs], freight transactions), Financial Management Reviews FMRs, Ad Hoc reports, and a Case Status filter to enable the user to quickly find cases of interest. For all cases that the user is authorized to see, the user is presented with a “Pyramid of Choices” (see figure 3) for all the case’s Letter of Offer and Acceptance (LOA) documents (Basic, Amendments, Modifications). Selecting any one of those pyramid levels will provide the user with specific case details (e.g., what is the LOA Anticipated Offer Date, when is the requisition material expected to be shipped, are there any unprogrammed case funds remaining, etc.) pertaining to that level. A summary report of all or a portion of that case data can be exported to a MS Excel file.



Figure 3: Case Status Menu Options - A “Pyramid of Choices”

**Case Execution Community**—Provides links to several tri-service applications including the Enhanced Freight Tracking System (EFTS), EMALL, Asset Visibility (AV), and the recently added WebRoR (formerly a Navy only application that automates the repair of repairable process). “EFTS is a secure web-based application, resident in the SCIP, and serves as a consolidated source for Security Cooperation material in-transit information. EFTS does not replace existing shipment systems, but rather provides a clearing house of all available shipment information in a single supplemental tracking system to provide additional visibility of equipment and material shipment. EFTS receives data from DLA, contractors, depots, Defense Transportation System, carriers, freight forwarders, consolidation points, and ports of embarkation and debarkation. This allows EFTS to provide visibility of the SC material distribution pipeline for all classes of supply and modes of transportation either outbound from the United States to the purchaser’s country or materiel returning to the United States or US facility overseas.”

**EUM (End-Use Monitoring) Community**—Provides authorized users with specific information, reports, and capabilities to the DoD End-Use Monitoring (EUM) Program. The EUM applications within SCIP provides inventory reports that will help inspectors plan for upcoming inventories and isolate items that are considered ‘delinquent.’

**Partner Info Community**—Provides an information sharing type of community vice a business process or business application community. It includes (among other items) documents, presentations, and files related to the Foreign Procurement Group (FPG), and International Customer User Group (ICUG).

**National Geospatial Agency (NGA) Community**—Allows authorized SCIP users to access, review, and download navigation charts (e.g., aeronautical en route and approach charts, terminal procedures, etc. for necessary international navigation and flight safety).

**SCMS(COP)SecurityCooperationManagement Suite Community**—Is authorized only for USG personnel to support case management responsibilities for Building Partner Capacity (BPC) and Foreign Military Sales (FMS) cases. “SCMS resides within the SCIP and is a joint service, web-based capability that provides US officials with a common operating picture of the SC process. SCMS has joint US military

and civilian users globally from all branches of the US armed forces and associated support Commands, which increases joint communication resulting in enhanced decision making. SCMS provides USG personnel with key information used to track high priority FMS programs, and is especially useful during the oversight process for expiring funds and those FMS cases that are funded via US appropriated sources. SCMS allows data input and customization through its multiple reports, showing information by appropriation and program, which allows for intense information sharing among multiple program participants. Although initially conceived to support the war effort in Iraq, the utility of SCMS has since been recognized by additional communities within DSCA. SCMS has been expanded for use with all the Building Partner Capacity (BPC) programs, which proved to be of great benefit to US decision makers when planning how to best build partner nation capacity.”

**Corporate Info Community**—Provides information to US Government personnel regarding metrics, Lean Six Sigma/Continuous Process Improvement, organizational charts, Security Cooperation Business Forum (SCBF) minutes, and Lessons Learned – Best Practices.

**SCO/COCOM Community**—Is authorized only for USG personnel and provides an information sharing (e.g., General Information, Lessons Learned & Best Practices, etc.) for the USG SCO and COCOM personnel.

**Navy Community**—Provides numerous capabilities (e.g. Case Execution Performance Tool—CEPT, Case Reviews, Information Warehouse, Supply Discrepancy Reports, etc.) pertaining to US Navy-managed cases. Case and line financial commitments, obligations, and expenditures details are also provided.

**Help Community**—The help desk was developed to provide all users of SCIP a common location and interface for submitting and reading SCIP help desk requests. Having the help desk embedded within SCIP provides users with more security and privacy and prevents unauthorized viewing of requests. There are also numerous online help guides (Help Desk User Guide, Case Information User Guide, SCIP Help Descriptions, Corporate Info User Guide, International Customer Token Access Guide, Logon Guide, SCIP Acronyms, SCIP Background, Token Administrators Guide, US Government (USG)/SCO Token Access

Guide, and the Partner Info User Guide) posted there to assist SCIP users with understanding how to fully use the numerous SCIP capabilities. Note: In addition to the guides and reference documents listed above, there are also other Community specific guides that are posted on SCIP that can be accessed via the Help links on the applicable community navigation menu.

### **Obtaining a SCIP Account**

The online SCIP registration form for both US and international users can be found by accessing the SCIP web site (<https://www.scportal.us/home/>) and ‘clicking’ the “REGISTRATION INFO” link on that page. All USG SCO and GCC students that attend the DISAM Security Cooperation Management Overseas (SCM-O) course are registered for their individual SCIP accounts while in that class per the DSCA Policy Memo 11-58 (Policy Update Regarding Security Cooperation Information Portal (SCIP) Account Access for Security Cooperation Officers (SCOs)). For all other SCIP account applicants, follow the instructions in the SCIP “REGISTRATION INFO” introduction to submit your form for processing by the SCIP Program Office/Defense Security Assistance Development Center (DSADC). An important note for international (i.e. non USG) SCIP applicants is that a pre-requisite to completing the registration form is to be issued a secure SCIP token by their country’s Host Nation Token Administrator (HNTA). DSCA Policy Memorandums 03-11 (Enrollment Process for the SCIP), and 05-17 (SCIP Electronic Token Issuance and Replacement Processes) are the policy references for details regarding issuance and management of SCIP tokens. The SCIP International Customer Token Access Guide (posted on the SCIP “REGISTRATION INFO” web page), provides further details on SCIP token operations and processes. Additional SCIP DSCA Policy Memorandums are posted on the DSCA web site. For additional SCIP assistance, users (and prospective users) can contact the SCIP Help Desk at [SCIPHelp@dsadc.dsca.mil](mailto:SCIPHelp@dsadc.dsca.mil) or via phone at (717) 605-9200.

### **Accessing the Security Cooperation Information Portal (SCIP) Website**

To access the SCIP system (once a user has obtained a SCIP account), type <https://www.scportal.us/home/> in the address line of your Internet browser and then click the “SCIP Logon” link on top of that page. Both Internet Explorer (IE) and Mozilla

Firefox can be used to access SCIP although SCIP functionality appears to work best on IE. The browser advanced security settings and certificates need to be correct to get access. Contact the SCIP Help Desk ([SCIPHelp@dsadc.dsca.mil](mailto:SCIPHelp@dsadc.dsca.mil)) if you have SCIP log-on issues. If you are logging into SCIP with your USG Common Access Card (CAC) certificate (which is the usual means for USG DoD users to log-on to SCIP if the account has been CAC enabled), select your non-email certificate. Logging in to the SCIP system with a token (vice a USG DoD CAC, DoS Smart Card, or commercial PKI certificate) will be via the subsequent SCIP login screens requiring entry of the SCIP user’s user ID and passcode. To keep the SCIP account active, users need to periodically log-on. If you do not log in to SCIP for 45 days, you will receive an automatic e-mail, advising you to log in or risk the loss of SCIP account privileges. If you fail to log in for 60 days, your account will be suspended, requiring your USG supervisor or country HNTA to contact the SCIP Help desk to reactivate the account. If you fail to log in for 180 days, your account will be permanently deleted, requiring you to submit a complete new registration form to obtain another account.

### **SCIP Training**

DISAM provides SCIP training (basic through advanced topics) in the majority of the DISAM offered classes. The DISAM SCIP classroom training (which includes in-residence and Mobile Education Teams—METs) has expanded by 125 percent in the last year due to the increasing importance of SCIP to the Security Cooperation users. Electronic copies of all the current DISAM SCIP presentations are posted on the SCIP Corporate Info Community and are accessible via the “Training...DISAM Presentations...SCIP” links to authorized USG users. The DISAM SCIP training maximizes the online demonstration (vice ‘screen shots’) of the system capabilities by the instructors and the ‘hands-on’ practical exercises by the students. There is additional SCIP information and training that can be accessed on the DISAM home page (<http://www.disam.dsca.mil/>) via the “SC Tools” link on that page. Those DISAM SCIP training resources (See figure 4 for reference) includes an overview presentation, a SCIP exercise handbook, DSCA SCIP Policy Letters, SCIP frequently asked questions (FAQs), and a link to access the SCIP system. The SCIP handbook is a

familiarization tool and training guide for Security Cooperation Information Portal (SCIP) users to better understand the capabilities of the SCIP system. It is intended for both initial system instruction, and also to provide users with future reference handbook when utilizing the SCIP system. All the exercise questions (Process, Logistics, Financial, Miscellaneous Advanced) in that handbook are based on information provided in the DISAM class lessons, and can be completed even without a SCIP account using the training case examples in the handbook. A basic understanding of the Security Cooperation Foreign Military Sales (FMS) process, logistics, and finance subjects is needed to understand and interpret the materials, and complete the exercises in that handbook. Future DISAM SCIP training will include online training module ‘vignettes’ (e.g., how do I login...develop a real time metrics...develop an Ad Hoc report...track a requisition shipment, etc.) that students can access and complete via the DISAM web page.

### About the Author

John O’Connor is an instructor at the Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management (DISAM—<http://www.disam.dsca.mil/>) where he has been teaching (Process, Finance, Logistics, Acquisition, Tech Transfer/Exports, Navy Seminars, SCIP, etc.) since 2010. He is the DISAM SCIP project lead responsible for developing, maintaining, and integrating SCIP lessons in the DISAM curriculum. Prior to working at DISAM, he was a US Navy Officer (Naval Aviation) for twenty-six years, and a systems and financial analyst in industry for four years. He has a master’s degree in Computer Systems, is certified by DSCA as Level III in International Affairs, has a Level II DoD certification in Program Management, is a DoD Acquisition Workforce member, and is a former Country Program Director (CPD at Navy International Programs Office) (<http://www.nipo.navy.mil/>). He can be contacted at [John.OConnor@disam.dsca.mil](mailto:John.OConnor@disam.dsca.mil).




Figure 4: SCIP on DISAM Web Page



# FMS Logistics Communications

By John O'Connor

Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management

## Introduction

To successfully accomplish all the material and/or service requirements that the United States (US) and other countries have agreed to when they sign and fund a Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Letter of Offer and Acceptance (LOA) requires effective logistics communications. This article will discuss some of the significant FMS logistic communications options available, with a focus on the capabilities and processes for each of those systems (to include Air Force Security Assistance and Cooperation Directorate (AFSAC) Online, Security Cooperation Information Portal (SCIP), Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) International Logistics Communication System (ILCS), and the Supply Tracking and the Repairable Return (STARR/PC) program).

## Background

FMS logistics communication occurs between the FMS customer (i.e., Foreign Purchaser) and the US Military Departments (MILDEPS—Air Force, Army, and Navy) International Logistics Control Organizations (ILCOs) as depicted in figure 1. That FMS logistics communication occurs either directly or is routed via the DLA Transaction Services. DLA also receives and processes incoming requisitions from purchasers worldwide and coordinates direct shipment of goods from their depots back to their customers. However, for FMS customers, the logistics communications (e.g., requisitions, status, shipment information, etc.) for that DLA material are typically also relayed (with exceptions such as the Excess Defense Articles provided by the DLA Disposition Services via their website) to/from the MILDEP ILCOs [Note: For additional information on the ILCOs and their functions, refer to DISAM's textbook, *The Management of Security Cooperation*, chapter 10, "Logistics Support of International Military Sales."




Figure 1: Logistics Communications between FMS Customer and US DOD

## FMS Logistics Communication

There are multiple logistics communications options available to the FMS customer to communicate with the MILDEP ILCOs. While international mail, faxes, e-mails, and phone calls can and are certainly used as options, all of those are "still subject to manual processing at the ILCO. This intervention slows down the request and subjects the document to potential transcription errors." Fortunately, there are several very capable and effective options available (that will be discussed in the following paragraphs) that offer much higher levels of automation for logistics communication processing.

- **AFSAC Online:** One such option is the US Air Force Security Assistance and Cooperation Directorate (AFSAC) Online (<https://afsac.wpafb.af.mil/>) system which provides numerous logistics communications options including online requisition and Supply Discrepancy Reports (SDRs) inputs, status updates, etc. Access to the customer's AFSAC Online account is via the internet using secure HTTPS protocol on the user's workstation web browser. Customer inputs are received and processed by AFSAC.

The biggest limitation to the FMS customer is that the AFSAC Online system can only be used for USAF managed FMS cases, which then requires an alternative system(s) for any Navy and Army managed cases that the customer has.

- **SCIP:** The US Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) managed Security Cooperation Information Portal (SCIP, <https://www.scportal.us/home/>) is another computer information system available to the FMS customers for logistics communications. It also includes multiple input, output, and report options including online requisitions (single or batch), SDRs, status updates, etc. Access to the customer's SCIP account is via the internet using secure HTTPS protocol on the user's workstation web browser. FMS Customer accounts can be set-up (if authorized and approved) on SCIP to access data and send/receive logistics communications to all three US MILDEPs (Air Force [USAF], Army [USA], and Navy [USN]) via a single user's account. SCIP logistics communications data (with some notable exceptions including the Enhanced Freight Tracking System—EFTS) is exchanged via daily 'snapshots' to/from the applicable MILDEP and DOD computer systems. Additional details (e.g., system description, functionality, accounts, training, etc.) about the SCIP system are included in the following paragraphs and are also available in the in the *DISAM Journal* (<http://www.disamjournal.org/articles/security-cooperation-information-portal-scip-788>), and in appendix 1 of the 32nd edition of *The Management of Security Cooperation*, appendix 1.

◇ **Requisitions:** International logistics requisitions can be submitted by FMS Customers on SCIP. Those online inputs will sent via direct and secure File Transfer Protocol (FTP) from the SCIP system to the applicable MILDEP legacy systems (Security Assistance Management Information System (SAMIS) for the USAF, Centralized Integrated System for International Logistics (CISIL) for the USA, and Management Information System for International Logistics (MISIL) for the USN) for official processing by each of the MILDEP ILCOS (AFSAC, USASAC-NC, and NAVSUP-WSS). Requisition status and visibility on SCIP to the customers

depends upon numerous factors including whether or not the requisitioned material has been shipped, the SCIP Community that is being used for the report, what country the requisition is supporting, and a couple of other criteria. In the SCIP Case Information Community, there are always details “on all requisitions that are unshipped or have been shipped or canceled within the last ninety days. There is an exception to the 90 day rule, however, for certain countries where authorized users are able to access multiple years' worth of data. Another exception to the ninety-day requisition rule in the SCIP Case Information Community pertains to “split shipments.” For “split shipments,” even if one or more suffixed portion(s) was/were shipped over ninety days ago, that/those suffixed requisition(s) will still be in SCIP Case Information Community. Additionally, if an authorized SCIP user wants to get details on shipped requisitions older than ninety days for a country that is not one of the above exceptions, they are able to either request an Information Extract (which they can do for one case a day to obtain ALL requisition info for a case), or go to the Case Execution Community Enhanced Freight Tracking System (EFTS), or Security Cooperation Management Suite (SCMS) Community (USG users only) to run transportation reports.”<sup>2</sup>

◇ **Supply Discrepancy Reporting (SDRs):** SDRs can be submitted on the SCIP system (by FMS Customers and USG personnel for Building Partner Capacity (BPC) programs, <http://www.dsc.mil/samm/ESAMM/Chapter15.htm>). Any SDR entered on SCIP will be sent (as discussed previously in the Requisitions section) via direct and secure FTP from SCIP to the applicable MILDEP legacy system. There are some differences between the US MILDEPs on how they will process SDRs submitted via SCIP. See the following paragraphs for details.

» US Navy will officially process and review international logistics a SDR that is submitted via SCIP (either through the Case Information Community Inputs, or Navy Community SDR applications).<sup>3</sup>

- » US Army official position on SDR submissions is that “The country may input SDRs to SCIP and it is the recommended method to do so.”<sup>4</sup>
- » US Air Force has stated that while “customers can submit SDR to the USAF thru SCIP, it is not recommended. Attachments cannot be transmitted to AFSAC Online and not all information required to process SDR is entered into SCIP. USAF recommendation is for USAF customers to use AFSAC Online SDR-A (which provides a direct web-services interface to DLA’s WebSDR) to submit their SDRs.”<sup>5</sup> USAF customers SDR submissions via SCIP “creates only a skeleton record and the customer must still manually provide hard copy and supporting documents to the ILCO so record can be updated prior to routing to the supplier for action.”<sup>6</sup>
- ◇ **Navy Community:** The SCIP Navy Community provides authorized users with significant additional logistics communications capabilities (e.g., Supply Discrepancy Reports [SDRs] full history of reviews, remarks and decisions; Case Reconciliation and Reviews; Information Warehouse; Case Execution Performance Tool [CEPT], etc.) for all cases that are managed by the Department of the Navy.
- ◇ **Future Enhancements and Capabilities:** The DSCA-managed SCIP system has improved significantly since its operational introduction ten years ago, and it continues to be regularly updated to meet user’s operational requirements. Future potential SCIP logistics communication improvements in-work includes the initiative by the USAF to “re-host AFSAC Online tools under the SCIP login ‘umbrella,’ and an expansion of the USAF SDR-A capabilities for use by all services.”<sup>7</sup> “Air Force’s SDR-A or a tri-service re-write of that application are potential solutions for international logistics communication SDR processing in the Security Cooperation Enterprise Solution (SCES) era that DOD is working towards.”<sup>8</sup>
- **ILCS/DAMES:** “The DLA managed International Logistics Communication System (ILCS)/DLA Automated Message Exchange System (DAMES) is another tri-service automated system available to FMS customers for Logistics Communications. ILCS/DAMES were established in 1979 and currently have connections operating throughout the world. ILCS/DAMES is a PC-based software communications system designed for routing transactions providing a means for FMS customers to input requisitions into the DOD Logistics ‘pipeline’ and receive status transactions responses. Users may also use ILCS/DAMES to send and receive narrative messages. DAMES’ users, connect via an Internet Service Provider (ISP) using Secure File Transfer Protocol (SFTP), or Async (Asynchronous Interfaces) to Point-to-Point Protocol (PPP) dial up connection. DLA Transaction Services can procure hardware/software through an FMS case, or the country can elect to purchase their own, or use an existing PC at their site.
- ◇ **Minimum System Requirements:**
  - » Pentium or Higher Processor PC
  - » 128 MB RAM
  - » 100 MB Hard Disk Drive
  - » SVGA Color Monitor 800 x 600 minimum
  - » Suggested resolutions 1024 x 768 or higher
  - » Microsoft Windows XP, VISTA, Windows 2000, Windows 7
  - » Read/write/delete access to hard drive
  - » Mouse (Microsoft Compatible)
  - » Printer
- ◇ **Network connectivity required:**
  - » Secure communications on the PC uses TCP/IP running custom SFTP developed by Transaction Services especially for DAMES.
  - » For Network Connectivity:
    - ◆ Internet connectivity
    - ◆ WINSOCK.DLL (Supplied by your Network Provider)
  - » For Modem Connectivity:
    - ◆ SFTP using Point to Point Protocol (PPP) communications
- ◇ **Requisition/Message Traffic:** Narrative messages will be sent directly to the addressee. MILSTRIP transactions will be processed individually and forwarded to the appropriate service (Air Force transactions to the SAMIS

system, Army transactions to CISIL, and Navy transaction to MISIL) for further service-specific processing. After passing validation edits, requisitions will be sent to the appropriate Source of Supply (SOS). Messages and/or transactions containing narrative text, MILSTRIP/ FEDSTRIP logistics transactions, nonstandard part number requisitions and other data may be built interactively at the keyboard and/or imported from other systems. MILSTRIP uses JANAP 128 data pattern formatted communications messages for transmission. The DLA Transaction Services DAMES website at <https://www.transactionservices.dla.mil> provides details on DAMES system requirements, connectivity (Network and/or Modem), benefits, and message capabilities (creation, receiving, and processing).

◇ **ILCS / DAMES System Options and Costs:**

- » The cost of ILCS/DAMES is reimbursed by the FMS country to the US Government annually under an established FMS case. The fees (which can vary) are determined by the number of connections associated to the FMS case. There is no charge to the FMS Customer for DAMES software acquisition, installation or training. Should user want in-country training, there would be a cost for travel (includes Per Diem/ Flight), but no cost for training.
- » Once the applicable FMS Case is implemented, the FMS Customer would request ILCS/DAMES through the appropriate US MILDEP ILCO Country Case Manager who is managing their FMS Case. That Case Manager will initiate a call to DLA Transaction Services. The time frame for a customer to be fully operational with their ILCS/DAMES capability once they initiate the request depends on various customer dependencies and their requirements (e.g., ten days to six months).<sup>9</sup>

◇ **Supply Tracking and Repairable Return (STARR/PC2):**

- » Background: STARR/PC is PC based software that can be used by an FMS Customer for logistics communications with the US MILDEP ILCOs. It was

developed by the USAF (AFSAC) and “became operational in 1988. The USA (USASAC) and USN (NAVSUP) began supporting its use as a customer logistics communication option in 1990 and 1994 respectively for the FMS cases those organizations managed.”<sup>10</sup> “The STARR/PC2 system is designed around a data download from SAMIS, CISIL and/or MISIL. Each day as status data is received by SAMIS, CISIL and/or MISIL, they produce a series of “master records” that duplicate the current status of a country’s updated requisitions. These records are then transmitted, via the International Logistics Communication System (ILCS) to STARR/PC2 at the customer’s location. This new set of records replaces the last set of master records for the affected requisitions. All processing of the MILSTRIP transactions is accomplished by SAMIS, CISIL and MISIL. STARR/PC2 merely updates its databases with the same status as found in the DOD systems. This method of overlaying the STARR/PC2 master records eliminates the need for duplication of system logic between STARR/PC2 and DOD. It also eliminates the need for continuous updates to the customer’s software as MILSTRIP changes occur. While every effort has been made to provide a usable tool for logistics management, STARR/PC2 is not the answer to all problems. It is not intended to be an in-country logistics or supply system.”

- » Computer Software: “Software required includes the STARR/PC2 software (provided by the USG) operating on PC Windows based (including Windows XP, Windows 2000, Windows Vista, or Windows 7) operating system. Additionally, since STARR/PC2 is written utilizing ORACLE, a registered ORACLE software license is required for the version of STARR/PC2 software package that will be installed. A STARR/PC2 user must also use the DLA VOLTS/DAMES software for logistical communications and data transfer to ILCS and the MILDEP ILCOs.”<sup>11</sup> See

figure 2 below for graphical reference of the communications link between the FMS Customer's STARR/PC2 software and the MILDEP ILCO international logistics systems via DAMES / ILCS.




Figure 2: STARR/PC2 Connectivity Diagram

- » Capabilities: The STARR/PC2 software includes the following logistics capability modules. See Figure 3 below for reference on how the user accesses those modules from the STARR/PC2 software.
  - ◆ “The Acquisition Management module is used to process requisitions (standard or non-standard orders), follow-ups,

modifications, cancellations and receipts (XDF) to SAMIS/CISIL/MISIL.

- ◆ The Case/Financial Management module is used to query the financial status of FMS cases established with the US Air Force, Army or Navy and to delete them after they are completed.
- ◆ The Supply Discrepancy Report Management module is used to prepare, submit, follow-up and resubmit SDRs and to track the status of SDRs once established with the USG.
- ◆ The Publications/Technical Orders Management module is used to input US Army, US Navy publications and US Air Force technical order (TO) requests.
- ◆ The Repairable Management module is used to process Component Exchange Request (XD6—manual MRRL [Material Repair Requirements List] request), Material Return (Repair/Return and Component/Exchange), and Receipts (XDF) transactions to the USG services.
- ◆ The System Management module is used for the input and output process, system housekeeping, archive process, and batch processing (the batch process is not available in this version).”<sup>12</sup>




Figure 3: STARR/PC2 Software Main Menu

- » STARR/PC2 Point of Contact: Additional STARR/PC2 information can be obtained by contacting the following:

HQ AFSAC/SCP, ATTN: STARR/PC2  
5454 Buckner Road  
WPAFB, OH 45433-5350  
DSN: 986-1950  
Commercial: 937-656-1950  
Telefax: 937-257-9102 / 787-9102  
ILCS/DAMES: RC919AA  
E-mail: STARRPC2@wpafb.af.mil  
or Oran.Sine@wpafb.af.mil

### **Summary and Conclusions**

To successfully accomplish all the material and/or service requirements that the United States (US) and other countries have agreed to when they sign and fund a Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Letter of Offer and Acceptance (LOA) requires effective logistics communications. The growth of options available to the FMS Customers to accomplish those logistics communications requirements has paralleled the growth of the internet and mass communications over the last twenty years. Each of the significant FMS logistics communications options (AFSAC Online, Security Cooperation Information Portal (SCIP), Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) International Logistics Communication System (ILCS), and the Supply Tracking and Repairable Return (STARR/PC) program) this paper has discussed provide similar capabilities but have some distinct differences, requirements, advantages, and disadvantages.

The US Air Force Security Assistance and Cooperation Directorate (AFSAC) Online system (<https://afsac.wpafb.af.mil/>) provides numerous logistics communications options including online requisition and supply discrepancy reports inputs, status updates, financial status of cases, etc. No additional user software is required to access the system other than a standard web browser, internet access, and an AFSAC Online account. There is also no additional cost or fees that the FMS Customer must pay to access AFSAC online. The biggest potential limitation for an FMS Customer's logistics communication requirements is that AFSAC Online can only be used to access US Air Force-managed FMS cases. The impact of that limitation is that if the FMS Customer also has US Army and US Navy managed FMS Cases, then they will need to identify

and use an alternative or additional system(s) for those country logistical communication requirements.

The Security Cooperation Information Portal (<https://www.scportal.us/home/>), like AFSAC Online, also provides numerous logistics communications options including online requisition and supply discrepancy reports inputs, status updates, financial status of cases, etc. It also provides repair of repairable items and freight tracking capabilities. There is also no additional user software required to access the system other than a standard web browser, internet access, and SCIP account, nor any additional cost or fees that the FMS Customer must pay to access SCIP. The biggest advantage that SCIP has compared to AFSAC Online though is for countries that have implemented FMS Cases with multiple US Implementing Agencies (IAs). Those countries can have their personnel use their individual SCIP account for the logistic communication requirements that they have with all of the IAs that they have implemented FMS Cases with.

The DLA-managed International Logistics Communication System (ILCS) also provides the FMS Customers (like SCIP), with a consolidated option to fulfill logistic communications requirements for their cases that are being managed by USAF, USA, and USN. To transmit and receive logistics communications via the DLA ILCS, FMS Customers need to either use their own logistics management system to communicate with ILCS via the DAMES software, or use the Supply Tracking and Repairable Return (STARR/PC) program to communicate with ILCS via the DAMES software. Each of those options though requires additional software and costs (including an annual subscription fee based on connections) for the FMS Customer to implement and operate those logistic communication systems. For an FMS Customer country that already has a STARR/PC (with DAMES / ILCS connectivity) system installation(s), their familiarity and expertise with those systems may be a strong reason to continue using them. Similarly, an FMS Customer country that has their own logistics supply system may decide its capabilities (along with their familiarity and expertise with that system would probably make a compelling case to establish a DAMES / ILCS capability to connect that system to the MILDEP ILCOs for all the logistics communication requirements that they need to transmit and receive from their own logistics supply system to manage their FMS cases that they have with the US.

The choice of the optimal FMS logistics communication system(s) must ultimately be decided by each individual FMS Customer. They should consider their own supply system infrastructure, system costs, hardware, software, expertise, and training requirements when making their decision on which system(s) to use.

### **Notes**

1. *The Management of Security Cooperation* Chapter 10 (Logistics Support of International Military Sales)
2. SCIP Senior Analyst (Emily Butler) Help Desk response dated 15 April 2013
3. NAVSUP Weapon Systems Support Systems and Planning (Michael Gindraw) e-mail dated 08 November 2012
4. AMSAC-LAL-SPM SDR Process Manager Process Management Office (Kim Paumer) e-mail dated 14 May 2012
5. AFSAC input to DISAM Associate Professor (William Rimpo) dated 25 October 2012
6. Air Force Security Assistance and Cooperation Directorate Technical Lead (Anita Smith) e-mail dated 16 April 2013
7. Air Force Security Assistance & Cooperation Directorate Technical Lead (Anita Smith) e-mail dated 16 April 2013
8. SCIP Program Manager (Tom Sippel) e-mail dated 15 November 2012
9. DLA Transaction Services/Dawn L. Kohlbacher/ April 26, 2013
10. Kent Wiggins, "STARR/PC: Supply Tracking and Repairable Return Systems," *DISAM Journal*, Summer 1995 ([http://www.disam.dscamil/pubs/Vol%2017\\_4/Wiggins.pdf](http://www.disam.dscamil/pubs/Vol%2017_4/Wiggins.pdf))
11. "STARR/PC2" brochure dated 1 November 2011 provided by Oran Sine (AFLCMC/WFSZ) STARR/PC Manager
12. STARR/PC2 "Training Handout" provided by Oran Sine (AFLCMC/WFSZ) STARR/PC Manager

since 2010. He is also the DISAM SCIP project lead responsible for developing, maintaining, and integrating SCIP lessons in the DISAM curriculum. Prior to working at DISAM, he was a US Naval Aviator for twenty-six years, and a systems and financial analyst in industry, supporting DOD and Homeland Security, for four years. He has a bachelor of science degree from the US Naval Academy in engineering/resource management, and a master of science degree from the Naval Postgraduate School in computer/information systems. He is certified by DSCA as Level III in International Affairs, by DOD as a Level III Program Management Acquisition professional and Acquisition Workforce member, and he served as a Country Program Director (CPD) at Navy International Programs Office (Navy IPO) (<http://www.nipo.navy.mil/>). He can be contacted at [John.OConnor@disam.dscamil](mailto:John.OConnor@disam.dscamil).

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### **About the Author**

John O'Connor is an Assistant Professor at the Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management where he has been teaching (Process, Finance, Logistics, Acquisition, Tech Transfer/Exports, Navy Seminars, SCO Operations, Legislation, SCIP, etc.)



# Combatant Commanders Praise State Partnership Program

By SFC Jim Greenhill  
National Guard Bureau

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Army Gen. Frank J. Grass, chief of the National Guard Bureau, talks with Mongolian soldiers serving in Afghanistan, Jan. 15, 2013. Mongolia is partnered with Alaska in the National Guard State Partnership Program. US Army photo by Sgt. 1st Class Jim Greenhill

WASHINGTON, March 18, 2013—The National Guard’s State Partnership Program is an extraordinarily effective, enduring, low-cost tool to advance the national security objective of building partnership capacity, two veteran combatant commanders told Congress last week.

“You probably have the co-chairs of the State Partnership Program fan club seated here,” Army Gen. Carter F. Ham, commander of US Africa Command, told the House Armed Services Committee, speaking for himself and Navy Adm. James G. Stavridis, commander of US European Command and NATO’s supreme allied commander for Europe, who also testified at the March 14 hearing.

Ham and Stavridis testified at a hearing on the posture of their commands related to the nation’s defense budget for fiscal year 2014, which begins Oct. 1. Since its inception more than 20 years ago, the State Partnership Program has paired the National Guard in US states and territories with forces from more than one-third of world’s countries.

“What we tried to do was take those Eastern European nations that were formerly part of the Warsaw Pact and bring them closer to the West and

eventually integrate them into NATO, which we’ve successfully done,” US Rep. Bill Enyart of Illinois noted at the hearing. Enyart is the former adjutant general for Illinois. The program has since expanded to sixty-five nations around the world.

“It’s a very powerful tool. . . . It is unmatched,” Stavridis told the Senate panel, noting he has seen the program in action in assignments in Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean. “They are, bang for the buck, one of the best things going. . . . Anything that enhances state partnership is money in the bank for the regional combatant commanders,” he said.

AFRICOM has eight partnership pairings, and Ham said the command is seeking to expand. “The real benefit in the State Partnership Program is the enduring nature of the relationship, that sergeants and lieutenants and captains grow up together and have multiple engagements,” he said.

In some cases, the relationships are two decades old. States with a mature relationship with an Eastern European country have considered adding second partners in other combatant commands, such as AFRICOM, forming multilateral partnerships where the more mature relationship helps to guide the newer one. Ham called the multilateral partnership among Michigan, Latvia and Liberia “a model for what might be possible in the future.”

In other National Guard news from the hearing, Stavridis called short—perhaps two-month—rotations of National Guard Brigade Combat Teams in Europe “a terrific idea.” He also noted that the next peacekeeping rotation in Kosovo will be by an active-duty unit after a decade of National Guard missions there.



# Lessons Learned and Best Practices in Action—Tell a Buddy, Be a Friend

By Jeff Fourman

Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management

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It's the last day of DISAM training for over fifty soon-to-be security cooperation officers. Soon after graduation they will be on their way to the airport en-route to their next training assignment before leaving the country.

Lt. Col. Smith is among the graduates. He was selected to be the new Deputy Chief for the Office of Defense Cooperation in a South East Asian country that seems to be getting more and more attention lately in the news. It should be a good assignment for him. Aside from his new found confidence as a result of the hands-on exercises he completed in training, he has a working knowledge of the language; he has been previously deployed to other countries in the same region. By chance, he was also lucky enough to meet his soon-to-be new boss over lunch one day who was state-side on other business. His new boss told him to remember his DISAM training, and when he gets in-country, he will show him the ropes and get him up to speed on all the details of the job that no amount of training could ever teach.

Three weeks later, Lt. Col. Smith arrives in-country ready to settle in and begin his new job. The first thing he learns upon arriving at the embassy is that he will no longer be reporting to the Chief he had lunch with while at DISAM. His presumed boss was apparently needed elsewhere and has since moved on to another position in a larger country to help manage a surge in Security Assistance requirements there. This news doesn't sit well with him. His boss seemed very knowledgeable, and he was really looking forward to following his lead. Worse yet, his boss' replacement has yet to arrive as he is likely back in the States receiving much of the same training that he completed himself over the past couple months.

Lt. Col. Smith has been in situations like this before, but this time it is different because nobody else in his small office performs the same function as he does. Thank goodness for the DISAM training he received. He starts thinking back to his training

as he finds his way to his new desk. As he logs into his workstation, he remembers someone mentioning DSCA's new Lessons Learned and Best Practices program. Maybe he can find some info about his new role that can orient him in the right direction for the next couple weeks while he is waiting for the new Chief to arrive.

Lt. Col. Smith googles "DSCA Lessons Learned" and finds instructions in the *DISAM Online Journal* directing him to [www.jllis.mil](http://www.jllis.mil). After he registers his CAC he clicks "View Observations" and scrolls down to check mark the "DSCA" box under Available Organizations. He clicks the "Search Observations" button and begins browsing the latest Lessons Learned and Best Practices.

He finds a document that looks very promising. Lt. Col. Smith clicks on the document titled "First 60 Days as A New SCO Chief." He feels like he struck gold. The document includes a detailed checklist, made by a SCO Chief, to help those who would follow in his footsteps. Though he is only the Deputy Chief, this document will give him a leg up and will help him tread water until his Chief arrives in a few weeks. His new Chief will definitely want this checklist too. He prints off two copies and pins one of them to the bare corkboard above his workstation. Now he can put all his training to work.

Three years later, Lt. Col. Smith has nearly seen it all from the perspective of a Security Cooperation Officer. The foreign partners now trust his judgment, and his Chief relies on him heavily to navigate the numerous authorities, strategies, and plans at their disposal. Simply put, he is good at his job and will be severely missed as his rotation date is approaching. He thinks back to his first day on the job, and how anxious he felt when he realized that he was going to be called upon to do both his and his boss' job until the new Chief arrived. He remembers how that "first 60 days" checklist gave him a little sliver of relief so he decides to record his own lessons learned and best

practices that he observed over the past three years. Hopefully the next guy will find his observations useful as well.

Lt. Col. Smith logs into [www.jllis.mil](http://www.jllis.mil), goes to the DSCA home page and clicks “Add Detailed Observation.” He begins to record all of the lessons learned that he observed and fills out all of the pertinent and relevant information. He clicks “submit” and feels as though he did his good deed for the day.

Meanwhile, back at DISAM, the newly submitted lessons learned are being reviewed and vetted by Subject Matter Experts for curriculum, policy, and strategy impact. Within three days they will be distributed to every possible channel in the Security Cooperation Community so that everyone can learn from Lt. Col. Smith’s invaluable experience as a Security Cooperation Officer.

The following Lessons Learned is the actual first 60 days checklist submitted by an Office of Defense Cooperation Chief as he prepared to leave his position in country:

1. Write a personal note to your boss thanking him/her for the leadership opportunity, and also send a short e-mail. This will not only be the right thing to do and makes a good impression, but also establishes your e-mail address with that individual in their computer. Then send one to each of your mentors and thank them as well. Then send one to the Ambassador and DCM, thanking them for the opportunity. Leading in today’s military is a privilege, and the opportunities are limited. This also lets you take a look at your card stock levels and design. Send a SIPR email to establish connectivity with your boss.
2. During any overlap time with the outgoing SCO Chief, arrange for them to introduce you to any key partner–nation personnel you need to know. Rather than starting a new network from scratch, take advantage of their existing network and build on the work of previous SCO Chiefs. You will also be creating partnerships amongst the right organizations (US and partner-nation) and it’s important to understand the airspace (battlefield) in which you find yourself. Building on the network of others creates persistence of US government support for the partner-nation; this leads to acquiring what they need through FMS and Training. Also, mentors come in all shapes and sizes (and nationalities). One technique to gauge the level of networking of our Joint SCO personnel was by how many partner-nation people showed up at their farewell parties.
3. Update your biography on any SCO and GCC websites. There is a correct military biography format, and it can be found at any of the service home pages. Visiting DVs (both US and partner-nation) will ask for them in advance of any visit, and having electronic copies handy saves time. As for updating biographies on the GCC page, beyond the professionalism of not having the previous SCO Chief’s picture on the page for a few extra years just above your name, it will become important as you reach out to other SCOs for information, Best Practice sharing, or when one of your partner-nation high-ranking acquisition leaders visits another country.
4. Ask your personnel to update their bios. Some SCOs use a single format for all Joint personnel. For ours, we kept the service-specific format for each individual but added our Office of Defense Cooperation (ODC) symbol to the top of each one. The SDO’s bio format should also work. One standard for the entire Office of Military/Defense Cooperation.
5. Look at medium and long-range calendar for events for which you must start planning (DV or IG visits, next bi- or multi-lat exercise, trade show, etc). This level of strategic planning gives you a picture of your operations tempo and can be compared with any manning shortfalls, crunch times, etc. Pick POCs if not already accomplished. Also, without going into too many details on the long-lead items for an IG inspection, this might be a good time for your IG inspection POC to start checking out the Lessons Learned page on the GCC IG web page. Pre-IG information will be covered in next month’s Lessons Learned from the Field article, “Hi, I’m with the IG and I’m here to help.”
6. This job is about building relationships. If you have any overlap with the previous. SDO/DATT, ask him/her to introduce you to the partner-nation leadership the SDO/DATT works with the most. Then ask your immediate, next-level of staff to introduce you to the partner-nation people they work with often. This strengthens your personnel’s credibility in the eyes of the partner-nation, and it also provides you a first-level of access without you having to build it from scratch.

7. When does the FY for your partner-nation end? If not for several months, then don't sweat it. If it's one or two months away, you may be crunching to finalize any signatures so they can spend remaining FY dollars before they lose the money with the new FY. Know this information by asking the FMS experts on your team.
8. Whoever answers the main office phone represents your office to the world. Who is the primary phone answering person and do they know this? Who is the backup? What happens when the office is closed? Do the phones get forwarded to a Command Post? Cell phone? Voice mail? Answering machine? What's your answering machine message?
9. Enter your office numbers in the contact list of your Blackberry and set up your Blackberry voice mail. Nothing like hearing the voice of the previous SCO Chief answering voice mails. Regarding the office numbers, entering in numbers will make it easier to reach your team during in-processing.
10. Business cards will be a necessity on Day One. If you can get a starter batch created before arriving, that would be best. Most I've seen from ODCs and OMCs around the world are double sided, meaning English on one side and partner-nation language on the other side.
11. Set up your dashboard. I'd love to go into an in-depth discussion about the dashboard a SCO leader can set up to make life easy, but there just isn't enough room in this article. Suffice it to say, I will cover this in a future article (see Toolkits article).
12. Ensure you know, and have designated in writing, you're buying official (to buy things/spend money). Also, find out who is the TDY certifying official? If it's you, grab the DISAM DVD and/or contact your GCC support staff for the required training, and do the certifying official course. Make sure your office supplies buyer is accurate with the books. The IG will need to see the authorizing certificates during the next IG visit, and knowing this information will help keep you within budget and on top of any budget concerns, especially during sequestration.
13. Read the Emergency Action Plan (EAP). Does SDO/DATT do emergency exercises? Learn where your safe havens are and where the alternate command center is in case access to

the embassy/ODC is unavailable. I took this for granted. Then, on 1 Feb 13, a suicide bomber killed one of our Embassy guards. State has a great checklist, recently improved by last year's Benghazi attack that killed the US Ambassador to Libya. However, what you may find in other State Department/Embassy post-incident checklists is that, other than the Marine guards, the military might be rarely mentioned. In Turkey, because the ODC is so large (more than 70), we are not co-located with the Embassy. So our checklist was adequate, but chair-flying (USAF) or performing a rock-drill (Army) added a few items to our checklist, as did practicing scenario responses, which was invaluable in adding critical items to our post-incident checklist.

14. Know your mission. You'd be surprised how many take it for granted. You are there to build partnerships. We do it through networking, engagements, and relationship building, all with the partner-nation (not with Americans, which is easier to do). To what end? Access to the Partner Nation during times when Americans need access (military, political, and business); Foreign Military Sales; International Training; Armaments Cooperation, Exercise participation; mil-to-mil and mil-to-political/economic leadership relations; information flow to the ambassador, GCC commander, etc. I echoed this mission at every opportunity, to ensure everyone understood it and there were no doubts in anyone's mind.
15. Vision—develop one early and define it to everyone at every opportunity. I envision the partnership between the SCO and the partner-nation to be so good, they will feel comfortable asking us for assistance first, in anything, to include an LOR build. Also, they would feel comfortable coming to us for any and all questions after the LOA is presented and any time they had a question or concern about a case. I envision the leaders of each US service having full basing/port rights in-country if and when they needed them, without negotiation or additional payments for use (support/logistics is always a different story), and we ensure that access continually. I envision the partner-nation leaders asking the ODC to escort them to the US for official visits. I see us identifying ways we could help the partner-nation save money or build capability, and then

make these a reality. I envision our personnel developing innovative ways in which the SCO could save money yet still accomplish our mission. I envision hearing about a welcoming atmosphere whenever one of our SCO personnel calls a partner-nation counterpart, and I saw partner-nation attendance at all of our personnel's farewell parties before a PCS. I envision all our spouses being comfortable calling the office, or stopping by whenever, and participating in SCO family events, as well as feeling comfortable calling me or my spouse at any time for anything. I envision officers and NCOs seeking leadership positions or leadership responsibilities (non-solo projects) in order to highlight themselves for higher levels of responsibility, promotions and PME in-residence pushes. Yet another vision, one becoming more prolific as sequestration hits, is envisioning the partner-nation at the functional level so they need little help from the SCO; teach them to fish, then get out of the way. This is truer for developed nations or nations in which the partner-nation acquisitions-personnel are DISAM trained, remain consistently in the job, understand and are well trained to perform FMS tasks with the Implementing Agencies (SAF/IA, NIPO, USASAC). The problem that comes to light with this vision is, a reduction in FMS for one nation, while itself negligible, impacts the whole of FMS with reduced US participation in mil-to-mil relationships and certainly decreases US business participation.

16. Be aware of and use social media. Friend the GCC commander on his Facebook page. A great DISAM instructor, referring to Admiral Stavridis in EUCOM, once told me, "The Admiral knows his friends." When the GCC Commander has something to say about Security Cooperation or something good to say about your partner-nation, this is where he or she will say it. This is their comm channel to the command, and communication is critical to successful leadership. Sometimes you'll see new news on their Facebook (social media) page first.
17. Start building relationships: ODC and embassy staff (personalities count...first impressions last), go meet your partner-nation rank-equivalents. In Turkey, a letter to the Turkish General Staff was required to do this. OK. Accept that process and do it. Besides, after doing one letter inviting

yourself over, it's easy to copy/change the names for other visits. They wanted letters...we gave them lots of letters, asking if we could meet routinely. Eventually, they stopped asking for letters and just said, "come on over."

18. Contact ODC support at the GCC (they should not have to call you) to look at OPR/EPR/FITREP/NCOER currency, upcoming boards, and physical fitness test currency for your folks. Ask them about any classes out there, your personnel require (AF Negotiations courses, ACQ courses, JPME II, DISAM, INTAC, etc). Ask them about due dates for upcoming awards and get on their distro list. This establishes comm with them and gets you added to their distro lists for all conferences and events.
19. Set your calendar for the next year, to remind you four weeks before any evaluation is due. This allows the ratee time to provide some data for you to write it. I recommend you also pre-set it for any paperwork due, for example, weekly activity reports, white papers, Javits report, etc.
20. Get your expectations to your folks every six months, except Army personnel, which is required quarterly. That way, if you are TDY or on Leave, they know what's expected of them and they know what responsibilities they have. Once you set expectations (I do it in writing), you have established everything from basic SCO rules to performance expectations. Some basic SCO ROE include but are certainly not limited to: dress code, punctuality, language, physical fitness supplementary training requirements, etc. Some performance expectations can include more: cultivate a network of partner-nation contacts; 100 percent complete on EEUM; know all major US business reps in the area; no missing information on partner-nation LORs before they go to the IA for LOA build; escort two DVs per semi-annual period; connect tasks to Lines of Activity to Lines of Effort; etc. If you don't set expectations, your personnel will start doing things that take them away from your mission of building partnerships.
21. Obtain expectations of the SDO/DATT. I once worked for an individual who provided me with one expectation at our initial meeting. He said flat out, he needs leadership in a particular Division. He emphasized it had been run by poor leadership for two years and he needed

someone who could re-motivate and re-focus the military and civilians in the Division and lead them towards achieving a common goal. It took about 1 month for me to realize, he didn't want leadership, he wanted an O-6 action officer. No wonder people in the Division had been all over the map; they were under the wrong impression regarding what was expected of them for two years! Four weeks after I started that job I sat down with that commander and we talked about some additional expectations of me that he would see (besides leadership). You will be able to tell how well an SDO/DATT knows both jobs by how well that individual defines expectations for the SCO.

22. Start mentoring sessions with personnel. This will require an understanding of the Joint system as well as how different services promote their people, or just understand the assignment process for each service. This is where you contact your connections from other services from DISAM course and ask them how for their opinion on how they would mentor or vector your Joint service personnel.
23. Start holding quarterly gatherings (for example, dinners) at your house, and invite small groups from your SCO to talk with visiting guests (E-8/9s, general officers, the ambassador or DCM, visiting DVs, SCO leadership from neighboring countries, NATO leaders in the same country or city, etc). Your personnel will appreciate your concern for their development and the "face time," and these special guests will appreciate the opportunity to mentor, learn about you, learn what's going on out in the field, give you a perspective you don't see every day, and not just talk shop/business.
24. What are your loyalties towards military traditions? Traditions are getting lost in today's fast-paced military, and can easily be lost when you are in the outskirts of a small country in a small SCO. Many Soldiers, Airmen, and Sailors don't understand that traditions are critical to defining our military. Amongst other things, traditions define your personality as an organization more than most other things. Pick a few and broadcast your tradition loyalties early, so your personnel have time to assimilate. Examples vary based on size of the military contingent, and include, but are certainly not limited to: Dining In (with

grog)/Dining Out, AF and/or USMC Ball; host retirement dinners at your house for O-5s or O-6s and E-8s and 9s assigned to you who will soon be retiring; some event (last Fri/month party) for your office; post-IG inspection party should ALWAYS be the biggest party of the year (never skimp on a post-inspection party); Round Metal Objects (unit coins); decorate offices of newly selected E-8s or E-9s, O-6s, or GOs; Aloha Fridays (everyone gets out early); monthly PT-Friday; hails and farewells; hose down honoree at fini flight (if you have a C-12); it's a travesty that this one is waning, but your whole staff/unit should attend E-8 or E-9/O-6 and above/your boss's retirement or change of command if these happen at your location. Also, consider a monthly lunch with leader of local retiree organization (MOA, NCOA, etc) if applicable; hitting the Marine house on party Fridays, and staying there late. Doing this really opened up a line of communication with others around the building/Embassy I would never get to know otherwise, and gives you a chance to inspire people to do things (National CGOC, volunteer for leadership roles, advanced education, etc) to better themselves and their unit, which, in turn, bettered the military.

25. Get on social media (get Facebook). May sound trivial, but it is a great way to connect with the families of the people in your organization. For the younger crowd, it is their communication life-line. Now, I say this with a bit of trepidation... nothing beats face-to-face communication, and I much prefer face-to-face leadership any day, but to break the ice with the 25s and below, and to connect families of that crowd, use social media as a tool and supplement it with face-to-face "analog" leadership I can't count the number of times spouses have thanked me for answering questions over social media that they didn't want to ask the boss of their husband (or wife) in person. As time went by, this barrier broke down and they were comfortable calling me directly with questions, which was always OK. I also discovered that social media makes a fantastic communication tool when you need to get information to everybody in your organization and their families, fast...like in the aftermath of a suicide bombing when phone lines go down, or you need to get short updates out quickly. Plus,

when you control the message, less RUMINT gets started.

26. Know when the mandatory meetings are with the: SDO/DATT; your GCC; staff meetings; Country Team meetings; Director's meetings; monthly VTCs with the J5; etc.
27. Obtain an electronic copy of current recall rosters (for your Blackberry and/or computer) and start loading your Blackberry with contact information. I'm sure there are numerous regs out there that cover storage of this type of information, but for Air Force personnel, this type of information must be stored in a FOUO labeled folder, which BlackBerry can do.
28. Air Force personnel, arrange Email-4-Life e-mail to go to your local base account. As the AF migrates to a common email server, this may change, but for now, E4L must be re-registered every time you move, to sink up with your new server location. To do this, go to the AF Portal, at the top click the email button and follow the directions.
29. Run a recall to ensure the names and numbers are correct. The first time you want to find out your recall tree is screwed up is not during the first crises. If you are Air Force, then concurrently, run a Personnel Accountability Event for the AFPAAS system. It will let you register Joint personnel under your charge, and satisfies AF accountability requirements in the event of a natural disaster.
30. Round Metal Objects: back in WWI, allied pilots who were supported by civilians would present them with gold coins in return for the assistance. That tradition has manifested itself today in the form of unit coins, or RMOs. Put your new RMO in your pocket. Order more after changing the design from previous leadership; expect to pay for these yourself. Plan to trade out with visiting military GOs. Don't get caught without one when a Flag Officer coins you as a thank you for a good visit.
31. Expand your e-mail inbox capacity and/or create .pst for larger files. Inevitably, rather than getting the, "YOUR MAILBOX IS ALMOST FULL" message, you can head this one off.
32. What's your motorcycle program? Hit it constantly! You must be proactive—there is no such thing as being 'reactive' with motorcycle safety policies and programs. Reactive means

someone in your unit has already died or been injured. Motorcycle fatalities are one of the top three causes for military deaths for the under 30 crowd. Are your motorcycle riders certified, insured, trained? Are the bikes in good repair, registered, street legal for your partner-nation? You need eyes on the bikes and the driver's credentials. Several SCO chiefs I have met tell me, their personnel are adults and can handle this responsibility themselves. My answer—your personnel are not working for the military, they are in the military...which means, they abide by an additional set of rules and principles, to include leadership authority and a chain of command. You can tell them to ride or not ride, but by validating training, registration, bike condition, etc, you are telling them, as a military leader you care about their well-being outside the office as well, and not just their job performance. In the military, leadership responsibilities don't end at the end of the work-day.

33. Make an appointment and get to know all E-8/9s, your secretary, other O-6s in your facility or Embassy, and on any nearby bases (also learn their promotion potential/timing). As with success in any assignment you've ever had in the military, a key to success as a SCO leader will be dependent on the relationships you build with Americans (civilians and military) to help you get your job done.
34. As a professional courtesy, call the previous SCO leader or ODC Chief to see which folks he/she brought into the SCO for a reason, or are fast-tracking for command or promotion.
35. Take a look at where all major FMS cases are in LOR process, for situational awareness. This will give you a pulse on the organization and let's you see where the emphasis areas might be. Partner-nation will be asking about status of case-builds, sometimes in the same meeting as your introduction.
36. In writing or e-mail (or, for small SCOs, do this yourself), change the safe combinations, and find out how many people have access to each safe. Also check to find out when door locks were changed last, for rooms with safes, and have them changed again if it has been awhile (in accordance with appropriate regulations).
37. Complete a unit compliance inspection (mandatory within the first sixty days). The best

way to do this would be to go to the GCC IG website and download the recent IG checklist, and then run it for your SCO. If any questions come up, call or e-mail the IG and ask. This gives you a baseline as to how you are doing, and provides you with areas for improvement.

38. Look at last promotion board results for all your personnel. For the ones who didn't get promoted, figure out why. Chances are there won't be any surprises. Rarely, the system doesn't work as it should and someone who should have been, wasn't. That's when you go to work and elevate the correct potential and performance picture of this individual to the higher rating chain.
39. What is your alternate work location if something happens to your office/facility? For example, air conditioning fails (in summer); the building/office catches fire/tornado damage; suicide bomber takes out the office next door, etc. Schedule/practice a move to this alternate work location. Your mission should not grind to a standstill if the building or office is inaccessible.
40. Ask a Safety person (either internal or from the GCC) to inspect all offices (unless done recently, in which case ask them to check for safety compliance). Ask a Security person to do the same thing. You don't want a preventable incident or accident to pop up out of nowhere because the last time your office was screened was several years ago.
41. Check to see how Partner Nation military budgeting system is organized. Does the military go directly to you? Is there an Acquisition corps? Is there a civilian arm in the partner-nation that approves/signs LORs? New personnel will need to know, US businesses will need to know, and the smart-person you ask will appreciate the opportunity to teach the boss something. Also, it cages your brain as to who is who in the procurement world.
42. You'll need a "picture" of your personnel; not a photo, but data points to help you see how their careers are progressing. Pull their last two or three OPR/OER/Fitrep/NCOER. Check their physical fitness currency. Check the amount of use/lose Leave that will be remaining on 1 Oct. Obtain the file on all the personnel (called a SRF in USAF) that directly report to you from the GCC ODC assistance folks, to see how they are looking: for upcoming boards and assignments; and so

you know how they are doing with Professional Military Education, advanced academic degree, flying gate months, and their last deployment, etc. For C-12 pilots, check their 30/60/90 flight times.

43. Establish a personal PT time on schedule and notify the office you wish to stick to it, so they don't schedule/plan any meetings during those times.
44. Schedule time with med folks, OSI, JA, Chaplain, DAO, and Mental Health to determine if you have any unit problems you need to know about (this is NOT immersion in their unit but a big-picture look at your SCO)
45. Call or make contact with previous SCO Chiefs to ask them of any pet projects/programs/civilian connections they started and why, so that you can continue to cultivate that same program or network. This helps you avoid the same problems they had, and not have to re-invent the wheel. They will also want to know how the unit is doing and latest news from the front. Also, legacy is important in the military. Former SCO leaders will support you in their circles if they know you are seeking their advice and continuing their name/legacy. This, in turn, will build a network so you can help your personnel get their desired jobs after the SCO assignment.
46. Within the first sixty days, it's important to obtain a copy of the Theater Campaign Plan, Country Cooperation Plan, and the Ambassador's ICS/MRR or MSRP. The GCC desk officer can help and can sometimes provide the unclass version, as well. The items in common between all three are where you should focus your efforts, and the reason is, it's more easily justifiable to everybody in the decision-making process. Now, not every nation thinks more than a year or two ahead, so they may or may not have their own strategic plan. Turkey has a ten-year procurement plan. If a strategic or procurement plan exists, compare the partner-nation's plan with the common elements of the three plans you already have and find commonalities amongst them. Consider writing an unclassified white-paper, or something that highlights only the common areas amongst the four plans and translates them into training/equipment/exercises, etc.
47. Look at State's USAID plan.

48. Obtain a listing of your personnel who have relatives or family friends that are flag officers or O-6s, E-9s, elected officials, SESs, retired any of the above, etc. When MGen Richardson shows up and walks through your SCO offices to say hello to his daughter-in-law...or my all time favorite—when the Speaker of the US House of Representatives is visiting your country and, without warning, stops by to say hello to her Godson—this is not the time to find out who the DV relatives are in your unit. Put these folks on your radar scope. Are they on track for next board, PME, advanced academic degree, leadership positions, opportunities for development, or are they being shoved aside? If so, why? The reasons may be legitimate but you will need to justify it when their DV parent calls or the GCC Vice asks you (because he is close friends with the DV parent). Also, some folks were brought into that office specifically to be groomed for the next promotion and leadership position under the previous SCO or SDO/DATT, and you should know this to carry on the intent as a professional courtesy.
49. Ask your Chaplain and NCOIC for a list of personnel that have: non-mainstream religions, officer/enlisted marriage, EFMP, single parents with kids, Unfavorable Information File (quality force indicators, Article 15s, etc), total SNCOs (by rank). For smaller SCOs, it may be easier to look the information up yourself, in personnel records.
50. Create Quick Reaction Checklists (QRC). Have all your personnel's living addresses handy in case of emergency, so you're not fishing. With these QRCs, I also had a personal checklist of what initial steps to take/think about if there was a personnel death (step 1 was always to notify SDO/DATT, step 2 was the ambassador, step 3 was our NCOIC). Lastly, know the steps to get a person emergency-shipped to the States. This involves a ton of calls if you don't know what to do, and it is not the State Department's responsibility. Besides, they don't use Red Cross like the military does. Some QRC examples include, death in office, death of a family member of an individual in your office, and suicide bombing adjacent to our building. Deaths are the worst thing that could happen to your unit, and you need to be ready for it rather than figure it out as you go along. I also highly suggest you contact buddies from DISAM or other ODCs and obtain their ideas.
51. Morale is a big thing with me and I highlighted the individuals I saw reflecting high unit/office morale at every opportunity. This set a tone quickly within the ODC.
52. Your OGE 450 Financial Disclosure form will be due within sixty days of your arrival. Go to the Financial Disclosure Management website at <https://www.fdm.army.mil>.
53. Establish your Critical Information Requirements (CIR)(or at least review the previous. SDO/DATTs or ODC Chief's). This is basically a list of items you should be woken up for if they happen in the middle of the night. Some examples include: death or serious injury of any SCO person or defense attaché, or their immediate family member; arrest of any SCO person or defense attaché, or their immediate family member; major damage to USG property; discovery of violation of US law (Leahy vetting discovery) or partner-nation law; attack on any American in your partner-nation, crash of any partner-nation military aircraft; loss of life of any Partner Nation active-duty military leadership; etc. The next step would be, for each CIR, list who you would contact, with a phone number. The middle of the night is not the time to go fishing for phone numbers when information needs to flow up the chain.
54. Each GCC will be different, but find out and take the required online, annual training courses. Some include: Joint AT/FP course (you can access it at <https://atlevel1.dtic.mil/at/>); Combating Trafficking in Persons (go to <http://ctip.defense.gov>, select Training and find the ctip course); Social Networking Awareness course; GCC OPSEC course; SHARP training—Sexual Harassment; DTS Approver course; wheeled-vehicle course certificate in order to get a U-Drive-It; Information Assurance course.
- DSCA now collects and disseminates Lessons Learned and Best Practices that are relevant to the Security Cooperation Community. CAC holders can submit lessons learned and best practices using the new DSCA page in the Joint Lessons Learned Information System (JLLIS) at [www.jllis.mil](http://www.jllis.mil). You can also submit directly to the DISAM Directorate of Research: [gregory.sutton@disam.dsca.mil](mailto:gregory.sutton@disam.dsca.mil) (Primary)

jeffrey.fourman.ctr@disam.dsca.mil (Alternate). If you find something that is particularly helpful to you, be a buddy, tell a friend!

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### ***About the Author***

Jeff Fourman is an analyst and research consultant for the Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management. He has a bachelor's degree in international studies from the University of Dayton and is currently completing his master's thesis on external support for insurgent groups. He also works on several security cooperation workforce initiatives, and his research focuses on the study of terrorism, European integration, and other international security issues.



# What is Military Training?

By Aaron Prince

Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management

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What is training, or more specifically, what is international military training from a US perspective?

Believe it or not, this is not always an easy question to answer when it comes to International Military Training that falls under Security Assistance (SA) or Security Cooperation (SC) authorities. Training is when you teach something to someone, right? Well, what constitutes teaching? Depending on how you look at it, what is considered teaching (or training) can fall into a very “grey area.” A joint military exercise between the US and an international country—is this training? When a US military organization does an “outreach” event or a conference with a foreign partner—is this training? When the Geographical Combatant Command (GCC) asks a US military organization to hold a seminar for an international military customer, is this considered training? As you ponder these questions, it comes to light that what is and what is not official training may not be as cut and dried as originally thought.

Why do we need to even concern ourselves with the term training? Who cares if an international partner participates in a military exercise or even in a Professional Military Education (PME) class at the Naval Postgraduate School? If it is determined that an international military student is attending training under a Security Assistance or Security Cooperation Authority, the training must be accounted for, that student and the unit they come from must be identified, the training must be paid for, and certain processes and procedures must be accomplished according to established Security Cooperation/Security Assistance (SC/SA) processes. This must be accomplished both before the student can attend the training event, as well as during the training event itself. An illustration of just a handful of these SC/SA processes includes, but is not limited to: documenting the student’s biographical information, ensuring the student has been medically screened, creating the Invitational Travel Orders by the applicable Security

Cooperation Office (SCO), and vetting the student for criminal activities and human rights abuses (i.e. Leahy Vetting). If the event is not considered training, the above SC/SA requirements and processes may not apply, though other organizational guidance may exist which is outside the scope of this article.

This article will help the reader determine whether or not an event fits the definition of Training for International Military Partners, thus requiring specific SC/SA processes to be followed. At the very least, this article will point out the policies and directives which currently exist in order to help determine what international military training is.

The broad definition for international military training comes from the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA), as amended, as well as the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), as amended.

Para n, Sec 644, chapter 3, of the FAA, as amended, states that the definition of “Military education and training” includes:

“formal or informal instruction of foreign students in the United States or overseas by officers or employees of the United States, contract technicians, contractors (including instruction at civilian institutions), or by correspondence courses, technical, educational, or information publications and media of all kinds, training aids, orientation, and military advice to foreign military units and forces.”

The AECA, as amended, has a very similar definition for “Training.” AECA, Section 47(5) (22 U.S.C. 2794(5)), as amended, states that “Training” includes:

“formal or informal instruction of foreign students in the United States or overseas by officers or employees of the United States, contract technicians, or contractors (including instruction at civilian institutions), or by correspondence courses, technical,

educational, or information publications and media of all kinds, training aid, orientation, training exercise, and military advice to foreign military units and forces.”

These two “training” definitions are quite broad and could include just about any kind of information exchange. As the Department of Defense (DOD) is responsible for managing and implementing international military training and education for foreign countries, the DOD Joint Staff attempted to narrow down the definition of training and provide more specific details. They accomplished this in a policy message disseminated in June 2004. (Yes, the policy is now over eight years old, but the Defense Security Cooperation Agency [DSCA] has confirmed that the policy is still in effect). This policy message was distributed to the DOD international training community with the following subject line: Human Rights Verification for DOD-Funded Training of Foreign Personnel.

In this policy message, military training of foreign personnel is defined to mean, “instruction of foreign security force personnel that may result in the improvement of their capabilities.” The wording “result in the improvement of their capabilities” is a very important aspect of this definition as we will see later. This message, as illustrated below, goes on to further spell out specific events that DOD considers training, and which must follow established SC/SA procedures.

DOD training **does** include (among other things) the following events:

1. Joint Combined Exercise Training (JCET)
2. Counternarcotics Training
3. Counternarcoterrorist Training
4. Humanitarian Demining Training
5. DOD Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP)
6. Any training activities conducted under the Combatant Commander’s Initiative Fund
7. US-Sponsored training programs, to include the International Military Education and Training Program (IMET) and FMS-purchased training at DOD educational institutions

This policy message goes on to identify events that are not considered to be training of international partners, and thus do not need to follow SC/SA training procedures (the events should have specific

program guidance of their own that is outside the scope of this article).

DOD training **does not** include these types of events:

1. Exercise (Incidental training is permitted as part of an exercise, including familiarization, safety and interoperability training with a force when necessary to permit conducting the exercise. This limited “incidental training” does not equate to providing a new capability for the international partner).
2. Individual and Collective Interface Activities, which include:
  - Individual or Subject Matter Expert Exchanges
  - Mil-To-Mil Contacts
  - Seminars and Conferences
  - Partnership and other small unit exchanges where the primary focus is interoperability or mutually beneficial exchanges and not training of foreign security forces
3. Bona fide familiarization and orientation visits
4. Pre-deployment site surveys (PDSS) or other planning and coordination visits supporting the Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) or training event

In the first section above, related to item 7 (US-Sponsored training programs), chapter 15, a relatively new chapter, has been added to DSCA Manual 5105.38-M, *Security Assistance Management Manual* (SAMM). This chapter describes the various Building Partner Capacity (BPC) programs (such as the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF), DOD Counternarcotics (CN) Program, Global Peacekeeping Operations Initiative (GPOI) etc.) which, “encompass security cooperation and security assistance activities that are funded with US Government appropriations and administered as cases within the FMS [SC/SA] infrastructure.” Nearly all of the BPC programs outlined in SAMM C15.1.4 include the word “training.” Therefore, training events under BPC programs must follow SC/SA training procedures and processes unless other program specific regulatory guidance exists.

As mentioned earlier, when looking at the DOD definition for international military training, the phrase “result in the improvement of their capabilities” is a key concept. The US Army’s Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center and School attempts to explain this concept further in their 2012

Operational Law Handbook when they differentiate “Big T” training (that provides new capabilities) from “Little t” training (which provides no new capability, but ensures safety and interoperability during an event). Although, the handbook specifically mentions Security Assistance Training, Department of State (DOS) authorizations and DOS appropriations, the same qualification would apply to Security Cooperation Training, DOD authorizations and DOD appropriations. If “Big T” training applies, then SC/SA processes must be followed unless other program specific regulatory guidance exists.

Chapter 14, section IX.A.1.a(1) of the handbook states, “If the primary purpose of the training of foreign forces is to improve the operational readiness of the foreign forces, then this is Security Assistance [or Security Cooperation] Training (“Big T”) and should be funded with DOS [or appropriate DOD] authorizations and appropriations. On the other hand, if the primary purpose of the training of foreign forces is for interoperability, safety, and/or familiarization, then this is Interoperability Training (“Little t”) and is NOT security assistance [or security cooperation] training.”

Factors to consider when determining if an event is “Big T” or “Little t” training include, “the cost of the training, the current level of training of the foreign troops before the training vs. the expected level of training of the foreign troops after the training is complete, and the amount of time and resources that DOD will need to expend to provide the training. As these factors increase, it becomes more likely that the training envisioned is Security Assistance [or appropriate Security Cooperation] Training, as opposed to Interoperability Training” (Operational Law Handbook).

Furthermore, the *Operational Law Handbook* attempts to give examples of the difference between providing “improved operational readiness” to foreign forces and providing incidental training “for interoperability, safety, and/or familiarization” which would not be considered real training and would not be held to SC/SA requirements and processes:

“A month-long Combined Airborne Parachute Exercise with other countries, whose participating troops are all airborne qualified in their own countries, a two-hour block of instruction on C-130 entry and egress safety procedures would be Interoperability Training (“Little t” training), since the

primary purpose is safety and interoperability of the foreign troops. Additionally, it is a short duration (2 hours) training event, the cost is not significant, and their level of training is not significantly enhanced (since the foreign troops are already airborne qualified). Therefore, this would likely be classified as Interoperability, Safety, and Familiarization Training, and DOD may fund this training with its own O&M funds.”

“On the other hand, training foreign troops on airborne operations, including the provision of DOD trainers for a month-long airborne school to qualify all the individual foreign troops in airborne jumps, would likely be classified as Security Assistance Training (“Big T” training). In this case, the duration of the training is long (one month), the cost is likely significant, and most importantly, the level of training of the foreign troops is significantly increased. As a result, the primary purpose of the training is not the Interoperability, Familiarization, and Safety of the foreign troops, and this training should be classified as Security Assistance training” (Operational Law Handbook).

Even with current guidance, regulations, policies, and handbooks regarding the definition of international military training, it can still be difficult to determine “Big T” training from “Little t” training in certain circumstances. When does a seminar or conference cross over to training? Military Exercises might also include an element of training that would increase the foreign country’s military capabilities; does this then cross over into the “Big T” training definition? If there are still lingering questions regarding whether an event is “Big T” training or not, contact your service’s International Affairs/Security Cooperation Policy and/or legal office (who may contact DSCA for further assistance) for a determination. In an effort to improve definitions and guidance for “Big T” training, it was determined during the November 2012 DSCA Training Policy Meeting that DSCA would put together a working group to add language to the SAMM that would provide clarification on circumstances under which SC training processes are required for SC-funded foreign military personnel undergoing other than institutional training by the DOD.

As described at the beginning of this article, it does make a difference if an event is considered to be “Big T” training that falls under Security Assistance or Security Cooperation Authorizations. If the event is “Big T” training, then certain SC/SA processes and requirements apply to make sure the training is appropriately accounted for and carried out. In this case, it is essential that the applicable Military Service Training Agency (i.e., Air Force Security Assistance Training Squadron (AFSAT), Security Assistance Training Field Activity (SATFA), Naval Education and Training Security Assistance Field Activity (NETSAFA), Marine Corps Security Cooperation Group (MCSCG), and the Coast Guard Director of International Affairs and Foreign Policy (CG-DCO-I)) be made aware of the training requirement and that they program the training into the Standardized Training List (STL). In addition, the SCO is responsible for such actions as, but not limited to: recording the biographical information of the student, ensuring proper medical screening and coverage requirements are met, vetting the student for criminal activity and human rights abuses, and creating the Invitational Travel Order. DSCA Manual 5105.38-M, SAMM chapters 10 and 11, as well as the Joint Security Cooperation Education and Training regulation (JSCET) contain the complete procedures that must be followed when DOD provides “Big T” training to an international partner that enhances their capability.

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### **About the Author**

Aaron Prince is an Assistant Professor and has been teaching at the Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management (DISAM) since 2001. He is the Functional Coordinator for International Training Management at DISAM. He holds a master of science degree in administration from Central Michigan University.

# IMET Study, Phase II, Part I, and Its Application to the Results of the Arab Spring

By Ferrelle Rodriguez-Perez Smith

Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management

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## **Introduction**

Imagine a country with a powerful autocratic regime, an equally strong military, and a festering insurgency ready to act at a moment's notice. Imagine a people downtrodden, disenfranchised, and rife with poverty. The tension is so thick you can cut it with a knife; a powder keg ready to explode. All it will take is a spark...BOOM! On December 17, 2010, Tarek al-Tayed Mohamed Bouazizi both literally and figuratively provided that spark by setting himself on fire in the middle of traffic in front of the governor's office in Sidi Bouzid, Tunisia.<sup>1</sup> This one act of defiance by a street vendor led to a chain reaction of demonstrations, violence, ousting of long-standing leaders, and wide-spread death and destruction that became known as the Arab Spring. However, the one thing that did not happen is the Tunisian military did not act against the protesters. Tunisia, Egypt and a few other Arab nations' military leaders made a decision that they would respect the human rights of their people.<sup>2</sup> What is it about these military leaders that may be different from the military leaders who chose a different course of action? A reasonable conclusion is that the military leaders from Tunisia and Egypt have been a part of the United States' International Military Education and Training Program for decades. This foreign policy program stresses key concepts including civilian control of the military, democracy, and international human rights.

This article will explore how the United States' International Military Education and Training Program (IMETP) provides access and influence for the United States to some of the most turbulent countries around the globe. Additionally, this article will update and validate the previous 2007–2009 DoS/DSCA/DISAM IMET Phase I Study findings pertaining to the effectiveness of the IMETP by continuing to show the link between IMET graduates and their understanding of civilian control of the military, international human rights, and democracy

in the United States. Finally, this article will outline a road map for the future of IMETP studies to justify Congressional financial support of the IMETP.

## **Background**

The IMETP, a Security Assistance program administered by the Department of State but executed by the Department of Defense, encourages mutually beneficial relations between the US and foreign countries, furthers the goals of international peace and security, and develops host-nation skills to operate and maintain US-origin equipment.<sup>3</sup> Additionally, a section of the IMETP, known as Expanded-IMET, outlines specific training objectives to include: “contributing to responsible defense resource management; fostering respect for and understanding of democracy and civilian rule of law, including the principle of civilian control of the military; contributing to cooperation between military and law enforcement personnel with respect to counternarcotics law enforcement efforts; and improving the military justice system and promoting an awareness and understanding of internationally recognized human rights.”<sup>4</sup> Finally, the IMETP is partially intended to provide long-term influence to hopefully help change the military culture in countries that participate in the program. Tunisian military leaders' (long-time participants in the IMETP) actions suggest a culture change. This shift, however, is best seen in the change in the Egyptian military's culture.

According to a June 2011 paper written by a team of West Point faculty, when civil protests broke out in Egypt, high-ranking Egyptian civilian and military leaders were in Washington, DC attending a conference with the US military. Throughout the visit and once the Egyptian leaders returned to Egypt, US civilian and military diplomats kept in constant contact with senior Egyptian leaders, urging them to exercise restraint. Key US officials were able to rely on strong lines of communication, which were

built on years of personal interaction between the leaders of both nations.<sup>5</sup> This paper goes on to say that, “Quantitative measures do not reflect the real value of education programs. Rather, education programs often translate in actions and behaviors, rarely recorded in the annals of history, but rooted in values, norms and practices that are formed over years of in-depth education and character building.”<sup>6</sup>

It is this in-depth education and character building that is the crux of the International Military Education and Training Program. LTC Michael Wright, US Army War College Fellow, demonstrates the effect of US influence through aid to Egypt by documenting the Egyptian military’s history in dealing with civilian unrest in his paper “Does US Security Assistance to Egyptian Military Warrant Continued Engagement?” According to Wright, the Egyptian Military was asked to intervene in three separate civil unrest situations from 1977 to 2012. In the first, the Bread Riots of 1977, the military was responsible for an estimated 800 dead and hundreds others wounded. In 1986, the military stepped in to quell an insurrection involving conscripts, resulting in hundreds dead and thousands missing. Finally, during the Arab Spring of 2011 and the Morsi Presidency of 2012, the military was again asked to intervene to suppress civil discord. This time, the military responded with professionalism and restraint, yielding less than ten overall deaths during the entire period of turmoil.<sup>7</sup> Wright attributes the change in military response to the fact that mid-level officers who graduated from US Professional Military Education (PME) schoolhouses under IMETP were able to influence senior decision makers; some of whom had also attended US PME under IMETP.<sup>8</sup>

### **IMETP Significant Research**

According to the Defense Security Cooperation Agency’s (DSCA) website, “The IMET program exposes students to the US professional military establishment and the American way of life, including amongst other things, US regard for democratic values, respect for individual and human rights and belief in the rule of law.”<sup>9</sup>

Additionally, the IMET program’s overall objectives are “To further the goal of regional stability through effective, mutually beneficial military-to-military relations which culminate in increased understanding and defense cooperation between the United States and foreign countries,” and “to increase the ability of foreign national military and civilian

personnel to absorb and maintain basic democratic values and protect internationally recognized human rights.”<sup>10</sup>


### **Phase I**

Despite the difficult nature of ascertaining the quantitative benefits of the IMETP, in 2007 the US Department of State and DSCA funded several studies to tackle the Congressionally-mandated performance evaluation procedures. The first project, a joint effort between the Center for Civil-Military Relations (CCMR) and the Naval Post Graduate School (NPS), provided some positive findings relating to senior officers attending graduate education under IMETP. However, it failed to deliver results evaluating the entire IMETP.<sup>11</sup>

A second effort, known as the IMET Survey Phase I, was developed to look comprehensively at the program and evaluate the effectiveness of the entire IMETP. The IMET Survey Phase I relies on questions developed by the Department of State and implemented by the Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management.<sup>12</sup> The major focus of the IMET Survey Phase I is an attempt to measure the change in perspective of military leaders by measuring the IMET students’ “self-described change in behavior.”<sup>13</sup>

The aforementioned IMETP Phase I survey findings were concluded based on IMETP students’ likert scale responses to evaluate how well the US has achieved the purposes of the IMETP. According to this 2007–2009 DoS/DSCA/DISAM study, the technique of the Phase I Survey relies upon, “international relations theory to determine positive results for the US based upon the students’ experiences in the US.”<sup>14</sup> The study describes how the results from all the student surveys have meaning in several dimensions. The second dimension, or reviewing select subsets of data in an effort to influence decisions about the future uses of IMET, provides a more meaningful look at the data collected from the IMETP students. Specifically, looking at survey data for questions relating to an understanding of US democracy, International human rights, and civilian control of the military offers quantitative analyses of how well the US is doing in meeting the IMETP objectives.<sup>15</sup>

The DoS/DSCA/DISAM report looked at data from IMETP students for 2007–2009. Results from the study are as follows:



**Civilian Control of the Military, 2008 Data**

Question (mean score) (1=very negative; 4=very positive)			
Region (N)	Pre-training view of Civilian control of military	Post-training view of Civilian control of military	Pre to Post difference
Western Hemisphere	3.14	3.45	.31
European and Eurasian	3.21	3.44	.23
Near Eastern	3.03	3.53	.50
African	3.03	3.68	.65
South and Central Asian	3.11	3.61	.50
East Asian and Pacific	3.14	3.55	.41

**Change in View of Democracy in the US, 2008 Data**

Question (mean score) (1=very negative; 4=very positive)			
Region (N)	Q14. Pre-training view of democracy in US	Q15. Post-training view of Civilian control of military	Mean Difference
Western Hemisphere	3.45	3.66	.21
European and Eurasian	3.42	3.53	.11
Near Eastern	3.58	3.69	.11
African	3.47	3.78	.31
South and Central Asian	3.40	3.68	.28
East Asian and Pacific	3.57	3.70	.14

**Change in Knowledge of International Human Rights, 2008 Data**


Question (Question mean score and sample size for each region) (1=very limited; 4=extensive)			
Region (N)	Q17. Pre-training knowledge of international human rights standards	Q15. Post-training knowledge of international human rights standards	Mean Difference
Western Hemisphere	3.26	3.54	.28
European and Eurasian	3.27	3.63	.36
Near Eastern	3.17	3.72	.56
African	3.16	3.73	.57
South and Central Asian	2.98	3.58	.59
East Asian and Pacific	3.12	3.44	.33

Based on the results, the DoS/DSCA/DISAM report concluded that IMET has a significant positive impact on student perceptions about civilian control of the military, democracy in the United States, and international human rights. Additionally, the regional breakout results indicate that there are marked differences in how students from different regions perceive civilian control of the military, democracy in the US, and international human rights. For example, the DoS/DSCA/DISAM report interpreted the regional results to show that although regions with a longer history of civilian control of the military (European and Western Hemisphere) show a positive change in understanding the importance of civilian

control of the military, they show much less change than regions where there was significant historical military control of civilians (Near Eastern nations). Accordingly, IMET in the US significantly changes the military members of these Near Eastern nations' perception of the importance of civilian control of the military.<sup>16</sup>

**Phase I Results Update**

Do the IMETP Phase I study trends continue with recent data? 2010–2012 numbers for the same categories as the 2007–2009 DoS/DSCA/DISAM study are as follows:



**Civilian Control of the Military, 2010–2012 Data**

Question (mean score) (1=very negative; 4=very positive)			
Region (N)	Pre-training view of Civilian control of military (2007–2009 numbers)	Post-training view of Civilian control of military (2007–2009 numbers)	Pre to Post difference (2007–2009 numbers)
Western Hemisphere	3.31 (3.14)	3.57 (3.45)	.26 (.31)
European and Eurasian	3.24 (3.21)	3.49 (3.44)	.25 (.23)
Near Eastern	2.98 (3.03)	3.51 (3.53)	.53 (.50)
African	3.10 (3.03)	3.66 (3.68)	.56 (.65)
South and Central Asian	3.10 (3.11)	3.60 (3.61)	.50 (.50)
East Asian and Pacific	3.07 (3.14)	3.61 (3.55)	.53 (.41)

### **Change in View of Democracy in the US, 2010–2012 Data**

<b>Question (mean score)</b> <i>(1=very negative; 4=very positive)</i>			
<b>Region (N)</b>	<b>Q14. Pre-training view of democracy in US</b> <i>(2007–2009 numbers)</i>	<b>Q15. Post-training view of Civilian control of military</b> <i>(2007–2009 numbers)</i>	<b>Mean Difference</b> <i>(2007–2009 numbers)</i>
Western Hemisphere	3.59 (3.45)	3.74 (3.66)	.15 (.21)
European and Eurasian	3.49 (3.42)	3.59 (3.53)	.10 (.11)
Near Eastern	3.42 (3.58)	3.67 (3.69)	.25 (.11)
African	3.49 (3.47)	3.77 (3.78)	.28 (.31)
South and Central Asian	3.43 (3.40)	3.71 (3.68)	.28 (.28)
East Asian and Pacific	3.48 (3.57)	3.73 (3.70)	.25 (.14)

### **Change in Knowledge of International Human Rights, 2010–2012 Data**

<b>Question (Question mean score and sample size for each region)</b> <i>(1=very limited; 4=extensive)</i>			
<b>Region (N)</b>	<b>Q17. Pre-training knowledge of international human rights standards</b> <i>(2007–2009 numbers)</i>	<b>Q15. Post-training knowledge of international human rights standards</b> <i>(2007–2009 numbers)</i>	<b>Mean Difference</b> <i>(2007–2009 numbers)</i>
Western Hemisphere	3.36 (3.26)	3.65 (3.54)	.29 (.28)
European and Eurasian	3.31 (3.27)	3.56 (3.63)	.25 (.36)
Near Eastern	3.23 (3.17)	3.65 (3.72)	.42 (.56)
African	3.16 (3.16)	3.74 (3.73)	.58 (.57)
South and Central Asian	3.08 (2.98)	3.60 (3.58)	.52 (.59)
East Asian and Pacific	3.04 (3.12)	3.62 (3.44)	.58 (.33)

The updated results validate the 2007–2009 DoS/DSCA/DISAM report’s previous findings that IMET significantly impacts student perceptions of civilian control of the military, democracy in the US, international human rights, and the regional results analyses. Of note, in most regions, including the Near East, these measures of success of the IMETP are even stronger with the updated data.

**Phase II**


In 2012, Phase II of the IMETP Study began. During this phase, studies of multiple countries of IMETP graduates were conducted to gather additional information on these students years after completing IMET-funded training in the US. After conducting studies in two countries, the initial review of the data is positive and supports the Phase I conclusions that the IMETP does meet its Congressionally-mandated purposes.


The initial review of Phase II data focused on three questions of particular interest to Congress:

1. Understanding of internationally-recognized human rights by IMET graduates (HR);
2. Understanding of the importance of civilian control of the military by IMET graduates (CCM); and
3. Understanding of the value of democracy as practiced in the United States by IMET graduates (DUS).

Of note, the research team’s concern that data collected from in-country IMETP graduates years post-US studies during Phase II would invalidate conclusions reached from data collected in the US from IMET graduates during Phase I was proven to be unfounded. In all areas, Phase II IMETP graduates showed not only a higher understanding of HR, CCM and DUS after their IMETP experience, but with an even better result than students in the US during Phase I. This indicates that upon return to their home nation, the value of HR, CCM and DUS is further amplified.

The charts below summarize the initial results. The first chart shows the difference between assessment of understanding by IMETP students pre-training and the final assessment of IMETP graduates in-country years after training. The second chart shows the difference between IMETP students after training in the US as compared to IMETP graduates in-country years after training.





Future Phase II Study reports will focus on all three Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) IMET Purposes assessed in the Phase I study:

FAA IMET Purpose One: Encourage effective and mutually beneficial relations and increased understanding between the United States and foreign countries in furtherance of the goals of international peace and security.

FAA IMET Purpose Two: Improve the ability of participating foreign countries to utilize their resources, including defense articles and defense services obtained by them from the United States, with maximum effectiveness, thereby contributing to greater self-reliance by such countries.

FAAIMET Purpose Three: Increase the awareness of nationals of foreign countries participating in such activities of basic issues involving internationally recognized human rights.<sup>17</sup>

### Phase III

In the future, a Phase III data analysis will be conducted. This phase establishes a control group comparison using PME Staff College and War College students in-country who have never attended IMETP or any other US-funded training. Their results will be compared with Phase I and Phase II results. The research team’s premise for Phase III is that international students who have not participated in IMET or other US-funded training will have less favorable perceptions for civilian control of the military, democracy in the US and international

human rights. If the premise proves accurate, there will be even further validity that the IMETP positively influences foreign students’ perceptions for civilian control of the military, democracy in the US, and international human rights, and thus warrants continued Congressional funding.

### Conclusion

The IMETP is a beneficial foreign policy instrument that provides influence and access to our foreign partners. IMETP’s premise to provide long-term influence to help change foreign military cultures with respect to civilian control of the military, democracy in the US and international human rights was a contributing factor in the actions exhibited by the Tunisian and Egyptian militaries (long-time participants in IMETP) during the recent Arab Spring events. The 2007–2009 DoS/DSCA/DISAM IMETP Phase I study used changes in IMETP students’ perceptions about civilian control of the military, democracy in the US, and international human rights to demonstrate that our foreign partners’ military leaders are being influenced as a result of their participation in the IMETP. 2010–2012 updates to the survey continue to show quantitative measures validating this success. Some may argue that it is difficult to show a definitive cause/effect of the IMETP. However, it is reasonable, using historical actions of foreign partners participating in the IMETP as well as the past and continued IMETP study efforts, to conclude that the IMETP is having a positive impact on the military leaders of our allies.

## Notes

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17. Ibid., 4.

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## About the Author

Ferrelle Rodriguez-Perez Smith is a retired Air Force Officer and an Assistant Professor at the Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management, specializing in International Training Management. Mr. Smith was an International Training Manager at the Office of Military Cooperation–Egypt, American Embassy, Cairo. He has also been an Instructor at the United States Air Force Academy and the Squadron Officer School, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama.



# Mobile Education Teams: Bringing DISAM Expertise to the Customer

By LCDR Dale Klan  
Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management

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Thousands of Security Assistance and Security Cooperation professionals around the globe are familiar with the Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management's (DISAM) various residence and online course offerings. Every year, DISAM hosts US and allied-nation military and civilian personnel for training tailored to everyone from Security Cooperation Officers to senior civilians. Tutorials are provided for general and flag officers assigned to various overseas billets, and on-site training is held at various agencies around the country. However, fewer personnel are familiar with DISAM's Mobile Education Teams (METs). Each year, DISAM subject matter experts in finance, logistics, training, technology transfer, and International Program Security Requirements bring DISAM training to US and host-nation personnel around the globe. Funded by the requesting country, METs are tailored to provide the training and instructor expertise requested by each customer. They may last anywhere from three days to three weeks and cover topics ranging from an introduction to SA/SC programs up to Advanced Finance, Logistics, and Training. METs are scheduled up to ten times per year and have been conducted in locations such as Iraq, Djibouti, Afghanistan, Qatar, India, Australia, and Mexico. METs are a cost-effective way to deliver training to allied nations, without the requirement for the country to fund travel, lodging and per diem for fifty or more students to attend courses in residence at Wright Patterson AFB. Customers may use a variety of methods to fund METs, including grant funding, defined or blanket order Foreign Military Sales (FMS) cases, and International Military Education and Training funds, with a waiver.

According to LCDR Will Scarborough, DISAM MET Coordinator, the MET request and coordination process can be fairly lengthy and complex. The requesting nation's training coordinator will identify a requirement and coordinate with the US

country team training coordinator, Office of Defense Cooperation (ODC), or Military Advisory Group (MILGRP) representative. The country team training manager will review the Training Military Articles and Services List (T-MASL) with the host nation training manager to determine which DISAM course offering best meets the host country requirement. This may be an in-country MET or a residence course. Once it's determined the country requires a MET, due to financial considerations and larger student audience, a training request is submitted by the US country team training manager to the Air Force Security Assistance Training squadron (AFSAT). AFSAT is the Implementing Agency (IA) for DISAM METs. The AFSAT country program manager will coordinate with DISAM to determine the availability of requested dates and details of the MET. Once complete, the AFSAT country program manager can input the request onto the country's Standardized Training List (STL). The country team training manager and host nation are notified of the approval of the request, and directed to the DISAM MET coordinator to arrange the details of the MET.

According to Mr. Roger Scott and Mr. Barton Chess, DISAM Assistant Professors of Security Cooperation, METs are both challenging and rewarding. Pre-MET preparation is detailed and lengthy. Shot records reviewed and updated, anti-malaria medication, and physician's approval are required for certain METs. In addition, travel complications are common with METs; delays in visa and passport requests (sometimes in excess of two months), security incidents in country, and difficulty coordinating student availability with proposed training dates are common.

LT Brittany Kaluscak, Instructor of Security Cooperation, emphasizes the importance of flexibility and planning to a successful MET. Local holidays, such as Ramadan, must also be factored into scheduling. Mailing of projectors, printers,

diplomas, student rosters, and other course materials may require one to two months to arrive in a country like Afghanistan. Translation of slides and exercises, along with the availability of in-class translators, are also a complication. Advance coordination between the MET Team Chief and the US representative in country, including threat briefings, force protection plans, and travel plans, is imperative. These often require hundreds of emails and hours of video teleconferences and phone conversations.

The challenges for DISAM MET members have only just begun once they arrive in country. Instructors have been on station during mortar attacks, indirect fire, and protests such as those during the Arab Spring. Living conditions may be quite austere, with twenty personnel living and sleeping in one bay. Communications and Internet access, taken for granted stateside, can be a luxury in the MET environment. Despite these difficult conditions, student feedback tends to be quite enthusiastic. METs are routinely described as invaluable, not only by host nation personnel, but also US students who may not have been able to attend DISAM training en route to their overseas assignments.

While the US combat mission in Iraq is complete, and is winding down in Afghanistan, our commitment to training, equipping, and developing those countries' military and security units is not. As long as there is a need for SA/SC training, DISAM personnel will continue to bring their expertise to wherever it is needed.

<b>FY 2012</b>	
Afghanistan	4–17 Oct 2011
Israel	7–11 Nov 2011 (Conducted in New York City)
Iraq	6–30 Mar 2012
Mexico	19–30 Mar 2012
Netherlands	16–27 Apr 2012
Afghanistan	15–30 May 2012
Colombia	16–27 Jul 2012
Australia	10–24 Aug 2012
Iraq	10–21 Sep 2012

<b>FY 2013</b>	
Taiwan	28 Jan–8 Feb 2013 (Conducted in Washington, DC)
Australia	28 Jan–8 Feb 2013
Denmark	25 Feb–8 Mar 2013
Colombia	6 May–17 May 2013
Mexico	15 Jul–26 Jul 2013
Afghanistan	20 Aug–4 Sep 2013 (Pending)
Iraq	9–28 Sep 2013 (Pending)
India	16 Sep–27 Sep 2013 (Pending)

### **About the Author**

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# French Defense Exports Towards the United States: Understanding the Environment

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## **Introduction**

France has historically purchased few major weapon systems from the United States, owing to its “Gaullist” policy of developing an independent defense industry with a full-spectrum force made up mostly of French designed and produced weapons systems. The exception lies in fixed-wing aviation where the French Air Force operates the E2C-Hawkeye, KC-135 Tanker, C-130 Hercules and E3-AWACS. Less well known are the purchases of Hellfire and Javelin missiles, tactical radios and night vision goggles. What receives less visibility is what the United States military acquires from French defense firms. While most defense enthusiasts can point to the US Coast Guard’s (U.S.C.G) Dolphin helicopter as a helicopter of French origin, or even the Army’s newly acquired UH-72A Lakota<sup>1</sup>, there is little visibility outside the acquisition world of Department of Defense (DOD) purchases from French defense firms. This article highlights those purchases, while showing the difficulty in acquiring data related to those sales and the challenges of breaking into the US defense market.

## **Interpreting the Data**

Understanding and interpreting data from arms and defense technology sales is a highly complex and monumental task. Defense acquisition is never evenly spread across sectors and systems, and the true origin of a product is sometimes quasi-impossible to determine. A “widget” destined for a US weapons platform, which appears to be produced by a French company, may actually be produced by a French-owned subsidiary in the United States that employs US workers, pays US taxes, and can be categorized as part of the US Defense Industrial and Technology Base (DITB). Recently, ThalesRaytheonSystems was awarded a \$44.9 million contract by the US Army to upgrade the Receiver Exciter (REX) in the Improved AN/TPQ-37 Firefinder radar as part of the

US Army’s program to further improve the AN/TPQ-37’s performance, maintainability and reliability. ThalesRaytheonSystems, created in 2001, employs over 1,600 people and is equally owned by Thales (French) and Raytheon (US), so interpreting the awarding of a \$44.9 million contract without having complete access to the company’s financial reports is not feasible. Thales Communications, Inc.<sup>2</sup>, a US proxy company owned by the Thales Group (French), produces the AN/PRC-148 Multiband Inter/Intra Team Radio (MBITR) used by the US Special Operations community, US Army, and US Marine Corps. Because of its proxy moniker, it is considered a 100 percent American company by the US Government.

Understanding the difficulty of acquiring such data, the primary data source for this article comes from the Federal Procurement Data System-Next Generation (FPDS-NG)<sup>3</sup>, which is used by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (OUSD AT&L) to publish annual defense procurement activity information. Data concerning arms sales are also available from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) in their annual report of conventional arms sales as well as national sources such as France’s annual report to the parliament on arms exports.<sup>4</sup>

In FY2011, the US Government obligated almost \$304 million in defense items and services from French owned companies.<sup>5</sup> Some contracts were for items worth a few thousand dollars, such as washers, nuts, and bolts from Messier-Bugati-Dowty, a Safran subsidiary, destined for US aircraft landing gear. Other contract obligations were in the millions of dollars, such as those signed with Thales Avionics SA in which the DOD obligated over \$27 million for UH-72A Lakota helicopter avionics. If the FY2011 base contracts and multi-year options for many of these contracts are honored, the value of all DOD contracts signed with French firms in 2011 could

reach \$932 million. Appendix 1 shows a sampling of French suppliers and the products they have supplied to the DOD in the last five years (2007–2011).

The data show that purchases and acquisitions from France grew from \$131 million in 2007 to \$414 million in 2010, before dropping to \$376 million in 2011. These purchases were mostly in avionics and electro-optical (optronics) systems. The Army's Light Utility Helicopter Program, not included in these figures and awarded to American Eurocopter, is a 345 helicopter program that could be worth between \$2–3 billion between 2006 and 2017. Over 240 UH-72A aircraft have been delivered to the US Army as of November, 2012.

### **The French Arms Industry**

The French city of Saint-Étienne, located in the Rhone-et-Loire department in east-central France, has been recognized since 1764 as the epicenter of the French arms industry, producing firearms for the French imperial army.<sup>6</sup> French archives show that weapons were made not only for the French army but also the Order of Malta, the French West Indies Company and American “insurgents”—the term used in the 18th century to refer to American revolutionaries. Renamed ARMEVILLE at the turn of the 19th century, the imperial arms factory in Saint-Étienne produced a new rifle in 1816 based on the use of Silex (black) powder. Initially capable of producing 15,000 to 30,000 rifles per year, by 1866, with new construction and improved technology, the arsenal of Saint-Étienne reached an annual production of 150,000 firearms with another 50,000 sabers and bayonets.

At the outbreak of the American Revolution the colonies possessed virtually no capacity to manufacture small arms suitable for military use (muskets). As was the case with virtually all manufactured goods, especially those requiring either high levels of artisan skills or large volume production, the colonies depended exclusively on imports from Britain. This reliance on Britain was particularly problematic once Baron von Steuben began training George Washington's Continental Army in European military tactics.

Despite the efforts of several state governments to organize armories, the situation remained desperate until the Continental Congress managed to arrange the purchase of muskets from France. The delivery of 80,000 French Charleville muskets to the Continental

Army did much more than eliminate the immediate arms shortage in General Washington's army.<sup>7</sup> When the fighting finally ended in 1781, the young American republic found itself in possession of a large stockpile of surplus muskets—more than enough to meet the Army's needs well into the 1790s.

### **French Defense Industry Today**

To supply cost-effective systems to maintain its nuclear deterrent and deployable military forces, France has long relied on an autonomous defense-industrial base partially subsidized by the Government. This autonomy and competitiveness in certain defense sectors comes from the Gaullist policy of independence which mandated a high level of technical invention and innovation within the military-industrial complex, fueled by a high level of engineers and scientists formed by France's *Grandes Ecoles*.<sup>8</sup> This autonomous defense industrial base has the world's fourth-largest defense expenditure behind the United States, Russia, and the UK, and claimed 8.5 percent of the global weapons export market between 2006 and 2011. The brunt of these exports can be attributed to fewer than a dozen large firms such as Thales, EADS, Nexter, MBDA, Safran and DCNS, but behind them are thousands of small and medium firms dependent upon the larger firms for work. These companies produced industry sales of €17.5 billion (\$22.1 billion) in 2011 and accounted for over 80,000 direct jobs and another 85,000 indirect jobs as reported by the French Defense Industries Council (CIDEF).<sup>9</sup>

### **Understanding the Environment**

The international nature of the flow of capital within the arms industry makes it difficult to identify the notions of a company's “nationality”—an important consideration in the defense procurement world. As previously stated, information can be difficult to extrapolate when researching various data sources from the US Government, European Union, and non-governmental organizations, and dissecting shareholder ownership.

Since the 1980s, French defense firms have slowly shifted away from complete state ownership and through a sometimes-complex set of mergers and acquisitions, have included a greater percentage of private and public shareholders. Safran, Thales, Aerospatiale (now EADS) and even DCNS, France's well-known naval shipbuilder which until 2007 was 100 percent state owned, have shifted toward

privatization. The French State now has a 27 percent interest in Thales, 30 percent in Safran and 74 percent in DCNS. In the case of Safran, they have been active in the United States for more than forty years operating in twenty-two States and supporting over 6,500 jobs. In 1974, a Joint Venture was created between Snecma, now part of the Safran group, and General Electric (GE), which led to a successful partnership providing Safran with substantial contracts in the US Defense market. In 2009, it acquired 81 percent of GE's Security Division, which is active in the homeland security sector and further bolsters Safran's ties with GE. Today, the US Air Force is the single largest end-user of Safran products due mostly to the CFM56 re-engining of the KC-135, E-3 and E-6 aircraft. Safran's Turbomeca provides engines for the HH-65 and LUH-72 helicopters and Sagem, also part of the Safran Group, is the primary supplier of avionics for the LUH-72A.

### **Why Buy French?**

The US defence market is characterized by strong domestic competition, a fairly complex bureaucratic system which involves multiple agencies,<sup>10</sup> and a somewhat superior view of US indigenous technologies and products often described as the "not invented here syndrome," and magnified during the post-9/11 period. France, which did not participate militarily in the 2003 invasion of Iraq, may have suffered indirectly through the "freedom fries" prism, which did not give French commercial or military products a competitive edge.<sup>11</sup>

Coalition warfare, interoperability, and reduced defense budgets will remain the trend in the foreseeable future. France is, and will remain, a major world player in defence. It has one of the most forward-deployed armed forces in the world after the US and has been strongly engaged in Afghanistan, the Balkans, sub-Saharan Africa and recently played a major role in combat operations in Libya. With the exception of Iraq, French forces are or have been almost everywhere that US forces have deployed, and in certain places where the US is not strongly present. To this end, the old adage that an arms deal is a way of buying a diplomatic and political guarantee and not simply buying weapons from an outside supplier remains relevant. With joint ventures and French companies operating with US subsidiaries, buying French can mean supporting job creation in certain states, while promoting innovation and broader competition.

The 2010 Ashton Carter "Better Buying Power" memo challenged the defence acquisition community to rethink how the DOD procures goods and services with ever decreasing budgets.<sup>12</sup> The mandate to be smarter with how we buy lends itself to looking outside traditional US supply channels. The purchase of French produced ammonium perchlorate (AP) composite propellant for rockets recently led to a \$1.5 million investment in a major French supplier. All DOD Precision Guided Munitions (PGMs) use thermal batteries and the US defence thermal battery market has been dependent upon one US supplier. Thanks to a French supplier, Bourges Aerospaciale,<sup>13</sup> the US now has a second source for these critical batteries. During the past six years, due mostly to operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, DOD flare (countermeasures to protect aircraft from air or ground infrared heat-seeking missiles) requirements have averaged more than \$275 million annually. A French company, which entered the US market in 2009, now has a US Navy contract to design, develop, and manufacture off-shore flares. These examples support Dr. Carter's initiative as Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics and serve not only to provide quality products to our military but strengthen our alliances.

#### The role of the French Government in Exports

As a result of declining procurement budgets in the 1990s and a sense that too many external agencies and services were involved in weapons development and procurement, the French Government decided to empower one single executive agency within the Ministry of Defense responsible for weapons research, contracting, procurement and acquisition from inception to delivery, to include exports.

The Direction Générale de l'Armement (DGA) serves as the Ministry of Defense's procurement and acquisition directorate, and reports directly to the Minister of Defense. Comprised of over 13,000 employees, in 2011 the DGA managed a little over eighty armaments programs representing almost €8 billion (\$10.5 billion) with €695 million (\$916 million) spent on development studies and demonstrations. In addition to Franco-French research and development and acquisition initiatives, the DGA is involved in over fifteen cooperative armaments programs with other European partners in the context of the European Defense Agency. While the DGA does not set stringent export regulations on French manufacturers, it does have

representation on the Inter-Ministerial Commission for the Study of Exports of War Materials, known by its French acronym the CIEEMG-Commission Interministérielle pour l'Étude des Exportations de Matériels de Guerre.

Weapons and defense related technology exports are done under the authority of the Prime Minister with the advice of the CIEEMG. Chaired by the Secretary General of National Defense, the commission is composed of the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs, the Ministry of Defense, and the Ministry of the Economy, Finance and Employment. The CIEEMG expresses its opinions in the framework of general directives approved by national political authorities. In rendering a decision to grant an export license, it makes use of general criteria such as embargoes, conflict areas and human rights violations for the denial of licenses. In the case of exports to the United States, French companies do not view the CIEEMG as a particular burden to doing business with the Department of Defense.

### **Foreign Comparative Testing**

The entry point for some of DOD's French acquisitions lies in the Foreign Comparative Testing program (FCT).<sup>14</sup> The mission of the FCT program is to test items and technologies of our foreign allies and friends that have a high Technology Readiness Level (TRL) in order to satisfy valid defense requirements more quickly and economically. Since 1980, the FCT program has served as a catalyst for cross-Atlantic industry collaboration and by leveraging foreign research, has benefited the US taxpayer and provided improved operational performance to the US military. One recent example that could affect not only the performance but also the morale of warfighters is the Osmofood meat processing system designed by a French company which uses a unique drying process to produce improved flavor Ready-to-Eat Meals.<sup>15</sup> This system will allow for greatly expanded menus and supplemental nutrients to improve cognitive and physical performance with the added benefit of creating American jobs. A new product line incorporating this French technology has been installed by Georgia-based FPL Food, LLC, at their West Columbia, South Carolina plant. The Army's Research, Development and Engineering Command (RDECOM) estimates that research and development costs to the government would have been 2-3 million

dollars to develop a comparable capability from scratch, and would have taken at least three to five years to develop.

Unfortunately, funding for FCT has been reduced as part of a 2011 initiative to cut spending within DOD, resulting in a 42 percent cut overall in the program. For the Army alone, nine FCT proposals were submitted in FY 12 and only two were selected for funding. The FCT program was funded at \$19.1 million in fiscal year 2012, with proposed funding of \$18.1 million in 2013, and \$18.7 million in 2014. Pentagon budget documents show the program's budget for fiscal years 2015 and 2016 is projected to increase to \$29 million and \$30.8 million, respectively.<sup>17</sup>

### **Conclusion**

Several studies by the defense acquisition community have suggested that US defense acquisition is in desperate need of an overhaul and that many of our policies discourage global suppliers from participating in the US supplier base. This competition is necessary to yield greater quality items at lower costs. While this article does not advocate that the US should have purchased the Rafale fighter in lieu of developing the Joint Strike Fighter, there is a strong argument to be made for the continued exploration of French technology and niche defense platforms which are already in production and could support our competitive advantage in many defense sectors. The benefits of leveraging US resources through cost sharing and economies of scale afforded by international cooperative research, development, production, and logistics support programs are well documented and should remain a key tenant of our acquisition strategy.

While it is highly unlikely that French President Hollande will reverse the decision of his successor to re-integrate into NATO, France will continue to push for a common European defense while remaining a strong ally and an innovative partner in the defense world. Continued investment in French, and by default European Defense systems and technology, is good for the US military, our defense industry and our relationship with our NATO partners.

### **Notes**

1. The USCG's HH-65 and the Army's LUH-72 helicopters are built by American Eurocopter. The UH-72A is manufactured in Columbus, Mississippi.

2. Thales Communications was incorporated as Racal Communications (UK) in 1964 and became part of Thomson-CSF (French) in 2000. In 2001, it was renamed Thales Communications and belongs to the French Thales Group even though it is recognized as a US owned company
3. <http://www.fpds-ng.com/>
4. Rapport au Parlement Octobre 2012 sur les exportations d'armement de la France, <http://www.defense.gouv.fr/>
5. GAO defines an obligation as “a definite commitment that creates a legal liability of the government for the payment of goods and services ordered or received, or a legal duty on the part of the United States that could mature into a legal liability by virtue of actions on the part of the other party beyond the control of the United States. Payment may be made immediately or in the future. An agency incurs an obligation, for example, when it places an order, signs a contract, awards a grant, purchases a service, or takes other actions that require the government to make payments to the public or from one government account to another.
6. The FAMAS-*Fusil d'Assault de la Manufacture d'Armes de Saint-Étienne* remains the standard issue assault rifle for the French military and is assembled in Saint-Étienne but is now owned by the government firm NEXTER.
7. After France officially entered the war in early 1778, it continued to send vast amounts of war materials to the colonies. The avalanche of arms and their components, ammunition, accouterments, naval vessels, clothing, loans, technical advisors, volunteer officers and regular army regiments that France poured into America from 1777 until 1783 played a key role in the success of the Revolution.
8. Grandes Écoles are very selective and prestigious institutions of higher education, offering degree programs in a variety of fields, from engineering to business to political science. A list of public and private Grandes Écoles that are members of the Conférence des Grandes Ecoles (CGE) can be found at [http://www.cge.asso.fr/cadre\\_ecole.html](http://www.cge.asso.fr/cadre_ecole.html).
9. CIDEF is the French defense industries council, an umbrella association for the main French defense industry trade associations: GIFAS (Air), GICAT (Land) and GICAN (Maritime).
10. See appendix 2 for a list of regulatory agencies and legislation
11. In the context of the “War on Terror” French support to US counter-terrorism (CT) efforts blossomed post-9/11. The CIA and FBI, recognizing this, were quick to establish CT liaison offices in Paris
12. [http://www.acq.osd.mil/docs/USD\\_ATL\\_Guidance\\_Memo\\_September\\_14\\_2010\\_FINAL.PDF](http://www.acq.osd.mil/docs/USD_ATL_Guidance_Memo_September_14_2010_FINAL.PDF)
13. ASB Aerospatiale Batteries specializes in the research, design and manufacture of thermal batteries. ASB has provided over 5,000 thermal batteries for the GMLRS, ATACMS, and MLRS programs, while maintaining a 100% combined performance rating since 2004.
14. There is a complementary domestic program to FCT called the Defense Acquisition Challenge Program (DAC). The purpose of DAC is similar to FCT, but DAC focuses on getting domestic solutions rapidly to the warfighter. For more information on DAC and FCT go to, <https://cto.acqcenter.com/osd/portal.nsf/>
15. See online article entitled, “DoD Considers Foreign Technologies to Save Dollars,” at [http://www.army.mil/article/82386/DOD\\_considers\\_foreign\\_technologies\\_to\\_save\\_dollars/](http://www.army.mil/article/82386/DOD_considers_foreign_technologies_to_save_dollars/)
16. The FCT proposed budget appropriation can be found at: [http://www.dtic.mil/descriptivesum/Y2013/OSD/stamped/0605130D8Z\\_6\\_PB\\_2013.pdf](http://www.dtic.mil/descriptivesum/Y2013/OSD/stamped/0605130D8Z_6_PB_2013.pdf)

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### About the Author

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## **Appendix I.**

### **US Government Agencies and Arms Import Related Laws and Regulations**

Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC), Department of State  
<http://www.pmddtc.state.gov/>

Bureau of Industry and Security, Department of Commerce  
<http://www.bis.doc.gov/index.htm>

Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Regulations, (19 CFR, chapter 1, parts 1–199)—Regulations that are administered by CBB that detail the import process, including the procedure for the evaluation and classification of merchandise

Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) Regulations (27 CFR parts 447, 478, 479)—Regulations that detail the import license process for the permanent import of defense articles contained on the US Munitions List

Food and Drug Administration (FDA) Regulations (21 CFR, chapter 1)—Regulate all imported electronic products that emit radiation or contain lasers

Federal Communications Commission (FCC) Regulations (47 CFR parts 1–199)—Regulate all imported digital devices, examples include: transponders, monitors, turning units with transceivers installed/radar components, alarm system devices that can transmit a signal for help

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Regulations (40 CFR section 707.20)—Regulate all imported regulated chemicals

Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS), <http://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/dars/dfarspgi/current/index.html>

Customs Modernization Act (Mod Act)—Shifted many responsibilities from CBP to importers, which placed new requirements on importers and levied heavy fines for noncompliance

ITAR (22 CFR parts 120–130)—Regulations administered by the State Department which require that all exports and temporary defense imports and services be authorized by a US State Department approved license, an approved agreement, or a valid ITAR exception

Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC)—Agency that controls the sanctions and embargos authorized by the US, which prohibit exports to, or the conduct of business with certain countries and/or governments

Berry Amendment (U.S.C., Title 10, section 2533a), requires the Department of Defense to give preference in procurement to domestically produced, manufactured, or home-grown products, most notably food, clothing, fabrics, and specialty metals

Restrictions on Specialty Metals (U.S.C., Title 10, section 2533b), The United States has implemented extensive and complex rules aimed at restricting the use of non-domestic “Specialty Metals” in the defense acquisition process. The stated goal is to protect the US defense industry from becoming overly dependent on foreign sources of supply, especially in times of conflict

## **Appendix 2.**

### **French Defense Articles and Technology Purchased by the United States**

Airbus-EADS	HC-144A Ocean Sentry Aircraft to U.S.C.G. 14 delivered by 2012
Cassidian-EADS	Eagle Vision Satellite imaging/ISR to USAF
Dassault	3D modeling, visualization, and interoperability software for Joint Strike Fighter
CILAS	SLD 500 Counter-Sniper Detection Systems to USMC
Deschamps	Mobi-Mat removable helicopter landing pads to US Army
Eurocopter/EADS	LUH-72 Lakota helicopter to US Army HH-65 Dolphin to U.S.C.G
*EUROMIDS	Multi-Functional Low Volume Tactical Airborne Terminal to USAF *Cassidian-EADS/Thales/Indra-Spain/SELEX ELSAG-Italy
HGH Systems	Surveillance systems. Long range infrared panoramic camera to US Army
*Labinal	Electrical wiring systems for aircraft. Bell Helicopter AH-1 Cobra, UH-1 Huey, CH-47, H-46 , Boeing B767 Tanker, V-22, F-22,C-130 AMP, A-10, Lockheed Martin F-16, Northrop Grumman E2D Hawkeye * Safran Group
Latécoère	Vertical and horizontal stabilizers on E-2C Hawkeye to USN
Lacroix	Airborne missile countermeasures and pyrotechnics to USAF
Metravib	Acoustic gunshot detections systems to US Army
*MicroTurbo	Engine in MQM-107 drone but production ended in 2003 (USA, USAF). 08/12 won US Navy Subscale Subsonic Aerial Target competition *subsidiary of Turbomeca
Osmo Foods	For dehydration/processing of foods— Foreign Comparative Testing (FCT) with Natick Soldier RD&E Center for improving quality of MREs
Paul Boyé Techs	NBC Suits to US Army
Sagem	Handheld laser designators to US Army
Sofradir	SADA II (Standard Advanced Dewar Assembly) deployed in Bradley and Abrams for US Army. 3rd-generation dual-band detectors and camera cores in UAVs (40% Thales, 40% Sagem)
Snecma	CFM56-7B Engine (F108 designation) for KC-135 to USAF
Snecma Propulsion Solide (SDS)	Composite divergent seals for General Electric’s F414 (F/A-18E/F) and Pratt & Whitney’s F100 engines (F-16)
TDA (Thales/EADS)	120MM Mortars to USMC
Thales	Flash dipping Sonar (low freq-wide band) to USN
Thales	AN/PRC-148 Multiband Inter/Intra Team Radio (MBITR) to USMC and US Army
*Turbomeca Arriel	Turbine engines in HH-65 helicopter to U.S.C.G and LUH-72 to USA *Safran Group

Safran Group:

Snecma, Turbomeca, Techspace Aero, Sagem, Morpho, Aircelle, Labinal, Hispano-Suiza, Messier-Bugatti-Dowty, Herakles

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# The Arab Spring and the Future of US Foreign Military Sales

By Tom Williams, PhD

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The start of the Arab Spring can be traced back to 18 December 2010 when Mohamad Bouazizi of Tunisia set himself on fire to protest corruption and mistreatment by government officials; he later died from his self-inflicted burns. This suicide by self-immolation was especially shocking to the Arab/Muslim world that treats such self-inflicted deaths as particularly sinful, as opposed to those who knowingly sacrifice their lives as part of a Jihad, which is considered a noble and virtuous way to die. To understand why this so shocking to people of the Middle East, one has to understand the religious condemnation that Islam places on suicide. According to the Hadith, the second most important Islamic document after the Quran, which is supposed to contain the actual sayings and doings of Muhammad as reported by those who knew him in life, Muhammad said that “Whoever strangles himself strangles himself into fire, and whoever stabs himself with a spear stabs himself into fire.”<sup>1</sup> So according to the amount of authenticity that you place in this Hadith, not all Islamic Scholars agree on all portions of the Hadith, Mohamad Bouazizi will be burning himself in protest for all eternity.

After this, protests rocked Tunisia and major protests also took place in Algeria. Less than a month later, in mid-January 2011, the Tunisia government was overthrown. Later that month, thousands of mostly young unemployed men gathered in Tahrir Square in Cairo to protest unemployment, high food prices, corruption, and the heavy handed rule of President Hosni Mubarak. In February, Mubarak transferred his powers to the Egyptian Supreme Council of the Armed Forces and resigned. That same month protests broke out in Benghazi, Libya, threatening the regime of Muammar Gaddafi. Also in the early months of 2011 there were corresponding protests in Bahrain, Iraq, Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Lebanon, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and Syria.

In Tunisia and Egypt the Arab spring stayed mostly peaceful with the occasional violent episode marring the somewhat orderly change of regime. One such incident occurred in October 2011, when Egyptian Coptic Christians protested the destruction of a church, and the Army responded with tanks. Nonetheless, by late May 2012 the first democratic Egyptian vote in decades was held, which placed Mohammed Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood and Ahmed Shafiq, Mubarak’s former Prime Minister, in a runoff election. On June 24, 2012 Morsi was announced the winner by a narrow margin, becoming the new president of Egypt. In the same year, a new Islamist-leaning government was also elected in Tunisia.

In contrast, the protests in Libya turned into a full blown civil war. In August of 2011 the Battle of Tripoli took place, where Rebel forces captured major portions of the city and toppled Gaddafi’s government. A couple of months later Gaddafi was captured and killed by rebels, ending the civil war. Since then, there have been clashes between different groups of rebels, oil production is struggling to return to pre-civil war levels, Islamists have gained political ground. This culminated on September 11, 2012 when an attack on the American Consulate in Benghazi by terrorists killed four, including the American Ambassador to Libya, Chris Stevens.

Yemen and Syria also had very violent protests. In Yemen there was a series of large protests and some protesters were killed. Then on June 3, 2011 the President of Yemen, Ali Abdullah Saleh, was critically injured in a failed assassination attempt. After recuperating in Saudi Arabia, Ali Abdullah Saleh returned to Yemen where on February 27, 2012 he resigned, transferring control of Yemen to his Vice President Abd Rabbuh Mansur Al-Hadi. Syria, like Libya, has evolved into a full scale civil war. However, unlike Libya, the civil war in Syria is still going strong and as of the writing of this article, the death toll is estimated to exceed 60,000.

In Iraq and Iran, there were protests. Where the Iraq protests were mainly over high food prices and quickly sputtered out once the Iraqi government addressed these concerns, the Iran protests were mainly about the lack of participation and representation in government, and they continued for some time. These protestors, mainly unemployed young Persian men, were suppressed through violent and harsh means.

Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Morocco, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain all had Arab Spring protests of various types in 2011, resulting in differing levels of change. In Jordan, the King has dismissed and reformed portions of the government. In Kuwait, the National Assembly was stormed by protesters and the Cabinet has resigned. The Sultan of Oman has dismissed several ministers. The King of Morocco has promised reforms. In Lebanon, a new government was formed. In Saudi Arabia, women are in the process of getting the right to vote in Municipal elections, although they are still not allowed to drive. Bahrain, outside of Egypt, Libya, Syria, and Yemen, has probably seen the most disruption. Here the majority Shiite population has staged large protests for greater freedom and more equality; these were harshly put down by Gulf Cooperative Council security forces.

In the two-year period from January 2011 to January 2013, four Middle East regimes have been toppled—Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, and indirectly, Yemen. One is currently in the middle of a violent civil war—Syria. Several are still experiencing various levels of violent protest—Egypt, Yemen, Libya, Tunisia and Bahrain. Many other Middle East Countries have changed their government policies in an attempt to pacify the protesters, including Kuwait, Oman, Lebanon, Algeria, and Iraq. Saudi Arabia has invested billions of dollars in domestic programs designed to keep the peace. Bahrain has had ongoing, albeit smaller scale, Shiite protests and Iran may see a renewal of protests with the upcoming presidential election. In other words, the Arab Spring of 2011 has turned into the Arab Spring, Summer, Fall, and Winter of 2012 and is still going strong today.

What is the cause of this so-called “Arab Spring?” Well, there are as many answers to that question as there are so-called “Middle East experts.” But instead of identifying one issue as the main cause behind the Arab Spring there were several economic, social and environmental factors that combined in a “Perfect

Storm” to create a political environment ripe for upheaval, which was waiting for just the right event to start a revolution.

Some of the more prominent regional factors include high unemployment, poor economic growth, trade imbalances, rampant corruption, a large gap between the rich and poor, oppressive and unresponsive regimes, religious intolerance, a high birth rate, high levels of pollution, poor public health programs, soil exhaustion, and water scarcity. Anyone of these issues alone would be difficult to address; the Middle East has all of them. For example, look at the difficulty the US is having in lowering an unemployment rate that currently stands around 8 percent (depending on where one lives in the US); how much more difficult is it to lower unemployment when the rates range from a low of 10 percent to a high of 35 percent, as they do in the Middle East. Additionally, Middle East unemployment numbers mostly under-represent youth unemployment and are often out of date, which make the actual unemployment rates higher than officially acknowledged.

Reviewing Egypt in regard to these issues, it has one of the better 2010 official unemployment rates for the region—12 percent (most likely a good bit higher). It had a growth rate of 1.8 percent for 2011; a trade imbalance of \$21 billion for 2010, and a corruption rating in 2009 that placed Egypt it in the median for the Middle East (based upon the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index). To put this corruption in context, according to Transparency International, about 2 percent of the North American population reports paying bribes over the past several years, the average for the Middle East is 40 percent. Remember, that is how many people report paying bribes. Finally, the gap between the rich and the poor is very large and is increasing every day. In summary, Egypt has economic problems that some would consider almost insurmountable.

The Mubarak regime was oppressive, and the new regime is on its way to becoming religiously intolerant, which further worsens the already poor conditions for the general public. Additional hardship is dumped on ordinary Egyptians because of the high birth rate (the Middle East on average has the highest birth rate in the world outside of Sub Saharan Africa). This continues to stretch the already exceeded carrying capacity of the land, resulting in increasingly expensive imports of basic food stuffs such as wheat and corn. Compounding these difficult

issues are poor public health, the loss of arable land, and the shrinking of water resources. What water is left is becoming increasingly unclean; with all of these factors, one begins to wonder why it took so long for the Arab Spring to sprout in Egypt. Until all these Middle East issues are addressed, there may be no end in sight for the Arab Spring. This could cause the Arab Spring to evolve in to one long, continuous and unending uprising (some scholars claim this has already happened).

How will the repeating cycle of instability, protest, and violence in the Middle East impact US Foreign Military Sales (FMS) sales? Well if the past two fiscal years serves as a guide, the Arab Spring has not depressed total US FMS at all. In fact, FY2012 was a banner year, with sales exceeding \$65B.<sup>2</sup> FY2011 was also very good with sales that exceeded \$34B, closer to the previous five-year average of \$30B. Nearly half of the sales for 2012 came from one massive buy from Saudi Arabia in December of 2011. This \$30B sale was for eighty-four advanced F-15s, and assorted equipment and services.

Why are US FMS sales still going strong in a region of the world that is seeing such a high level of unrest? First off, sales in the region were going strong before the Arab Spring. For instance, the annual level of FMS for the first five years of the 21<sup>st</sup> century was \$12.5B, which is much closer to the historical average. Why did world-wide US sales begin to increase by nearly threefold in 2006, and remain elevated? No one is quite sure but it is probably due to a combination of trends: the world's GDP increased over the last decade, so military spending increased accordingly, various major weapon systems (especially in the Middle East) were aged and needed recapitalization, and Middle East governments were responding to increased regional instability brought about by America's invasion of Iraq.

Middle East sales in near term will probably continue to show strong growth, in part because each country in the region is nervously looking across their border and seeing unrest or potential future instability (in some cases they are looking within their borders). Combine this nervousness with recent historical trends discussed earlier, and it becomes apparent to the casual observer that Global US FMS will not be dipping much below the \$30B average of the last couple of years (not including the December 2011 \$30B one-time sale to Saudi Arabia).

What could negatively impact future US FMS sales in the Middle East? There are many possibilities, but if the most scenarios are removed, such as price of oil falling and staying at record lows, then the assumption is that recent history will most likely become the near future. Three possibilities become probable:

1. A war between US allies in the region breaks out and, in an attempt to end the conflict, the US reduces sales to those involved and in the region
2. New civil wars break out in various countries of the Middle East and the US reduces sales in an attempt to prevent US weapons from being used on civilian populations
3. Islamist leaning groups, like Hamas, Hezbollah, or the Muslim Brotherhood gain such a level of influence in newly formed governments that US no longer feels comfortable providing the same level of FMS support

If any of these events (or more than one) occur, they will have the potential to greatly limit or reduce future FMS in Middle East. These same events could also increase sales to surrounding countries in the region who would now be nervous about the unrest and instability on the other side of their borders, partially offsetting the loss in sales.

What could increase sales in the near term for the Middle East? Taking a similar tack as the above approaches; some other scenarios come to mind. First, the civil war in Syria gets worse and that country breaks apart; the increased instability in the region would probably prompt surrounding countries such as Iraq, Jordan and Israel to spend more on US FMS to increase their security. A similar outcome could occur to countries surrounding Yemen and Libya if the ongoing conflicts between the tribal, ethnic, and sectarian interests in those nations degrade and cause Libya and Yemen to fall back into civil war. Finally, the Arab countries of the Persian Gulf (including Iraq) could increase their purchase of US weapon systems if Iran continues to increase its bellicose behavior in the region.

Sans one of the scenarios presented above, FMS in the Middle East and the world will most likely stay around current levels, but for how long? Probably as long as the Arab Spring continues, but unfortunately, the longer the Arab Spring lasts, the greater the chance that one of the above scenarios could occur. Since none of these scenarios are something that the US would like to see happen, what can be done to

bring the Arab Spring to a peaceful and beneficial conclusion. Furthermore, how can stability be restored in the region? To bring closure to the Arab Spring one must adequately address the underlying causes of the unrest. Long term solutions for the complex web of Middle East problems must be found, including high unemployment, poor economic growth, trade imbalances, rampant corruption, the large gap between the rich and poor, oppressive and unresponsive regimes, religious intolerance, unsustainable birth rates, pollution, poor public health, soil exhaustion, and water scarcity.

Looks like FMS will stay at current levels for a while.

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2. Global FMS figures include the \$3–8B (depending on the year) in foreign military aid granted by the US to various countries of the world for FMS purchases. The vast majority of this aid has been going to Afghanistan, Iraq, Israel, and Egypt.

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# Does US Security Assistance to the Egyptian Military Warrant Continued Engagement?

By LTC Michael Wright  
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The United States spends \$1.5 Billion each fiscal year in assistance to Egypt. Over one billion of that is Foreign Military Financing (FMF) designated for the purchase of US military goods and services, and \$1.8 million of assistance funds to International Military Education and Training (IMET). Egypt ranks as one of the top five nations receiving such support from the United States.<sup>1</sup> Many Americans question this expenditure for a country in seemingly constant turmoil with a history of frequently defying US democratic values.<sup>2</sup> This question has rightly led to an examination of the value, effectiveness, and return on this investment; yet no quantifiable measure exists for determining the United States' return on its investment, and even a qualitative metric is difficult to develop. This problem is especially acute when assessing the value of IMET. Unlike FMF, where sales of goods and services provide a tangible benefit to both nations, IMET is a training and education program whose value is not readily evident. In 1990 Congress approved the Enhanced-IMET (E-IMET) program to focus on respect for civilian control of the military, responsible resource management, and military justice in accordance with internationally-recognized human rights. In addition to its formal curriculum and other goals, congresses' most valued objective for IMET is "to build positive relationships between civilian and military officials from the United States with counterparts in other countries."<sup>3</sup> These relationships are difficult to quantify, but are especially critical in Arab culture, which prioritizes relationships as an avenue to wield influence.<sup>4</sup> A historical comparison of the Egyptian military's actions toward its government prior to US assistance and after provides a contrast that suggests continued support for the program is warranted.

The modern Egyptian military, comprised of over 430,000 personnel, is largely professional and viewed by most Egyptians in favorable terms.<sup>5</sup> The military evolved into its current form as modern Egypt

emerged with the 1952 overthrow and dismantling of the Egyptian monarchy. During this transition, the military assumed governance in addition to other roles not traditionally associated with defense and security. Military members assumed cabinet and senior government positions, including Prime Minister, and President.<sup>6</sup> Under President (and Colonel) Gamal abd al-Nasser, the military maintained this control until 1967. Nasser oversaw the nationalization of private industry and empowered the military with strong police powers.<sup>7</sup> The constitution, established under Nasser in 1956, specifically states the "Egyptian Army shall belong to the People" despite his use of it to quell dissent.<sup>8</sup> During this time, much of the government and military came under Soviet influence.<sup>9</sup> The military's influence in government faltered in 1967 when Nasser's antagonism provoked the Arab-Israeli war that ended with the loss of the Sinai to Israel. This failure reflected badly upon the military and the government, resulting in the military's decline from direct rule.<sup>10</sup> Nasser's era of rule ended with the military's transition to a traditional national-security focus and away from the oppression of opposition.<sup>11</sup>

Nasser's successor, Anwar Sadat, implemented a program to professionalize the armed forces that coincided with the post Camp David Accords agreement, resulting in the rise of US influence both politically and militarily.<sup>12</sup> This developing reputation and professionalism were quickly tarnished by the "Bread Riots" that occurred in January 1977. The riots were a product of Sadat's new economic policies to de-nationalize industry; a key component of his "open-door" policy included the reduction of government subsidies. The riots primarily sparked from this action. The government reversal of the decrees to reduce foodstuff subsidies did not stop the riots, which lasted two days before the Army directly intervened against the people and popular will.<sup>13</sup> The government ordered the military to quell the unrest and do so "ferociously."<sup>14</sup> In some accounts, the

military responded reluctantly to this order and would not intervene until the cancellations of subsidies were reversed.<sup>15</sup> Ultimately, they sided with the regime and intervened with extreme violence against the people. The crisis ended with an estimated 800 dead and hundreds more injured.<sup>16</sup>

In 1986 the military was again asked to intervene, this time under President Hosni Mubarak. Conscripts of the Central Security Forces (CSF), subject to low pay, long hours, and high stress, responded to rumors of a one year extension to their two-year conscription with riots and fires. The military was called in to suppress the uprising and protect the regime.<sup>17</sup> The result was hundreds dead and nearly 8000 conscripts ominously missing; another 20,000 were dismissed.<sup>18</sup>

This response contrasts markedly to the way in which the Egyptian military reacted to recent events, including the sudden end of the Mubarak regime during the Arab Spring in 2011, the recent challenge to the interim government led by Field Marshal Hussein Tantawi, and Morsi's Presidency in 2012. The military was called to protect these governments from thousands of rioting protestors. In response to Mubarak's call to put down the uprising, the military took five days to respond, then provided a nationally televised announcement that, "the armed forces will not resort to use of force against our great people."<sup>19</sup> In response to President Morsi's request that the Army quell widespread rioting directed against his attempts to expand presidential power, the military maintained its neutral stance, positioning tanks around the palace instead of reacting violently.<sup>20</sup> Even during the transitional military rule, when the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) declared it would preserve a decisive political role for itself in the government, the military did not suppress the subsequent protests; Field Marshal Tantawi said, "the military was able to respond to insults with "violence from 'an iron fist,' but that [it] would not do so in order to keep Egypt safe," reaffirming his intention to turn over control of the government after elections.<sup>21</sup> The military's policy to refrain from violence against the populace was not perfect. In November and December of 2011, military police clashed with protestors and rioters and in one instance reportedly ripped the clothes off of and beat a woman.<sup>22</sup> Seven to ten protesters were killed and numerous wounded in the outbreaks. The military's response with beatings, tear gas, and water cannons indicate a significant restraint when one considers the prolific use of live

ammunition and 800 dead during the bread riots. Additionally, the reports on the triggers and methods of the response coupled with the minimal loss of life indicate a policy, or climate, of restraint rather than an official order to disperse the crowds and maintain military rule at any cost.<sup>23</sup>

There are many possible explanations for such restrained responses. These include: the military's desire to maintain its rapport with the population; an evolved loss of respect and confidence in the regime; outside perceptions from constant media coverage; the more peaceful nature of the protests compared to 1977 and 1986; fear of civil war; or, as one West Point study suggested, a "low interest" in intervening despite "little restraint" against doing so, implying a purely self-serving motive to protect its autonomy, resources, or power.<sup>24</sup>

All of these reasons likely factored into the response. However, US engagement should not be excluded as a factor in that change. Contrasting changes in behavior in 1977 and 1986 to 2011 and 2012, suggests that engagement played a role in that gradual change. Many of mid-level officers in position to influence senior decision makers were educated and exposed to these ideals.<sup>25</sup> This influence manifested itself in the relationships built through exposure to Western views of civilian rule, education in international humanitarian ideals, exposure to other professional militaries, and through professional military education since 1979. Of these, exposure to Western ideals through our military assistance program, specifically the IMET program, warrants examination as a key part of that change given "the IMET program is based upon a belief that educating militaries in the areas of IMET emphasis will change national behavior."<sup>26</sup>

Has E-IMET successfully reached those key leaders, which are in, or rising to, positions of prominence in the Egyptian military? Since February 2010, a total of 141 E-IMET Human Rights Courses were offered. Professional military education accounted for nearly 50 percent of the IMET program costs.<sup>27</sup> From 2000 to 2009, Egypt sent over 11,500 students, 2.49 percent of its officers, to training.<sup>28</sup> Since 1979 Egypt has sent a minimum of twenty students per year professional military education. From 1998 on, the numbers surge from fifty to one hundred students.<sup>29</sup> The duration of the average program is forty-two weeks, giving some opportunity for sustained exposure to western culture and ideals

and for the development of relationships between Egyptian and US military members.<sup>30</sup> In a study of E-IMET effectiveness, international students' self-described changes in behavior pre- and post-training/PME indicate a meaningful, positive development. The results of students from the Near East indicated that E-IMET training altered their perceptions about civilian control of the military and knowledge of human rights to a statistically significant degree.<sup>31</sup> While the data only indicates a linkage to the military's decision not to intervene, it does show exposure to these ideals through E-IMET is reaching a critical audience and provides anecdotal evidence the recent responses were not coincidental.

In a recent study, noted expert Gregory Aftandilia, asserts, "the development of personal contacts between US and Egyptian Army officers, which such schooling provides, can enhance bilateral military cooperation, especially when regional crises arise."<sup>32</sup> Continued engagement between the US and Egyptian military was considered so valuable by the current administration that it rebuffed congressional pressure to reduce assistance to the Egyptian military throughout the Arab Spring Crisis.<sup>33</sup> Among the many arguments for funding and continuing these programs, the strongest endorsement is the formalized directive in the Quadrennial Defense Review's Defense Objective, "Prevent and Deter Conflict," which calls for all services to "Build Partner Capacity," of which IMET is a critical component.<sup>34</sup>

Considering the changes in Egyptian military responses for the past thirty years, indications are Congress's most important objective is being met, that the data on E-IMET is accurate, and the positive relationships built over this duration are making a tangible difference. Most notably, by fostering appropriate military restraint and professionalism for a relatively low cost compared to other alternatives.<sup>35</sup> While future study may develop a metric to measure this influence more accurately, for now the continued engagement with programs such as IMET seems worth the investment.

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# The Transfer/Surplus Paradox: The Case of Bandaria

By Eric Patterson, PhD  
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## **Introduction**

Recent events, from the proliferation of Libyan-origin weapons stockpiles following the fall of Moammar Qadhafi to the massive detonation of a military munitions depot in the Republic of Congo's capital on March 3, 2012, to the proliferation of weapons in destabilized Mali continue to remind the world of the problem of excess military conventional weapons stockpiles. That being said, sovereign governments continue to have legitimate defense concerns and national militaries will continue to need to upgrade and modernize their equipment over the long-term. The US government (USG) has an important role to play in supporting our partners' efforts in these areas, particularly with regard to legal arms sales and the modernization of national militaries. The USG is also the world leader in assisting countries deal with their legacy conventional weapons stockpiles. However, at times these two goals are disconnected, particularly in those rare cases where new US military sales/transfers to a foreign partner cause an excess. This article discusses how the USG, particularly the Departments of State and Defense, can better link these objectives.

## **USG Goals: Smart Military Sales, Stockpile Security, and Destruction of Surplus**

The USG has good reasons to sell military articles to foreign countries.<sup>1</sup> The USG knows that selling superior American defense articles means a higher level of capability on the part of our allies and partners. When the US military is in the field with allies, it wants the systems in allied hands to work well. Furthermore, if our allies and partners choose to utilize American weapons, this makes interoperability much easier (e.g., in Afghanistan and Iraq). Interoperability of hardware usually means a deepening of military-to-military relationships, which is an important way for governments to broaden and deepen their bilateral ties. The US and US corporations benefit from the

sale of such weapons, undergirding a critical national asset—the future viability of America's know-how and technical capacity to defend the nation.

The USG also has robust programs designed to monitor and dispose of excess defense articles. The Department of Defense (DOD) has a multitude of internal mechanisms for handling the full life cycle of its weapons inventory, from R&D to procurement of new items to the ultimate retirement of obsolete, outdated, worn, and excess materials. The USG also has programs designed to assist foreign countries with the life cycle of their national stockpiles (physical security and stockpile management (PSSM)). One such program, located in the State Department's Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement, helps countries secure national stockpiles and funds destruction activities. More specifically, the State Department program funds highly trained NGOs and contractors to destroy excess land mines, unexploded ordnance, munitions, conventional weapons, and small arms/light weapons such as rifles and man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS).<sup>2</sup> Since 1993, WRA and its predecessor offices have destroyed over 1.3 million at risk weapons and 50,000 tons of unstable and unsecure ammunition; disposed of nearly 33,000 MANPADS, and helped more than 80 countries in their quest to become mine impact-free at an investment of approximately \$2 billion.<sup>3</sup>

In the US, the notion of a life cycle for national arms inventories is rational, institutionalized, and long-standing. But, such is not the case in many countries, particularly those with new governments following regime change (e.g., Libya), those that amassed huge stockpiles during the Cold War (e.g., the Warsaw Pact), lesser developed countries with poor physical security and stockpile management safeguards (e.g., Republic of Congo), and countries limping out of civil war (e.g., Liberia, Sierra Leone). In those inventories, weapons may sit for long periods of time and the records and planning for

their future is likely nil. Many of those charged with supervising the weapons are low-ranking conscripts without training or experience. Risks abound, including pilferage or the temptation to resell these items illicitly. In the most horrendous of such cases, these stockpiles result in humanitarian catastrophes when unstable ordnance spontaneously combusts, as happened recently in Brazzaville (Republic of Congo) or as has occurred previously in Ukraine, Albania, Nigeria, Mozambique, Bulgaria, Tanzania, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and elsewhere.<sup>4</sup>

These are the worst case scenarios, and although they happen at the alarming rate of about three per month (thirty-five such incidents January–October 2011), they are not the norm for thousands of military arms depots world wide.<sup>5</sup> Nonetheless, the question remains: what to do with excess military items? Perhaps of greater urgency is what to do in situations where potential US sales of military goods will make the older weapons “excess.” What should the US do to prevent legitimate military sales to sovereign governments from creating surpluses of weapons that could be resold on gray arms markets or end up stockpiled and dangerous (and forgotten) over time?

Imagine such a scenario where US sales contribute to foreign surplus. The USG receives a request to supply Bandaria<sup>6</sup> with an advanced weapons system. This third-generation system is state of the art and useful for the legitimate defense needs of Bandaria. With the formal request in hand, the thoughtful processes of the US governing such sales and transfers, regulated under the Arms Control Export Act,<sup>7</sup> begin to move forward. To simplify, imagine a checklist handled by the Department of State’s Directorate of Defense Trade Controls.<sup>8</sup> Is Bandaria a sovereign government? Check. Does the government have a legitimate defensive need for these items? Check. Are we certain that the Bandarians do not plan to use these weapons on their own or their neighbors’ civilians? Check. Have the Bandarians agreed to sign an end-user certificate solemnly promising that they will not transfer these weapons to a third party (e.g., another government or a non-state actor) without our consent? Have the Bandarians agreed to US end-use monitoring requirements? Check. Check. Check.

However, the process, as it currently stands, misses a crucial point—one that historically has not been a significant part of our thinking about the third-order effects of overseas transactions. Will this transaction create an excess of this type of weapon

in Bandaria? If so, what will the Bandarians do with their existing capacity, which will now be surplus?

In our fictional example, the Bandarians respond to our demarche that they are going to equip their national military with the new made-in-USA third-generation weapons. Subsequently, they will hand down the yet-operational second-generation systems to the Bandarian military reserve forces. But if the reserves are getting the second generation weapons, what will happen to the reserve’s existing inventory? What the US does not want is for Bandaria to re-sell its sturdy though somewhat outdated weapons on the gray market. Nor does anyone want those items—particularly if they include explosives—to be put back in the national stockpile and forgotten beyond their shelf life.

In short, is the USG thinking about the unintended consequences of creating this surplus? How can we do a better job of managing this process so that a part of some new military hardware deals includes a disposition of excess and obsolete defense items?

### **Modifying Our Approaches**

In many US defense article sales, the conundrum described here is simply not an issue. Foreign militaries expend uniforms, vehicles, ammunition, and weapons during routine training and national missions and thus need replacements. Many purchases are first-time orders or major upgrades to old systems that are now obsolete and for which there is a disposition plan in place. Furthermore, it is clear that not every type of military sale need consider this (e.g., field-grade kitchen gear). Nonetheless, what steps can be taken in order to ensure that the US does not unwittingly create undesirable surpluses in such cases? The following are some modest observations and suggestions that will raise awareness and deepen interagency communication when planning the transfer or sale of defense articles.

### **Update Training**

One of the key nodes for training defense export professionals are courses under the aegis of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency’s (DSCA) Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management (DISAM). DISAM’s goals are:

- Develop a professional security cooperation workforce and build partner capacity through education and career development programs.
- Provide research and consultation services to the security cooperation community and international partners.

- Conduct a public information program for the security cooperation community and international partners.
- Develop and maintain selected IT programs for the security cooperation community and international partners.<sup>9</sup>

Much of the DISAM training is rooted in the Security Assistance Management Manual (SAMM), and a host of short courses as well as extensive training is available through DISAM for both DOD and State Department employees such as the “Security Cooperation Familiarization Course,” “International Programs Security Requirements Course,” and more in-depth courses on Case Management, Financial Management, Logistics Support, and Advanced Training Management.<sup>10</sup> Moreover, it is not uncommon for DSCA to take the “show on the road” and visit combatant commands with primers on security assistance: such are perfect venues to alert country teams about dealing with the sales/surplus paradox.

A simple modification of training, which is currently under discussion, would be to look at real-world cases where the transfer-surplus paradox has been at play and how it has been (or should have been) resolved. In addition to theory and real-world cases, the training should provide a venue for interagency collaboration and a set of contacts across military, intelligence, and diplomatic communities so that the final whole-of-government response to an arms sales request is rooted in early cross-agency conversation and information-sharing.

### **Revise the SAMM**

The *Security Assistance Management Manual* (DSCA Manual 5105.38-M [April 30.2012]) is a 600-page document that outlines the full-range of possibilities and foundational policies for security assistance writ large. The SAMM’s five appendices and dozens of “annual policy letters” (seventeen in the first quarter of CY 2012 alone) demonstrate that not only is this a wide-ranging document, but also it is a living one that constantly attempts to respond to changing economic, strategic, and political trends. In short, the SAMM is the bible for many security assistance professionals at the Department of Defense.

On the first page of its first chapter, the SAMM makes a compelling case for US security assistance to foreign governments:

Security Assistance programs support US national security and foreign policy objectives. They increase the ability of our friends and allies to deter and defend against possible aggression, promote the sharing of common defense burdens, and help foster regional stability. Security Assistance can be the delivery of defense weapon systems to foreign Governments; US Service schools training international students; US personnel advising other Governments on ways to improve their internal defense capabilities; US personnel providing guidance and assistance in establishing infrastructures and economic bases to achieve and maintain regional stability; etc. When we assist other nations in meeting their defense requirements, we contribute to our own security.<sup>12</sup>

With this in mind, a revision of the SAMM or, more likely, an up-to-date policy letter could capture the nexus of US security assistance objectives (e.g., “support US national security” and “help foster regional stability”), legitimate arms sales, and scrutiny of the disposition of excess and/or obsolete weapons stockpiles. This would be in-line with many of the contemporary policy letters, which tend to be titled “Policy Update Regarding...” and “Revision of DSCA Policy Concerning...” Taking a cue from the Bandaria case, a policy update clarifying policy considerations, agency involvement, and coordinating actions for dealing with the sales/surplus paradox seems to be appropriate, and such a document could be folded into future iterations of DISAM training.

### **Use the Sale as Leverage on Stockpile Management from the Beginning**

In some cases it may be appropriate that an arms sale that would clear all the US regulatory hurdles should be considered as having a secondary potential: to spur a careful inventory of national stockpiles and assess physical security and stockpile management considerations. In such cases, highlighting the US desire to see weapons life cycle management for the arms sale from the outset may provide the leverage necessary to improve safety conditions and practices as well as determine, and ultimately ameliorate, potential weapons excesses. Of course, the tenor of the “sales pitch” and the right message for the partner

government is critical, lest the US' tedious process and apparent double-speak result in both a lost sale (in favor of a foreign competitor) and a missed PSSM opportunity. A sophisticated approach means coordinated activity by embassies, the intelligence community, various offices in Washington, and especially DSCA, the State Department's Political-Military Affairs Bureau, and perhaps the Defense Threat Reduction Agency.

### Conclusion

In the case of Bandaria, a clever Foreign Service Officer or Security Cooperation Officer stationed at the US embassy in the Bandarian capital recognized a comparable transfer/surplus situation as an opportunity. He was able to alert both DSCA and the State Department's Political-Military Affairs Bureau as to reports of overflowing Bandarian arms storage depots as well as a pending request for a sale of advanced US weapons. In this unique instance not only did the US provide the defense articles—a legitimate need of the Bandarian government—but also provided training on PSSM and assisted in the disposition and destruction of some excess and obsolete conventional weapons and munitions. The ease of the process (which nonetheless took the better part of a year) was due to good training, a high level of communication and transparency between offices at DOD and the State Department, thoughtful policies in the SAMM and other regulatory and procedural manuals, and good will (rather than turf wars) in Washington. Multiple US objectives were met, and the US-Bandarian bilateral relationship was strengthened.

### Notes

1. It is important to note that the US has long been a global watchdog against the transfer of high value armaments and dual-use technologies (hi-tech items that are critical components to weapons as well as non-weapons systems, such as advanced gyroscopes or computing technologies). Such leadership is beyond the bounds of this essay, but in short it began in earnest with the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls ("CoCom") arrangement of 1949 and extends to this day in the subsequent Wassenaar Arrangement and other fora. For more, see Richard T. Cupitt and Suzette R. Grillot, "COCOM is Dead, Long Live COCOM: Persistence and Change

in Multilateral Security Institutions," in *British Journal of Political Science* 27, no. 3 (Jul., 1997). Available at: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/194122>; Michael Lipson, "Transaction Cost Estimation and International Regimes: Of Crystal Balls and Sheriff's Posses," in *International Studies Review* 6, no. 1 (Mar., 2004). Available at: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3186537>. See for instance, Edward W Kratovil, et al "Department of the Navy Risk Management Program for the Safe Manufacture, Storage and Handling of Ammunition and Explosives." Conference Paper for the Twenty-Eighth DOD Explosives Safety Seminar Held in Orlando, FL (18-20 August 1998); James Bevan, ed. *Conventional Ammunition in Surplus: A Reference Guide*, co-published with BICC, FAS, GRIP, and SEESAC with support from the German Federal Foreign Office (January 2008). A related issue is the life cycle of nuclear components; see D. Crawford et al, "A Perspective on the Alliance Program's benefits," *Computing in Science & Engineering* 2, no. 2 (March–April 2000).

2. A complementary program that provides partner nations with PSSM assessment and seminars is found within DOD's Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA). A snapshot of their work can be found at: [http://www.dtra.mil/Libraries/System\\_Documents/SALWScorecard.sflb.ashx](http://www.dtra.mil/Libraries/System_Documents/SALWScorecard.sflb.ashx).
3. *To Walk the Earth in Safety: Documenting 10 Years of the United States' Commitment to Conventional Weapons Destruction*. US Department of State Publication (July 2011). Available at: <http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/rpt/walkearth/index.htm>.
4. Adrian Wilkinson, 2011. "The threat from explosive events in ammunition storage areas," 2nd edition. (Kent: Explosive Capabilities Limited, 2011).
5. "Unplanned Explosions at Munitions Sites," Research Note No. 6. Geneva, Switzerland: Small Arms Survey, 2011. Available at: <http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/?uems>.
6. Bandaria is a fictional country not based on any single state.
7. 22 U.S.C. 2778 of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) provides the authority to control the export of defense articles and services, and charges the President to exercise this authority.

- Executive Order 11958, as amended, delegated this statutory authority to the Secretary of State.
8. For more information about US arms exports regulations and about the State Department entities who handle them, see <http://pmddtc.state.gov/index.html>.
  9. See the *DISAM Journal of International Security Cooperation Management* website: <http://www.disamjournal.org/about-us>.
  10. Many of these DISAM courses fall under DOD's High Priority Performance Goal/Security Cooperation Training Initiative (HPPG/SCTI). For more information and a link to the complete course offering guide, see <http://www.disam.dsca.mil/hppg/>.
  11. For the 2012 policy letters and links to previous years, see <http://www.dsca.mil/samm/PolicyMemoList-2012.htm>.
  12. DSCA Manual 5105.38-M, *Security Assistance Management Manual* (SAMM). <http://www.dsca.mil/samm/>.
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### **About the Author**

Dr. Eric Patterson is Dean of the Robertson School of Government at Regent University and Senior Research Fellow at Georgetown University's Berkley Center for Religion, Peace & World Affairs. His interest in this issue comes from two stints working at the US Department of State's Bureau of Political-Military Affairs: in the bureau's Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement and on the Interagency MANPADS (Man-Portable Air Defense Systems) Task Force. His most recent book is *Ending Wars Well: Order, Justice, and Conciliation in Contemporary Post-Conflict* (Yale University Press, 2012).



# Civilian Diplomat Attire for Security Cooperation Officers (SCOs)

By Timothy Burke

Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management

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As a member of the US Embassy team, your role in the SCO will entail not only dealing with the administration of foreign military sales and training, but you will also be expected to interact with the host nation and work closely with representatives from across the US government in your daily interactions with the embassy country team. We all know the cliché about first impressions; an effective SCO presents a professional image in every encounter.

What to wear in the SCO and around the local area will depend on a number of factors, e.g., the desires of the Chief of Mission, the SDO/DATT, the GCC, and the local environment. Also, you may receive invitations to attend meetings, functions, receptions, parties, dinners, etc., from host nation representatives. Your attire at these functions, if not your service dress uniform, will reflect greatly on the United States.

No doubt you know when your uniform needs updating. It is relatively easy for military members to notice someone in an out-of-date uniform; civilian clothing also has a “style” lifespan, if you will. Professional diplomats and politicians who wear suits daily can recognize one that is no longer in style. Therefore, it is important for you to have a relatively up-to-date wardrobe to project the image of a competent diplomat/warrior. Women’s runway fashions change with the seasons, but conservative business attire will stay relevant for much longer. Men’s fashion designers change business suit characteristics on a three- to five-year cycle.

An effective SCO will understand how to wear civilian attire correctly. SCO counterparts in the Defense Attaché Office receive multiple hours of clothing instruction and a personal evaluation of their wardrobe. SCOs will generally not receive such exhaustive instruction. Therefore, some simple rules will be useful in preparing your wardrobe for activities ranging from office wear to functions at the

Ambassador’s residence to celebrations of your host nation, and perhaps invitations to dine with foreign nationals in their homes.

## **Event Types**

Determine the type of event from the invitation: Formal (rare, but certainly the Marine Birthday Ball would be one), Informal (most often worn at the embassy and dealing with the host nation, and for receptions, parties, dinners when not in uniform), and Casual (acceptable for around the house and travelling). Note that the style of dress at an event, whether formal, informal, or casual, also is driven by the time of day. In general, any event beginning at 6:00 p.m. or later would have an expectation of a higher level of formality in clothing.

## **Style Basics**

As mentioned earlier, a great way to be comfortable in civilian clothing is to consider it to be just another uniform. Neither gender would wear outrageous colors, jewelry, or other decorations on their military uniform, so it would not be appropriate with a civilian suit/uniform.

For formal events, a tuxedo or service equivalent of a mess dress is appropriate. If you learn from speaking to your predecessor that you will attend formal events and are required to wear a tuxedo but don not own one, the rule of thumb is that it is better to rent if there are two or fewer occasions.

The majority of the time will be at informal events; this is not “casual.” For both gender’s informal style, if you are not restricted to wearing your uniform at all times, plan on having at least two suits. By definition, a suit is the same fabric in the jacket and bottom (pants or skirt). Your wardrobe should have one charcoal gray, and one navy blue (women can also add brown). Shirts should be primarily white, but one can add very subtle light blue or light gray, and some white with fine pinstripes. For the men,

the “variety” in the wardrobe is created by having multiple ties in the closet from which to choose. Start with deep red for the most professional look, then blue (often seen on the President), then some metallic colors. Small repeating patterns on the tie are acceptable. Men’s socks will be darker than their slacks; women should always plan on wearing subtle hosiery. Women’s skirts must reach the knee and should not climb high on the thigh when seated. Leather shoes are appropriate for both genders; men wear oxfords or wingtips, women wear low-heeled “pumps” (no boots or stilettos, no open-toes, no white shoes). Keep jewelry to a minimum for both genders. Men’s belts will match the color of their shoes.

For casual events, men may feel comfortable with a blazer and a button down shirt (probably no tie, but be aware of the level of formality at the event). Dockers and casual shoes work for both genders. It is extremely rare to wear denim, but should the occasion arise, be sure there are, no holes, tears, or fading. Women can wear a blouse with long sleeves, or a wrap to cover exposed skin (certainly host-nation culture dependent). Slacks and casual shoes are acceptable.

In many locations the SCO is “weight-restricted” due to travel regulations and host-nation realities. Therefore, when choosing your wardrobe, strive for mix-and-match outfits where you can get the most wear out of multiple combinations of the same clothes.

In summary, it is important to realize that how you dress at diplomatic functions is a direct reflection of the United States and your professionalism. Always strive for a sharp, classic, conservative look (both men and women). Both men and women need to know their body type and choose clothes that complement that body type while enhancing their image. By making smart choices, you can limit your expenditures and maximize your clothing flexibility. Lastly, ensure you speak with your predecessors and future coworkers to gain an understanding of the environment and how often you will be expected to wear different outfits, military or civilian. Your objective is to blend in with the other professional diplomats, not stand out. For reference, the entire Civilian Diplomat Attire computer-based training is available at the DISAM web page under Online Learning.

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## **About the Author**

Timothy Burke is DISAM’s European Regional Seminar Director and Instructor of Security Cooperation Management. His SC experience includes a three-year tour in the US embassy in Warsaw, Poland as Senior Defense Official/Defense Attache and Chief of the Office of Defense Cooperation. He is a retired USAF Colonel and former F-4G, F-16CG and AT-38B fighter pilot with combat time over Iraq and Bosnia-Herzegovina. He commanded the 435th Fighter Training Squadron, and served as Deputy Operations Group Commander at the Euro-NATO Joint Jet Pilot Training Wing. He received his master’s degrees in Strategic Studies from Air War College in-residence, and Aviation Operations from Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University, and a bachelor of science in physics and astronomy from the University of Massachusetts at Amherst. While on active duty, he earned the Defense Superior Service Medal twice, the Distinguished Flying Cross, five Meritorious Service Medals, and five Air Medals among other awards. He also was presented the Silver Medal of the Polish Army for his security cooperation team’s work in Poland.

# Enhancing National Security Cooperation Policy With Remotely Piloted Aircraft

By Lt Col Ken Callahan  
US Air Force

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## **Introduction**

The global security environment has changed dramatically since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. The new environment is characterized by a spectrum of threats ranging from non-state actors based in failed states,<sup>2</sup> to the rise of new regional powers, to continued concern about the spread of weapons of mass destruction.<sup>3</sup> Responding to these threats requires a new approach directed by our national security strategy that includes “an adaptive blend of diplomacy, development, and defense” and a realization that the United States must learn to accept partnerships of varying degrees of commitment to ensure our own security.<sup>4,5</sup> Building partnerships includes strengthening relations not only with like-minded democratic allies but also with nations that have “little in common except for the desire to defeat al-Qaeda and its affiliates and adherents.”<sup>6</sup>

From a military perspective, building a spectrum of security partnerships requires the Department of Defense to enhance nation-specific security cooperation programs in an effort to leverage their unique capabilities. However, in the new security environment, nation-specific programs must be linked to a global security strategy that responds to increasingly global threats. Security cooperation programs should promote United States security interests, improve allied and partner capacity, facilitate information and intelligence sharing, and provide access to forward basing and en route infrastructure.<sup>7</sup> Each of these criteria are easy to understand, but increasingly difficult to apply to the wide spectrum of complex relationships ranging from strong traditional allies to weak partnerships with nations who wish to defeat radical ideology but have little else in common with the United States.<sup>8</sup>

Two unique technology systems that can achieve Department of Defense security cooperation goals across a spectrum of tailored relationships are the Air Force’s fleet of MQ-1 Predator and MQ-9 Reaper intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) remotely piloted aircraft (RPA). These ISR RPA systems can be globally postured and regionally focused in a manner that enhances global security cooperation efforts. Unfortunately, there is not currently an overarching strategic plan in place to provide specific nations with ISR RPA capabilities to promote security cooperation. In addition, the thirty-four-member international body Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) led by the United States has placed restrictions on the proliferation of ISR drones in an effort to limit the spread of vehicles that can deliver weapons of mass destruction.<sup>9</sup> Despite this restriction, the United States should reconsider its position on the proliferation of ISR RPA systems and include these systems in a global security cooperation plan that accounts for a wide-range of nation-to-nation relationships.

The purpose of this research paper is to provide a baseline discussion for how Air Force MQ-1 and MQ-9 ISR RPA platforms can enhance security cooperation. Following a brief overview of Department of Defense security cooperation programs, a specific approach to integrating MQ-1 and MQ-9 ISR RPA systems across a range of partnerships will be proposed. It is recognized that there are current prohibitions in place that prevent the proliferation of these systems. These prohibitions will be discussed as challenges to United States strategic choices and will be considered in the recommendation portion of this paper.

## **Security Cooperation**

Joint Publication 3-0, *Joint Operations* discusses security cooperation and military engagement activities together as the means by which the Department of Defense interacts with other nations

to ensure security, deter conflict, and enable future contingency operations. Joint Publication 3-0 defines security cooperation as:

All DOD interactions with foreign defense and security establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific US security interests, develop allied and friendly military and security capabilities for internal and external defense and for multinational operations, and provide US forces with peacetime and contingency access to the HN [host nation].”<sup>10</sup>

Likewise, Joint Publication 3-0 states, “Military engagement occurs as part of security cooperation, but also extends to interaction with domestic civilian authorities.”<sup>11</sup> For simplicity, throughout this discussion, the term *security cooperation* will include interactions with both military and domestic civilian authorities.

Joint Publication 3-22, *Foreign Internal Defense* figure I-4 lists fifteen activities with the last being “other programs and activities,” implying some leeway.<sup>12</sup> However, despite the multiple number of activities that can occur under the umbrella of security cooperation, all of the activities can be grouped under four broad categories: stability operations, preparing for coalition operations, information and intelligence sharing, and strategic access.<sup>13</sup> Grouping all the security cooperation activities into these four broad categories is non-doctrinal, but forms a good framework for consideration.

### Stability Operations

The primary purpose of security cooperation programs is to promote US interests abroad. In most situations, US interests are best served by ensuring the stability of allied and partner nations and the global regions those nations are in. Joint Publication 3-07, *Stability Operations* defines stability operations as:

various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the US in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief.<sup>14</sup>

Security is a key part of stability operations and a lack of security often generates the need for stabilization operations to begin.<sup>15</sup> Generally, security is thought of as an external consideration or “a condition that results from the establishment and maintenance of protective measures that ensure a state of inviolability from hostile acts or influences.”<sup>16</sup> Yet, security concerns may also arise from internal sources such as an insurgency, organized crime, or drug trafficking.

When the US has an alliance with another nation, stability and security support arrangements are generally codified in a treaty or formal agreement.

Security Cooperation Activities			
Stability Operations	Preparing for Coalition Ops	Information and Intelligence Sharing	Strategic Access
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Counter-narcotics Assistance</li> <li>• Counter/Non-Proliferation</li> <li>• Defense Support to Public Diplomacy</li> <li>• International Armaments Cooperation</li> <li>• Security Assistance</li> <li>• Humanitarian Assistance</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Multinational Education</li> <li>• Multinational Exercises</li> <li>• Multinational Experimentation</li> <li>• Multinational Training</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Intelligence Cooperation</li> <li>• Information Sharing</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Defense &amp; Military Contacts</li> <li>• Facilities &amp; Infrastructure Projects</li> </ul>

However, when the US deals with less formal partners, a consideration of US interests must be made on a case-by-case basis. In addition, the US must evaluate the motives of a partner nation. As William Lambert notes, a partner nation's definition of security might be different than that of the US. The US may seek to protect a nation from external threats while the leadership of the partner nation may simply want to stay in power. A controlling regime may view with more concern threats from internal rather than external sources.<sup>17</sup> Under such circumstances, careful consideration must be given to supporting a country that may use support (especially military support) for an unintended purpose.

### **Preparing for Coalition Operations**

Former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates highlighted the importance of building allied partner capacity to meet the challenges of the current security environment during his tenure as head of the Defense Department. He noted that the effectiveness and credibility of the US would rely on the effectiveness and credibility of local partners. Gates commented:

This strategic reality demands that the US government get better at what is called *building partner capacity*: helping other countries defend themselves or, if necessary, fight alongside US forces by providing them with equipment, training, or other forms of security assistance.<sup>18</sup>

In order to accomplish Gates' vision, the US must provide allies and partner nations with both the equipment and the training required to operate in a coalition environment. In many cases this task requires the US to transform and optimize foreign militaries in an effort to raise their capabilities to a level where they can effectively contribute to an operation.<sup>19</sup> Long-term allied nations (for example, many NATO partners) already have significant capabilities, but less developed partners may require a long-term investment to raise their capabilities to an effective level.

### **Information and Intelligence Sharing**

Since September 11th, 2001, the US has placed a greater interest on information and intelligence sharing with foreign governments. The 2010 National Security Strategy states, "...our intelligence and law enforcement agencies must cooperate effectively

with foreign governments to anticipate events, respond to crises, and provide safety and security."<sup>20</sup> Unlike security, stability, and coalition warfare, the US is not always the strongest partner when it comes to information and intelligence gathering. The 2008 National Defense Strategy notes, "Often our partners are better positioned to handle a given problem because they understand the local geography, social structures, and culture better than we do or ever could."<sup>21</sup> Due to the strengths of our allies and partners, it is vital to US interests to establish structures and agreements to facilitate information and intelligence exchanges.

Responsibility for information and intelligence sharing protocols is given to commanders, but restricted by law. Joint Publication 3-0 highlights the importance of information and intelligence exchanging:

The sharing of information with relevant USG [US government] agencies, foreign governments and security forces, inter-organizational partners, NGOs [non-government organizations], and members of the private sector, has proved vital in recent operations. Commanders at all levels should determine and provide guidance on what information needs to be shared with whom and when. DOD information should be appropriately secured, shared, and made available throughout the information life cycle to appropriate mission partners to the maximum extent allowed by US laws and DOD policy. Commanders, along with their staffs, need to recognize the criticality of the information-sharing function at the outset of complex operations and not as an afterthought.<sup>22</sup>

### **Strategic Access**

The 2010 National Military Strategy states, "Global posture remains our most powerful form of commitment and provides us strategic depth across domains and regions."<sup>23</sup> Security cooperation programs improve global posture by engaging host nations in order to obtain strategic access to facilities and sovereign space during both peacetime and contingency operations.<sup>24</sup> Additionally, strategic access includes making contacts with appropriate local agencies, establishing support contracts and improving host nation facilities when necessary.

This type of strategic access to allied and partner nations frequently requires enduring relationships based on trust and commitment to long-term security. Fortunately, the Air Force now possesses a flexible technology that can permit tailored security cooperation across all four broad areas with partners of diverse capabilities and capacities.

### **ISR RPA Systems**

There are many tools available to conduct security cooperation activities, but few have the ability to conduct all security cooperation activities as comprehensively as Air Force ISR RPAs. Although the Air Force ISR RPA portfolio is large and growing, the most commonly known and widely requested systems are the MQ-1 Predator and the MQ-9 Reaper. Both the Predator and the Reaper are unique because they are *systems* that are more extensive than the aircraft itself.

The MQ-1 and MQ-9 systems are complex, but the main elements are the aircraft, ground control station (flight controls), video distribution and exploitation system, and data-links. The aircraft are relatively low technology airframes with a high-resolution camera. In addition to the camera, the MQ-1 and MQ-9 are designed to carry weapons to include the AGM-114 Hellfire laser guided missile and the GBU-12 500-pound laser guided bomb. The aircraft can be modified to carry additional payloads at the expense of fuel and overall endurance.<sup>25</sup>

The MQ-1 and the MQ-9 systems are remotely piloted from a ground control station. The ground control stations consist of the same hardware for both the MQ-1 and the MQ-9, but each requires different software. The basic crew for the MQ-1 and MQ-9 consists of a pilot (responsible for flying the aircraft) and a sensor operator (responsible for operating the camera). A third crew member, mission intelligence coordinator, is added when needed to operate in a complex tactical environment.<sup>26</sup>

Both the MQ-1 and the MQ-9 systems can provide real-time full motion video direct to the battlefield or to a command center anywhere in the world. This allows command and control elements to maintain some direct awareness of and remote access to the battlefield. Information and intelligence gathered during operations can also be shared and exploited real-time permitting decisions to be made at a faster rate.<sup>27</sup>

*Data-links* comprise many different systems available to control and monitor the aircraft and its payload. MQ-1 and MQ-9 RPAs can be controlled using various technology and methods to fit the needs of the mission being performed. The control technology and methods can be tailored to balance information access with security, and autonomy with failsafe control, as desired by the commander.

### **Types of Control**

There are four basic ways of operating MQ-1 and MQ-9 RPAs: pre-programmed missions, line-of-site control, beyond line-of-site satellite control, and remote split operations. Pre-programmed missions are uploaded to a computer in the aircraft, which then flies the programmed mission until a new mission is reloaded. Often, emergency missions are pre-programmed in the event the primary control link is broken so the aircraft can fly to a specific location where another control link can be established. Pre-programmed missions are not usually the primary method of control because they limit tactical interactivity.<sup>28</sup>

Line-of-site control requires a ground-based signal to be sent to an aircraft. This type of control limits the range of the aircraft due to the strength of the control signal, terrain, and atmospheric conditions, but does not limit the RPAs endurance. Line-of-site control is especially useful for base defense operations and limited range but high endurance targets (urban or border patrol). In addition, line-of-site control tends to be more responsive and less expensive than satellite control options.<sup>29</sup>

Beyond line-of-site control uses a satellite link to fly the aircraft. Typically, a line-of-site signal will be used to launch the aircraft and then the crew will establish a secure satellite control link to increase the range of the aircraft. Using this type of control, aircraft range is limited only by fuel and satellite signal limitations. This type of control is very useful with limited airfield infrastructure and geographic challenges (large border areas, difficult terrain, remote locations, etc.).<sup>30</sup>

Remote split operations expand on the beyond line-of-site concept by adding an additional crew in a different location. Using this type of control, a crew launches an aircraft using line-of-site control and then passes control via a hand-off procedure to a flight crew at a different location using a secure satellite control link. The US currently uses this

construct effectively to fly its ISR RPA fleet and the advantages are numerous. Using remote split operations, a CONUS-based crew can fly an RPA anywhere in the world. CONUS basing improves support structures, limits risk to aircrews, and permits real-time reallocation from one theater of operations to another within a short period of time.<sup>31</sup>

### **ISR RPAs and Stability Operations**

The MQ-1 and MQ-9 ISR RPA systems are well suited for a variety of stability operations in allied and partner nations. The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review states, “Long-dwell UASs [Unmanned Aerial Systems] such as the Predator, Reaper, and other systems, have proven to be invaluable for monitoring activities in contested areas, enhancing situational awareness, protecting our forces, and assisting in targeting enemy fighters.”<sup>32</sup> An allied or partner nation could easily realize the same benefits if trained and equipped with MQ-1 and MQ-9 aircraft. In addition, the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review notes, “Terrorist groups seek to evade security forces by exploiting ungoverned and under-governed areas as safe havens from which to recruit, indoctrinate, and train fighters, as well as to plan attacks on US and allied interests.”<sup>33</sup> Because of their ability to monitor such areas, both the MQ-1 and the MQ-9 provide a capability for a country to deny terrorist access to ungoverned space.

In addition, the MQ-1 and MQ-9 have proven to be useful in humanitarian assistance missions. After the Haiti earthquake in 2010, the United States provided MQ-1 support to monitor supply movements and direct the limited Haitian police force to troubled areas. Although this operation was flown using US crews employing remote split operations control, if trained and equipped, Haitian forces could have flown the operation using line-of-site control directly from their own airfield.<sup>34</sup>

### **ISR RPAs and Preparing for Coalition Operations**

Perhaps the most unique aspect of ISR RPAs is the ability for a crew to fly an aircraft from anywhere in the world. This has great utility for training with allied partners. For example, utilizing remote split operations, a NATO ally could participate from their home station in an exercise being conducted in United States military training airspace. This type of training would greatly enhance interoperability of forces

for both peace and wartime coalition operations. Conversely, a crew from the United States could get real-time training in European airspace without leaving CONUS. This type of training is much less expensive than deploying squadrons for military training, but still realizes the same benefits of multinational training exercises.

### **Information and Intelligence Sharing**

Information and intelligence sharing represents the greatest potential gains in security cooperation for the United States. Local partners often know the area, terrain, and customs better than American analysts and can provide crucial inputs about what to look at and when.<sup>35</sup> In addition, when an MQ-1 or MQ-9 video feed is distributed across a network, command centers around the globe can simultaneously access information and full-motion video real-time. In Haiti, full motion video was shared directly with government and non-government agencies in both the United States and Haiti. This provided good awareness of the problem by allowing relief participants to view stricken areas, determine the extent of damage, and prioritize relief efforts.<sup>36</sup>

In addition, intelligence sharing is valuable during allied and coalition operations and can be restricted to permit access from secure areas and approved partners. One approach to intelligence sharing may be to have a US air crew fly the RPA but give an allied or partner nation access to the video feed and exploitation resources. The ally or partner nation can even participate in the targeting or maneuvering of the aircraft or sensor through direct communication with a US command center or the crew. In addition, an allied or partner nation might also be able to fly the aircraft and provide intelligence back to the United States in the same manner. Different relationships and capabilities with the host country will dictate different approaches.

### **Strategic Access**

Obtaining strategic access to regions, airspace, and host-nation facilities is an important part of the United States global engagement strategy. The 2011 National Military Strategy states, “With partner nation support, we will preserve forward presence and access to the commons, bases, ports, and airfields commensurate with safeguarding our economic and security interests worldwide.”<sup>37</sup> An integrated RPA plan can facilitate and improve the forward basing options.

For example, a country located in a region sensitive to a large presence of US military forces could be equipped with lower signature MQ-1s or MQ-9s as part of a foreign military sales package. The host-nation could then fly the aircraft to observe areas of interest like a disputed border or ungoverned territory, and the video feed could be sent to a coalition command center for exploitation. Another alternative application would be to ask the allied or partner nation to launch and recover the aircraft while US crews fly the missions from CONUS. This arrangement would leverage the host nation's ability to work airspace, logistics, and billeting issues, but give the US access to the region. In either example, the approach taken can be tailored to meet the needs of the mission.

### **Challenges**

Despite the advantages of using ISR RPAs to enhance security cooperation, there are significant challenges the Air Force must overcome before MQ-1 and MQ-9 systems can be integrated into security cooperation programs. Three specific challenges are the Missile Technology Control Regime's (MTCR) export limitations, network security, and system standardization. Each issue requires significant changes by the Air Force, and the Department of Defense before ISR RPAs can be exported to global allies and partners.

### **MTCR Restriction**

The MTCR was established in 1987 by the United States, Canada, France, West Germany, Italy, Japan and the United Kingdom to "prevent the proliferation of missiles and unmanned aerial vehicle capable of delivering nuclear weapons."<sup>38</sup> In 1993, the MTCR expanded its charter to limit the "proliferation of missile delivery systems for all weapons of mass destruction."<sup>39</sup> Since the creation of the organization, the MTCR has grown to 34 partner nations. Currently, the MTCR does not permit the sale of MQ-1 or MQ-9 aircraft to other nations because these weapons systems have the capability of delivering a 500-kg payload to a range of 300-km. This restriction has been in-place for over 20 years but will be reconsidered at the next MTCR meeting in April 2012.

The MTCR restrictions on the export of ISR RPA technology are problematic for using MQ-1 and MQ-9 RPAs as part of security cooperation programs. The

2005 Air Force RPA strategic vision document noted the restrictions and advocates their removal:

The Air Force must continue to address RPA and UAV export policy. The sale of US-manufactured, interoperable RPAs and UAVs to key allies and foreign partners enhances coalition capability, and an integrated production strategy provides advantages to the US industrial base. Currently, the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) limits the export of the MQ-1 Predator, MQ-9 [Reaper], and RQ-4 Global Hawk, severely constraining RPA security cooperation activities with allies and foreign partners. The Air Force must continue to advocate updates to the MTCR and the US government export policy to fully develop interoperable coalition capabilities that support US national security objectives.<sup>40</sup>

### **Network Security**

The second challenge for the Air Force to overcome prior to exporting MQ-1s and MQ-9s is network security. As Pentagon spokesman Bryan Whitman noted in 2009:

Every capability comes with its advantages, disadvantages, benefits as well as potential weaknesses. As you develop those (technologies) you have to be mindful of how the enemy can counteract any technology that you have. That's why you always have a constant review process in place to not only improve that capability but address any vulnerabilities it may have.<sup>41</sup>

In the past five years, there have been two network security vulnerabilities publicly acknowledged and fixed by the Air Force in the ISR RPA system. The first was the discovery that insurgents in Iraq had found a way to hack into data feeds and monitor full motion video from MQ-1 aircraft. In December 2009, a Pentagon spokesman acknowledged the breach and indicated the problem had been fixed.<sup>42</sup> A second vulnerability was discovered in September 2011, when a credential-stealing virus was discovered on ground control station hard drives at Creech Air Force Base. The Air Force described this virus as a *nuisance* and reportedly isolated and removed the virus from the system.<sup>43</sup>

Unfortunately, network security will only get more difficult as allies and partners are given access to the system. However, access to the network is only required when RPAs are fully integrated and satellite technology is in-use. By limiting integration or employing line-of-site control, RPAs can be isolated from the network. Implementing restrictions on integration and control methods increases network security but decreases the overall effectiveness of the systems.

### **System Standardization**

System standardization is another significant issue the Air Force must address prior to implementing a comprehensive security cooperation program with ISR RPAs. As noted with network security, standardized equipment, network monitoring, and security protocols are important to the health and effectiveness of the entire system. In addition, the Federal Aviation Administration has raised specific concerns over the lack of standardization with displays, controls, response to system failures, crew composition, and crew qualifications. Although these concerns are specific to national airspace in the United States, many of the same concerns will need to be addressed to operate in international airspace.<sup>44</sup>

### **Recommendations and Conclusions**

The 2010 National Security Strategy directs the Defense Department to enhance relationships with old allies and create new partnerships with other countries seeking to defeat Al Qaeda.<sup>45</sup> The Department of Defense uses nation and region-specific security cooperation programs to promote stability, prepare for coalition operations, exchange information and intelligence, and ensure strategic access when needed. Air Force ISR RPA systems have the ability to enhance all of the outcomes desired by security cooperation programs, but are currently restricted by the MTCR, network security concerns, and the lack of global operating standards. In order to overcome the current challenges and limitations, the Air Force should consider advocating three recommendations.

#### **Recommendation #1**

The United States should open discussion with MTCR members to reconsider the ban on the proliferation of ISR RPA systems. Although MTCR concerns about delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction are shared by the United States, MQ-1 and MQ-9 ISR RPA systems are not the most threatening

delivery platforms. The MQ-1 and MQ-9 systems do not employ stealth technology or self-defense capabilities and are relatively slow moving vehicles that can easily be defeated by air defense systems.<sup>46</sup> The security benefits gained by exporting MQ-1s or MQ-9s outweigh the limited risk of them possibly being used to deliver a weapon of mass destruction.

In addition, nations with the ability to manufacture weapons of mass destruction are likely to have the ability to manufacture their own unmanned platforms. For example, Iran, India, Russia, Pakistan, China and the European Union have already built and marketed unmanned aircraft and are benefitting from national sales and partnerships with interested nations.<sup>47</sup> Restricting exports of unmanned aircraft systems among friendly nations does not eliminate the threat from more aggressive nations and damages United States efforts to establish security cooperation relationships.

#### **Recommendation #2**

In the absence of a fully secure network, the Air Force should pursue the sale of MQ-1 and MQ-9 systems with limited line-of-site control technology that would isolate partners from secure networks. Although limiting access will reduce the ability for partner nations to integrate with the United States, some limited security cooperation goals can still be accomplished. For example, restricting network access will prevent nations from participating in intercontinental multinational training and exercises but will permit stability operations to be performed by the host nation.

#### **Recommendation #3**

The United States is the global leader in unmanned systems, but standardized operating procedures and regulations have not caught up with the rapid growth of the program. The Air Force should take the lead in developing operating procedures that are acceptable to other services, the Federal Aviation Administration, and the international airspace system. By leveraging its leadership position in unmanned systems, the United States has the opportunity to pioneer standards for the global community that are in our national interest and include safety, equipment specifications, and crew qualifications. If the United States does not take the lead in exporting unmanned systems, other nations (to include adversaries) will. By forfeiting the leadership role, the United States will have less influence in establishing global rules

and standardization. In combination, reevaluating MTCR restrictions, improving network security, and standardizing procedures and regulations will strengthen security cooperation with other nations and improve overall national defense.

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# A Few Hints for the New Security Cooperation Officer

By Clay Crawford


Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management

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Today is your first day on the job as a new Security Cooperation Officer (SCO). Your sponsor is whisking you around the Embassy completing paperwork and meeting people. You finally end up meeting your boss and he welcomes you and says get to work! While clearly no two countries are the same, this article will lay out a few ideas you might find helpful when starting your SCO duties. Further, it will discuss several additional responsibilities that will test your time management skills and finally address some relationship-building tips, which are key to accomplishing the SCO goals and objectives.

The first priority is to determine specifically what you need to do to help build host nation capacity. This will take some time, but it is an important step to ensure your efforts are in line with the overall US country strategy. As you learned at DISAM, it is best to start with the Strategic Guidance and work your way down to the country and SCO specific plans. Focus on the Embassy Integrated Country Strategy (ICS) so you understand how all the assistance programs fit together to achieve the country-wide goals and objectives (Diplomacy, Development, Defense, etc). Then analyze the SCO plans to ensure they are consistent and support the Embassy ICS and Geographic Combatant Command (GCC) strategies. One superb source for additional information is your GCC desk officer. Contact him/her early and often to make sure you stay abreast of GCC activities and recognize which SC programs are working well across the region. Additionally, it is critical to meet with the Host Nation (HN) personnel to gain an understanding of their plans and priorities. The combination of these will provide a clear picture of the short- and long-term program goals and objectives. It will also highlight where the capability gaps exist. The challenge then becomes figuring out the best way to fill those gaps. Would an equipment upgrade or new procurement solve this problem? Is it simply a training issue? Is it a doctrine problem? Once you answer these questions

and determine the best option, you are now ready to ascertain if nirvana is reachable. The chart below depicts additional questions you must ask at this time. Specifically, what does the US want, what does the HN want, what can the US resource and what can the HN absorb?



A key aspect that must be examined when determining the HN's ability to absorb a platform or program is the ability to sustain it. Is the HN willing to program sustainment funding? Is there an FMS case established for support, training, and spares, or will this be addressed with organic HN capabilities or a private contractor? When all of these issues are resolved and a plan is developed, you are well on your way to implementing a successful program. The bottom line should be that you are doing everything possible to help the HN "be all they can be."

The SCO's life would be simple and easy if reaching nirvana was all you had to do. However, the SCO's environment is dynamic and beset with challenges across the board, with time management ranking at or near the top. The SCO is inundated with additional requirements coming from all directions—GCC, different Embassy sections, Military Service HQs, Implementing Agencies (IAs), State Department, HN, Industry, etc. The following is a small sampling of fixed requirements influencing the SCO's time management:

- Strategic Plan
- LOR Processing
- Ship Visits
- Pol-Mil
- JAVITS Report
- Humanitarian Assistance
- Senior-level Visits
- Monthly GCC Report
- ACSA Coordination
- Human Rights Vetting
- In-Country Team Oversight
- Exercise-Related Construction
- Performance Plan
- Financial Management Reviews
- Community Relations Projects
- Country Team
- EUM Reports
- Exercise Conferences

I would like to take a moment to discuss senior-level visits from the chart above. Coordinating and executing a senior-level (GCC Cdr, CJCS, SecDef, CODEL, etc) visit with the HN takes an enormous amount of time and energy. Multiple coordination meetings are required to detail everything from the motorcade lineup to the formal dinner seating chart. Moreover, it is vital to remain patient and flexible throughout the planning and execution process. Anticipate the HN making last-minute scheduling changes and take it in stride and with a smile—remember, you will need to work closely with them to reach nirvana, and building and sustaining relationships is central to your success as an SCO.

Perhaps the most important aspect of building partner capacity is the relationship between the SCO and the HN. It will be very difficult to attain the SCO goals and objectives without developing and sustaining key relationships with the HN counterparts. Of course, this will not happen overnight. Relationship building

takes time and effort—developing trust, knowing who makes the key decisions, understanding the culture (not everyone operates like us), etc. Here are some areas to think about that may help the new SCO build and sustain these vital relationships:

### **Unit Visits**

It is extremely difficult to “really” know what is going on if you stay in the Embassy. It is important and necessary to conduct your first visit to the HN General Headquarters (or Joint Staff equivalent). These introductory meetings are the first step in relationship building. Recommend you review the principal's biography and mention something you have in common. Also, make sure you convey your appreciation to them for hosting you and always have a business card readily available. Conduct the same type of meeting with your Service HQ, specifically focusing on your core counterparts (e.g. G-3, G-5, etc.). Ensure you meet and get all the contact info for your primary counterparts, normally at the O-4/O-5 level. Once these HQ-level visits have taken place, you will be cleared to meet with lower level units outside of the capital region. It is highly recommended that you meet with the base/wing/post commander or designee before meeting with lower level units on his/her facility. When conducting unit visits, be sure to make it clear any requests for training or equipment must be vetted through the HN Service HQ and Joint Staff before it reaches the SCO. These visits are key to building relationships and, understanding unit level challenges, and they are a superb tool for getting feedback from previously implemented programs. Be prepared to spend most of your time addressing challenges facing the unit and developing options to resolve them. It is also important to pay attention to what is working well and be ready to share that when visiting other units. Moreover, positive feedback from the field, captured in an e-mail to the country team/GCC/IAs/Defense Security Cooperation Agency as appropriate, is always well received, builds morale, and helps justify resources spent.

### **Representational Events**

SC organizations have representational funds because they work! A representational event is a great icebreaker for the newly assigned SCO and is important to furthering already developed relationships. While representational events can take on many forms (luncheon, golf outing, etc.), I found that an informal dinner with a few individuals

worked best. If possible, the outgoing SCO should set up an introductory event with the key players. A small, informal dinner with your counterparts provides a wonderful opportunity to begin the relationship building process. Once the relationship is established, representational events may also be a good venue to introduce issues that may be difficult or problematic—a testing of the waters. In addition, you may want to consider keeping leadership events separate from action officer level occasions. It might be a good idea to have the SDO/DATT attend when hosting HN leadership. Finally, make sure you understand any cultural peculiarities and be sensitive to the HN customs and courtesies. This will ensure you further the relationship rather than hindering it.

### **Go the Extra Mile**

There are some little things the SCO can do that will go a long way toward building a good relationship. Do your homework during the pre-LOR stage. Research the item, talk to the program office, talk to industry, review the Security Assistance Management Manual (SAMM) pre-LOR checklist on the web, and seek out other experts to ensure you have as much information as possible to assist the HN. Your counterparts will notice and appreciate your efforts. Additionally, be properly prepared for meetings. Once you get to know the key players, you will be able to anticipate questions – be ready beforehand. For instance, if you know a certain HN official will ask about a specific program during the upcoming meeting, contact the IA for that case in advance to get the latest status. Then when the question arises, you can say you just spoke to the IA Case Manager and provide the updated information. This gives the HN confidence you are being proactive. Depending on the country, it may be a good idea for the SCO to remain apprised of items available through the Excess Defense Articles (EDA) program. You might be able to fill a capability gap with EDA equipment, which will result in significant savings, increased capacity, and furthered relations. Another area where the SCO can build rapport is by covering the upcoming exercise conference and International Military Education and Training (IMET) program course schedules. Most HN personnel covet going to the US for training and planning meetings. Discussing these schedules with appropriate HN personnel well in advance of the execution dates (so they can select the best attendee) goes a long way toward relationship building.

In summary, this article covered a few tips the new SCO may find helpful. My experiences are from a friendly/allied nation that looks to the US for assistance. While your situation may be very different, the basics of understanding how the strategic guidance, Embassy and GCC plans, and the HN strategies flow down to the individual program level remain important. It is also critical to determine where the gaps exist and the best way to fill them to build partner capacity effectively. It is easy to get bogged down with the additional duties, so finding the proper balance is crucial. Finally, building and sustaining relationships continues to be the key ingredient for successful SCOs. Unit visits, representational events, and going the extra mile will all play a significant role in enhancing the SCO & HN relationship. Now, get to work and have fun!

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### **About the Author**

Clay “Crawdad” Crawford earned a commission through the Florida State University’s Air Force Reserve Officer Training Corps program in 1986. He was a career pilot logging over 3,200 hours in C-130, T-37 and T-38 aircraft and served twenty-four years before retiring from the United States Air Force. His career included assignments in Texas, Arkansas, Illinois, Washington DC, Alabama, Japan, and the Philippines. His last five years of service were at the Joint United States Military Assistance Group–Philippines where he served as Chief, Air Force Programs and was designated as an Honorary Command Pilot in the Philippine Air Force. Mr. Crawford is currently a Security Cooperation instructor and Asia-Pacific Regional Seminar Assistant Director at the Defense Institute for Security Assistance Management located at Wright-Patterson AFB, OH.



# The Heart of Islam: Enduring Values for Humanity

By Roger Scott  
 Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management

*The Heart of Islam: Enduring Values for Humanity*, Seyyed Hossein Nasr  
 New York: HarperOne, 2004  
 352 pp, \$13.99

In the world of Security Cooperation and Security Assistance, relationships are crucial. Since the US has a plethora of Muslim international partners in the Middle East, Asia, and elsewhere, it is crucial we US workers gain a better understanding of their religion, culture, beliefs, and way of life, so we can build even stronger relationships.

It is in this spirit that I highly encourage you to read *The Heart of Islam* by Seyyed Hossein Nasr. This book is Nasr’s answer to those vilifying the religion of Islam after 9-11, because of an extremely miniscule number of radical Muslims who perverted the religion of Islam with their extremist violence. The author writes, “May this humble effort serve as a small step toward bringing about better understanding between people of good will in the West and in the Islamic world.”<sup>1</sup> This book explains who Muslims really are: extremely religious, devout, and loyal to their families—among other things.

The author does an outstanding job of introducing readers to crucial terms in the Islamic religion. These are terms that people need to know in order to understand Islam and Muslims. Here are some of the many introduced in this book:

Allah	The Arabic name for the One God
Muhammad	God’s prophet—the most praised one, the trusted one
Sharia	Divine law/God’s law
Quran	(spelled “Koran” in the West): God’s word
Haddith	Sayings of Muhammad (God’s prophet)
Mecca, Medina, and Jerusalem	The three holy cities in Islam
Ummah	Community
Sunnah of the Prophet	The teachings and doings of God’s prophet

Ulama	religious scholars
Jihad	exert effort in the path of God
Allah akbar	God is great or greater than all
Al-Islam	Surrender—“the peace that issues from our surrender to God” (8)
Haram	Forbidden
Halal	Dietary regulation—that which can be eaten
Imam	Person who heads the daily prayers
Eschatological	The end of time
Dar al-Islam	Abode of Islam, where Muslims are the majority

Nasr also does a tremendous job of explaining numerous critical tenets in the Islamic religion. When bearing witness as a Muslim, the believer says, “There is no god but God,” and, “Muhammad is the messenger of God.”<sup>2</sup> “The One God...is the central reality of Islam in all of its facets, and attestation to this oneness, which is called tawhid, is the axis around which all that is Islamic revolves.”<sup>3</sup> He stresses oneness with God, total surrender to God, returning to God, and remembering God at all times. God has many different names (e.g., Beauty, Majesty, Perfection).

Islam is very tolerant and accepting of other religions. For example, Muslims believe in Moses, Abraham, Jesus, the Virgin Mary, and other people from Judaism and Christianity. “In the conscience of many devout Muslims, a pious Christian or Jew is still seen as a believer.”<sup>4</sup> Muslims, Christians, and Jews are all known as “Children of the Book.” They all believe in many of the same things. Islam despises secularism. It is true, however, that Muslims do not allow non-Muslims in a certain area around Mecca, which is similar to equivalent sacred spaces in Hinduism and several other religions.<sup>5</sup>

There is a strong sense of unity in Islam—at its epicenter is the Quran. The Sunnah and the Hadith of the Prophet are also unifying. Also, divine oneness (tawhid), prophecy (nubuwwah), and eschatology (ma'ad) join Muslims together. Islamic law (known as Sharia) also conjoins Muslims. Muslims also practice the rites of the religion: five daily prayers, the annual pilgrimage (hajj) to Mecca at least once in their lifetime (if able), the fast during the month of Ramadan, the tithe paid to the poor, and other religious acts.

Those Muslims of intense piety and serious attachment to Sharia are known as Sufis. A Sunni Muslim or Shiite Muslim can also be Sufi. Nasr writes, “The Sunni-Shiite division is the most important in the formal structure of Islam, although even this division does not destroy the unity of Islam.”<sup>6</sup> When breaking down the make-up of Muslims, 87 percent are Sunnis and 13 percent Shiites.<sup>7</sup> When the Prophet died, many people thought Ali ibn Abi Talib should be the Prophet’s successor and formed the group that is now Shiism. According to Nasr, “The major point of contention between Sunnism and Shiism was not only the question of who should succeed the Prophet, but the question of what the qualifications of such a person had to be.”<sup>8</sup> Wahhabism arose as a reformist movement in the eighteenth century in southern Arabia. It opposed Sufism and Shiism and became accepted for a while in Saudi Arabia as the official interpretation of Islam. It has limited influence.

The Sharia is the divine law. It is based on the Quran, the Sunnah, and the Hadith. Nasr writes, “The Quran orders Muslims to pray, and its laws and rules apply to all Muslims. Family is so important in Islamic society...One can hardly over-emphasize the role of the extended family in Islamic society even today.”<sup>9</sup>

The author then addresses the complex realm of men and women in Islam: “Nearly all of the criticism coming from secular feminists is aimed these days at the Islamic world without bothering to ask practicing Muslim women themselves... what their problems really are.”

He says men’s and women’s roles are complementary: “The man is seen as the protector and provider of the family... The woman’s primary duty has been seen as that of raising children... Within the home, Muslim women usually wield

great power and authority.”<sup>11</sup> To me, this view is very consistent with the way America was in the 1950s and before. He contends that many Western women would love to stay home with their children but can’t because of their economic situation.

Islam is a religion that stresses “compassion and love, peace and beauty.”<sup>12</sup> Nasr argues that defending justice and Islam is critical, but Muslims must strive to do so peacefully. He then addresses responsibilities and rights within Islam, commenting that human beings’ main responsibility is to God, without whom we wouldn’t even exist—after that, our responsibility is to ourselves, our family, and society.

Having worked in Saudi Arabia for a year, Afghanistan for over a month, Iraq for three weeks, Malaysia for a week, and having spent a few nights in Dubai, Bahrain, and Kuwait, and also interacting with a multitude of Muslim students here at DISAM, I have had a great deal of exposure to Muslims, and I have found them to be, on the whole, fun-loving, devout, gregarious, and giving people. I have always enjoyed my time with them, drinking chai and telling stories. I value Muslims as allies and friends, I have learned about them, and this book does an outstanding job capturing the essence of Islam and Muslims.

## Notes

1. Seyyed Hossein Nasr, *The Heart of Islam: Enduring Values for Humanity*, xiv
2. Ibid., 3
3. Ibid., 3
4. Ibid., 45
5. Ibid., 51
6. Ibid., 63
7. Ibid., 65
8. Ibid., 66
9. Ibid., 183
10. Ibid., 190
11. Ibid., 197
12. Ibid., 236

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***About the Author***

Roger Scott is an assistant professor of Security Cooperation Management at DISAM with a concentration on the FMS process, training, BPC process, logistics, end-use monitoring, acquisition, finance, SC programs, SCIP, and cross-cultural communications. His experience includes the Director of Air Force Training for the SCO in Saudi Arabia and over two years as an instructor at DISAM. He is a retired Air Force Lieutenant Colonel who taught Air Force ROTC at Indiana University on two different occasions, for five years total. He also taught and commanded a squadron at the US Air Force Academy Preparatory School and was the Military Equal Opportunity Chief at Tyndall AFB, FL. He was awarded a master of arts degree in human resources development from Webster University in St. Louis, MO, and a bachelor of science degree in communications from the University of Southern Indiana in Evansville, IN. He also completed Air War College by correspondence and earned the Defense Meritorious Service Medal, four Meritorious Service Medals, and four AF Commendation Medals, among other awards.



DISAM mourns the passing of Mr. Chris Burns, a key player in DISAM's rapidly growing online learning program. We acknowledge Chris' absolute dedication to DISAM's education mission and his commitment to improving and expanding the online learning program in supporting and executing that mission. He will be missed.

