The DISAM Annual

Annual, Vol. 3
2014

A Journal of International Security Cooperation Management

A Year of Global Engagement

The DISAM Journal of International Security Cooperation Management

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The DISAM Journal of International Security Cooperation Management

Welcome to the 3rd DISAM Annual Journal of International Security Cooperation Management. We circulate this annual hard-copy publication as a supplement to our Online Journal, which can be accessed at www.disamjournal.org. We sincerely hope the Online Journal is of benefit to you in your daily activities and welcome any feedback you may have for improvement of it or this annual edition at: disam.journal@us.af.mil. A highlight article that we always hope to have in time for the annual publication is the recap of the current/upcoming fiscal year recap of security assistance and security cooperation legislation and policy. That is contained in this edition for FY15. I want to commend Mr. Ken Martin for his work on this article, and his service for over 26 years as a DISAM faculty member and journal contributor. Ken will be retiring in a few months and his diligence in following legislation throughout the year has had a dramatic impact on the Journal and even more particular on DISAM curriculum currency. Ken will be missed and we wish him and his wife, Pat, the very best.

In addition to the traditional authorization and appropriation legislation that we consolidated for you here, this year also looks to be a year in which reforms in the U.S. Export Control System will be considered in conjunction with the Administration's efforts to rationalize the two control lists maintained by the Commerce and State Departments. (See that article here as well.)

I won't highlight each article here as that would take pages in and of itself. This annual contains articles covering various issues facing our community and what a number of our organizations are doing to meet those challenges. Also, and most particularly, we have a broad cross-section of thought provoking articles in the "Perspectives" section – likely something there that you'd be interested in reading. There is always something happening in the training environment, so check out what we have included here from both DISAM as well as the Army Command & General Staff College. As with our continually updated online Journal, we have a number of contributors to this annual edition.

With the circulation that our annual receives, I must not fail to mention DSCA's Vision 2020 Strategic Plan released in October. You can find it on the DSCA website at http://www.dsca.mil/2014-strategic-plan-vision-2020. It focuses DSCA and our community on important goals, and accompanying initiatives that will help us reach them – thus a work in progress! In VADM Rixey's own words, "The intention of this strategic plan is to leverage DSCA resources both to build on the community's strengths and address our weaknesses in order to better achieve U.S. national security and foreign policy objectives."

Please to let us know if you found this edition particularly helpful in your organization, and any recommendations for future editions: gregory.sutton.2@us.af.mil.

DR. RONALD H. REYNOLDS
Commandant

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Recap of FY 2015 Security Assistance/Cooperation Legislation

The following summary is a compilation of documents in the public record and is provided to the community in single document.

By Kenneth W. Martin, SC/SA Programs Functional Manager
Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management

Later FY 2014 Legislation

- *Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Resolution,* P.L.113-145, 5 August 2014.
  - Provides an additional appropriation of $225M of DOD procurement available through FY 2015 for additional Iron Dome missiles for Israel.

Continuing Resolutions

- *Continuing Appropriations Resolution, 2015*, P.L. 113-164, 19 September 2014.
  - Until other legislation is enacted, extends FY 2014 authorities and appropriations into FY 2015 through 11 December 2014.
  - Authorizes the use of FY 2014 S/FOAA authorities and appropriations to be obligated at a rate for operations as necessary to sustain assistance for Ukraine and independent states of the Former Soviet Union (FSU) and Central and Eastern Europe to counter external, regional aggression and influence.
    - Inter alia, includes the security assistance programs of Economic Support Fund (ESF), International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE), Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs (NADR), and Foreign Military Financing Program (FMFP).
    - SecDef is authorized, in coordination with SecState, to provide assistance, including training, equipment, supplies, and sustainment, to appropriately vetted elements of the Syrian groups and individuals for specified purposes.
- *Further Continuing Appropriations Resolution, 2015,* P.L. 113-202, 12 December 2014.
  - Amends P.L. 113-164, extending FY 2014 authorities and appropriations through 13 December 2014.
- *Further Continuing Appropriations Resolution, 2015,* P.L. 113-203, 13 December 2014.
  - Amends P.L. 113-164, extending FY 2014 authorities and appropriations through 17 December 2014.

FY 2015 Appropriations Legislation

- *Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act (CROmnibus), 2015,* P.L. 113-235, 16 December 2014.
  - Funds the government through the end of FY 2015, except the Department of Homeland Security which is funded only through 27 February 2015.
- In addition to "enduring appropriations," includes $5.4B of emergency funding to prepare for and respond to the Ebola outbreak, $73.7B for Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO), and $6.5B for disaster aid.

- Division C of P.L. 113-235 provides FY 2015 funding for the Department of Defense to include the following OCO programs:
  - $4,109,333,000 for the Afghanistan Security Funds Fund (ASFF),
  - $1,618,000,000 for the requested Iraq Train and Equip Fund (ITEF),
  - $1,300,000,000 for the requested Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund (CPF), and
  - $175,000,000 for the requested European Reassurance Initiative (ERI)
- Division J of P.L. 113-235 provides FY 2015 funding for the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs (S/FOAA) to include the following security assistance programs:
  - $2,632,529,000 for enduring ESF
    - Plus $2,114,266,000 for OCO ESF
  - $853,055,000 for enduring INCL
    - Plus $443,195,000 for OCO INCLE
  - $586,260,000 for enduring NADR
    - Plus $99,240,000 for OCO NADR
  - $144,993,000 for enduring Peacekeeping Operations (PKO)
    - Plus $328,698,000 for OCO PKO
  - $106,074,000 for International Military Education and Training (IMET)
  - $5,014,109,000 for FMFP
    - Plus $866,420,000 for OCO FMFP

National Defense Authorization Act, FY 2015

- *Carl Levin and Howard P. "Buck" McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1915,* P.L. 113-291, 19 December 2014, inter alia, to include the following:
  - Retitles Section 1004, NDAA, FY 1991, as amended, P.L. 101-510, 5 November 1990, to read "Section 1004. Additional Support for Counter-Drug Activities and Activities to Counter Transnational Organized Crime."
  - Amends Section 1207, NDAA, FY 2012, P.L. 112-81, 31 December 2011, Global Security Contingency Fund (GSCF) to include equipment, including routine maintenance and repair of such equipment; Supplies; small-scale construction, not to exceed $750,000 per project; and Training.
  - Codifies the prohibition on use of DOD funds for assistance to units of foreign security forces that have committed a gross violation of human rights as 10 USC 2249e.
  - Repeals Section 1206, NDAA, FY 2006, as amended, P.L. 109-163, 6 January 2006, and codifies it as 10 USC 2282. Authority to Build the Capacity of Foreign Security Forces.
  - Authorizes the new DOD 1206 program of training security forces and associated security ministries of foreign countries to promote respect for the rule of law and human rights. Program expires 30 September 2020.
  - Amends Section 1208, NDAA, as amended, FY 2005, P.L. 108-375, 28 October 2004, supporting special operations to combat terrorism. Extends the authority through FY 2017 and increases the annual amount to $75,000,000.
  - Authorizes SecDef to provide assistance to vetted Syrian opposition groups and individuals through 31 December 2016.
  - Authorizes the provision of logistic support for the conveyance of certain defense articles to foreign forces training with the U.S. armed forces. The authority is only during fiscal years 2015 and 2016 and not to exceed $10,000,000 each fiscal year.
  - Extends Section 1222, NDAA, FY 2013, as amended, P.L. 112-239, 2 January 2013, authorizing the transfer of defense articles and provide defense services to the military and security forces of Afghanistan by one year through 31 December 2015.
  - Authorizes SecDef to provide assistance to Iraq, including Kurdish and tribal security forces or other local security forces, to counter the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) through 31 December 2016. $1,618,000,000 in DOD OCO is authorized to be appropriated for FY 2015 for this program.

- Section 2015, NDAA, FY 2012, as amended, P.L. 112-81, 31 December 2011, is amended to authorize OSC Iraq to provide training to Iraqi forces during FY 2015 not to exceed $140,000,000.

Other Recent Legislation

- *Ukraine Freedom Support Act of 2014,* P.L. 113-272, 18 December 2014, inter alia, authorizes specified defense articles, services, and training IAW the AECA and the FAA to the government of Ukraine. Also authorizes annual appropriations to SecState for $100,000,000 during FY 2015, $125,000,000 during FY 2016, and $125,000,000 during FY 2017 for such assistance.
- *Naval Vessel Transfer Act of 2013,* P.L. 113-276, 18 December 2014, authorizes the EDA transfer of two FFG-7 class ships to Mexico and the FMS transfer of three FFG-7 class ships to Taiwan.
  - Additionally, amends the AECA with a new Section 36(i), requiring a thirty day notification prior to a shipment of defense articles upon the joint request of the chairman and ranking member of the HFAC and SFRC.
  - Amends Section 516(g)(1), FAA, regarding the annual value of grant EDA to be transferred to now $500,000,000.
  - Amends Section 38, AECA, with a new Section 38(k) to allow the license granted by State Department also authorizing the export of items subject to the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) if such items are to be used in or with the defense articles controlled on the USML. A separate Commerce approval will not be required.
  - Amends Section 38(f), AECA, with a new Section 38(f)(5) authorizing the President to approve the transformation of any MDE listed on the 600 series of the CCL into a defense article if determined appropriate to U.S. national interests and the HFAC and SFRC are notified consistent with Section 36(b)(5)(A), AECA.
  - Also Amends Section 38(f), AECA, with a new Section 38(f)(6) regarding the notification and reporting of MDE removed from the USML. The President shall ensure that any MDE listed on the 600 series of the CCL shall continue to be subject to the notification and reporting requirements as follows:
    - Section 516(f), FAA, grant EDA,
    - Section 655, FAA, 1 Feb annual military assistance report,
    - Section 3(d)(3)(A), AECA, Third party transfer,
    - Section 25, AECA, Javits Report,
    - Section 36(b), AECA, FMS notification,
    - Section 36(c), AECA, DCS licensing notification, and
    - Section 36(d), AECA, DCS technical assistance or manufacturing licenses.
  - Amends Section 502B(d), FAA, for the definition of security assistance to include licensing of 600 series items on the CCL.
  - Amends the AECA notification requirements throughout to include the HFAC in addition to the Speaker of the House and the SFRC.
- *United States – Israel Strategic Partnership Act of 2014,* P.L.113-296, 19 December 2014, inter alia, includes the following:
  - The U.S. will continue to provide Israel with robust security assistance to include the procurement of the Iron Dome Missile Defense System,
  - Stating the sense of Congress that Israel is a major strategic partner of the U.S.,
  - Amends Section 514(b)(2)(A), FAA, extending the War Reserves Stockpile Authority (WRSA) with Israel through FY2015,
  - Congress finds that Israel has adopted high standards in the field of export controls,
  - Congress also finds that Israel has declared its unilateral adherence to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the Australia Group, and the Nuclear Suppliers Group, and

- Amends Section 36(h), AECA, regarding certification requirements relating to Israel's qualitative military edge (QME):
  - Detailed explanation of Israel's capacity to address the improved capabilities provided by such sale or export,
  - Detailed evaluation of (i) how such sale or export alters the strategic and tactical balance in the region, including relative capabilities, and (ii) Israel's capacity to respond to the improved regional capabilities provided by such sale or export,
  - Identification of any specific new capacity, capabilities, or training that Israel may require to address the regional or country-specific capabilities provided such sale or export, an
  - Description of any U.S. security assurances to Israel made, or requested to be made, in connection with, or as a result of, such sale or export.

The U .S. Export Control System and the Presidential Reform Initiative

The 113th Congress may consider reforms of the U.S. export control system. The balance between national security and export competitiveness has made the subject of export controls controversial for decades. Through the Export Administration Act (EAA), the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), and other authorities, the United States restricts the export of defense items or munitions; so-called "dual-use" goods and technology—items with both civilian and military applications; certain nuclear materials and technology; and items that would assist in the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons or the missile technology used to deliver them. U.S. export controls are also used to restrict exports to certain countries on which the United States imposes economic sanctions. At present, the EAA has expired and dual-use controls are maintained under IEEPA authorities. The U.S. export control system is diffused among several different licensing and enforcement agencies. Exports of dual-use goods and technologies—as well as some military items, are licensed by the Department of Commerce—munitions are licensed by the Department of State, and restrictions on exports based on U.S. sanctions are administered by the U.S. Treasury. Administrative enforcement of export controls is conducted by these agencies, while criminal enforcement is carried out by the Department of Commerce, units of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and by the Department of Justice (DOJ).

Aspects of the U.S. export control system have long been criticized by exporters, nonproliferation advocates, allies, and other stakeholders as being too rigorous, insufficiently rigorous, cumbersome, obsolete, inefficient, or any combination of these descriptions. In August 2009, the Obama Administration launched a comprehensive review of the U.S. export control system. In April 2010, then-Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates proposed an outline of a new system based on four singularities:

- a single export control licensing agency for dual-use, munitions exports, and Treasury-administered embargoes.
- a unified control list,
- a single primary enforcement coordination agency, and
- a single integrated information technology (IT) system

The rationalization of the two control lists has been the Administration's focus to date. Interim steps have also been taken to create a single IT system and to establish an export enforcement coordination center. No specific proposals have been made concerning the single licensing agency, although elements of a future single system such as the consolidated screening list and harmonization of certain licensing policies have been achieved. The Administration reportedly has prepared legislation for the final stage of the reform effort, but no legislation was introduced concerning export control reform in the first session of the 113th Congress.

In considering the future of the U.S. export control system, Congress may weigh the merits of a

unified export control system—the end result of the President's proposal—or the continuation of the present bifurcated system by reauthorizing the present EAA or writing new legislation. In doing so, Congress may debate the record of the present dual-use system maintained by emergency authority, the aims and effectiveness of the present non-proliferation control regimes, the maintenance of the defense industrial base, and the delicate balance between the maintenance of economic competitiveness and the preservation of national security.

To access the entire report: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R41916.pdf

Bridging the Divide: How Can USAID and DOD Integrate Security and Development More Effectively in Africa?

By G. William Anderson
Virginia Tech's School of Public and International Affairs

Effective collaboration between the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Department of Defense (DOD) is a critical element of the U.S. government's approach to security, governance, and development in Africa. USAID assistance and DOD security cooperation in Africa currently reflect a minimal level of interagency coordination at both regional and country levels. A more integrated approach in Africa to U.S. security and development objectives will support African economic growth and poverty reduction; accelerate African progress in reaching its Millennium Development Goals (MDGs); reduce the number and Intensity of conflicts; and block the growth of violent extremism among vulnerable populations, such as disenfranchised and unemployed youth in fast-growing mega-urban centers.[1] Such progress clearly serves U.S. national interests and security objectives in Africa.

This article explores four principal questions: (1) what is the potential for USAID and DOD collaboration in Africa; (2) what are the challenges facing DOD/USAID coordination; (3) what are the risks some see in a closer USAID and DOD relationship; and (4) what can be done now to improve cooperation between USAID and DOD in Africa.

THE POTENTIAL FOR USAID AND DOD COLLABORATION IN THE FIELD

The 2010 U.S. National Security Strategy, the 2010 Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR), and the World Bank's 2011 World Development Report (WDR), *Conflict, Security, and Development,* emphasize the interdependence between security and development.[2] To quote former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, "You can't have development without security, and you can't have security without development."[3] Development assistance or-

U.S. agencies, like DOD, pursuing U.S. national security objectives cannot achieve their objectives without a foundation of broad-based development, which provides long-term stability.

ganizations like USAID cannot operate effectively without a minimal level of security. Successful security and justice sector reform (SJSR), in which both USAID and DOD play major roles, is necessary to transform local institutions in fragile or conflict-prone states over the long-term. This reform process "provides citizen security, justice, and jobs" and thus deters or mitigates violence.[4] U.S. agencies, like DOD, pursuing U.S. national security objectives cannot achieve their objectives without a foundation of broad-based development, which provides long-term stability.

The current policy discussion emphasizes employing all elements of national power to address conflict and crisis situations.[5] Although U.S. forces are not currently deployed in a combat role on the African continent, the United States faces challenges and opportunities in Africa that require the full range of its civilian and military capabilities.[6] Half of the forty-seven fragile states identified by the Development Assistance Committee's (DAC) Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development's International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF) lie in Africa.[7] Current conflicts in Mali, the Central African Republic, and South Sudan, which have resulted in tens of thousands of internally displaced people illustrates some of the challenges fragile states face.

Pursuing U.S. diplomatic, development, and security objectives in Africa, including more effective crisis prevention, requires cooperation with international partners, host governments, the private sector, and civil society.[8] The QDDR makes a number of recommendations to enable civilian agencies like USAID and the State Department to lead conflict response and prevention efforts, including more integrated security and justice sector reform.[9] Further, the policy guidelines of the recently approved U.S. Security Sector Assistance Policy make clear that U.S. security assistance should complement overall U.S. foreign assistance objectives; enhance interagency collaboration; promote economic development; and undergo rigorous monitoring and evaluation.[10]

What Would Effective DOD/USAID Collaboration Look Like?

Effective USAID and DOD collaboration in Africa would have multiple characteristics. The first characteristic, a prerequisite, would involve mutual understanding of what each agency brings to the table in financial resources, capabilities, and field assets. Second would come knowledge of what each agency is doing regionally and in each country where both USAID and DOD are present. Experienced field staff in multi-year assignments would be able to build long term relationships. Third, and based on this broader understanding, USAID and DOD would plan together at both regional and country levels so that long term strategies and individual projects are complementary. Fourth, joint coordination of program implementation would follow collaborative program design. Fifth, the more that monitoring and evaluation of program results were undertaken jointly, the more easily both agencies could improve designs of DOD security cooperation and USAID development assistance programs to exploit each agency's comparative advantages. For example, under State Department coordination, USAID's Regional Mission in East and Central Africa (based in Nairobi) could lead the development of a medium-term (3-5 years) regional conflict prevention and mitigation strategy focused on current and future conflicts, involving State, DOD, and USAID staff and representatives from African regional institutions and other aid donors. Based on that strategy, DOD's regional African Command (AFRICOM) could host a week-long workshop of USAID, State, and DOD staff from the field and Washington to define regional and country-level priorities and responsibilities for moving forward. The resulting U.S. government and multilateral efforts would seek to achieve U.S. government security, development, and diplomatic objectives.

What Opportunities Do USAID and DOD Offer Each Other for Effective Collaboration?

DOD. The potential for fruitful collaboration between USAID and DOD is substantial. The principal contribution that DOD and AFRICOM

can make to USAID's foreign assistance efforts lies in the security sector through a range of security cooperation programs. These programs are aimed at building professional militaries that are accountable to civilian governments, respect international human rights standards, are regarded by local populations as protectors, and contribute to regional peacekeeping missions.[11] USAID and its NGO partners cannot make much of a difference in people's lives without accountable governance, which includes militaries that local populations respect rather than fear. Building more professional and accountable militaries is an important aspect of comprehensive security and justice sector reform, which integrates the capabilities of "the military, the police, the justice system, and other governance and oversight mechanisms," including legislatures and civil society.[12]

DOD carries out a range of security cooperation programs through AFRICOM and its more than 1000 headquarters staff based in Stuttgart, Germany, service component military personnel stationed in Europe, and additional DOD staff assigned to embassies in Africa. The principal long term DOD staff in-country include Defense Attaché Offices (DAOs) and Offices of Security Cooperation (OSCs). However, AFRICOM does not yet have long-term OSC staff posted in all twenty-three African countries with fully-staffed USAID missions. In the absence of an OSC, the DAO is responsible for security cooperation, but because of his/her other duties, usually limits those activities to a few high priority programs. These usually consist of foreign military sales of U.S. military weapons systems and training of local military contacts at DOD training facilities.

Except for a few large personnel concentrations in Africa like the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) based in Djibouti, DOD staff numbers in individual countries are much smaller than USAID mission staff in U.S. embassy country teams. Few USAID staff in Washington or Africa are aware of the full range of DOD's security cooperation programs in their countries.

USAID. USAID contributes to U.S. national security objectives in its capacity to strengthen weak and fragile states by building accountable governance institutions over the long term and addressing major issues such as food security. Further, by improving delivery of improved health and education services and by helping accelerate inclusive economic growth that reduces poverty and human suffering, USAID can support stability and help prevent conflict. Former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates made this point in 2010, saying, "Development is a lot cheaper than sending soldiers."[13] USAID's field presence covers more than forty-three of the fifty-four countries in the AFRICOM area of operation, which includes North Africa. USAID implements its assistance programs through twenty-four bilateral missions and four regional USAID missions which support regional organizations like the African Union (AU) as well as cross-border trade, infrastructure, river basin programs, and conflict early warning systems. Three experienced USAID Officers, one with a General Officer/Flag rank, presently serve at AFRICOM Headquarters. Therefore, USAID's Africa Bureau and its field staff in both bilateral and regional USAID missions manage billions of dollars of assistance, much of which is aimed at strengthening institutions critical for citizen security, and therefore of direct relevance to DOD and U.S. government objectives of security and stability.

USAID contributes to U.S. national security objectives in its capacity to strengthen weak and fragile states by building accountable governance institutions over the long term and addressing major issues such as food security.

Directly relevant to DOD security cooperation programs, USAID can quickly field assessment teams for strategic planning, to design programs to address all aspects of development, including conflict or

crisis situations, to provide immediate assistance, or to evaluate assistance programs. USAID's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance and its Office of Transition Initiatives can mobilize teams in days to fund disaster relief or crisis mitigation efforts, in which DOD personnel are often involved.[14] USAID's strategy to address violent extremism, insurgency, and similar issues in pre-conflict situations and the underlying analysis that led to this strategy show clearly how USAID development assistance can and cannot contribute directly or indirectly to U.S. government counterinsurgency and stabilization efforts that DOD is often implementing.[15] In addition, USAID bilateral and regional missions possess strong planning, implementation, and evaluation capabilities across all development sectors as well as in cross-cutting areas, such as youth, gender equality, climate change, and conflict and crisis response, management, and mitigation. Three USAID regional missions in Ghana, Kenya, and South Africa, and the Joint Sahel Programming Cell provide legal, procurement, and financial accountability backup to USAID sub-Saharan bilateral missions and support regional initiatives in collaboration with the African Union and other regional institutions. Finally, USAID representatives to the international donor and NGO communities, can provide clear channels for AFRICOM contacts with these organizations and networks, if used by AFRICOM.

WHAT ARE THE CHALLENGES FACING DOD/USAID COLLABORATION?

Given the potential, the level of effective cooperation between USAID and DOD at the regional level (through AFRICOM) and at country levels is surprisingly limited. Most effective DOD/USAID collaboration occurs in specific areas like disaster and pandemic preparedness and HIV/AIDS prevention. Outside of these specific areas, none of the characteristics of effective USAID/DOD collaboration discussed in the preceding section are present to any significant degree. The causes of this minimal cooperation are both general and specific. As former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates wrote, "in general, the United States' interagency tool kit is still a hodgepodge of jury-rigged arrangements constrained by a dated and complex patchwork of authorities, persistent shortfalls in resources, and unwieldy processes."[16] Although the 2010 National Security Strategy emphasizes the "integration of skills and capabilities within our military and civilian institutions, so they complement each other and operate seamlessly," multiple obstacles and perceived risks have impeded DOD/USAID collaboration in Africa.[17]

Perceived risks of closer DOD/USAID cooperation, such as apprehension by the NGO and wider development communities that DOD will take over a greater share of U.S. foreign assistance, limit efforts to work together in both strategic and more practical ways.

Although both DOD and USAID plan at multiple levels—global, regional, and country—little coordinated or joint planning takes place. Minimal mutual understanding of each other's programs and operations exists, and differences in language, style, and culture complicate communication. Senior leaders in both agencies have failed to emphasize the necessity of expanded cooperation or to change agency incentive structures to reward such efforts or interagency assignments. In several African countries, no long term DOD security cooperation, staff exist to maintain effective working relationships with their USAID counterparts. The government has moved slower than glacially to shift its emphasis from crisis response to conflict prevention, in which USAID and State Department have clear comparative advantages. Further, the continuing lack of experienced personnel in USAID and other civilian foreign affairs agencies since the end of the Cold War hampers expanded cooperation. Finally, perceived risks of closer DOD/

USAID cooperation, such as apprehension by the NGO and wider development communities that DOD will take over a greater share of U.S. foreign assistance, limit efforts to work together in both strategic and more practical ways.

Common Issues Reported by Senior USAID Officers in the Field

Difficulties reported by USAID officers in the field refer primarily to DOD's ponderous bureaucracy and to challenges with community-level projects funded under DOD's Humanitarian Assistance Program (HAP). The huge difference in scale between DOD's $100,000 to $200,000 village projects versus USAID's national health or education programs totaling tens of millions of dollars raises questions about the usefulness of working with DOD community project teams.

Often, OSC civil affairs teams developing a community project rotate with little notice and fail to brief the incoming DOD team who takes over. One senior USAID officer described a ribbon-cutting ceremony for an intensive care unit (ICU) in a major city refurbished by DOD. Because the USAID health staff in-country had not been engaged in project planning, the ICU was completely empty with no medical equipment, supplies or personnel. It thus amounted to an embarrassing, unsustainable white elephant in a major urban hospital.[18]

Lack of Coordinated Programming

The fundamental problem that inhibits effective USAID/DOD coordination is lack of collaborative program planning, execution, monitoring, evaluation, and learning from experience. Since both USAID and DOD engage in planning and implementing programs at multiple levels, their lack of coordination is perplexing. AFRICOM develops a comprehensive regional theater campaign plan, a regional security cooperation plan and individual security cooperation plans at the country level. USAID's African Missions develop five-year regional or bilateral strategies and programs focused on a wide range of development sectors, such as private sector development, democracy and governance, climate change, health, and education. These strategies also target areas such as youth skills training and employment, conflict early warning, food security, and community resilience that are directly relevant to AFRICOM regional security plans and broader U.S. government foreign policy objectives. Moreover, DOD currently carries out little effective monitoring and evaluation of its full range of security cooperation programs for which information is publicly available.[19] With better coordination, USAID's experience and systems could enable AFRICOM to establish stronger evaluation systems that are also compatible with existing USAID monitoring efforts.

The fundamental problem that inhibits effective USAID/DOD coordination is lack of collaborative program planning, execution, monitoring, evaluation, and learning from experience.

USAID's Senior Development Adviser and other staff assigned to AFRICOM are available to facilitate visits by USAID mission direc- tors, but these rarely happen. On such visits, USAID mission directors could educate AFRICOM senior leaders regarding USAID strategies and programs and learn from AFRICOM planning and program staff. Few such visits are encouraged by senior USAID Africa Bureau leaders in Washington. Other lost opportunities include incorporation of briefings by USAID staff of AFRICOM senior leaders who visit countries with USAID missions. Neither USAID directors nor AFRICOM senior leaders take advantage of the full range of opportunities to initiate coordinated or joint planning.

The lack of coordinated and integrated planning carries over into existing interagency programs, such as the Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership

(TSCTP), the Partnership for Regional Africa Counter-Terrorism, and the CJTF-HOA. In these counter-terrorism programs, U.S. interagency partners struggle to attain even the basic level of "visibility" or knowledge of the programs of the other members of the partnership. Although guidelines in the new U.S. security assistance policy urge greater interagency collaboration as well as more "rigorous analysis, assessments, and evaluations of impacts and results" of security cooperation, implementation of these guidelines may be long incoming.[20]

In DOD's efforts to build professional militaries in Africa, no systematic planning approach is evident. No defense sector assessment tool or other form of systematic analysis exists that is required and widely used to assess the existing problems in an African military. No strategic planning method or tool, such as USAID's results framework, is used by DOD to conceptualize the outline of a strategy for resolving priority problems in a particular local military or for a long term capacity development effort of the defense sector in a particular country with clear objectives, outcomes, indicators of progress and targets for accomplishment. Therefore, how DOD designs individual programs or projects that are part of a larger capacity development effort aimed at professionalizing an African military remains a mystery. Clearly, DOD and AFRICOM could profit from USAID's capabilities and experience in this area.

Who's On First? Minimal Mutual Awareness and Understanding

In general, AFRICOM headquarters and field staff continue to have limited understanding of how USAID works and of the full range of capabilities possessed by USAID bilateral and regional missions in Africa. One senior USAID officer in Africa referred to the "total lack of understanding about what USAID does and how we work."[21] This is mirrored by a lack of knowledge and appreciation within USAID of DoD's capabilities and resources. Without a clear grasp of what both DOD and USAID bring to the table, it is difficult for each party to identify the best ways to complement the other's efforts. No in-depth training course exists to inform either agency's staff on what their counterparts bring to the table. The one exception is a brief (one and one-half day) Joint Humanitarian Operations Course (JHOC) focused on interagency coordination in disaster response situations. USAID's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) delivers JHOC courses annually to AFRICOM headquarters and component staffs as well as to all other regional DOD commands and components around the world. Such an approach could be expanded to include all of USAID and copied by DOD to educate USAID staff on the relevant DOD capabilities and resources.

Senior Leader Commitment in AFRICOM Needed for Expanded Collaboration

AFRICOM senior leadership has not established strong incentives for their midlevel headquarters and field staff to build collaborative relationships with USAID, engage in joint planning and evaluation, or to seriously investigate the capabilities of USAID regional and bilateral missions to complement DOD's security cooperation programs. When AFRICOM's commander or either deputy travel, they do not include in their itineraries a substantial time to meet with USAID staff, visit relevant project sites, or participate in NGO or donor community roundtables hosted by the USAID country director.

Although USAID's Office of Civil-Military Cooperation (CMC), OFDA, and OTI have worked to expand coordination regarding disasters and complex emergencies, USAID senior leaders have not made DOD/USAID collaboration a high priority nor reoriented personnel incentives to encourage USAID staff to take initiative in this area. The USAID Assistant Administrator for Africa (AA/Africa) does not insist on inviting AFRICOM senior leaders to African Mission Director Conferences. AA/Africa does not instruct Washington senior staff or mission directors in Africa to look for ways to include AFRICOM staff, nor does AA/Africa request AFRICOM or CJTF-HOA to detail staff to each of the regional missions in Africa to search for opportunities for collaboration. Therefore, neither AFRICOM,

nor USAID's Africa Bureau in Washington nor field staff, get a clear message from their main boss that they should put a priority on seeking innovations in joint planning, implementation, or evaluation with their opposite agency's colleagues.

"This Won't Get Me Promoted"

Weak incentives for interagency assignments have generally discouraged both DOD and USAID officers from pursuing assignments with each other, with State, in both regional and functional bureaus, or in the National Security Staff. This lack of strong incentives is also true for USAID senior development advisor (SDA) jobs, which are reportedly derided by USAID staff as "not real jobs" compared to USAID jobs in the field.[22] No explicit guidance to USAID promotion panels exists to require interagency assignments, such as as SDAs to DOD regional commands, for promotion to senior ranks. Therefore experienced USAID foreign service officers (FSOs) are reluctant to bid on such positions for fear of losing ground in their careers. Similarly, DOD staff who accept assignments as heads of field OSCs are considered to have ruled themselves out for consideration for promotion to Flag rank (General or Admiral).

Lack of Long-term DOD Field Staff

Although progress has occurred over the last two years, several countries in Africa remain without DOD OSCs. While this expansion of OSC offices represents progress and reduces by half the number of countries with USAID missions that lacked such long-term OSC staffs in 2010, five countries with USAID missions still remain without long-term OSC staff—Namibia, Zambia, Malawi, Benin, and Madagascar. The presence of long-term DOD staff in OSCs makes it possible for USAID and DOD staff to work on a continuing basis to link security and development cooperation more closely.[23] When country teams do not include long-term OSC staff, USAID missions cannot coordinate or plan effectively with DOD in-country.

Additionally, no DOD field staff are detailed to any USAID regional missions in Africa to develop a DOD understanding of the capabilities of such missions. Also, with the exception of USAID/Ethiopia, no DOD field staff have been detailed to bilateral USAID missions in fragile states where a coordinated security and justice sector reform program could experiment with an Embassy-led unified U.S. strategy, as the U.S. ambassador in the Philippines has done with Mindanao, to help prevent or mitigate conflict.[24]

Insufficient Emphasis on Conflict Prevention versus Response

Given recent conflicts in Mali, the Central African Republic (CAR), and South Sudan, prevention of such crises versus responding after they have happened should command high priority for DOD, USAID, and State. Both DOD and USAID pay some attention to conflict prevention in their work at the country level and regional levels. At least two of the three USAID Africa Regional Missions work on conflict early warning and mitigation with regional African organizations like the African Union and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). One of AFRICOM's "Four Cornerstones" is "prevention of future conflicts.[25] In Washington, USAID's Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation (CMM) pioneered the development of a conflict assessment framework (CAF), which was further developed by the State Department for use as an interagency tool, and developed a series of nine toolkits addressing land, women, and youth with concrete options for addressing causes of conflict. Recent research suggests that assuring food security for vulnerable regions and populations, in which USAID enjoys strong capability, can play a major role in preventing violence.[26]

Yet, other than the overcommitted National Security Staff (NSS) in the White House, no U.S. government department or agency possesses a clear leadership role for conflict and crisis prevention; has authority to act within the Executive Branch; or can commit the U.S. government in the international community.[27] Notwithstanding the creation of a new Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO) in the State De

partment, no coherent U.S. government strategy to prevent crises and conflicts yet exists.[28] Despite multiple references to conflict prevention in the 2010 National Security Strategy and the QDDR, most of the discussion on conflict in both these documents refers to response to post-conflict situations, not prevention of them.

The *World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security, and Development* concludes that "Building capable and legitimate institutions to deliver citizen security, address injustice, and create employment is key to breaking ...cycles of violence" which takes a generation.[29] Building such institutions requires the commitment of local governments, private sector and civil society combined with help from the international community. This means that in addition to clear interagency roles and responsibilities a coherent U.S. government conflict and crisis prevention strategy must also engage bilateral and multilateral partners. Until it has its own house in order, the U.S. government will lack credibility in the international community on multilateral prevention efforts.

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Nobody's Home in USAID

Another fundamental obstacle for effective collaboration between USAID and DOD has been the weakness of USAID, as well as the State Department and other U.S. civilian foreign affairs agencies in staffing, programming, and management systems. From 1990 until 2008, USAID lost more than 40 percent of its staff, even though foreign aid budgets and the number of USAID missions were increasing, especially during the last Bush administration. As staffing declined, USAID's basic programming systems degraded to a dangerous level, and in 2006, the agency lost its Washington-level budgeting and policy planning capability to the new Foreign Assistance Bureau (the F Bureau) in the State Department. Those functions were not re-established at USAID until 2011. Over the same two decade period, the State Department suffered similar but not as extreme staffing losses, and benefited from a substantial boost in hiring in the early years under Secretary of State Colin Powell. [30]

Since 2008, USAID has built its staffing levels and technical capabilities by hiring 850 new Foreign Service staff under the Development Leadership Initiative (DLI). Following the arrival of Administrator Rajiv Shah in early 2010, the agency embarked on a series of ambitious reforms known as USAID Forward, which included reviving basic programming systems and expanding training of staff in these systems, re-establishing budget and policy offices, and issuing an agency policy framework for 2011 to 2015. Nevertheless, rebuilding technical staff with program expertise will continue for several years, assuming adequate funding levels.. In addition, although USAID's human capital and program management capabilities are rapidly improving, its overall weakness over more than ten years has meant that its ability to engage robustly with DOD at all levels, play its appropriate role in the field, and protect its prerogatives has been weak. This weakness has compromised the achievement of U.S. security, foreign policy, and development objectives in Africa and other regions. Current budget pressures could again cripple USAID and the State Department and reverse current efforts to rebuild civilian capabilities, especially in USAID.[31]

These Folks Don't Talk or Act Like Me

In spite of some significant similarities, USAID and DOD also differ widely in language, style, and culture. For example, the term "humanitarian assistance" to USAID means short-term assistance to populations afflicted by natural disasters or other emergencies. For DOD, the same term means short term assistance to populations afflicted by natural disasters or other emergencies. For DOD, the same term means civic assistance projects, such as schools, health clinics, water, and sanitation projects, which for USAID are often part of longer-term development assistance programs in education and health.[32]

Moreover, USAID focuses on growth through long-term capacity development in institutions and sustainable changes in socio-economic systems. DOD focuses on security threats, whose imperatives usually favor quick results. USAID field staff generally serve four years in a country, while DOD generally deploys its personnel in short-term teams for engagement at the country level comprises short-term teams arriving to conduct military exercises, training, or community-level projects.

USAID missions maintain a large country footprint, the majority of which are foreign service nationals. Most USAID staff have substantial cross- cultural, area, and language expertise. The number of DOD staff in individual OSCs are quite small compared to total USAID mission staff. DOD lacks enough knowledgeable field staff with country expertise and cultural sensitivity. This training or exercise activities. With few exceptions, DOD increases USAID's burden of working with DOD on community projects and other security cooperation activities that relate to USAID assistance. Put simply, USAID's preferred operating style is to examine the problems to be addressed, then build agreement for the proposed solution among stakeholders in country. DOD's normal style is to respond immediately to a problem in some way, a style which could be described as "Don't just stand there; do something!" If not reviewed by experienced USAID staff, DOD's "action first" style can result in community, ethnic, or religious tensions and unsustainable projects.[33] Finally, USAID uses empirically-based strategic and program planning, including with in-country assessments and problem analyses. While DOD has many experienced planners, it employs top-down strategic planning derived from theater campaign and security cooperation plans. DOD's planning systems for humanitarian assistance and security cooperation are less robust than USAID's revamped planning systems in the areas of systematic assessment, strategic planning and project design, monitoring and evaluation, and learning.

None of these differences by themselves prevents expanded collaboration between USAID and DOD in Africa, but their cumulative effect is complicates cooperation. Successful collaboration requires that each party understand how the other works, its objectives, and its language. Disagreements on approaches to problems must surface early and be resolved transparently, even if issues have to be raised to higher-level decision-makers in both agencies. Such comprehension requires effort, training, and sufficient time working together.

CONCERNS AND RISKS OF USAID/DOD COLLABORATION

Concerns about greater collaboration between AFRICOM and USAID emanate from within and outside the U.S. government. They include concerns about the militarization of U.S. foreign assistance; uncoordinated security and justice sector reform efforts; the risk of DOD assuming more responsibility non-military foreign assistance; and the hazards for the United States if it fails to link security and development efforts in Africa effectively.

Apprehension from NGOs and the Development Community

NGOs and the development community fear that greater collaboration in Africa between DOD and USAID will mean that U.S. foreign assistance will be perceived as militarized, and that DOD community assistance projects will be uncoordinated with USAID, poorly designed, unsustainable, and exacerbate ethnic or regional tensions. NGOs also fear that aid workers operating in conflict-prone

environments may be threatened if DOD HAP teams and NGO staff are operating in the same areas.

While these are serious concerns, those who raise these points often are not aware that U.S. economic assistance resources from USAID and other civilian assistance agencies allocated for Africa dwarf the level of AFRICOM funding for security cooperation programs of all kinds in Africa. AFRICOM's budget for all security cooperation programs in Africa, which comes from different appropriations accounts than economic assistance, totaled less than $500 million for fiscal year (FY) 2010.[34] By comparison, total U.S. economic assistance committed to Africa in 2010 was $6.9 billion and rose to $7.2 billion in FY 2011. This means that fears by NGOs and the larger development community that DOD's security cooperation and related assistance budget for Africa will overwhelm civilian-managed economic assistance are exaggerated.

DOD funding for civic assistance programs, which tend to be hot buttons for critics of AFRICOM foreign assistance, totaled less than $15 million in 2010. Compared to USAID budgets in health, education, and water, AFRICOM funding for community projects represents a tiny proportion of total U.S. economic assistance to Africa. Nevertheless, it is true that DOD civic assistance teams have had problems in the design, placement, and sustainability of community assistance projects in Africa.[35] In addition, DOD objectives for access and influence in particular geographic areas may conflict at times with USAID's impact and sustainability objectives. If activities in the same area work at cross purposes, this can complicate USAID relationships with host country partners.[36]

Current DOD guidance for civic assistance programs directs AFRICOM and DOD field staff to consult with USAID in the early stages of programs to identify and design activities and to "seek concurrence from the USAID Mission Director prior to the Chief of Mission… for approval."[37] USAID and Washington staff agree that coordination with DOD has improved on community assistance activities of all kinds.[38] Although as noted earlier, USAID officials have experienced problems in coordinating with DOD OSC staff and civil affairs teams on individual projects, past experience demonstrates that this can be done successfully with some effort.

In one case in a remote Sahelian town, DOD teams worked with USAID and the State Department on a joint community project. DOD provided a substantial quantity of vegetable seeds, and USAID provided farmer training along with a new water pump. The U.S. ambassador visited the town with USAID and DOD several times to support the townspeople who had initiated the project.[39] A second case involving interagency collaboration on an East African project aimed at easing cross border pastoralist tensions. The U.S. ambassador and USAID were set on limiting AFRICOM's civil affairs teams to security issues, which required a high level of labor-intensive oversight. The USAID mission's new country five year strategy includes a specific objective for whole of government work to bring peace and security to the same regions with AFRICOM's civil affairs teams focused on security issues.[40]

These two examples suggest that many concerns with AFRICOM community assistance projects can be dealt with by robust engagement by USAID with DOD. In the two cases cited above, senior USAID and State Department officers exerted such pressure with positive results.

Risk of Uncoordinated USAID and DOD Assistance Efforts in Fragile States

If budget reduction pressures intensify over the next few years, the political will of the executive branch and Congress to continue to rebuild USAID and other civilian foreign affairs agencies over the long term may ebb. If the U.S. government cannot stay the course to rebuild these institutions, Congress and the executive branch may again ask DOD to take responsibility for a larger share of U.S. foreign assistance. If asked, DOD will accept. However, the costs will be great. Having DOD take on a greater responsibility in development and other economic assistance will dilute DOD's focus on security challenges. Greater DOD involvement in economic assistance will send a message to the international community that U.S. foreign

assistance is becoming militarized. DOD lacks the capability, skills, and modes of operation to plan and implement long term development assistance and, especially, to develop sustainable institutional capacity outside of the defense sector.[41] As former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates freely admitted in a public roundtable with Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and USAID Administrator Rajiv Shah, development is "not our (DOD's) core competency."[42]

WHAT TO DO NOW TO IMPROVE DOD/ USAID COLLABORATION

Although some aspects of the DOD/USAID working relationship require high level policy changes, important actions can be taken now at the level of AFRICOM and USAID's Africa Bureau to advance effective collaboration. Senior leaders in AFRICOM and USAID's Africa Bureau should work together to improve coordination in areas of complementarity. State, DOD, and USAID should initiate a joint effort to assess and use lessons from assistance to fragile states, such as Liberia, Sierra Leone, Chad, Zimbabwe, Mali, DRC-Congo, especially those involving conflict. In planning, DOD and USAID together with State, should involve each other in each agency's strategic and project planning and carry out joint monitoring and evaluation in areas of mutual interest. To improve coordination on community projects, USAID should employ "robust engagement" to make sure DOD community projects are consistent with larger USAID programs. AFRICOM and USAID's Africa Bureau, including USAID missions in Africa should expand their efforts to increase their mutual awareness and understanding of what each agency brings to the table. To encourage staff from both agencies to link up creatively, DOD and USAID should strengthen organizational and personnel incentives for interagency collaboration versus bureaucratic competition. Finally, so that USAID missions have long-term DOD staff to work with, DOD should expand the number of OSCs to the remaining countries with USAID missions but which lack OSCs and detail AFRICOM headquarters staff to each of the three USAID regional missions and the Sahel Joint Planning Cell to educate AFRICOM headquarters and field staff on how USAID regional capabilities can contribute to DOD objectives and vice versa.

Senior Leaders Must Lead and Persist

Under the coordination of the State Department, USAID's AA for Africa and the AFRICOM Commander should launch a joint initiative for improved collaboration at AFRICOM headquarters, USAID missions, and in country teams. The first step would be a joint decision message to their respective AFRICOM and USAID senior staff. That joint directive would state that the AFRICOM Commander and the USAID AA/AFR expect to see immediate, continuing progress in expanding DOD/USAID collaboration in Africa in coordinated programming and in increased mutual awareness and understanding. The joint message would announce a set of actions to improve incentives for expanded partnership and personnel incentives to bolster this effort. The AFRICOM commander would assign his two deputies and other senior leaders to supervise progress, emphasize the importance of this initiative to DOD field staff, and report at each senior staff meeting on their plans and progress. USAID's AA/AFR would act similarly with regard to senior staff in Washington and with African missions. Both AFRICOM's commander and USAID's AA/AFR would persist over time in pressing forward this priority.

Learn from Experience

Many cases exist of fragile states in which USAID and DOD have both provided substantial assistance over long periods. These countries include Mali, Ivory Coast, Uganda, Kenya, Somalia, Chad, Nigeria, Liberia, and others. To inform future coordination, joint USAID, DOD, and State assessment teams should analyze cases and identify lessons, especially in the interrelated areas of security, governance, and justice sector reform and as well as in combatting violent extremism and insurgency. USAID development assistance has a major role to play in all these areas.[43]

In areas of successful DOD/USAID collaboration, such as disaster assistance, pandemic

planning, preparedness, and response, and HIV prevention and supportive care, especially in fragile states, USAID, DOD, and the State Department should jointly evaluate results by country, synthesize best practices, and advance collaboration accordingly.

Coordinate Programming

DOD's and USAID's assistance programs both start with planning, and each agency undertakes strategic and project planning at several levels. In both its regional and country security cooperation plans AFRICOM should engage USAID regional and bilateral mission staff more broadly in conferences and as part of the teams that develop such plans. USAID regional and bilateral missions should invite AFRICOM headquarters and field staff to participate in the development of their five-year regional and Country Development Cooperation Plans (RDCSs and CDCSs)—and in their regional and bilateral project designs, which bring their strategies to life. The State Department new strategic planning processes, which include a multi-year integrated cooperation strategy (ICS) for each country team and a security and justice strategy, could support more collaborative planning between DOD and USAID.

Yet planning is only one step in programming and must be followed by program execution, monitoring, evaluation, and learning from experience. Broadened DOD/USAID partnerships in these other programming steps are essential as well because these steps constitute a cycle in which feedback from one step affects other steps. Joint program monitoring and evaluation encourages greater awareness and understanding of each other's relative strengths and weaknesses and contributes better approaches for new activities.

EMPLOY ROBUST ENGAGEMENT

As a tool in effective coordination, USAID mission management and staff should employ robust engagement in coordinating activities with DOD—with the OSC staff assigned to their countries, with the short-term civil-affairs teams who design and implement community activities, or with both. Robust engagement means that the USAID mission director and his/her staff and the U.S. ambassador oversee DOD activities closely from planning to execution; raise issues; and object, if necessary, to DOD plans and actions on the ground that do not meet basic standards of interagency coordination or of sustainability. Such assertive action is expected and generally welcomed in DOD's bureaucratic culture, both by DOD field staff and especially by senior AFRICOM staff. If the USAID mission director does not succeed in obtaining needed adjustments to a DOD project, he/she should raise the issue to the ambassador. If such interventions do not work, then the USAID director and the ambassador should raise their issues to their superiors in Washington.

Expand Mutual Awareness and Understanding

Once senior leaders like the commander of AFRICOM and USAID's AA/AFR clearly direct their staffs to work more closely together, many other actions can follow. Although each of USAID's four regional missions in Africa work intensively on conflict early warning, food security, and trafficking in persons, few AFRICOM senior leaders take the time, during visits to countries housing such regional staffs to obtain a sense of their capabilities in areas like conflict early warning or governance and resources. Similarly, few USAID regional mission directors add to their travel to or from the United States a two-day visit to AFRICOM headquarters to (1) brief AFRICOM senior staff on his/her regional programs and relation to AFRICOM's security cooperation efforts and (2) learn how his/her mission could work more cooperatively with DOD staff in his/her region.

When the AFRICOM commander or other senior staff visit a country with a USAID mission, his schedule should always include a USAID briefing on its programs relevant to security issues, a site visit to a relevant USAID-funded program, and a roundtable discussion, arranged by the USAID director, with representatives of the NGO or donor communities. When USAID bilateral mission directors are traveling through Europe to or from their posts, they should schedule a two-day stopover in Stuttgart to brief AFRICOM planning and program staff on their current

USAID country development strategy and programs and receive similar briefings on AFRICOM assistance and other events coming up in their country. Currently, these simple types of coordination occur because senior management of both DOD and USAID do not make clear such collaborative efforts are a high priority.

Other necessary actions to improve mutual understanding more systematically include introductory training, both online and in person, for each other on their agency's resources, capabilities, and field assets. The existing USAID Joint Humanitarian Operations Course (JHOC) should be expanded to cover all that USAID does and offered annually to AFRICOM headquarters and service component staff as well as to AFRICOM's field staff. AFRICOM should do the same to educate USAID staff on relevant DOD capabilities and resources. AFRICOM and USAID's Africa Bureau should invite each other more frequently and in greater numbers to participate in conferences and exercises, and include in the agendas of such meetings ample time to explore improved coordination.

Strengthen Personnel and Career Incentives

Joint efforts to coordinate program planning and implementation, learning from experience, improve mutual understanding, and other actions by large numbers of DOD and USAID staff will not take place unless organizational and career incentives support such actions. Most people in organizations behave most of the time in ways that support their career interests. Although public advocacy by USAID and DOD leaders for broader collaboration is a necessary step, USAID and DOD staff, including active duty military personnel with a more clearly defined top-down chain of command, will look beyond statements by leaders directing them to collaborate with each more actively for strong evidence that promotions, onward assignments, awards and increased pay will follow such statements by their superiors. To strengthen incentives for coordination, AFRICOM and USAID leaders should also highlight the importance of interagency assignments and insist that employee work objectives and personnel evaluations demonstrate achievements in broader DOD/USAID and other interagency collaboration. For example, USAID could revise promotion precepts that determine staff promotion rankings and require successful interagency experience for consideration for senior management positions.

Deploy Staff to Create Field Partnerships

Even with the actions mentioned above, USAID and DOD cannot build collaborative relationships if they don't have partners over time. AFRICOM should immediately request additional resources for establishing OSCs in the five African countries that have USAID missions but still lack OSCs and sufficient long-term DOD security cooperation staff to work closely over time with their USAID colleagues. For all USAID missions with AFRICOM OSCs, including regional missions, USAID directors should place a high priority on finding creative opportunities for partnerships and joint programming with DOD staff, such as joint strategic planning, program design and evaluation. These could include taking DOD staff on USAID field trips and project site visits, or rotating USAID staff in the OSC office and OSC staff through USAID mission offices.

To strengthen incentives for coordination, AFRICOM and USAID leaders should also highlight the importance of interagency assignments and insist that employee work objectives and personnel evaluations demonstrate achievements in broader DOD/USAID and other interagency collaboration.

In South Africa, Kenya, Ghana, and Senegal, where USAID has regional missions and, in Senegal, the Joint Sahel Planning Cell, AFRICOM should detail for at least six months one mid-level AFRICOM staff officer to each of the four regional USAID offices learn as much as possible regarding regional USAID programs and capabilities that is relevant to AFRICOM programs. Those AFRICOM detailees would then return to AFRICOM and be expected share their experience and recommendations to AFRICOM senior leaders for advancing collaboration with USAID.

LOOKING AHEAD: CONFRONTING UNDERLYING ISSUES

Much can be done by AFRICOM and USAID's Africa Bureau to deepen coordination under existing authorities. While significant, these actions are limited. Their extent depends on the continuing commitment of the AFRICOM Commander and the USAID AA/AFR, whose periods of service rarely last beyond three years. Nevertheless, a vigorous joint effort could establish a model for their successors to emulate and blaze the trail for other DOD regional commands and USAID regional Bureaus. However, improving results on both development and security objectives in Africa over the longer term can occur only if (1) U.S. conflict and crisis prevention efforts in Africa improve in effectiveness and (2) rebuilding of U.S. civilian foreign affairs agencies, especially USAID, continues.

Enhancing U.S. Conflict Prevention Capabilities

Formulating a cohesive U.S. government conflict and crisis prevention strategy supported by an interagency framework with clear authority, roles, and responsibilities is a prerequisite for effective conflict prevention in Africa over the long term. Prevention allows sustainable development efforts to continue and "is a lot cheaper than sending solders," to quote former Defense Secretary Robert Gates.[44] Focusing on prevention in Africa is crucial because Africa's high number of fragile states, and exposure to droughts makes the continent more vulnerable to conflict.

Preceding fundamental changes at the Washington level, more effective U.S. government crisis prevention in Africa can occur through improved coordination between AFRICOM and USAID under the coordination of the State Department. Beginning with a few priority countries, AFRICOM, USAID, and State should develop integrated plans to (1) identify and address causes of conflict, (2) combat violent extremism and insurgency; (3) strengthen accountable governance; and (4) accelerate comprehensive security and justice sector reform. For this effort, USAID would draw on its Africa Bureau and its specialized Washington staff in the Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance or DCHA; State, its Africa Bureau and its new Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations; and AFRICOM, its relevant headquarters and field staff.

The European Union's (EU) interest in cooperation on security and development in Africa under the US-EU Development Dialogue, early engagement with the EU and with like-minded EU member states should contribute to the choice of priority countries in Africa and lead to a robust multilateral dimension in the U.S. government conflict prevention strategy.[45] In the field, these USAID/AFRICOM efforts should be under-taken in coordination with the U.S. ambassador and embassy staff.

For the U.S. government as a whole, the president should designate a lead federal agency for conflict prevention, provide necessary authority, and request sufficient resources for the new responsibility.

Rebuilding and Maintaining Civilian Foreign Affairs Agencies

Ultimately, USAID success in building a collaborative relationship with AFRICOM and DOD field staff in Africa requires sufficient experienced USAID staff in the field of appropriate rank so that AFRCOM views USAID as a credible partner on the ground. It also requires that the AFRICOM commander take his relationship with USAID seriously and move forward in building a closer relationship with USAID field missions, using the USAID senior development advisor on his staff. For

DOD, a more productive DOD/USAID relationship requires an expanding number of DOD field staff who have area expertise and cultural sensitivity in working with partner governments and communities. DOD field staff with such expertise will have higher credibility with USAID mission staff.

In this period of emphasis on budget cuts, the ongoing process of rebuilding civilian foreign affairs institutions is threatened. The political struggle over budget levels will be fought in Washington, but DOD, USAID, and the State Department must all strive to protect civilian agency budgets for Africa. Without continuing, long term rebuilding of civilian agencies, the United States cannot succeed in advancing its security, development, and diplomatic objectives in Africa.[46]

Effective collaboration between USAID and AFRICOM is a fundamental cardinal building block for a successful U.S. security and development strategy in Africa. Through a more integrated approach, the United States can demonstrate more effective conflict prevention and response in Africa and other regions, which will yield great benefits. Reduced conflict will enable African leaders and institutions to reap the benefits of Africa's impending demographic transition, accelerate inclusive growth and poverty reduction, strengthen accountable justice and governance, and block violent extremism among vulnerable populations.[47] While improving the lives of millions in Africa, these developments will also serve fundamental U.S. interests.

About the Author

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In the interest of brevity, the author's ENDNOTES can be accessed at:
http://www.fletcherforum.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/38-1_Anderson1.pdf

Next Steps on Egypt Policy

[Prepared]Testimony by A. Elizabeth Jones, Acting Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs Statement Before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Washington, DC, October 29, 2013 - Chairman Royce, Ranking Member Engel, distinguished members of the committee, thank you very much for inviting us to discuss next steps on U.S. policy toward Egypt this morning. This is a summary of my full statement.

Egypt and the U.S.-Egypt relationship matter to us. Egypt is a vital partner. Our longstanding partnership is predicated on shared interests: Promoting a stable and prosperous Egypt, securing regional peace and maintaining peace with Israel, and countering extremism and terrorism throughout the region.

This partnership has brought the United States significant benefits: as you have each mentioned, easy transit through the Suez Canal; military overflights that facilitate our activities; and the counterterrorism and counterproliferation gains that come from Egypt's efforts to control its borders with Gaza and security challenge countries like Libya.

There is no doubt that a reliable Egyptian partner is in U.S. strategic interests. We firmly believe that the best, most reliable Egyptian partner is a democratic Egypt. A sustainable, inclusive, nonviolent transition to a democratically elected government will give Egypt the best opportunity to succeed. And Egypt's success can be the region's success.

Since the January 2011 revolution, Egypt's history has centered on what Egyptians want for democracy: political and economic reform and how their government can meet their aspirations. Following the revolution, the Muslim Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice Party won the parliamentary elections. And in 2012, President Morsi was voted into power, an election viewed as free and fair.

However, Mr. Morsi proved unwilling or unable to govern inclusively, alienating many Egyptians. Responding to the desires of millions of Egyptians who believed the revolution had taken a wrong turn and you saw a return to security and stability after years of unrest, the interim government replaced the Morsi government.

But the interim government has also made decisions inconsistent with inclusive democracy. We were troubled by the July 3 events and the violence of mid-August. The decision to remove Morsi, excessive force used against protesters in August; restrictions on the press, civil society and opposition parties; the continued detention of many members of the opposition; and the extension of the state of emergency have been troubling.

We have also consistently and strongly condemned the heinous violence and acts of terror against Coptic churches and the Coptic community. At the same time, we have condemned the continuing attacks on the security forces in the Sinai and elsewhere in Egypt.

After the events of mid-August, the president said we could not continue business as usual with respect to our assistance. That decision -- after careful review, we recently announced a recalibration of this assistance. That decision ensures that assistance is directed towards core U.S. interests, including helping Egypt secure its borders in the Sinai, preventing the flow of weapons into Gaza that threaten Israel and countering terrorists seeking to attack U.S. and Egyptian interests.

We will continue military training and education as well as a sustainment of certain U.S.-origin military systems. However, we are holding the delivery of several major weapons systems: F-16s, M1A1 tank kits, Harpoon missiles and

Apache helicopters. We will work to provide economic support that directly benefits Egyptian people, including in the areas of health and private sector development but are not moving forward with any further cash transfers to the government.

We will review these decisions informed by credible progress on the interim government's political roadmap toward a sustainable, inclusive and peaceful transition to democracy. This recalibration reflects our effort to advance U.S. core interests in Egypt and the region while impressing upon the Egyptian leadership the importance of making progress toward a democratic transition, progress we believe the Egyptian people want. Our decision is designed to use our assistance to encourage such a transition and a strong private-sector- led economy that can reinforce political stability.

We welcome the interim government's commitment to a political roadmap to restore a democratically elected civilian government. We continue to urge the government to be inclusive, respect the rights of all Egyptians and respect the rule of law, freedom of expression and peaceful assembly, the role of civil society and religious freedom.

Beyond issues related to the roadmap, the United States has stayed firm to its principles and interests of advancing civil society engagement by encouraging the passage of an NGO law that conforms to international standards and Egypt's own international commitments. We have registered concerns over the June trial verdict against NGO workers and have urged redress.

We have also raised our concerns about state of emergency, which the government recently announced would not be extended when it expires on November 14.

On the economy, we are encouraging the interim government to maintain economic stability, help restore growth and investment and create jobs.

Egypt has an enormous opportunity now to pursue the aspirations of the 2011 revolution and to provide for the needs of the Egyptian people. The United States wants to help. To do that and to actively advance our core interests in Egypt and the region, we need to have the ability to continue U.S. assistance to Egypt.

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Engel and distinguished members of this committee, we want to work closely with Congress to obtain the flexibility needed to continue our assistance relationship with Egypt consistent with the law and our national interest and to encourage progress on Egypt's democratic transition.

The United States and Colombia-Strategic Partners

The White House
Office of the Press Secretary, For Immediate Release December 03, 2013 FACT SHEET

The United States and Colombia – Strategic Partners. Today President Barack Obama hosted Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos at the White House. Their visit underscored the close ties between the United States and Colombia, founded upon shared democratic values, deepening economic ties, and a long history of shared security goals. The visit highlighted our cooperation in the following areas:

Economic and Social Opportunities

• Free Trade Agreement: The U.S.-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement continues to benefit both nations. U.S. exports to Colombia increased by nearly 19 percent in the first year, while Colombia diversified its export base with more than 1,300 companies exporting goods to the United States for the first time. Both countries' businesses and economies are benefitting from eliminated or lowered tariffs and increased trade opportunities, and both are committed to ensuring all aspects of the agreement are fully observed in order to maximize opportunities for growth.

• Labor Action Plan: The United States and Colombia continue to work on implementation of the Colombian Action Plan Related to Labor Rights, which was announced in April 2011 before the trade agreement entered into force to address labor concerns. The United States and Colombia decided to hold formal meetings through at least 2014 on Action Plan commitments, and recognize advances under the Action Plan and areas where challenges remain.

• Strengthening Colombia's Energy Market: In early 2014, the U.S. Trade and Development Agency intends to host a commercial workshop in Bogotá, Colombia, aimed at creating state-of-the-art electricity transmission and distribution projects in Colombia, as well as a visit to cities in the United States, to help upgrade Colombia's wholesale electricity market into the most efficient and advanced in Latin America. Through the Department of State's Unconventional Gas Technical Engagement Program (UGTEP), Colombian and U.S. officials are working to help create the basis for environmentally sustainable unconventional gas development in Colombia. On December 2, the Department of Energy also signed a Memorandum of Understanding with Colombia's Ministry of Mines and Energy to strengthen cooperation in the energy sector and to promote regional leadership on energy and climate change.

• Expanding Opportunity for Vulnerable Populations, including Afro-Colombians: In June 2013, the United States and Colombia held a session of the U.S.-Colombia Action Plan on Racial and Ethnic Equality (CAPREE), hosting government and civil society representatives from both nations to collaborate on long-standing challenges faced by indigenous and afro-descendent communities in Colombia and the United States. The resulting work plan, the first under CAPREE, aims to expand educational, cultural, and economic opportunities for vulnerable and disadvantaged groups. One CAPREE program hopes to engage 1,415 Afro-Colombian youth leaders, at-risk youth,

coaches, and teachers to promote sports for social change and to prevent youth violence.

Peace, Security, and Rule of Law

The United States reaffirmed its long-standing defense and security partnership with Colombia, and strongly supports Colombia's unwavering commitment to seeking a durable peace, including through the peace talks now underway, in order to permit Colombians the greater peace, security, and prosperity they deserve.

• Land restitution: The United States continues its collaboration with Colombia to assist its people, particularly in the areas of rural development and land restitution, key concerns at the heart of the Colombia's ongoing conflict. USAID announced $68 million in support of Colombian efforts to: 1) restore land to victims of conflict; 2) issue land titles; and 3) generate opportunities for viable rural livelihoods for small farmers. In addition, USAID will help expand the coverage of legal protection of land rights, especially those of small farmers, by strengthening the Colombian government's land titling efforts.

• Building Rule of Law and Assisting Victims: The United States and Colombia continue to partner on strengthening the rule of law and protection of human rights in Colombia, including in the criminal justice system. Over the past five years, the United States has provided nearly $100 million dollars of rule of law assistance to the Colombian Attorney General's Office focused on human rights, victim assistance programs, and the investigation and prosecution of criminal organizations.

• Humanitarian Demining: In cooperation with the Organization of American States, the United States provided more than $4 million in FY 2013 to support demining in Colombia, to both clear mines that threaten communities and to help victims. With this support, non-governmental organization HALO cleared its first mine in September 2013.

• Secure Movement of Goods and People: The United States and Colombia share an interest in preventing transnational illicit networks from conducting, planning, and supporting operations aimed at harming our populations, including through the exploitation of financial systems, international trade, and transportation systems. In August 2013, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) broadened security cooperation with the Colombian Ministry of Finance and Public Credit through the Joint Statement to Establish a Cargo Targeting Center and the Joint Statement on Global Supply Chain Security. The U.S. Trade and Development Agency is also facilitating, via a technical assistance grant, the Colombian National Tax and Customs Directorate's acquisition and implementation of non-intrusive inspection systems.

Regional and Global Partnership and Integration

• Global Economic Integration: In 2013, the United States supported the invitation to Colombia to begin accession proceedings with the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Colombia's future OECD membership will strengthen its economic growth, creating opportunities for Colombian and American businesses and workers. To further expand economic opportunity, Colombia joined Mexico, Peru, and Chile as part of the Pacific Alliance, a regional organization intended to harmonize trade policies and expand commerce. The United States was welcomed as an observer on July 19, and Secretary of State Kerry discussed next steps with his Pacific Alliance counterparts in New York in September.

• Partners in Regional Security Cooperation: Colombia has evolved into a regional exporter of security expertise, sharing its knowledge to help develop the capacity of other countries to improve citizen security and confront the effects of transnational organized crime, including illicit drug trafficking. Through the U.S.-Colombia Action Plan on Regional Security Cooperation, the United States and Colombia have formalized support to selected third countries. In 2013, this

security assistance included 39 capacity-building activities in four Central American countries focused on areas such as asset forfeiture, investigations, polygraphs, and interdiction. The United States and Colombia announced the Action Plan for 2014, which aims to increase assistance through 152 capacity-building activities in six countries in Central America and the Caribbean.

• Expanding Energy Access and Security: Colombia and the United States continue to engage bilaterally and regionally on Connect 2022, a hemispheric initiative the two countries launched in Cartagena in 2012 to achieve universal access to electricity through enhanced electrical interconnections, power sector investment, renewable energy development, and cooperation.

Environment, Science, and Innovation

• Conserving the Environment and Livelihoods: Both the United States and Colombia emphasize and support conservation efforts that preserve valuable ecosystems. In 2013, USAID made a new $10 million commitment to conserve biodiversity and reduce deforestation in the Colombian Amazon. Under the Initiative for Conservation of the Andean Amazon (ICAA), the United States is partnering with Colombia to slow the expansion of the agricultural frontier, while creating corridors for critical biodiversity. In addition, with support from USAID, the U.S. National Park Service and Colombia's Parques Nacionales aim to expand their long history of collaboration, to include cooperation on climate change adaptation, concessions development and management, environmental education and interpretation, and the development of "Sister Parks." Renewable energy is also expected to be deployed in several Colombian parks by the USAID Clean Energy Program.

• Protecting Marine Species and Ocean Ecosystems: The United States and Colombia share similar responsibilities and challenges in conserving and sustainably managing marine species and ocean ecosystems in Pacific and Caribbean coasts and waters. The United States recognizes Colombia's leadership in marine conservation, most recently demonstrated by efforts to protect marine species at risk due to international trade under the auspices of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES). The U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration collaborates closely with Colombia's Ministry of Environment, National Authority of Aquaculture and Fisheries, and local non-governmental organizations to promote healthy and productive marine environments.

• Cleaner, Responsible Mining: Colombia is working to address the destructive effects on the environment of illegal mining operations. To support Colombia's efforts, in 2013 USAID launched a three-year $6.5 million program to formalize artisanal gold mining operations, improve working conditions, and reduce mercury and other contamination, and plans to expand work in the mining sector by at least $10 million in 2014. In 2013, the Department of Labor announced a separate four-year, $9 million project in collaboration with the Ministry of Labor to combat child labor and promote a safe work environment in the mining sector. In addition, the Department of the Interior is working with Colombia's Ministry of Mines and Energy to design a tool that will measure and monitor mining activities in Colombia and the broader Andean Amazon.

• Smart Technology: Colombia is undertaking an ambitious infrastructure development and modernization effort. Colombia will assess options for intelligent transportation system (ITS) technologies as a means of reducing congestion and improving the effectiveness of its control and management of highway and other transport systems through a U.S. Trade and Development Agency grant with the Ministry of Transport.

Education

• 100,000 Strong: In March 2011, President Obama launched "100,000 Strong in the Americas," an initiative to increase international study in Latin America and the Caribbean. Co-

lombia is a priority country for the initiative, and the United States is providing $1 million in economic support funds and has leveraged $2.6 million in private sector funds to build the capacity of universities to boost exchanges. More than 6,500 university students from Colombia are currently studying in the United States.

• Sports Diplomacy and Leadership: The United States and Colombia are deeply committed to furthering educational opportunities for at-risk youth, through sports exchange programs such as in baseball, track and field, and basketball. With support from the U.S. Embassy, Mónica González - a former professional soccer player and ESPN analyst - established soccer academies in Santa Marta, Quibdó, Medellín, and Bogotá to teach leadership and sporting skills to girls from vulnerable areas.

• Bilingual Colombia: Colombia is working to strengthen its international competitiveness through stronger bilingual education. The Department of State is partnering with Colombia's Ministry of Education to implement a two-year program to train up to 500 public school instructors on English instruction. In September, in cooperation with the U.S. Embassy, DIRECTV launched a distance learning education program, "Inglés en las Aulas" (English in the classrooms).

• MLK Fellows program: The MLK Fellows Program, established in 2005, provides English language and leadership training to outstanding Afro-Colombian university students. The U.S. Embassy has supported 230 MLK fellows to date, with another 120 talented Afro-Colombian university students starting in 2014.

• Fulbright Scholars: The United States has helped fund scholarships for more than 750 Colombian scholars during the last ten years, including more than 100 in 2013.

Review of Security Cooperation Mechanisms Combatant Commands Utilize to Build Partner Capacity

A RAND Report - Security cooperation has long been an important instrument of the U.S. government and the Department of Defense for advancing national security objectives vis-à-vis allies and partner countries, including building critical relationships, securing peacetime and contingency access, and building partner capacity (BPC). One of the key challenges for policymakers and combatant commands is gaining a more complete understanding of the real value of BPC activities. Assessments of prior and ongoing BPC activities, in particular, have become increasingly important given the current fiscal climate and budgetary limitations. But it is no easy task to assess the value of what are essentially qualitative activities, and data limitations severely hinder assessments. The tools available — such as resources, authorities, programs, processes, and organizational relationships — may or may not be the optimal ones for the delivery of BPC activities to partner countries. This report characterizes security cooperation mechanisms used by combatant commands for BPC, produces a detailed database of the mechanism elements, develops and applies a preliminary means of evaluating the effectiveness and efficiency of select mechanisms, and draws on the analysis from the case studies to recommend ways to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of those mechanisms in the future.

KEY FINDINGS:

Efficiency and Effectiveness Are the Same Across Commands for Some Mechanisms

- Lack of flexible, multiyear authorities hinders effective planning and efficient execution.
- Foreign military financing is slow, not prioritized against objectives, inflexible, and difficult to control once disbursed.
- Constraints on certain funding availability, sustainment potential, and working with non-ministry-of-defense partners limit its effectiveness, while associated equipping efforts can be onerous on staffs.
- Education programs generally score as highly effective; however, some processes are onerous on staffs.
- Military-to-military authorities are effective as foundations of building partner capacity but cannot be used to support training and equipping; those controlled centrally are not efficient; some authorities are left to interpretation.
- Mechanisms for cooperation with regional organizations are limited.

For Other Mechanisms, Experiences Differ

- The European Command has been able to effectively utilize some funding programs with coalition partners that other commands find less effective.
- Lack of training/equipping authorities in the Southern and Pacific Commands force

reliance on indirect mechanisms for building partner capacity in counterterrorism.
- Dedicated training/equipping mechanisms provide Africa Command with flexible means of building partner capacity in counterterrorism.

Recommendations

- Establish a working group to explore existing authorities for missile defense activities executed by the commands with allies and partners to determine if additional, specific authorities are needed to accomplish objectives.
- Seek to establish a new global authority for rapid, inexpensive equipping to meet the demand, particularly to support current operations.
- Explore ways to enable greater partner capability sustainment and institutional reform.
- Seek additional, global authorities to broaden dedicated counterterrorism training.
- Provide the commands with clear, current interpretations of all relevant spending authorities on an annual basis to enable effective leveraging of available mechanisms.
- Consider simplifying requirements for annual justification of ongoing programs to improve efficiency.
- Explore options for developing and managing the growing number of Foreign Military Sales pseudo cases to improve efficiency.
- Consider seeking approval to lengthen time for select spending authorities and funding sources beyond two years (to a minimum of three years) to enable effective institutionalization of capabilities.
- Take maximum advantage of existing training programs to demonstrate the need for expanding authorities to build partner capacity with armed forces under the authority of ministries other than ministries of defense.

To access the entire report: http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR413.

Locklear Briefs on Asia-Pacific, Partners, Security

By Cheryl Pellerin
DoD News, Defense Media Activity

WASHINGTON, July 30, 2014 – The commander of U.S. Pacific Command briefed Pentagon reporters yesterday, discussing the U.S. rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region, successful engagement with partners there and conditions for continued stability and security.

Navy Adm. Samuel J. Locklear III described some of PACOM's most important activities so far this year, including a visit to Hawaii by Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel, who in April hosted the first informal meeting on U.S. soil of defense ministers from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, or ASEAN.

Navy Adm. Samuel J. Locklear III, commander of U.S. Pacific Command, listens to a reporter's question during a news conference at the Pentagon, July 29, 2014. DoD photo by Cheryl Pellerin .

The meeting, Locklear said, "was an excellent opportunity to build upon the friendships and strengthen our bilateral relationship with ASEAN member nations."

Next, the Admiral said, Rim of the Pacific, or RIMPAC, the world's largest maritime exercise, began June 26 and will end Aug. 1. More than 25,000 military personnel from 22 countries are participating, including troops from China, who are participating for the first time.

Locklear said the exercise has been "an excellent training opportunity for all nations involved," and added that PACOM continues to "work hand in hand with our allies and partners to help ensure stability and security across the Indo-Asia-Pacific."

The Admiral also took questions from reporters, including one about whether unrest in Russia and Ukraine would require a reconsideration of U.S. and NATO posture in Europe, and whether that would affect the U.S. rebalance to the Asia-Pacific.

Locklear agreed that given the ongoing environment in Europe, a relook at U.S. force posture there and NATO posture in general is important, but he said he didn't think in such terms about the Asia-Pacific region.

"Our forces are globally deployable no matter where they're stationed, and the United States military has put a lot of time and ef-

fort into being able to get forces where we need them, when we need them, on a timeline that makes sense for us," he explained.

The severe budget cuts of sequestration, scheduled to resume in fiscal year 2016, may force decreases in force structure and put greater stress on the force to be able to stay forward in numbers that most combatant commanders would like, the Admiral said.

"But the rebalance to the Asia-Pacific is a lot more than just about military, but the military piece of it is moving forward," Locklear added. "We're seeing tangible evidence across all elements of the rebalance, not only in force structure, … so I think we remain on course. I don't get the sense that we're backing away from the Asia-Pacific rebalance because of other events occurring in the rest of the world."

A military part of the rebalance involves the Army, the Admiral added. A plan called Pacific Pathways allows the Army to develop small units that will be forward-deployed for quick response to humanitarian emergencies or regional threats. It also lets the Army create a semi-permanent presence in parts of the Pacific where it isn't feasible to establish bases.

"As we started to draw down out of Iraq and Afghanistan, and we found that the Army was able to return to some of its historic roots in the Asia-Pacific, we started looking for opportunities to get the Army more involved in what we do day-to-day in the Pacific," Locklear said.

Seven of the 10 largest armies in the world are in PACOM's area of responsibility, he added, "so it makes good sense for us to have good cooperation, good interaction between our armies."

The idea, Locklear added, is to take Army units under PACOM command -- some of those that might be stationed on the U.S. West Coast -- and put them into exercise cycles that allow them to be more present in the region with key partners and allies and to work on skills that are unique to army-to-army interactions.

On specific countries in his area of responsibility, Locklear took questions on India, political tensions between Japan and South Korea, and North Korea and nuclear proliferation. He congratulated a reporter from India on the country's recent elections and the new administration headed by Prime Minister Narendra Modi.

"We look forward to enhancing our [military-to-military] relationships with India," the Admiral said. "A couple of years ago, President [Barack] Obama reiterated that we will need to build a long-term and … a stronger relationship with India, and that includes our mil-to-mil participation."

The relationship between the countries also is a whole-of-government effort, he added, with Secretary of State John F. Kerry and Defense Secretary Hagel both visiting India in August, Locklear said, adding that he hopes to visit the new team in the future.

"We have had, for a number of years, very good relationships between … PACOM and the services there, and we have an ongoing number of exercises that seem to have worked pretty well for our growing partnership," he said. "So we look forward to the road ahead. We think it's all positive."

In answer to questions about political tensions between Japan and South Korea, Locklear said it's very important for both the Japanese and the South Koreans to recognize that they have many mutual security interests that can benefit by better bilateral, and trilateral and military-to-military cooperation.

Both countries have a huge common concern with North Korea, he added, and the United States encourages them both to work together to overcome their political difficulties so the United States can help provide a better security environment in the region.

For example, Locklear said, Japan and South Korea, who have very credible missile defense capabilities, are not able to communicate with each other because of information-sharing restrictions that are of a political nature, not of a military nature. "This degrades their ability to defend their own airspace, their own nations," he said. "It's a fact, and they understand that."

It's important, the Admiral added, "that we keep articulating to the people of Japan and South Korea that from a military perspective we understand the serious political issues and social issues that have to be overcome. But … they are an impediment to your security."

Locklear was asked about actions taken this week by the U.S. House of Representatives and the United Nations to bolster sanctions against North Korea based on weapons proliferation.

"We have a growing interest among nations in the region and throughout the world and participating in our counterproliferation exercises," he said. "We're growing our capabilities across nations and institutions to be able to better anticipate and deal with this, so I think in the long run we're getting better at it.

"That said," Locklear continued, "the proliferation activities of North Korea, their desire for nuclear missiles and nuclear capabilities, as we've said over and over again, are highly threatening to the global security environment, and denuclearization of North Korea is an essential part of the way ahead in that part of the world."

The Admiral said the long-term concern is that every time North Korea does something the international community has told them not to do, particularly as it relates to missile technology or nuclear technology, "you have to assume that it's a step forward in technology. Otherwise, they probably wouldn't be doing it."

In doing so, he said, "it's a demonstration to themselves that they can do it, [and] it's a demonstration to the world that they can do it. And a concern I have is that … over and over and over again, you see it and you become somewhat numb to it … and you start to say, 'Well, it's not such a big deal.'"

Locklear added, "There's wide debate throughout the intelligence community about how much capability they have, the ability to weaponize it, the ability to put it into warheads and those types of things."

As a military commander, the Admiral said, he has to plan for the worst.

"And I have to plan for, No. 1, what the North Koreans say they have, and they say they have it, … so I take it seriously," he said. "I believe that they have continued to make steady progress in both their missile technology and in their nuclear capability, and that they desire to continue to do that."

Afghan National Security Forces: Actions Needed to Improve Weapons Accountability

WHAT The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) Reviewed:

The U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) supplies weapons to the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) as part of international efforts to train and equip the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police. DOD has provided over 747,000 weapons and auxiliary equipment valued at approximately $626 million to the ANSF since 2004. Included in these figures are over 465,000 small arms—weapons such as rifles, pistols, machine guns, grenade launchers, and shotguns. The Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) is the primary DOD component responsible for overseeing the delivery and transfer of weapons to the ANSF. It works with the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) to acquire these weapons. Section 1225 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-84, requires DOD to implement a program to provide for the registration and monitoring of defense articles transferred to Afghanistan and Pakistan. DOD is also responsible for the oversight and accountability of these weapons after they are transferred to the ANSF. This audit focuses on DOD's procedures to account for weapons provided to the ANSF. Specifically, we (1) evaluated the controls used to account for weapons before DOD transfers title to the ANSF, (2) evaluated the controls used to account for weapons after DOD transfers title to the ANSF, and (3) determined the extent to which the number of weapons provided by DOD and coalition partners reflects current ANSF requirements and changes in ANSF personnel levels.

WHAT SIGAR FOUND

The U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) maintains information on weapons purchased for the ANSF in two primary Information systems: the Security Cooperation Information Portal (SCIP) and the Operational Verification of Reliable Logistics Oversight Database (OVERLORD). SCIP is used by DOD personnel to track the shipment of weapons from the United States, while OVERLORD is used for tracking the receipt of weapons in Afghanistan. Errors and discrepancies often occur because these two systems are not linked to each other and require manual data entry. When SIGAR compared the data in the two systems, it found that the databases did not always match; some records were duplicated, and some records were incomplete. The discrepancies listed below show examples of where DOD was not in compliance with its internal operating procedures and accountability requirements, and where missing information could result in the inability to locate weapons. Specifically, SIGAR found that:

- Of the 474,823 total serial numbers recorded in OVERLORD, 43 percent, or 203,888 weapons, had missing information and/or duplication.
- 24,520 serial numbers in OVERLORD and 22,806 weapon serial numbers in

SCIP were repeated two or three times, meaning that there are duplicate records of weapons shipped and received.

- OVERLORD contained 50,304 serial numbers with no shipping or receiving dates, and SCIP contained 59,938 serial numbers with no shipping or receiving dates.

While DOD uses SCIP and OVERLORD to account for weapons it purchases and transfers to the ANSF, the Afghan National Army (ANA) tracks weapons using an automated inventory management system called Core Inventory Management System (CoreIMS). However, Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) Security Assistance Office (SAO) officials stated that the information contained in CoreIMS is incomplete and cannot be relied upon for accurate information. CSTC-A SAO officials concluded that this is due, in part, to the ANA not entering information correctly into the system. A 2008 report by the DOD Inspector General also raised concerns about the ANA's record keeping process including CoreIMS. As for weapons provided to the Afghan National Police (ANP), there is no standardized or automated system to account for them. Instead, the ANP uses a combination of hard copy documents, handwritten records, and some Microsoft Excel spreadsheets to maintain inventory records. To test the accuracy of weapons data in the various inventory systems and hard copy sources used by the ANSF, SIGAR conducted physical inventory testing at four ANSF depots and storage facilities in Afghanistan. Although testing at these locations was challenging for a variety of reasons, including the lack of inventory information, SIGAR was able to assess, to some degree, the reliability of information maintained at these sites:

- At the ANA Central Supply Depot, SIGAR found that 551 weapons documented on the Afghan inventory record, called a "property book," did not match a physical count of the inventory.
- At the ANP 22 Bunkers Depot—the national depot for the ANP—SIGAR was unable to conduct a fully inclusive inventory test; however, SIGAR's limited testing verified the quantities of weapons in each storage container, and SIGAR did not find discrepancies in the weapons it was able to inspect.
- At the ANA Kandahar Regional Military Training Center, SIGAR was unable to obtain a complete inventory record, which limits the assurance of accurate and reliable weapons accountability.
- At the 1st Afghan National Civil Order Police Garrison Facility, SIGAR could only conduct a limited physical inspection of the inventory because no inventory list was available. No discrepancies were noted in the limited weapons inspection.

This poor record keeping by the ANA and ANP limits DOD's ability to monitor weapons after transfer to the ANSF, as required by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010. The U.S. and coalition partners provide weapons to the ANSF according to the quantity and type agreed upon in the Tashkil—the Afghan government's official list of requirements for the ANSF. The Tashkil has changed over time, with some weapons requirements increasing and others decreasing. SIGAR found that, as of November 2013, more than 112,000 weapons provided to the ANA and ANP exceed requirements in the current Tashkil. In some cases, excess weapons were provided because ANSF requirements changed. For example, the ANA has 83,184 more AK-47s than needed because, prior to 2010, DOD issued both NATO-standard weapons, such as M-16s, and non-standard weapons, such as AK-47s. After 2010, DOD and the Afghan Ministry of Defense determined that interoperability and logistics would be enhanced if the ANA used only NATO standard weapons. Subsequently, the requirement was changed. However, no provision was made to

return or destroy non-standard weapons, such as AK-47s, that were no longer needed. DOD officials told SIGAR that they do not currently have the authority to recapture or remove weapons that have already been provided to the ANSF.

This issue will be compounded as the number of ANSF personnel decreases to lower levels in the coming years. Without confidence in the Afghan government's ability to account for or properly dispose of these weapons, SIGAR is concerned that they could be obtained by insurgents and pose additional risks to Afghan civilians and the ANSF.

For more information, contact SIGAR Public Affairs at (703) 545-5974 or sigar.pentagon.ccr.mbx.public-affairs@mail.mil.

WHAT SIGAR RECOMMENDS

To account for weapons procured for and transferred to the ANSF, SIGAR recommends that the Commanding General, CSTC–A, in coordination with the Director, DSCA, (1) perform a full reconciliation of OVERLORD and SCIP and correct any data errors identified between the two systems within 6 months. SIGAR also recommends that the Commanding General, CSTC-A (2) work with the ANSF to complete a 100 percent inventory check of small arms transferred to the ANSF, and (3) determine what action can be taken to either recover or destroy U.S. and coalition-provided weapons that the U.S. and Afghan governments jointly identified as being in excess of the current Afghan requirements as stated in the Afghan Tashkil, and develop a plan that addresses the potential future excess of small arms if the ANSF force strength is reduced.

In commenting on a draft of the report, DOD concurred with SIGAR's first recommendation and partially concurred with the second and third recommendations. DOD's proposed actions are responsive to SIGAR's recommendations. DOD's comments, along with SIGAR's response, are reproduced in appendix II of this report.

U.S. Security Cooperation in Foreign Policy: Looking Past Human Rights Paradigms

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Any opinions, analysis, recommendations, or conclusions should be attributed to the author, and is not necessary the view of the USCG, DISAM, DSCA, DOD, or the USG

Introduction

On February 24, 2014, Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni signed an anti-homosexuality bill into law. In response, the Obama administration pulled approximately $6.4 million of foreign aid, which supported the Inter-Religious Council of Uganda (IRCU). The IRCU is an organization that publicly supports anti-gay legislation, yet has received millions of dollars in grants from the United States (U.S.) to help fight HIV/AIDS. Nevertheless, and almost simultaneously, the Obama administration sent four special operations aircraft and additional special operation and service support troops to Uganda to continue international efforts linked to tracking down Joseph Kony and the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA). Observably, there are inconsistencies in American foreign policy rhetoric and foreign aid allocation to a state that has undermined the civil liberties and human rights of its citizens.

The purpose of this article is to highlight a need for research, which the authors intend to pursue in the coming months. The follow-on project will serve two purposes. First, it is intended to generally test competing theories of international relations, including realism, liberalism, and constructivism, to determine which theory supports the current American policy practices concerning sub-Saharan Africa. Second, it further hopes to analyze which specific factors, human rights practices or strategic significance, influence our foreign aid allocation, more specifically, security cooperation efforts. By using security cooperation as a dependent variable and strategic significance and human rights as independent variables, we intend to test which casual factor has the most influence on U.S. foreign policy.

Realism assumes that states pursue a policy of self-interest in an international system. This theory predicts that U.S. security cooperation will have a stronger correlation with states that have strategic significance, such as key resource providers. Liberal policies focus on human interests, or, as Forsthye wrote, "at least redefine the national interest so as to incorporate more individual interests including those of foreigners" (1995, 111). If liberal theory is accurate, a state's human rights record should matter in U.S. foreign policy decisions, particularly political rights and civil liberties. Audie Klots presents a constructivist view and writes, "Constructivist theory argues that global norms are part of the explanation for the definition of state and individual interests" (2011, 478). Human rights, and thus, the protection of those human rights are considered as de jure if not

de facto international norms, and should therefore contribute significantly to the decision making process in American foreign policy.

A principal goal of United States foreign policy is to promote the increased observance of internationally recognized human rights by all countries. Title 22 U.S. Code § 2304 prohibits U.S. security assistance to a foreign government that engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights unless the President certifies that extraordinary circumstances warrant the provision of such aid. Although human rights practices are not the only criterion, and although legislation does permit certain limited waivers of this consideration, a foreign state's respect for human rights very often plays a determining role in whether or not security cooperation exchanges will occur. Most scholars tend to generalize that the U.S. uses foreign aid for national security, to address threats, and win allies (Poe and Meernik 1995). Other scholars researching military assistance and state cooperation found that military aid is allocated to states that the U.S. depends on for security reasons, while the "states receiving aid…exhibit lower levels of cooperation." In addition, many also claim, "there is no relationship at all between recipient state dependence on U.S. aid and recipient state behavior" (Sullivan, Tessman and Li 2011, 291).

Africa and AFRICOM

Africa, and in particular, the countries within the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) area of operations (AOR), present a suitable and still relatively unexplored arena for testing competing theories of international relations. Additionally, fairly recent developments in U.S. foreign policy (primarily the very creation of an entirely new geographic combatant command in 2008 to manage African security interests as well as interagency political-military policy) confirm that the United States views Africa as a significant location of interest, further supporting the need for analysis in this particular region. Officially, AFRICOM's purpose is to: …strengthen our security cooperation with Africa and help to create new opportunities to bolster the capabilities of our partners in Africa. Africa Command will enhance our efforts to bring peace and security to the people of Africa and promote our common goals of development, health education, democracy and economic growth in Africa (Sprance 2008, 8).

Skeptics argue that AFRICOM only aids U.S. interests, and "will benefit the U.S. Military, U.S. defense contractors, U.S. oil companies, African governments interested in repressing indigenous, minority, activist, environmentalist and resistance groups, and terrorists, who win adherents to their causes" (Besteman 2008, 20). Others argue that the true purpose of the command is to counterbalance China's rise and interests, and combat terrorism in Africa. These critics claim that AFRICOM only serves U.S. national interests at the expense of the African people, and undermines democracy and security in the region (Besteman 2008, Keenan 2008). Whether these arguments are accurate or not, AFRICOM has taken on a slightly more unique strategic role than other combatant commands. It has quickly become a deeply interagency organization, with at least nine other U.S. federal agencies (beyond the Department of Defense) occupying important positions within the command. At the same time, AFRICOM has placed continuing focus on non-traditional military operations involving the execution of security cooperation programs, primarily via grant assistance.

Naturally, AFRICOM's role has been guided by evolving U.S. foreign policy. The United States has stated that it has no aspiration for direct military engagement or to commit troops to the area, and "officials stress that there are no plans to establish any new military bases in Africa" (Ploch 2011, Cochran 2010).

So, now that six years have passed since the creation of AFRICOM, enough data exists to test certain theoretical assumptions regarding AFRICOM's role in foreign policy. Those

central to this piece include: Do human rights matter when the U.S. chooses AFRICOM partner nations? Or, do U.S. military and economic interests play a dominant role in African foreign policy? More importantly, which set of interests equates to greater security cooperation grant assistance at a country level?

Analysis and Trends in Literature:

Human rights and U.S. foreign policy analysis has evolved over the years, most notably after the passage of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and a subsequent 1974 amendment mandating foreign aid considerations based upon national human rights practices. In 1988, the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights found, "Human rights concerns have been incorporated into security assistance decision-making in an often inconsistent manner… decision makers tend to focus on a recipient country's foreign policies and the perceived defense needs both of that country and the United States, often to the near exclusion of that country's human rights record" (1988, 59).

The literature surrounding the topic of human rights and our foreign aid presents alternative views on this subject: human rights do not matter in foreign policy; or, human rights do matter in foreign policy, but to a lesser degree than other national interests. Based on these assumptions, there have been two approaches linked to different time periods of analysis, Cold War era and the post-Cold War era. The literature surrounding the Cold War era is the most extensive and typically supported neorealism philosophies positing that the U.S. Government allocates foreign aid based on critical national interests. Most scholars have indicated that, during the Cold War era, foreign aid was used to influence states to create international leverage over or a balance of alliances against the Soviet Union. Some scholars did find that our foreign aid was linked to human rights, along with other lesser strategic interests, at least at the initial decision making stage, also known as the gatekeeping stage. Research on the post-Cold War period tried to predict a shift away from U.S. foreign policy based critical military and economic interests or a change in national interests reflecting liberal values and positive human rights practices in receiving states. The findings, however, are mixed and there does not seem to be a major shift away from the traditional strategic factors used to determine the direction of U.S. foreign aid.

The predominant scholars each offer their own methodology for determining foreign policy consistency with the law and rhetoric of human rights and other liberal values. Their arguments, the controversy surrounding their findings, and strengths and weaknesses are the focus of the remainder of this review.

Lars Schoultz analyzed the relationship between U.S. economic aid and military assistance versus human rights violations in Latin America. By using foreign aid as an independent variable, he found that "during the mid-1970's, United States Aid was clearly distributed disproportionally to countries with repressive governments" (Schoultz 1981, 167). Recognizing the inconsistency of foreign aid in relation to human rights adherence and advocacy, Congress "passed 25 pieces of legislation between 1976 and 1979 linking the human rights practices of foreign nations to U.S. foreign policies" (Cingranelli and Pasquarello 1985, 540). After the passage of legislation joining foreign aid and human rights, Carlton and Stohl compared and contrasted the Carter and Reagan Administrations foreign aid allocation in relation to states' human rights practices. According to Carlton and Stohl, publically, the rhetoric between to the two administrations was "radically" different. However, "The practice of the Carter and Reagan Administrations has been remarkably similar. Neither administration has acted in accordance with the established human rights legislative package" (Carleton and Stohl 1985, 227). Up to this point, scholars only focused on bivariate analysis, a weakness Cingranelli and Pasquarello aimed to correct.

Adding to Schoultz and focusing again on Latin America, Cingranelli and Pasquarello applied a multiple regression statistical analysis, using foreign aid as a dependent variable, and created one of the first studies to quantify human rights through content analysis and multivariate analysis of military assistance. They also developed a two-stage analytical framework. The first stage focused on "gatekeeping." Cingranelli and Pasquarello define gatekeeping as, "some countries were systematically excluded from the recipient pool while others were passed on to the second stage" (Cingranelli and Pasquarello 1985, 540). Additionally, "the gatekeeping stage involves the decision of whether or not a country is to be given aid" (Apodaca and Stohl 1999, 189). The second stage focused on the amount of aid a nation received (Cingranelli and Pasquarello 1985, 540). They found "no evidence that human rights practices were related to the levels of military aid provided in Latin American nations or that short-term changes in human rights practices of nations had much effect upon economic or military aid decisions" (Cingranelli and Pasquarello 1985, 542). However, they also discovered that a state's human rights practices were significant at the decision level (gatekeeping stage) of U.S. policy development, and were playing a more significant role in policy decisions. States with poor human rights records were likely excluded from receiving military assistance and those with improved records tended to be included. Ultimately, after a decision was made, human rights no longer played a significant part in determining the level of assistance a state received (Cingranelli and Pasquarello 1985, 554).

Responding to Cingranelli and Paquarello, McCormick and Mitchell took issue with the design method used in their previous study that excluded El Salvador, and developed an analysis that included all Latin American states that received aid. Their results found that human rights practices were not important factors in U.S. foreign aid decisions (McCormick and Mitchell 1988, 232). Even though the 1974 amendment of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 mandated a relationship between human rights and aid, empirical research has had difficulties in proving such a relationship.

Steven Poe also recognized a developing controversy between human rights and military assistance. Poe praised Cingranelli and Pasquarello's study for its groundbreaking contributions, but he also identified several inconsistencies. "Specifically, Cingranelli's and Pasquarello's use of the Department of State›s reports on nations 'human rights practices as their sole source for human rights data" (Poe 1991, 206). Poe's contribution focused on the allocation of military assistance, "and the probability of a country being allocated U.S. military assistance" based on human rights practices (Poe 1991). Instead of using a single year for his study, he focused on a multiyear study from 1980 and 1984, and improved his measure of human rights support by using multiple sources — Freedom House, Amnesty International, and the State Department. Poe also utilized a strategic importance control variable. Poe's improved multivariate analysis found, "human rights records have been important in determining which countries are allocated aid" (Poe 1991, 211). Adding to Poe's previous work, Poe and Merrick used a pooled cross-sectional time series analysis and a two-stage Heckman model that found, "Taken as a whole…our results clearly indicate that human rights concerns are balanced against other, more self-serving motives" (Poe and Meernik 1995, 408). However, they also found that once a decision was made to allocate aid, human rights violations no longer were considered (Poe and Meernik 1995, 406), and that political and strategic variables were more important. To this point, human rights and foreign aid research focused on the Cold War era has decisively indicated that strategic and political decisions played the predominant role in foreign aid decision making. Moreover, the only area of consensus where human rights were weighted equally in foreign policy decisions in both eras of history was during the

gatekeeping stage (Cingranelli and Pasquarello 1985; Poe 1991; Poe and Meernik 1995).

Realizing the gap in the literature that focused on the Cold War, Apodaca and Stohl conducted their own research involving the Carter through Clinton administrations. Their contribution compared each administration and revealed that human rights played a role in the foreign aid decision-making process at the gatekeeping stage (with the exception of the Clinton administration, where human rights practices had no effect on foreign aid decisions); however, other national security interests were generally more important (Apodaca and Stohl 1999, 195). They also state one critical point when discussing human rights and foreign aid allocation: "Even the most optimistic human rights advocate would not believe that the United States would forego its strategic interests in favor of human rights concerns" (Apodaca and Stohl 1999, 187). Surprisingly, they found that past aid was the most significant indicator that a state would receive present foreign aid (Apodaca and Stohl 1999, 189).

The next significant development in the literature involves comparisons between Cold War and post-Cold War aid allocations. Blanton analyzed the role of human rights and democracy in influencing U.S. arms exports (2000; 2005). Her two-stage model found that, at the gatekeeping stage, the United States prefers to deal with states that respect human rights and values associated with democracy (Blanton 2000, 129). Furthermore, human rights and democracy are significant influences in determining levels of arms transfers in the post-Cold War era (Blanton 2005, 663). Demirel-Pegg and Moskowitz conducted similar research focused on human rights and economic aid allocation from 1979 to 2000. They preferred an economic model because, "Military aid by definition implies strategic interest while economic aid tends to imply a broader array of interests such as strategic, commercial, and humanitarian concerns" (Demirel-Pegg and Moskowitz 2005, 7). Their findings coincide with findings of previous research that human rights practices, along with many other variables such as alliances and bilateral trade, matter at the gatekeeping stage (1999, 30-31). Additionally, they found that, despite the emphasis on human rights and liberal values rhetoric in the post-Cold War era, the impact of human rights considerations has not increased over time (Demirel-Pegg and Moskowitz 2005, 30).

Employing a Heckman model, Lai focused on the "onset of aid, or who gets aid for the first time in any given year" (Lai 2003, 105). His results found that in the post-Cold war era, human rights did not matter at the initial stage or in terms of annual aid allocation. Moreover, "while human rights and democracy do not affect the decision to give aid, they do affect how much aid is initially allocated" (Lai 2003, 119). More importantly, "security considerations play just as important a role, if not more so, in who gets aid in the post-Cold War period as in the Cold War period" (Lai 2003, 124). Furthering their earlier work, Demierl-Pegg and Moskowitz found that the levels of economic development are important factors in determining aid in the post-Cold War era; however, "both human rights and regime type significantly determine allocation amounts. These distinctions show that shifts in the international environment have, in fact, altered the calculus of U.S. foreign aid" (Demirel-Pegg and Moskowitz 2009, 196). Another significant finding by Demirel-Pegg and Moskowitz was that America does not hold developed states or transitioning regimes accountable for their human rights practices (2005, 196). More mature autocracies with poor human rights records were the only states where high standards were exercised, possibly as a reward-punishment scenario to promote better human rights practices (Demirel-Pegg and Moskowitz 2009, 196).

Overall, these scholars have contributed significantly to our understanding of U.S. foreign aid allocation and its relationship to states' human rights practices. The consensus: the U.S. Government considers a state's human rights practices at the initial or gatekeeping stage to determine if foreign aid, or what type of foreign aid, is appropriate. However,

other variables play equally important roles, such as more critical strategic interests, economic conditions, and prior aid receipts.

The Direction for the Proposed Research:

While scholars have linked state human rights practices to military aid allocation, there are three significant gaps in the current literature. First, most of the research does not focus on nor capture the entire scope of U.S. military assistance. Moreover, the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Department of State do not recognize the term "military aid" or "military assistance." Security assistance and security cooperation are the terminologies used when referring to foreign aid that focuses on defense and security partnerships, and may include activities not normally considered as military assistance, but which serves as complimentary supports or multipliers to other forms of military aid in the execution of our foreign policy. In other words, scholars and researchers have not generally considered DOD's more comprehensive collection of foreign engagement activities, defined as security cooperation. DOD describes security cooperation (SC) as: ...Department of Defense (DOD) interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation (Joint Pub 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense, 2010).

Security cooperation comprises all activities undertaken by the Department of Defense (DOD) to encourage and enable international partners to work with the United States to achieve strategic objectives. It includes all DOD interactions with foreign defense and security establishments, including all DOD-administered Security Assistance (SA) programs, that build defense and security relationships; promote specific U.S. security interests, including all international armaments cooperation activities and SA activities; develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations; and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to host nations. It is DOD policy that SC is an important tool of national security and foreign policy and is an integral element of the DOD mission. SC activities shall be planned, programmed, budgeted, and executed with the same high degree of attention and efficiency as other integral DOD activities. SC requirements shall be combined with other DOD requirements and implemented through standard DOD systems, facilities, and procedures (Defense Security Cooperation Agency 2008).

Additionally, when operationalizing a measure of U.S. military interaction and influence on foreign policy, scholars tend to define it as an aggregate or coded variable that only entails bilateral military grants, loans, troop presence, and arms sales (Poe 1991, Poe and Meernik 1995, Sullivan, Tessman and Li 2011, Cingranelli and Pasquarello 1985). These are only four limited dimensions of persuasive (versus coercive) military interaction that, in actuality, consists of over 100 programs; the more comprehensive conceptualization of military interaction becomes especially important in research on Africa and AFRICOM. For fiscal year 2013, the total aggregate loans or foreign military financing (FMF) for African nations within AFRICOM's area of responsibility amounted to only about $40 million, while the total value of our military engagement with Africa was arguably well over $500 million based on the size of AFRICOM's operations and maintenance budget, other DOD security cooperation funding provided under Title 10 programs and authorities, and Department of State Title 22 funding. Researching the factors that motivate America to provide foreign military aid to African states demands a more comprehensive analysis of security cooperation programs not previously applied.

The second gap in the literature concerns accounting for other variables related to the strategic significance of a state at the gatekeeping stage. Strategic significance includes two

descriptive indicators. First, is a state's strategic value, including level of terrorist activity, geographic location, current U.S. presence or engagement and the presence of Chinese or other opposing powers. Second, is the presence of key resources. Key resources are, "The resources having the greatest bearing upon policy, and therefore looming largest in geopolitics, are generally considered to be energy and strategic materials…For the United States, the key resources are energy and strategic minerals" (Anderson and Anderson 1998, 3-4). The Strategic and Critical Materials Stock Pile Revision Act (1979) refers to strategic materials as those that "…would need to supply the military, industrial and civilian requirements of the United States during an emergency… [and] are not found or produced in the United States in sufficient quantities to meet such need" (Anderson and Anderson 1998, 4). Strategic Minerals must meet three criteria: "The resources are critical for defense and defense-related industries and essential civilian uses; there is a marked degree of import dependence; and there are a few significant sources of the supply" (Anderson and Anderson 1998, 5-6).

Scholars have avoided or unintentionally ignored DOD's own declarations that, "SC comprises all activities undertaken by the Department of Defense (DOD) to encourage and enable international partners to work with the United States to achieve strategic objectives… promote specific U.S. security interests" (Defense Security Cooperation Agency 2008). Observing this critical statement by the DOD, which is based on direction provided from the President's National Security Strategy (2011), and therefore a direct outgrowth of foreign policy, human rights are only one factor among many that drive military aid, and the specific weight or relevance of this factor may not be equivalent to other foreign policy interests. Further research is needed to compare state strategic variables in relation and relative value to our foreign policy, including such factors as the level of terrorist activity within the state or generated by elements residing within its national territory, geographic location, and the presence of strategic materials/minerals, along with human rights practices, in order to conclude which indicators have the most significant influence on the allocation of American foreign military aid and general engagement. More importantly, and more consistent with DOD's own policy, research focused on decision making at the gatekeeping stage may reveal that U.S. decision makers establish first if a proposed recipient state strategically matters to the United States before any other variables are considered. Researchers thus far have not adequately addressed the gatekeeping stage and have only shown that at this stage policy makers consider human rights along with other variables. They have not identified which variable is dominant or which variable is ranked first—human rights practices or strategic significance. Additionally, they have not adequately addressed how policy makers are able to provide military aid to states with poor human rights records, essentially ignoring the law.

Analyzing food aid, Fariss found that, "the conditional relationship between human rights and strategic interests is an important part of the determination of the type of foreign aid that country receives" (Fariss 2010, 126). This identifies another gap in the military aid literature. Because scholars have generally failed to include all aspects of security cooperation into their analysis, research should also be accomplished that considers not only the presence and "quantity" of U.S. military assistance with various states, but also the type and "quality" of military aid. Furthermore, researching security cooperation programs that appear to contradict the scope and intention of the Foreign Assistance Act may discover significant nuances in the way American decision makers provide military aid to strategically significant states with histories of human rights violations.

The final gap in the literature is the lack of scholarly research which recognizes a third and clearly defined era in the continuum of U.S. foreign policy history: the post-9/11 period. The United States currently has security cooperation programs with at least 49 of 53 African states in

the AFRICOM AOR. Therefore, it seems that our leaders may be undermining their own rhetoric concerning the promotion of human rights and liberal values, given the human rights records of countries such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Central African Republic, Burundi, Algeria, Morocco, and many other African states.

Conclusion

In this more complex, current era, Africa's fundamental strategic importance (its geographic location and abundance of natural and other strategic resources) is coupled to a complex mix of other more emergent (and sometimes transient) political interests linked to instability, terrorism, genocide, and Western social values, to include human rights concerns. In the face of such complexities and changes, a new, finer degree of analysis is required to draw firm conclusions on what truly drives U.S. foreign policy, whether it is traditional strategic issues supported by realism or human rights concerns linked to constructivism and liberalism. Further research in this area should likewise take into account the full range and significance of African security cooperation engagement by the United States and its relative importance as a tool of foreign policy. Additional research aimed at creating a better understanding of our security cooperation efforts in Africa, as well as an understanding of the choice and mix of security cooperation used with particular countries based on a broad range of properly weighted foreign policy interests, will contribute significantly to existing literature. As our research project develops, the authors welcome comment and criticism in guiding the analysis, the results of which we hope to report in a future article in the *DISAM Journal*.

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USCG's FMS Customers Shifting Focus from Procurement of New Assets to Enhanced Maintenance, Support

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Any opinions, analysis, recommendations, or conclusions should be attributed to the author, and is not necessary the view of the USCG, DISAM, DSCA, DOD, or the USG

The USCG has carved a unique niche in the world of the U.S. Government's Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program. Despite being far smaller than most of the government's FMS organizations, the USCG FMS program has transferred nearly $750 million in equipment, training, and related support to foreign allies over the last five years alone. While maritime vessels still make up a large portion of this total, the USCG has seen a significant increase in the role that follow-on training and technical support plays in their projects. The fact that countries are beginning to shift a larger percentage of their FMS dollars to manufacturer-provided sustainment efforts is already proving to be a sound strategy for all involved.

"Success" in the FMS world can be measured in a number of ways. It can be quantified by raw numbers including the amount of assets transferred or the total dollar value of goods and services delivered. It can be measured in the delivery of capabilities to partner nations, who can then perform missions the U.S. forces may otherwise have to conduct on their own. It can also be judged by less tangible measures, such as the U.S. Government's ability to maintain a bilateral relationship with one country or gain influence in a region.

Defining "failure" in the FMS world is also highly subjective. What happens all too often is that the U.S. Government delivers military equipment to our allies, only to see that equipment fall into disrepair far earlier than its "standard" service life would forecast. Whether this is caused by a lack of expertise, a lack of interest, or a failure on the U.S. Government's part varies from case to case and is often the subject of debate. What is far clearer however is that when this scenario plays out, the partner nation fails in their efforts to enhance their capabilities and the U.S. Government regresses in its foreign policy goals.

The USCG's FMS program has found that most partner nations understand the key role that maintenance plays in the long term "success" of these programs. In many cases, they are also able to determine that their organizations lack the organic resources, expertise and experience to provide the required support. As FMS dollars of all types become scarcer and scrutiny of "best practices" increases, even the most regular recipients are no longer able to count on having new equipment delivered annually to replace "broken" equipment from previous years. In an increasing number of instances, follow-on support packages delivered by the original equipment manufacturers in a continual, iterative fashion provide a solution. These "enhanced" support packages provided through FMS cases have become the most efficient way to bridge the capa-

bility gap and significantly extend the lifespan of equipment delivered through the FMS program.

So why is the USCG at the forefront of this trend? For starters, it is likely a byproduct of necessity. With only five FMS case managers and a limited number of support personnel, there is a heightened premium on developing solutions that can be procured, managed, and executed efficiently. Having the ability to dictate the itinerary for the work effort, direct the time and place with minimal notice, and remain unburdened by some of the operational constraints that restrict uniform service members operating overseas, gives maximum flexibility to the case managers in setting up in-country support. This is especially useful when accommodating for scheduling delays resulting from shipping issues, local Customs procedures, and the myriad other unforeseen challenges that upend even the most succinct plan.

From a procurement standpoint, contracting for these additional iterations of support is a straightforward process. Whether in-country support focuses on training, maintenance, technical support, or all of the above, ultimately what is being purchased is the manufacturer's time. When a dollar value is placed on each day of time, and travel costs and other incidentals are built in, it is very easy to determine the costs associated with additional in-country support. Divide the total cost for one iteration into a country's available funding, multiply the result by the standard length of time between iterations (i.e. every six months), and the U.S. Government can easily project how many years of support that country will receive. The compartmentalized costs and easily defined requirements mean that with an active FMS case and available funding in place, actual delivery of additional in-country support can take place within as little as 90 days from receipt of a formal request.

Additionally, the USCG's FMS program has very limited access to USCG "blue suiter" training teams. While the USCG maintains a Training Division at Yorktown, VA, for several reasons including the Training Division's own scarce resources and preexisting international commitments, the FMS program has had limited ability to incorporate those teams into FMS cases for new boats.

With few organic options in the USCG, there are several different ways that this additional support can be delivered through an FMS case. As part of the "total package" concept, there is an initial training program built in to every USCG FMS boat delivery. Generally this includes two to three weeks of training, delivered by a team from the boat manufacturer, at a location of the recipient's choosing in their home country.

Historically, this has been the only in-country support delivered, at least via the FMS case. As most veterans of maritime FMS programs will tell you, this initial training is simply not enough. More time is always needed, whether it is to enhance familiarity, incorporate more personnel, or just to compensate for inefficiencies caused by translation requirements, cultural differences, or logistical delays. Regardless of how smoothly the initial training goes, refresher training is needed after the partner nation has had the opportunity to operate their boats.

Several years ago a small number of countries who received boats through the USCG FMS program began inquiring as to how they could procure additional in-country support from the manufacturers. These inquiries lead to several cases that delivered multiple iterations of supplemental, manufacturer-provided assistance. The practical value of these programs became immediately apparent, as the additional involvement of the manufacturers had a direct impact on increasing the utility and availability of those assets. This concept gained traction, and in just the last year, more of than half of FMS cases for boats have included multiple iterations of in-country support. Additionally, another half dozen countries have requested that the residual funding on existing cases for boats be utilized to fund follow-on iterations of training and/or technical assistance. Some of these requests have come directly from the partner nations, some have been incorporated via recommenda-

tions from the USCG, and others were the result of ongoing dialogue between the stakeholders.

These follow-on sessions are usually delivered six to nine months after completion of the previous session and focus on a combination of repairs, maintenance and operator training. This sequence leaves the vast majority of the maintenance burden on the partner nation, but guarantees anything that cannot be resolved at the local level will be addressed by the manufacturer in a matter of months, during their next visit. It also helps maintain proficiency amongst the operators and maintainers, and mitigates the impact of loss and/or rotation of personnel. The USCG has several countries that are now into their third or fourth year of this format, and one partner nation has already submitted a Letter of Request to extend their in-country support to a full time, "24/7" presence, in support of their fleet of response boats.

Ultimately, the benefits of contractor-provided training lead to a genuine "win-win-win" for the three primary stakeholders (partner nation, U.S. Government, and commercial entity) in the FMS process. In the forefront of this trifecta is the recipient country, which reaps the most tangible benefits. The repair efforts, conducted in "train the trainer" format, not only directly address existing maintenance issues, but also serve as a practical training program for that partner nation's maintainers. The in-country presence of the manufacturer at intervals well beyond the initial delivery of the boats serves as a de facto replacement for warranty coverage in areas where warranty support is not practical. The more manufacturer-provided follow-on support that can be provided through an FMS case, the more the utility of newly acquired assets can be increased and the more the lifespan of those assets can be extended.

The U.S. Government also has much to gain from the shift to enhanced support packages. Buying new boats for another country may be considered a "win" in the FMS world, but if the boats are out of commission six months after delivery that short-term victory will quickly become a point of contention amongst the stakeholders. The higher the level of overall capabilities that a partner nation is able to maintain, the greater the level of utility they will generate from their FMS-acquired assets. This means more "bang for the buck" from every dollar spent by foreign countries on FMS and a greater collective satisfaction with the program. Mr. Tod Reinert, who leads the USCG's International Acquisition Programs, sums up the shift by saying, "Our mission is not to make sales or deliver assets, but instead to deliver capability and establish or further develop long-term partnerships. What we are seeing with this enhanced, vendor-provided, follow-on support is a very positive trend and is absolutely aligned with our mission.

The bilateral relationship is enhanced further by a regular schedule of follow-on visits, provided by the manufacturer, which directly address the technical and training shortfalls in that partner nation. Ultimately, when partner nations dedicate resources to maintaining their own assets, it ideologically aligns with the U.S. Government's goal of developing the concept of "ownership" amongst our allies.

While it may seem counterintuitive, the manufactures also benefit when partner nations shift away from "new boats" as the automatic answer to their maritime needs. On the most basic level, a shift from boats to follow-on support does not necessarily result in a loss of revenue; much, if not all, of the available funding still ends up going to the manufacturer, but for the procurement of services (which generally have much larger profit margins) instead of material goods. The ongoing involvement with equipment operated by the partner nations affords the manufacturers an opportunity to help maintain the equipment at optimal levels. Representatives of the boat manufacturers that work directly with the partner nations have a vested interest in the success of those FMS programs, perhaps more than any other stakeholder. Their livelihood depends, at least to some degree, on the relationships and ultimately the success of those boats and the resulting sense

of "ownership" incentivizes a heightened level of service. The more satisfied a partner nation is with the boats (or any other equipment) they have received and the support from the manufacturer to keep those boats running, the more likely they will choose to spend future FMS dollars with that same manufacturer, whether it be for more equipment or additional support.

Mr. Henry Irizarry is the Director of International Sales and Support for Metal Shark Boats, one of the manufacturers that has numerous ongoing FMS projects with the USCG. As a former USCG officer who worked for years in the Security Assistance arena, he also has first-hand experience developing FMS packages for maritime support with partner nations. He too has seen the shift in focus. "Their desire to maximize their operational capability … has led partner nations to team up with boat builders and protect their investment by establishing long-term strong working relationships that include training and technical support. This decision has led many countries to forego an additional asset to ensure training and support is included in their procurement". The more effective this change in strategy is, the better the result for all stakeholders.

The shift in focus from procuring new assets towards enhanced support packages for boats already in operation is spreading across geographical boundaries, differing capability levels, and the full range of force sizes. The USCG has active cases with countries in nearly every COCOM where partner nations have chosen to spend their available funding on enhanced support packages for their existing boats, instead of simply going out and buying new ones. While there are a number of motivating factors, the cost/benefit analysis being done by the partner nations is more frequently resulting in a sustainment plan that extends well beyond the initial delivery. Whatever the motivation for the shift, the new strategy is proving to be universally beneficial and an undisputed "win" for the USCG FMS program.

About the Author

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A Vision for Global Aviation Enterprise Development

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Any opinions, analysis, or recommendations offered by the author(s) are those of the author(s), and do not necessarily reflect the views of DISAM, DSCA, DOD or the USG.

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*…**we must focus American engagement on strengthening international institutions and galvanizing the collective action that can serve common interests** such as combating violent extremism; stopping the spread of nuclear weapons and securing nuclear materials; achieving balanced and sustainable economic growth; and forging cooperative solutions to the threat of climate change, armed conflict, and pandemic disease. **The starting point for that collective action will be our engagement with other countries…We are expanding our outreach to emerging nations, particularly those that can be models of regional success and stability, from the Americas to Africa to Southeast Asia**."*

– President Barack Obama, *National Security Strategy – May 2010*, 3 (emphasis added)

Introduction

A key pillar of the President's *National Security Strategy* (NSS),[1] which guides the entire U.S. government, is to leverage partnerships with other nations and international organizations to address the unique strategic, economic, and fiscal challenges facing the United States (U.S.). Leveraging partnerships includes:

- Creating and strengthening alliances and relationships
- Improving interoperability and cooperation between the United States and foreign militaries
- Improving intelligence and law enforcement cooperation with other nations
- Strengthening weak and failing states
- Working with others to foster economic development, strengthen institutions of democratic governance, and solve major international problems and crises.[2]

An important way of leveraging such partnerships is to assist partner nations (PNs) with their aviation enterprise development (AED). The United States Air Force (USAF) describes AED as "the plans, programs, and activities undertaken to develop the system-of-systems necessary for a nation to optimize employment of national aviation resources. The total aviation resource capacity and capability of a nation is defined by the sum total of all air domain resources including humans, aircraft, processes and infrastructure in both the civilian and military/security sectors."[3]

While the U.S. Government has assisted PN AED for years, such assistance has generally been ad hoc or short-term reactions to crises. For U.S. AED assistance to leverage partnerships effectively as directed by the NSS, it must instead be a deliberate, targeted, long-term effort closely tied to enduring American strategic

interests. To achieve this, the U.S. Government should produce a vision and associated strategy for global AED, either separately or as part of broader U.S. assistance guidance.

This article suggests a starting point for such a whole-of-government AED vision. It achieves this by first highlighting the importance of the global air domain to American strategic and economic interests overall and reminding that these benefits came, in part, from similar deliberative, strategic U.S. AED assistance after World War II. The article then argues why America should once again think strategically about its AED assistance given that U.S. strategic and economic interests are becoming increasingly tied to the emerging economies of Southeast Asia, South Asia, Africa, and Latin America, which are all poised to greatly expand their aviation enterprise. It then suggests a vision for the United States to guide its AED assistance to these emerging economies to ensure that America continues to benefit from the global air domain going into the foreseeable future

While written from an Airman's perspective, this suggested global AED vision deliberately considers the broad economic and security interests articulated in the NSS as well as Department of Defense (DOD) strategic guidance and regional plans. We have attempted to look beyond DOD equities and seek natural whole-of-government synergies that will enhance U.S. national security and freedom of action associated with the global air domain. However, any actual whole-of-government AED vision will undoubtedly need to include additional content than what is suggested here.

How the Global Air Domain Benefits the Nation

The United States is an air-faring nation that benefits tremendously by using the global air domain.[4] For example, America's utilization of the air domain has been essential in advancing all four enduring U.S. strategic interests articulated in the NSS: values, prosperity, security, and international order.

Values and the Air Domain. The NSS includes "respect for universal values at home and around the world" as an enduring U.S. strategic interest.[5] The air domain enables large-scale international travel and the corresponding mobility of ideas, capital, people, and associated values. According to recent statistics, 1,568 commercial airlines flying 23,844 commercial aircraft between 3,846 airports serving 34,756 city-pair routes commercial aviation transported over 2.6 billion passengers worldwide.[6] In addition, a significant part of AED assistance involves experts from the United States, Western Europe, and other nations working with the militaries and civilian authorities of various partner nations. Among other benefits, such cooperation and relationship building often helps expand universal democratic and human rights values.

Prosperity and the Air Domain. The NSS lists "a strong, innovative, and growing U.S. economy in an open international economic system that promotes opportunity and prosperity" as another enduring U.S. strategic interest.[7] The commercial use of the global air domain has significantly contributed to America's prosperity by directly generating U.S. economic activity and enhancing international commerce that benefits the United States. For example, the U.S. civil aviation industry:

- Generates $1.3 trillion in total U.S. economic activity each year
- Supports 10.2 million American jobs
- Accounts for 5.2 percent of the American economy[8]
- Contributes $86 billion in export sales to the U.S. economy (and is America's strongest export sector).[9] The United States exports 42 percent of all aerospace production and 72 percent of all civil aircraft it produces.[10] These exports, in turn, also have a major global economic impact given aviation's

total global economic impact (direct, indirect, induced, and tourism catalytic) is estimated at $2.2 trillion or 3.5 percent of global gross domestic product.[11]

Aviation's contribution to American prosperity is likely to increase even further in the future given that global air traffic is expected to double over the next 15 years.[12]

Furthermore, aviation significantly contributes to American prosperity through the medium of international trade. Indeed, aviation accounts for roughly one-third (34.6 percent) of global trade by value.[13] The U.S. share of this global trade is substantial. The United States annually exports roughly $1.5 trillion in merchandise and imports $2.3 trillion,[14] accounting for eight percent of all global exports and over twelve percent of all global imports.[15] In terms of the U.S. economy in 2012 ($15.7 trillion in GDP), that trade represents nearly $1.4 trillion in additional American income. Indeed, one analysis shows American real incomes are nine percent higher than they would otherwise have been as a result of trade liberalizing efforts since World War II.[16]

Security and the Air Domain. The NSS also identifies "the security of the United States, its citizens, and U.S. allies and partners" as an enduring strategic interest.[17] It highlights America's primary security issues or challenges as homeland security, counterterrorism counterproliferation, Middle East peace, investment in the capacity of strong and capable partners to improve regional stability and prevent conflict, and a secure cyberspace domain.[18] America's direct use of the global air domain is an essential enabler of activities to address these security challenges. In broad terms, American air power protects U.S. territory and American forces abroad from air attack. It also enables world-wide ground and naval operations by enabling direct effects, rapidly moving people and supplies across the globe, and providing essential global scale surveillance and reconnaissance.[19] Conversely, as detailed later, PNs with a capable aviation enterprise often assist the United States in addressing its security challenges because many internal security challenges of PNs – such as terrorists, transnational criminal organizations, and insurgents - also often threaten U.S. interests. The more PNs can address these mutual challenges to U.S. and PN security, the less the United States will need to deploy its forces directly.

International Order and the Air Domain. Finally, the NSS lists "an international order advanced by U.S. leadership that promotes peace, security, and opportunity through stronger cooperation to meet global challenges" as an enduring strategic interest.[20] Most of the benefits of the air domain to international order are discussed later in this article's suggested global AED vision. In short, aviation enables the United States, its allies, and its PNs to conduct operations that contribute to international order, both directly and in terms of improving the internal security and stability of key partners.

Returning to a Strategic Mindset in the Global Air Domain

These benefits of the air domain to the United States did not appear exclusively by chance. They were, in part, the result of important contributions by both U.S. civilian and military thinkers in the post-World War II reconstruction period who understood the strategic value of aviation. At a time when American leadership was shaping the institutions of the world and industrial policy at home, they drafted and executed a global U.S. AED strategy that had two key components: (1) investing at home in aviation transportation technology and infrastructure; and (2) shaping global AED through laws, institutions, infrastructure, and sales.

Abroad, the United States led the creation of international legal regimes. It convened the Chicago Conference, which set global air norms and provided a clear basis for overflight and the development of institutions such as the

International Civil Aviation Organization. The United States also assisted allied AED by funding the development of overseas runways in Europe and East Asia for both civil reconstruction and military posture. This was critical in their recovery and economic development after World War II. It also ensured an economically strong web of alliances that today form the stable zones of the world and the most vibrant nodes in the global economy.[21] In addition, these efforts put in place the infrastructure that the United States has successfully relied upon since to prevent and respond to crises in Europe, East Asia, and their periphery.

Today, America is confronted with a similar opportunity to help shape the global air domain to support its enduring strategic interests, this time in the emerging economies of Southeast Asia, South Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The global transportation map above highlights the differences between the extensive air networks of the industrialized world, developed in part by the global AED efforts of the United States after World War II, and the relatively sparse air networks in these emerging regions. Just as post-World War II reconstruction saw the development of many European and East Asian states, globalization[22] is expected to enable some three billion of the world's poorest citizens in these regions to urbanize and participate in the global economy over the next two decades.[23]

This presents both major challenges and opportunities for the United States and its enduring strategic interests of values, prosperity, security, and international order. In terms of promoting universal international values, if the expected AED in these regions is enabled by U.S. assistance, an excellent opportunity would arise for those values to spread and solidify in these regions.

In terms of prosperity, the expected rapid forthcoming AED growth in these regions provides a huge economic opportunity for the U.S. aviation industry as well as American trade writ large that can leverage the improved aviation infrastructure and stability. For example, within Southeast Asia, South Asia, Africa, and Latin America, Airbus projects the number of airports handling more than 10,000 long-haul passengers per day ("aviation megacities") to increase nearly four-fold (from 8 to 31) over the next

twenty years. This accounts for almost half of the expected growth in aviation megacities (42 of 92) worldwide during this period.[24]

In terms of security and international order, many U.S. security interests associated with terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, transnational criminal organizations, and secure trade routes are located in these emerging regions. As highlighted by the NSS and other strategic guidance, addressing these interests requires the assistance of PNs there to, among other things, to help prevent conflict, and, if necessary, to provide access to the United States and the international community during a crisis. America's key strategic and economic competitors know this and are already very active in these regions – particularly China and Russia. *If the United States wants to shape this unfolding change to ensure the global air domain will continue to effectively support its enduring strategic interests, it is time to again think strategically about where targeted U.S. AED assistance in these emerging regions will best advance these interests.*

The Need for National AED Guidance

Proactively shaping this evolving global air domain, however, requires U.S. AED assistance to be a deliberate, targeted, long-term effort closely tied to enduring American strategic interests, as envisioned in the recent Presidential Policy Directive 23 on security sector assistance (SSA). By contrast, for many years most U.S. AED assistance has been ad hoc or short-term reactions to crises. To address this, the U.S. Government should produce a vision and associated strategy for global AED, either separately or as part of broader U.S. assistance guidance, to guide and coordinate the whole-of-government effort. The U.S. Government already has the necessary resources in terms of expertise, authorities, and programs. However, they are spread out among various services and agencies such as the United States Agency for International Development, the Federal Aviation Administration, and the Departments of State, Homeland Security, Transportation, Commerce, Justice, as well as Defense. In addition, given ongoing fiscal challenges, the United States cannot afford to build partnerships everywhere. Therefore, it must make "thoughtful choices" about where to focus these efforts to best achieve its strategic objectives.[25]

A Proposed Vision for American AED Assistance

Below, we propose a starting point for a whole-of-government vision for global aviation assistance in the form of four desired end states. Each end state is focused on advancing the Nation's ability to fully leverage the distinctive capabilities of the global air domain and the American aviation enterprise – especially associated with the emerging economies previously described. Each provides lines of effort in which interagency planning and coordination is essential for success.

U.S. AED assistance should be focused on creating a global air domain in which:

1 - Partner Nations Have the Aviation Resources to Achieve Internal Security and Contribute to Regional Stability

Many PNs lack the aviation enterprise necessary to achieve their own internal security, much less contribute to regional stability. This often leads to ungoverned and under governed spaces where terrorists, transnational organized criminals, and other challenges to U.S. strategic interests can thrive. Even the most basic aviation enterprise can extend a PN's reach by enabling rapid response and improving situational awareness to combat internal threats and provide local humanitarian assistance. Using aviation to extend state reach contributes to PN internal security and supports global efforts to reduce ungoverned spaces where terrorists and

transnational criminal networks operate. Such visible, practical, and effective means to improve governance and provide basic services for the populace also enhances PN legitimacy.[26]

The aviation system required to support these ends must be capable of light lift, surveillance, and airdrop to provide lifelines to local communities that lack adequate road, river, or rail networks. Such an aviation system also must include airfields with sufficient support equipment, airfield operators, mechanics, logisticians, aviation medicine capability, and aircrews. This basic aviation system would lay the foundation for more advanced capabilities and could eventually enable some PNs to directly contribute to regional security or support coalition operations in regional security environments. *Therefore, U.S. AED assistance should focus on developing the aviation enterprise of select PNs for our mutual security.*

2 - The International Community Can Effectively Respond to Crises Anywhere in the World

Achieving this has three separate, but related, aspects. First, when a crisis grows beyond a nation's internal ability to handle, that nation must have an aviation enterprise capable of receiving outside help. However, many nations in the emerging regions of the developing world (especially in Africa) lack the basic aviation infrastructure (such as airports, airport security, storage, and/or cargo unloading capability) necessary to effectively receive international help – even humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. *Therefore, U.S. AED assistance should facilitate the construction or upgrading of aviation infrastructure to enable effective international assistance during a crisis.* An important step forward would be the creation of a U.S.-proposed international standard to certify airports for humanitarian/disaster response operations.

Second, the United States cannot effectively respond to every crisis in the world and needs the help of capable PNs that can contribute aviation resources (such as airlift) for rapid assistance. *Therefore, U.S. AED assistance should also facilitate the acquisition of airlift in capable PNs that can effectively respond to crises and coordinate agreements between them to enable regional and global crisis response.*

Lastly, neither the United States nor the international community can rapidly respond to crises if they fail to build and maintain overflight rights for the necessary route structures. *Therefore, the United States should work with PNs to design a desired global route structure that permits rapid crisis response worldwide and secure the necessary enabling partnerships.*

3 –The Global Aviation Enterprise is Safely Operated, Secure, and Well-Supported

As previously noted, the global air domain is a key conduit for the movement of people, technology, capital, and information around the world. This greatly benefits America's economic and security interests and helps spread universal international values. Maintaining these benefits requires all nations to have access to a global aviation enterprise (especially non-military civil aviation) that is safely operated, secure, and well-supported. A safely operated aviation enterprise is one whose operations and activities are conducted in a reliable manner according to international standards. A secure aviation enterprise is one that deters and prevents bad actors from attacking or otherwise disrupting operations and from using air transport as a vector of illicit activity or attack. A supported aviation enterprise is one that is effectively sustained over time to ensure efficiency and effectiveness. *Therefore, U.S. AED assistance should also be used to ensure the global aviation enterprise is safely operated, secured, and well-supported.*

4 - America Becomes the Aviation Security Partner of Choice to Nations with Emerging Aviation Enterprises

The United States seeks to be the security partner of choice and pursue new partnerships with a growing number of nations.[27] U.S. AED assistance can be an effective tool in achieving this objective. The aviation enterprise is a complex system. When a country purchases capabilities to enhance its aviation enterprise, it is usually entering into a multi-decade relationship with the seller nation that often includes opportunities for improved interoperability, access, and future sales.

However, the United States is clearly not the aviation security partner of choice throughout the emerging regions of the world discussed here. For example, the United States only accounted for 17 percent of supersonic combat aircraft, one percent of subsonic combat aircraft, 11 percent of other military aircraft, and 14 percent of military helicopters delivered to the developing world between 2004 and 2011. This adds up to a total "market share" of sales in the developing world of all military aircraft types of only 13 percent during this period. In three of the emerging regions of particular interest to this article, U.S. market share of military aviation sales is mostly worse: 16 percent in Latin America, 7 percent in the Asia/Pacific region, and zero percent in Africa during this period. By comparison, China and Russia combined have a 42 percent military aviation market share in the developing world globally during the same period, 29 percent in Latin America, 54 percent in the Asia/Pacific region, and 44 percent in Africa. This would not be as much of a concern if close U.S. allies were filling much of the remaining market share, but they are not.[28]

The specific reasons why this is so vary country by country. In part, existing U.S. laws, policies, and authorities governing security cooperation and assistance often do not position America to effectively and affordably address these needs of emerging air forces compared to its strategic competitors.[29] Former Defense Secretary Robert Gates wrote that America's interagency tool kit is "still a hodgepodge of jury-rigged arrangements constrained by a dated and complex patchwork of authorities, persistent shortfalls in resources, and unwieldy processes." In the meantime, he noted "other countries that do not suffer from such encumbrances have been more quickly funding projects, selling weapons, and building relationships." Secretary Gates also added that "convincing other countries and leaders to be partners of the United States, often at great political and physical risk, ultimately depends on proving that the United States is capable of being a reliable partner over time."[30] Unfortunately, however, existing laws and authorities rarely enable security assistance beyond a year or two at a time. In addition, Assistant Secretary of Political-Military Affairs Andrew Shapiro recently alluded to various complaints by potential partner nations about the U.S. arms transfer process such as: onerous rules and procedures, intrusive monitoring, rigorous investigations of potential violations, and an unpredictable and uncertain export control process.[31]

However, one reason the United States is not the aviation security partner of choice in these emerging markets may be that it has not developed a concerted program to offer them what they need.[32] The aviation needs and resources of emerging air forces are often different from those of fully developed air forces. They may only need to learn basic airmanship and gain experience with maintenance and operations. Many need to obtain and operate transferable, affordable, modular, and sustainable aircraft that more closely resemble what the United States uses for customs, border protection, and law enforcement as opposed to advanced combat. By contrast, America's security related aviation sales and assistance processes are clearly geared towards other advanced militaries. *Therefore, within the limits*

of existing U.S. laws, policies, and authorities, U.S. AED assistance must serve the actual needs of emerging air forces throughout the world to advance our mutual security and prosperity.[33]

Conclusion

To summarize, the United States is an air-faring nation that benefits tremendously by using the global air domain to support its enduring strategic interests of security, prosperity, values, and international order. In part, these benefits have been a result of a deliberate, strategic U.S. AED assistance effort that followed World War II, especially among what is widely considered the industrialized world in Europe and parts of Asia. Given American strategic interests are becoming increasingly tied to the emerging economies in Southeast and South Asia, Africa, and Latin America, and those areas are all widely expected to pursue significant AED, America should once again think deliberately and strategically about its AED assistance in these regions. This is especially critical if the United States intends to shape AED in these emerging economies rather than cede such influence to its strategic competitors. Such an AED assistance effort requires a strategic perspective as well as whole-of-government planning and collaboration. It is our hope the above suggested framework offers a starting point for a whole-of-government AED vision and strategy to provide this focus.

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[1]While an updated NSS is being written at the time of this article, the themes of the forthcoming version are consistent with the NSS themes cited here (and, if anything, are further emphasized).

[2]President of the United States, *National Security Strategy – May 2010*, 11-12, 26-27.

[3]U.S. Air Force, *2011 USAF Global Partnership Strategy*, 38.

[4]By the "air domain," we mean "the atmosphere, beginning at the Earth's surface, extending to the altitude where its effects upon [air] operations become negligible." Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-30, *Command and Control for Joint Air Operations*, 12 January 2010, GL-5.

[5]President of the United States, *National Security Strategy – May 2010*, 17.

[6]*Aviation Benefits Beyond Borders*, Air Transport Action Group, March 2012, 2-4.

[7]President of the United States, *National Security Strategy – May 2010*, 17.

[8]Federal Aviation Administration, "The Economic Impact of Civil Aviation on the U.S. Economy," August 2011, 5.

[9]U.S. Department of Commerce, "The Aerospace Industry in the United States," http://selectusa.commerce.gov/print/industry-snapshots/aerospace-industry-united-states.

[10]U.S. Department of Commerce, "Resources for Aerospace Manufacturers and Their Suppliers," http://www.commerce.gov/blog/2011/06/20/resources-aerospace-manufacturers-and-their-suppliers.

[11]*Aviation Benefits Beyond Borders*, Air Transport Action Group, March 2012, 2, 7.

[12]"Developing a Global Safety Strategy That Responds to States' Varying Needs," *International Civil Aviation Organization Journal*, Vol. 68, No.5, 2013, 6. See: http://www.icao.int/publications/journalsreports/2013/6805_en.pdf.

[13]*Aviation Benefits Beyond Borders*, Air Transport Action Group, March 2012, 4.

[14]See the World Trade Organization website at: http://stat.wto.org/CountryProfile/WSDBCountryPFView.aspx?Language=E&Country=U.S..

17]President of the United States, *National Security Strategy – May 2010*, 17.

[18]President of the United States, *National Security Strategy – May 2010*, 17-28.

[19]For a U.S. Air Force perspective on how air power benefits U.S. national security, see *Global Vigilance, Global Reach, Global Power for America*, 2013. For a U.S. Navy perspective on air power, see *Naval Aviation Vision*, January 2012.

[20]President of the United States, *National Security Strategy – May 2010*, 17.

[21]For background, see: http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/space/terrill.pdf, http://www.archives.gov/research/guide-fed-records/groups/340.html, http://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=463321http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=14145,http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=77956,http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=77956, http://www.icao.int/publications/pages/doc7300.aspx.

[22]There are various definitions of "globalization" that touch on the same concept. We use the Defense Intelligence Agency's definition: "reduction of barriers to free movement ofgoods, people, information, services, ideas, and money internationally, producing a more interconnectedworld." Defense Intelligence Agency, "Joint Strategic Assessment 2010 – 2030," 21 May 2010, 16.

[23]For a comprehensive analysis of the ongoing and projected growth and development within the developing world, see United Nations Development Programme, *Human Development Report 2013 - The Rise of the South: Human Progress in a Diverse World*.

[24]Airbus, *Global Market Forecast 2012-2031: Navigating the Future*, 2012, 37, 40.

[15]See the World Trade Organization website at: http://stat.wto.org/CountryProfile/WSDBCountryPFView.aspx?Language=E&Country=U.S..

[16]See the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative's website at: http://www.ustr.gov/trade-topics/economy-trade.

[25]"A reduction in resources will require innovative and creative solutions to maintain our support for allied and partner interoperability and building partner capacity. However, with reduced resources, thoughtful choices will need to be made regarding the location and frequency of these operations."President of the United States, *Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense,* January 2012, 5-6.

[26]The Department of Defense defines "irregular warfare" (IW)as a "violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations." U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Publication 1-02: *Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, 148. The IW Joint Operating Concept further emphasizes "the contest for legitimacy and influence over a population will be won primarily through persistent effort to enable a legitimate and capable local partner to address the conflict's causes and provide security, good governance, and economic development." U.S. Department of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Irregular Warfare: Countering Irregular Threats Joint Operating Concept*, *Version 2.0*, May 17, 2010, 16-17. Finally, USAF IW doctrine similarly notes that "the desired IW end state is a self-sufficient partner with a supportive population." Air Force Doctrine Document 3-2: *Irregular Warfare*, March 15, 2013, 12.

[27]President of the United States, *Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense,* January 2012, 3.

[28]Grimmett, Richard and Kerr, Paul, "Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 2004-2011," Congressional Research Service, Washington, DC, 24 August 2012, 64-68.

[29]For details, see, for example, Livingston, Thomas, "Building the Capacity of Partner States Through Security Force Assistance," Congressional Research Service, Washington, DC, 5 May 2011, 51-54.

[30]Robert M. Gates, "Helping Others Defend Themselves," *Foreign Affairs,* May/June 2010. See: http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/66224/robert-m-gates/helping-others-defend-themselves.

[31]Shapiro, Andrew, "Remarks to Defense Trade Advisory Group," 26 July 2012, See: www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/rm/195609.htm.

[32]For example: "Air component staffs agreed in their interviews that they need platforms that not only can be employed to conduct [irregular warfare] IW and [building partner] BP missions, but must also be transferrable, affordable, modular, and interoperable (TAMI). If there are no adequate U.S.-made platforms for this purpose, the only alternative is that other suppliers (primarily Russia and China) will fill this role and diminish U.S. influence." *U.S. Air Force Irregular Warfare Tiger Team: Observations and Recommendations*, 22 May 2009, 5.

[33]Indeed, PPD-23 emphasizes that "partner capacity can only be sustained over the long term when partner governments have the political will, absorptive capacity, credible and effective institutions, willingness to independently sustain U.S. investments, an equal stake in the success of SSA initiatives, and policy commitment to security sector reform. United States Government SSA efforts must be sensitive to these requirements, including anticipation of partner capacity, sustainment and oversight needs…" President of the United States, "Presidential Policy Directive/PPD-23," 5 April 2013, 4-5.

Leading the Army's Security Assistance Enterprise

By USASAC Public Affairs

Unifying numerous and diverse organizations toward a common goal is a challenge even when leadership exercises direct authority over the supporting entities. But "leading when you're not in charge," may seem impossible.

The U.S. Army Security Assistance Command (USASAC) directs a large enterprise that executes Security Assistance and Foreign Military Sales programs for 145 different countries and agencies. It is currently executing the largest, most complex program in the U.S. Army's history. USASAC is aligned by Combatant Commands, but its 71 Country Program Managers (CPMs) are the focal point for the U.S. Army's Security Assistance relationship with countries across the globe. USASAC employs six governing principles in leading this enterprise of multiple organizations, the same organizations that acquire, field and sustain systems for U.S. Army units (Army Materiel Command's Life Cycle Management Commands, the Program Executive Offices, Army Contracting Command, TRADOC amongst many others).

The principles have provided a unifying framework that has dramatically improved all aspects of managing our FMS cases, thereby strengthening the relationships we enjoy with our international partners. While these rules have been effectively applied in the Army Security Assistance Enterprise (ASAE), they're equally applicable in directing any large network of disparate organizations that work together to meet a common mission.

Our six rules for "leading when you are not in charge" include: 1) Establish Coherent Authorities; 2) Establish a Common Operating Picture for all members; 3) Communicate Enterprise Priorities 4) Focus on Outputs 5) Exercise Proactive Leadership; and 6) Cooperate and Collaborate. They have shaped both the culture and integration of the ASAE.

Establish Coherent Authorities

Establishing coherent authorities required defining the responsibilities of enterprise members at each step in a very prescriptive, complex FMS process. The collaborative revision of Department of the Army (DA) Pamphlet (PAM) 12-1, "Security Assistance Procedures and Operations" by all agencies yielded a framework to describe supported and supporting relationships throughout the FMS execution process.

"This document, for the first time in many, many years lays out what each of the ASAE elements should be doing in their areas of functional responsibility," Ulysses (Dusty) Rhodes, Deputy Director of USASAC's G-5 Directorate explained. "Whether an organization has the lead or is a supporting element of a particular program, DA PAM 12-1 provides the guidance on integrating the process."

The pamphlet provides detailed instructions and procedures for implementing the policies contained in Army Regulation (AR) 12-1. It addresses the initiation, administration, implementation, and execution of FMS cases, as well as other assigned Security Assistance (SA) programs.

"I think reading the PAM gives you a perspective of the entire process and not just your own little piece," Sandy Long, Director

of Policy of Resources, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Defense Exports and Cooperation (DASA-DEC), added.

Establish a Common Operating Picture for all Enterprise Organizations

Establishing coherent authorities also meant that enterprise members needed more visibility of not just their portions of the process, but also required the ability to "see" what others are doing, when milestones are reached, the status of each and every FMS cases, or more simply put, a Common Operating Picture (COP).

The COP essentially attaches a GPS tag to each FMS case, allowing all in the enterprise to take appropriate action in the expeditious development and execution of cases. The COP integrates case information from several data sources to provide end-to-end visibility of the FMS process … from initial Letters of Requests from countries to ultimate case closure. The COP facilitates better coordination across all enterprise agencies throughout the life-cycle of a case in areas such as requirements definition, contracting, acquisition, finance, logistics, and even training support.

"The COP provides a unified representation of several contracting, financial and supply database systems, and by linking these systems, it creates enterprise-wide visibility critical for the FMS and acquisition communities," James Meredith, Communications and Electronics Command (CECOM), Life-Cycle Management Command (LCMC) Security Assistance Management Directorate (SAMD) director, explained. "This has been extremely beneficial in eliminating boundaries between CECOM, USASAC and other organizations," he added.

The technical leaps made by the enterprise will not necessarily lead to a cultural change, but it does pave the way for a new dynamic among members.

"Technology can transform some aspects of the environment," Robert Brown, USASAC G-6 director, said. While the COP consolidated the data into one system providing visibility for all enterprise members, the customized dashboards are what really take the enterprise to the next level, according to Brown.

"It focuses the user on what needs immediate attention in their areas or responsibility," Brown explained.

The dashboard was originally developed for senior leaders (Senior Enterprise Leader Dashboard, or SLED) to pinpoint issues and priorities without having to "drill down" through the COP. The success of the initial dashboard spawned a Country Program Managers (CPM) dashboard, a Regional Operations (RO) dashboard and a SAMD dashboard (currently in development) and will eventually produce a DASA-DEC dashboard.

The CPMs developed their dashboard requirements, according to Leslie Davis, a CPM in the CENTCOM Regional Operations Directorate.

"The CPMs wanted a more personalized tool … one that would provide more detail to help us manage the process, alert us when an action is required on our end to keep things moving, and one that would allow us to collaborate, within it, with key players across the enterprise."

Similarly, for the SAMD-level dashboard, Meredith described the requirements as including, "Expanding the sorting ability – SAMD needs to be able to sort by their unique organizational structures (divisions, case managers, weapon system managers, etc.), so each individual can tailor the COP to their specific needs."

Meredith also touched upon wanting a "drill-down" capability, giving the example of the dashboard reflecting 50 FMS cases in development, the SAMD would need to be able to see all cases that are in development with their respective status and all applicable information. The results being one-click in the dashboard providing all relevant case development information.

The new COP and dashboard technologies suggested the enterprise needed to change its operational procedures to fully exploit the new capabilities they provided. USASAC changed the focus of the weekly Enterprise Synchronization

Meetings (SYNCH) to a more detailed review of performance in specific segments of the FMS process, with all enterprise members participating. This enabled the close scrutiny of all 4600+ cases every month vice the previous attention on a few high priority countries and cases.

Communicating Enterprise Priorities

The third principle, Communicating Enterprise Priorities, is accomplished through flagging of specific high-priority cases in the COP to provide awareness to all enterprise agencies on a continual basis. Next, the weekly SYNCH meeting evolved from preparing for the monthly Equipment Distribution Review Board (EDRB) with Department of the Army and Defense representatives focused almost entirely on case priorities for Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan into a meeting that focuses on both priority and routine cases across all Combatant Commands (COCOMs).

"There was a conscious decision by the Commanding General (Maj. Gen. Del Turner) to expand the scope of the SYNCH from the CENTCOM-focused EDRB to a virtual EDRB-type review of all COCOM programs. Eventually the virtual EDRB yielded to our current COP-driven SYNCH meetings," Col. Marvin Whitaker, USASAC G-5 director, said. "This … had a unifying effect on participants. The COP incorporated more cases in development, contracting information, and then ACC (Army Contracting Command) regional contracting officers were participating alongside the SAMD directors and this led to a more strategic meeting," Whitaker explained.

Meredith sees first-hand the benefits the SYNCH has had on communication priorities. Meredith explained: "The COP has impacted the overall operational standard in a positive way. By utilizing this system, all SYNCH participants can prepare and execute using the same set of data. This is allowing everyone to continuously be on the same page during the meeting and making the best use of time." Meredith also sees the benefits of incorporating Army Contracting Command (ACC) information and personnel more prominently into the SYNCH meetings so "they can hear what the priorities are and know what contract award they should shift, if need be."

Focus on Outputs

It's very easy for operators within a tedious process to confuse *activity* with *results* and think of meetings, emails, phone conversations, etc. as indicators of success. The fourth rule, Focus on Outputs, demands all enterprise operators to remain focused on the many intermediate milestones, actions and deliveries that move a FMS case expeditiously through the process. It is essential that enterprise leaders establish the "measures that matter," those important milestones and indicators that ensure the U.S. Army keeps its promises to our international customer/partner. USASAC actively "leads" each FMS case through the many segments of case development, implementation and execution by focusing on the end product of each intermediate segment in the process – one organization's output is another's input for the next task to be performed.

USASAC has drastically reduced the time required to deliver a valid offer of goods and services in response to a country's request – all done by focusing on the hand-off of outputs between the many players involved in case development. Finished products, of much higher quality, are being "moved" through the process much faster as a result of better visibility and this focus on production.

John Neil, Director of USASAC's Performance Management Office, describes how a schedule promise for delivering a system to our customers becomes a Line Commitment Date (LCD) that drives the enterprise's activities. USASAC will measure performance based on offering the item for shipments by this LCD date resulting in a percent shipped by LCD as the metric. Through collaboration with the Army's Contracting Command, USASAC can now "see" all pertinent contracting milestones supporting

FMS sales and deliveries. Since initial receipt of this data in early 2013, the improvement in meeting our LCDs has been significant.

"For items where we see both Acquisition Requirement Package (ARP) data and Contact Award Date (CAD) data in our system we have about 14 percent better performance in meeting the LCD. This information allows our leaders to more effectively collaborate with ACC to adjust contracting priorities to meet promises we've made to our customer. Receiving the contracting milestones has been huge for us; we've seen great improvements in our performance and we expect that to continue to in the future," Neil stated.

Much of customer satisfaction is based on feedback from the Foreign Procurement Group (FPG), which is a large group of FMS customers that engage the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) and industry on issues of concern common to all FMS customers. Their top two priorities for 2013-2014 are: "1) Increase FMS customer visibility and participation in the FMS acquisition and contracting process, and 2) seek greater FMS process improvement."

Neil briefed the FPG last year, and members indicated they would like to have visibility of the contracting milestones. According to Neil, these could be provided to customers through the Security Cooperation Information Portal, or SCIP, as the Army has no issue with the release of these data points because there is no sensitive contracting data provided such as price negations. In seeking greater FMS process improvement, much like the priority for visibility of the acquisition and contracting process, customers are looking for greater transparency of reports and information when required.

Exercise Proactive Leadership

The fifth rule, Exercise Proactive Leadership, is an essential mindset for directing enterprise actions. With fragmented agencies required to perform separate, distinct and complex tasks to ensure a legal, executable FMS offer, it is necessary that one "trail boss" actively leads a case from development through execution – coordinating and synchronizing those disparate actions. USASAC's CPMs and Regional Operations Directors, enabled by the COP, can now provide that leadership.

Visibility of each case's progression through development and execution allows leaders at all levels to influence actions to meet promises to customers. Leaders know which cases are tagged as COCOM priority cases and intensively manage their successful completion. Country Program Managers are able to more effectively lead their enterprise teammates in the development and completion of routine cases. Leaders at each of ACC's Contracting Centers focus on timely execution of contracting actions to ensure on-time delivery of goods and services to allies.

Leaders and managers now have the tools to be proactive; they must also possess the personal skills to lead effectively. USASAC is executing a very rigorous operational training program that will extend to major enterprise organizations in the future. A program of computer-based and contact training, developmental assignment program and institutional training provided by Defense Institute for Security Assistance Management (DISAM) ensure that all Army enterprise practitioners are fully qualified.

The increased emphasis on training has helped standardize knowledge and promote a cultural change.

"Many years ago, when I was a Security Cooperation Officer, the CPM was the point of contact for the FMS process throughout the life-cycle of the case, but there seems to have been a departure from that at some point," Whitaker noted.

Turner believes the shift came because of disruptions from the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) that relocated USASAC HQs from Fort Belvoir, Va., to Redstone Arsenal AL. The BRAC move resulted not only in lost experience but also a change in culture.

"We are now seeing the 'focal point' shift back to the CPMs and USASAC to 'lead' the enterprise and oversee the life-cycle of the process," Whitaker concluded.

Cooperation and Collaboration

Cooperation and Collaboration, the sixth guiding principle, also relies on all three Portfolio of Initiatives (POIs), but is most significantly impacted by the "See" POI. The COP, and its newest counterpart, Casebook, are designed to move enterprise members away from the two-communication methods of phones and e-mail, and move toward what Brown sees as the new social business network. Casebook, in particular, allows for more dynamic coordination of each FMS case by all enterprise residents in a virtual meeting space. It will allow documents and information to be posted for all enterprise members to see, discuss and follow, and to focus discussions and create "groups" that focus on areas ranging from countries, to weapon systems or lessons learned. Casebook also prevents institutional knowledge that may be lost in e-mail documentation that is not retained when employees depart.

Summary

Turner views leading and unifying the enterprise as not just process improvement, but as a necessity.

"The environment is changing … our workload has dramatically increased. We are executing twice the number of cases we did just ten years ago, with more amendments and modifications associated with each of those cases. We are executing cases with over 20 new countries from just seven years ago. Programs and authorities are also becoming increasingly more complex ranging from additional funding authorities, all with different executing parameters, to increased use of the Excess Defense Articles (EDA) divestiture (USASAC is currently developing or executing over 70 separate requests from 30 countries for some 70,000 excess articles)," Turner said. He points to progress being made through more integrated operations, improved visibility throughout the enterprise and improved workforce proficiency. "These are changes that could not be made through the classic, corporate, hierarchical model, but came through the individual enterprise components adhering to a set of six simple rules."

Two essential command functions support USASAC's leadership of the enterprise through these guiding principles – an "operationalized" strategic planning process and effective alignment of enterprise resources to the mission workload.

USASAC employs a dynamic strategic planning and execution process that continually assesses its progress toward the future vision for the enterprise through developing and reviewing POIs that operationalize that vision. As the six principles were being implemented, it became clear that the enterprise did not have all the capabilities or tools required to effectively operate. Specific, actionable initiatives were developed to move toward a more collaborative, "self-organizing" enterprise and to track the improvement efforts across the enterprise. Progress on these initiatives are reviewed at quarterly leadership "huddles" and the portfolio is refreshed annually; initiatives are prioritized and resourced, added and deleted, consistent with the vision.

USASAC allocates resources to its primary enterprise members (the SAMDs in the LCMCs and the ACC) for civilian pay/allowances, travel and operational expenses. The very dynamic nature of foreign sales, of many systems and services, coming from 145 different countries significantly impacts workload variance across the enterprise. Recent sales are good forecasts of future workload. USASAC now utilizes Activity-based Costing to accurately allocate funding to projected workload levels.

For Turner, the success of unifying the enterprise is seen in a wide-range of improvements such as the increase in customer satisfaction metrics, continuation of strong sales, exceptional close-outs of special Department of Defense programs such as Section 1206 and Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) programs. And most importantly, process improvement has resulted in significantly lower processing times

for Letters of Offer and Acceptance (LOA); a decrease in the percentage of deficient cases submitted to DSCA's quality control division Case Writing Development (CWD) returns; a decrease in problem Supply Discrepancy Reports; and decrease in the number of problem EDRB cases.

Turner is enthusiastic about the results, "In just about every 'customer satisfaction' metric, we are doing better than twice as good as we did just a few years ago."

"I have travelled to over 40 countries over the past two plus years and met with over 300 senior leaders of foreign militaries. They all love USASAC and the job the Security Assistance Enterprise is doing to deliver equipment, training and services, on time and within their budget. More importantly, they have tremendous respect for the United States and our Army. They very much want to maintain our strong relationships. And that's what it's all about."

"We know where we are going as an enterprise, and how we are going to get there," Turner concluded. "We're all about promises, process and people. Our people are what make the process and promises happen, and they have taken the enterprise to a new level." And it was all done while "leading, without being in charge."

Human Trafficking in the Indo-Asia-Pacific Region

By Hannah Collins
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Any opinions, analysis, recommendations, or conclusions should be attributed to the author, and is not necessary the view of the USCG, DISAM, DSCA, DOD, or the USG

WHAT IS HUMAN TRAFFICKING?

It has been stated by President Obama and acknowledged by many world leaders that trafficking in persons is a form of modern slavery that violates human rights, country security, economies, and public health in every state (State 2014). For this reason, the United States has been playing an active role in combating human trafficking at home and abroad in an effort to protect U.S. interests, security, citizens, and allies.

Human Trafficking is a complex system that encompasses a wide variety of behaviors and actions. The United States simply defines trafficking in persons as 'The use of force, fraud, or coercion to compel a person to provide labor, services or commercial sex. This includes elements of recruiting, harboring, transportation, providing or obtaining a person for the purpose of exploitation.' The three most common forms of trafficking that are recognized by the U.S. include Labor Trafficking, Sex Trafficking, and Child Soldiering (Defense 2014).

Figures of how many victims are involved in human trafficking and the revenue this crime brings in each year are all estimations based on arrests and survivor accounts. Accurate figures are not available due to the secrecy of the crime and fear on behalf of the victims in escaping or reporting their captors, in large part in fear of physical retribution to themselves or family. Today there are believed to be 12 to 27 million people enslaved and exploited through human trafficking. This illicit crime network brings in $30 billion dollars annually (USAID 2013).

Traffickers violate many state and international laws while exploiting victims. When trafficking in persons, the main objective of a trafficker is to keep the victim under control as much as possible until payment is received. To accomplish this, victims are usually transported to different countries, commonly through highly traveled economic trade routes but also through illegal avenues such as borders with limited security. Trafficked persons are typically taken to other countries because of the unfamiliarity with the environment, culture, and language which makes trafficked persons isolated and solely dependent on the Trafficker. Traffickers rely on the use of fake passports or papers and bribery of boarder security guards and other officials to cross borders. Victims are commonly physically abused and threatened which also aids in the compliance to traffickers' demands. While it is common for victims to be transported outside the country of origination, trafficking can and does take place inside the country of origin. The common feature between trafficking

within a country and outside of it is that victims are moved from their home location where they have personal connections to an area that they do not know well and have no personal connections.

While trafficking affects every demographic of the world's population, women and children are the most vulnerable to being trafficked. It is estimated that 70% of trafficking victims around the world are women. This is due to multiple factors that include the inequality of women in society-which comprises the social constraints of duty to family, lack of or poor education, and poverty (Anstadt 2013).

The system of human trafficking is highly organized and relies on multiple people to carry out its goal of exploitation. There is typically a recruiter, transporter and maintainer at the basic level with multiple people involved in each category which can, and does, span across countries, regions, and the world.

It is common in this organized crime for traffickers to participate in other areas of crime alongside human trafficking. Drug trafficking is commonly found alongside human trafficking due to the established routes and connections already in place within the human trafficking network (Munro 2012).

HUMAN TRAFFICKING IN THE INDO-ASIA-PACIFIC REGION

History

The Asian region has a history of condoned prostitution. In the 1800s, China had a system of prostitution that correlated to the classes in society and typically exploited women. Many women were sold into prostitution by family members due to the cultural idea of the 'lesser value' of girls compared to boys. Families believed that girls were a cost to the family as they would leave the family once married and they were obligated to pay a dowry for this marriage which could incur financial hardship. During this period of China, opium addictions were prevalent among the population; many daughters were sold into prostitution by drug addicted family members for money to support this habit. A few families sold their daughters into prostitution due to basic poverty. Other women chose prostitution due to their own poor finances or abusive living situations (Gronewold 1985).

There were specific brothels for the gentry, the middle class and the poor. Younger girls who were believed to be pretty were commonly placed in the gentry brothels or were even lower gentry themselves. As the girl got older, and her looks decreased, she was usually sold to different houses, typically progressing lower in status. The excitement and pomp and circumstance surrounding the virginity of young prostitutes aided in the attractiveness of young girls over older ones. Families received higher payments from brothel owners, and the owner received a significant amount of money as well from their sale (Gronewold 1985).

Women entered this system in debt to the brothel owner which accounted for the money given to her seller. Women were given a small wage for their services but were required to pay the brothel owner rent and work related materials such as clothing and make up that the brothel owner required women to wear. This left the women with very little or no money and increased their debt to the owner, which strengthened the debt bondage. Not many women were able to escape this system but those who did typically used tips and gifts given to them from clients to pay off her debts. Rarely, some women were able to leave this system through a client who would purchase a favorite prostitute to be a concubine, to become one of his multiple wives, and at times, even more rarely, to be his first wife. More commonly, women would spend their time being sold from one brothel to another where she would finally end her career and life in abject poverty at the lowest class brothel. China's system of prostitution was similar around the Asian region such as in Japan and Korea (Gronewold 1985).

This unique cultural practice of prostitution aided in the expansion of exploitation later in the region. In 1931, after the colonialization of the

Korean peninsula and the beginning of World War II in the East, Japan began a system of militarized sexual slavery in Northern China. Military officers noticed the determent of venereal diseases on military personnel which they attributed to members' relations with Chinese prostitutes. In an effort to control the spread of venereal diseases and to curb the military rape of the native population, the Japanese military created a program commonly referred to as 'Comfort Women.' Military brothels were established on and near military bases and staffed with prostitutes that were required to receive monthly medical inspections. Prostitutes were first brought from Japan as the Chinese prostitutes were assumed to be disease ridden. The first Comfort Women stations were for officers and were encouraged to attend as a leisure activity since they typically received no leave to return home during this time period. Military officers paid a very small fee to attend, but the women received very little to none of the money(Chung 1997, Tanaka 2002).

The Comfort Stations became very popular throughout the Japanese military. As such, the military began increasing Comfort Stations throughout military instillations and opened the practice to all members. As the Comfort Stations expanded, there were no longer enough Japanese prostitutes to fulfill the demand so Japan looked to women of other nationalities. Comfort Stations were set up everywhere the Japanese military was present. As the war became more brutal, Comfort Stations were even set up on front lines. Due to their popularity and wide spread use, there were never enough women to fill the demand for Comfort Stations. The Japanese military drew heavily upon Korean colonists, where the majority were living in abject poverty due



The map above illustrates Japanese expansion during World War II. Everywhere the military was present so were Comfort Stations and the exploitation of women. Numerous countries experienced the exploitation of their women at the hands of the Japanese (Burns 2012).

to the region's exploitation by the Japanese and were kidnapped, coerced, or lied to in order to fill Comfort Women positions. This practice of coercion and force was also used towards native populations to help fill positions. Korean women commonly served three years as Comfort Women but many served longer if they were far from home. Native populations typically served lesser time, anywhere between three months to a year (Chung 1997, Henson 1999). The Japanese military continued the practice of Comfort Stations until the end of World War II even though Comfort Stations did not curb the spread of venereal diseases or the abuse of native populations.

Women in the Comfort Stations were horrifically mistreated. Physical abuse at the hands of soldiers was a common occurrence. Women would be forced to work long hours and saw anywhere from 20 to 40 men a day, which they were never allowed to turn away. Due to such practices, many women became infertile, suffered physical deformities, developed posttraumatic stress disorder, and dealt with social stigmas and shame from society if they were eventually able to return home. Women who contracted venereal diseases were 'sent away' which is understood to be that they were killed by military overseers of the Stations. Some women became pregnant and chose to have an abortion, which they performed themselves, as Comfort Stations would not allow the women to keep children. As the war was nearing its end and the fighting became even more severe, Comfort Stations, along with the women, were abandoned. Many women lost their lives due to military advances and withdraws. Those who survived such abandonments usually never made it back to their homes. Some women who were favored by Japanese soldiers were murdered alongside them as they committed suicide (Henson 1999, Tanaka 2002).

The Japanese government kept the military mobilization of sexual slavery a quiet issue until 1991 when a group of Korean former Comfort Women filed a lawsuit against the Japanese government for their actions against them in World War II and the issue gained world attention (Tanaka 2002). This issue has not yet been resolved and still continues to disrupt relations between both Koreas and Japan. In current events, the issue has gained more fervordue to the idea of limited time for reconciliation of the dwindling numbers of living former Comfort Women. Of the 200,000 total estimated Comfort Women in World War II, 80% are estimated to have been Korean, and only 55 known women are alive today (Hancocks 2014).

The Japanese military mobilization of women for the use of sexual slavery is a form of human trafficking that the Asian region had to contend with in the past, and in some cases still today. Today, the demographic of victims trafficked in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region is still dominated by females.

Causes of Human Trafficking

While trafficking occurs across the globe and within states, intra-regional human trafficking is high within the Indo-Asia-Pacific region. Poverty is a major cause of the intra-regional trafficking due to the large disparity of economic growth between states. Many persons from economically struggling states seek better opportunities outside of their own country, which has led to a large movement of skilled and unskilled laborers. Some scholars have claimed that it is not always the poorest of the population being trafficked as some victims pay up to $7,000 to traffickers who are believed to be 'brokers' of travel or employment before they are enslaved (Larsen 2010). Indonesia is a major source nation for human trafficking as many of the victims are looking for work. The Indonesian government estimates there are six million Indonesians working abroad. Malaysia is a major destination country for the Indonesians (State 2014).

It is important to note that there is a difference between smuggling and trafficking. Both persons who are smuggled into a country or trafficked can be required to pay large sums of money to the transporter. In smuggling, persons are moved from one country to the other illegally.

Once persons are in the designated country, of which they know that they are entering, they are released from any obligation to the transporter. In trafficking, persons are also moved from one country to another illegally but once they are within country they are not free from the transporter. Many transporters claim that the persons being moved still owe money for their services and become indebted to the trafficker, others are taken to a different country than originally planned, while still others are forced into different work than originally agreed upon. It is very easy for a person who is smuggled to fall victim to trafficking since they are relying solely on the transporter for movement. Oftentimes, persons who are trafficked through smuggling have their falsified papers withheld for an indefinite amount of time and are forced into servitude to receive their papers back (Munro 2012; Larsen 2010).

Many people seeking a better life are lured by traffickers with the false promises of employment with better wages and better working conditions. Persons who fall prey to the trafficker's lies find the promised employment involves very poor or no pay, and horrible work conditions, often with physical and mental abuse, by the employer. These people are held against their will as the trafficker withholds identification papers and leverages the victims' lack of knowledge and connections with the area, and even their education level in regards to reading and understanding contracts. Traffickers are also able to exert control over victims due to the fear many victims have of being identified by the destination country as an illegal immigrant and suffering legal consequences for such actions (Anstadt 2013; Munro 2012).

Fisheries are a large area of forced labor in South Asia, as exemplified in Thailand. Victims are enticed by employment where they are promised decent wages and working conditions. What is found is that laborers are forced to work long hours on ships in the waters of the destination country, given the most grueling jobs, are beaten, not provided breaks or limited food, and pay is typically withheld. Health regulations, along with working regulations, are not followed on these ships and have many times resulted in ship fires, which often times result in death. Similar conditions and experiences are common in factories and construction. Employers take advantage of human trafficking due to the cheap labor they provide and the limited pressure to abide by state regulations (State 2014; Larsen 2010).

As previously mentioned, women dominate the trafficked population in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region. Like their male counterparts, many are lured into trafficking with the promise of work opportunities. The demographics of the women who are trafficked are in poverty and typically have low education. Many women sign up for employment as domestic servants, which is the largest form of trafficking of women in this area. Once captured these women are held against their will, sent to different countries within the region and without, and receive very little to no wages for their work.

Women are not only vulnerable to trafficking because of poverty, but due to cultural elements as well. In many societies within this region, women are viewed as less valuable than men due to the idea of changing loyalties once a woman is married. Moreover, the burden placed on the woman's family to provide a marriage dowry and the idea of purity further exacerbates the problem. Women in poverty are sold by their families to traffickers as a way for the family to receive some income, lessen living expenses of the family, and be relieved of the burden of marriage dowries. Dowries in places like India can be very high which puts a strain on family resources. Some families are convinced they are sending their daughters to a job that will benefit whole the family by having another working family member and are given advancement on wages. This 'advancement' leaves the daughter indebted to the trafficker. Other families are tricked into paying for their daughters to be placed with traffickers that they believe are marriage brokers (Anstadt 2013).

The idea of purity also impacts women's vulnerability. If a woman has relations with a

man not approved by her father or before marriage, she is typically cast out of the family home, which increases her vulnerability of being trafficked. Violence against women has also been a common occurrence in this region. In India, women have been physically harmed, such as through acid throwing, when society has believed her to be impure or even turning down a man's advances. Rape, to include gang rape, is a growing and serious problem in India. After being harmed, these women are stigmatized in society and usually cannot find suitors or work, leaving them destitute and a burden to their family which increases their vulnerability to being trafficked (Anstadt 2013; Park 2013).

The impact of China's one child policy and India's cultural preference for males has left large populations with more men than women. This gender imbalance has created high demand for women that has fueled trafficking of women to both nations. Acquiring women and girls for the purpose of brides has become a common occurrence in the region. Females are obtained through multiple ways such as coercion and force that have been previously mentioned, but also through kidnapping. Kidnapping has become a common means for acquiring women and children as the migration of populations between and within states increases the ability for kidnapping to occur. In China, persons traveling from the countryside to cities are extremely vulnerable to kidnapping as paths traveled are not always high trafficked routes (State 2014; Baculinao 2004).

Sex trafficking is the second most prevalent way for women to be trafficked. Often times women found in sex trafficking have signed up for employment as domestic servants and are forced into the sex industry by traffickers. They are also held against their will and receive no or little money and are abused physically and mentally (Larsen 2010). Women in sex trafficking are found many places such as brothels, karaoke bars, and dance bars. Specific places that have been identified in the sex trafficking of women include casinos on the boarder of India and Bangladesh, and 'Juicy Bars' in South Korea and Japan (Anstadt 2013). 'Sex tourism' has also promoted trafficking of women and children as men from places such as Japan, travel to areas like Thailand and Malaysia to engage with women. Racism from the idea that other nationalities such as Indonesian or Cambodian women are exotic and "always want it," has justified actions for some men who engage in sex tourism. The fear of contracting AIDs has increased the trafficking of children for sex tourism as they are typically viewed as pure (Munro 2012).

Corruption and limited border controls have enabled human trafficking to continue and thrive. Traffickers commonly pay off border patrol guards for false documents and entry into the country. Often times, border patrol guards are not well paid and so they use entry bribes as a means to supplement their income. But corruption of this nature does not stop at border control guards, many governmental officials also engage in bribery. Unprotected borders provide a second means of entry for traffickers. Such unprotected borders are common between India and Bangladesh, which has marshlands that are hard to control. Also, the borders of Thailand, Cambodia, and Laos suffer from limited protection (Munro 2012). In 2004, ASEAN created the Declaration Against Trafficking Persons Particularly Women and Children. Their effort to combat human trafficking has been made more difficult by the amount of corruption within member nations (News 2011).

The U.S. Response

In 2000, the United States Congress passed the 'Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000 (TVPA). This has been a pivotal piece of legislation that defines what human trafficking comprises, the protection of victims, the prosecution of traffickers, and also strengthens the rights of persons who are more susceptible to being trafficked such as women and children. This legislation has guided United States' actions to combat trafficking in persons at home and abroad.

In an effort to combat trafficking, the TVPA establishes the Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons. This office is armed with the minimum standards of what comprises country actions in combating human trafficking that has been set by Congress (TVPA Sec. 108). Along with the minimum standards, the Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons is required by the TVPA to publish the U.S. Trafficking in Persons report (TIP) annually. This report details the kinds of human trafficking taking place within countries, including the U.S., the protection of victims, and the prosecution of traffickers for every state in the world. Once the report is compiled, each state is assessed a tier ranking. There are four rankings that can be given which include;

Tier 1	Countries whose government fully complies with the TVPA's minimum standards.
Tier 2	Countries whose government do not fully comply with the minimum standards but are making significant efforts to comply.
Tier 2 Watch List	Countries whose government do not fully comply with the TVPA's minimum standards but are making significant efforts to comply and included significantly increasing numbers of victims, or failure to provide evidence of efforts to combat trafficking from the previous year, or that the country has made commitments to take additional future steps over the next year to comply with the minimum standards.
Tier 3	Countries whose government do not fully comply with the minimum standards and are not making significant efforts to do so.

As can be observed by the tier ranking system, countries are not assessed on the amount of trafficking taking place within their region but on what actions are being taken to address this issue. The TIP reports are available to every country for review once they are published. Along with the detailed report of trafficking within a country, and the assessed ranking, the U.S. also provides suggestions on how the state could better address the specific trafficking issues detailed in the report. Most importantly, the U.S. uses the TIP report and rankings as a way to work with other states to effectively combat trafficking. States that comply with the minimum standards, or are making significant efforts to comply, are provided resources and aid, such as educational material and monetary funds, from the U.S. to continue their efforts. USAID has played a large role in distributing and working with states for this support (TVPA Sec 109; USAID 2013). Likewise, States who do not comply with the minimum standards, and are assessed a tier ranking of 3, incur penalties form the U.S. that include withholding non-humanitarian and non-trade related assistance for the next year (TVPA Sec 110). The visibility of the TIP report and the consequences and benefits related to the rankings has motivated many states to take greater action in combating the crime of trafficking in persons within their own borders.

The Indo-Asian-Pacific region is composed of states from every ranking of the TIP. The majority of states are found within tier 2 as illustrated below;

As mentioned earlier, human trafficking is a highly organized criminal activity that takes place within every country and through a network that spans the globe (USAID 2013). With this understanding, scholars and the U.S. government use such phrases as 'place of origin', 'place of transport', and 'place of destination', to help distinguish the path that victims have taken over the course of their enslavement. 'Place of origin' refers to the place where a victim was first trafficked, typically their home nation. 'Place of transport' refers to the place that the victim is moved through, and 'place of destination' refers to the place that victims are headed or end up. While every country is a place of origin, transport, and destination due to the nature of the crime, many countries have a majority of trafficking victims that fit into a category such as origin or destination. For example, Indonesia is largely a place of origin in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region in part due to the high migration of people looking for better work. The

Indonesian government estimates that there are 6 million Indonesians working abroad today (State 2014). Below is a chart of the countries in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region organized by origin, destination, or origin, transport, and destination. The category of transport was not included as no state under review fit solely in this category (State 2014). The chart below was compiled by reviewing the U.S. TIP report for each state.

Tier 1	Tier 2	Tier 2 Watch List	Tier 3
Australia	Bangladesh	Burma	China
New Zealand	Bhutan	Cambodia	North Korea
South Korea	Brunei	Malaysia	Papua New Guinea
Taiwan	Fiji	Maldives	
The United States	India	Marshal Islands	
	Indonesia	Micronesia	
	Japan	Solomon Islands	
	Kiribati	Sri Lanka	
	Laos	Thailand	
	Mongolia		
	Nepal		
	Palau		
	Philippines		
	Singapore		
	Timor Leste		
	Tonga		
	Vietnam		

The categories of origin, transportation, and destination do not influence the U.S. TIP report ranking; it only illustrates a small portion of the trafficking that is taking place within a country.

While the United States has been working to combat human trafficking around the world, the government has also been working to combat trafficking within its own boarders. U.S. military members and governmental employees are required to take annual human trafficking awareness training that provides some education on this prevailing issue (Defense 2014). This training is based online and gives an overview of what composes human trafficking, suggestions on how to personally combat the crime, and a reminder of the extraterritoriality that the U.S. maintains over U.S. military, personnel, and persons associated with the U.S., such as through work agreements, overseas. The U.S. has a zero tolerance policy against persons who knowingly engage in human trafficking abroad (Preston

Areas of Origin and Destination

Places of Origin:	Places of Destination:	Places of Origin, Transport and Destination
Bangladesh	Australia	Cambodia
Burma	Bhutan	China
Indonesia	Brunei	Fiji
Kiribati	Malaysia	India
Laos	Maldives	Japan
Micronesia	Marshal Islands	Mongolia
North Korea	New Zealand	Nepal
Philippines	Palau	Papua New Guinea
Sri Lanka	Singapore	Solomon Islands
Vietnam	Taiwan	South Korea
	Timor Leste	Thailand
	Tonga	The United States

2006). Military personnel are subject to discipline under the Uniform Code of Military Justice for any violation of trafficking laws. The U.S. has chosen to adopt extraterritoriality for personnel overseas, as not all countries have laws and regulations to combat trafficking, or the laws do not meet acceptable standards that the TVPA sets. By holding U.S. personnel to U.S. laws and regulations of trafficking, the U.S. is helping to ensure that citizens are not promoting crime and human rights violations within other nations, thus helping to maintain U.S. security abroad.

Education has been deemed as a vital component to combating human trafficking at home and abroad. Through the TVPA, the U.S. government awards grants to U.S. states to fund rape prevention and education programs to combat violence against women for public and private entities that include such areas as non-profits and college and universities (TVPA Sec. 1401). USAID also provides educational materials to foreign nations regarding abuse and human trafficking to help educate foreign populations to the crime and dangers of trafficking (USAID 2013).

Human Trafficking is a modern form of slavery that undermines human rights and national security around the world. As Luis CdeBaca, Ambassador-at-Large in the Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, states "Our moral obligation against this crime is clear, but it is also imperative. Modern slavery undermines the rule of law. It feeds instability, breeds corruption, fuels transnational crime and taints supply chains that drive the global economy." (CdeBaca 2014). The Indo-Asia-Pacific region is especially susceptible to this crime given the regions past history of human trafficking, the economic disparity and high migration between countries, and the inequality gap between men and women. The U.S. government has taken an active role to combat trafficking in persons but to end human trafficking it also takes the active involvement of every nation and every citizen.

About the Author

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The Role of the Export Credit Agency in Supporting Arms Transfers: A Comparative Analysis

Any opinions, analysis, recommendations, or conclusions should be attributed to the author, and is not necessary the view of the USCG, DISAM, DSCA, DOD, or the USG

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In an environment of shrinking defense budgets and increased Chinese influence and investment in the developing world, the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) seeks to identify ways to maximize security cooperation opportunities with existing funding streams, making these programs more affordable; foreign military sales are a major component of the U.S. security cooperation program portfolio. The world's major arms exporters, with the exception of the U.S., rely exclusively on their respective national Export Credit Agency (ECA) to facilitate competitive, and at times concessional, financial arrangements in order to secure business for domestic arms exporters. This paper performs a comparative analysis of how the U.S. and other major arms exporting countries, particularly China, utilize their ECA to facilitate arms sales, making the recommendation that the U.S. should reevaluate how it currently employs the Export-Import Bank as a measure to increase affordability of arms sales for developing nations in the current competitive environment.

INTRODUCTION

The last decade has featured two important catalysts that have altered the international landscape: a global financial crisis and the continued economic ascent of the BRIC (Brazil/Russia/India/China) nations. Within this context, the U.S. has prosecuted two costly, decade-long conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, while acknowledging that in the process, resources and attention have been diverted from other global regions of strategic importance. Consequently, this paper will address how these macro-level catalysts are impacting U.S security cooperation programs through the lens of ECA competition among major arms exporting nations, addressing the question "should the U.S. reevaluate its policy concerning Export-Import Bank support of military sales"?

a. Security Cooperation

United States DOD security cooperation programs are an important element of the U.S. National Security strategy, establishing and strengthening military-to-military relationships between the U.S. and partner nations. These programs promote mutual understanding between militaries, as well as interoperability through joint exercises and foreign military sales (FMS) programs. As the last of the two wars winds down, it is of interest to maximize limited funding in order to further future security cooperation opportunities, as the DOD global footprint is downsized amid a constrained budgetary environment,

and competing influences from BRIC nations, most notably China, challenge U.S. interests.

b. Fiscal constraints

Aside from the current estimate of $2 trillion spent thus far executing the combined wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the full financial impact of both wars is estimated to eventually encompass $4 - $6 trillion, as the post-war experience of prior conflicts suggests that continued medical care and benefits for veterans will be the main cost driver to be realized over the next few decades.[1] Therefore, the financial impact of these wars should not be viewed as a short-term financial impact that diminishes after hostilities have ended, but instead as a longer-term impact that will claim an increasing share of the annual DOD budget. This reality implies that DOD will need to seek more effective ways of maximizing security cooperation opportunities with existing funding streams by increasing affordability of these programs for partner nations.

Arms sales are treated as sacred in most arms exporting nations. Consequently, transparency and standardization of financing offered by major arms exporting countries, including both OECD and non-OECD member nations, is lacking. This deficit of standardization and transparency associated with concessional financing of arms sales is a challenge that threatens the regional influence of U.S. security cooperation programs by making them prohibitively more expensive and thus less attractive. While terms of finance do not constitute the only, nor necessarily the main consideration associated with arms procurement decision calculus, the global recession has increased the weight of this factor, especially in developing nations. Notably, China has been well positioned to leverage this dynamic, aggressively pursuing strategic access to natural resources and establishing new markets for arms exports to developing nations in Asia, Africa, and South America through concessional ECA supported financing.[2] Before addressing this topic in further detail, the following section will examine the current ECA competitive commercial environment and identify how military sales fit into this framework.

1. The ECA Competitive Environment

National ECAs provide official support for sales of defense articles and services for many of the same reasons that such support is provided for commercial sales, filling a gap that markets are unable or unwilling to fill due to political or country financial risk associated with sales to a particular country. But unlike commercial sales, the sale of major defense equipment presents unique challenges to commercial lenders in that the unproductive assets being procured do not generate a revenue stream that the lender can lay claim to as collateral, and military sales can generate unwanted publicity and controversy that can threaten commercial operations[3]. As a result, military sales financing provided by the world's major arms exporting nations – U.S.[4], China, Russia, U.K, France, Germany – is generally reliant on the national ECA to mitigate these risks, provide the generous financing and repayment periods that commercial lenders do not offer, and compete with the ECAs of other major arms exporting nations to make their domestic exporters more competitive. Because the OECD Arrangement on Officially Supported Export Credits states in article 5c that exports of military equipment are exempt from the arrangement, ECAs of OECD member states are free to exercise a similar degree of flexibility as China in creating financial incentive packages for arms sales. This exemption recognizes the importance of the defense industry to major arms-exporting nations as both an exercise of national sovereignty and an important sector of the national industrial base.[5] As a result, major arms-exporting nations exercise a great deal of freedom in how they utilize ECAs to promote defense equipment exports. Because two of the major arms exporting nations are not OECD members, Sweden's 1993 initiative to bring exports of military equipment under OECD Arrangement authority failed.[6]

1. "Three Universes of Trade and Investment Finance"

In its June 2012 report to the U.S. Congress on global export credit competition, the Export-Import Bank of the United States identified 'three universes of trade and investment finance' as a means of providing a framework for analyzing the competitive operating environment: OECD regulated, OECD unregulated, and non-OECD/BIC (Brazil, India, China) export finance programs.[7] The report estimated OECD unregulated and BIC 2011 export credit activities at $160B ($100B and $60B respectively)[8], concluding that although there appears to be no immediate threat to U.S. exporter competitiveness, further research is required to better ascertain the likely impact that this growing volume of strategic actions will exact in the future. While this report does not specifically address the role of ECAs in promoting defense exports since Exim Bank is prohibited by U.S. law from financing defense articles and services,[9] the 'three universes of trade and finance' construct remains relevant and useful in categorizing the financing activities of the other OECD (UK, France, Germany) and non-OECD member (Russia, China) major arms-exporting nations, since defense sales are not subject to OECD arrangements and unregulated OECD and non-OECD account for an ever increasing share of global trade and investment activity.

As China is the driving force behind the rise in non-OECD/BIC trade and investment activity, as well as a growing player in the global arms market, the following sections will compare how the U.S. and China utilize their respective national ECAs to support domestic defense industries.

1. United States

This section will distinguish between U.S. Direct Commercial Sales and Foreign Military Sales processes, review the history of Export-Import Bank involvement in financing military sales from U.S. exporters to foreign nations, and compare this historical activity to current policy governing ECA involvement in supporting foreign military sales, addressing existing authorities and methods used by the U.S. to support arms transfers outside the ECA framework.

1. DCS versus FMS

An important distinction in how the U.S. primarily facilitates arms sales in relation to the rest of the major arms exporting nations is the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) process in which the U.S. government (USG) serves as the procuring agent on behalf of the purchasing nation, with privity between the U.S. and the purchasing nation and between the USG and the defense firms involved. The benefit of the FMS process for the defense industry is that contracts are with the USG, mitigating country political and financial risk to the contractor. The purchasing nation benefits by being able to leverage the expertise of Department of Defense as the largest procurer of defense equipment and associated economies of scale. In contrast, any military sales transactions financed through the Defense Export Loan Guarantee (DELG) program or potentially, in the future, through the Export-Import Bank are termed 'Direct Commercial Sales' by the USG, since the purchaser procures the equipment, service, or training directly from the defense firm. USG involvement, in these cases, would be restricted to financing and relevant export licensing; this is similar to how most major arms exporting countries facilitate arms sales. Therefore, the USG FMS program is unique among arms sales programs, with arms exporting nations such as U.K[10] and South Korea[11] having recently expressed interest in adopting a similar arms sale regime to better facilitate sales.

A discussion of the major grant and financing programs associated with the U.S. FMS process is beyond the scope of this paper, but the importance of distinguishing the FMS and DCS arms export processes is to acknowledge that the U.S. provides multiple programs of grant aid and financing support that are primari-

ly geared toward FMS customers, making it one of the largest subsidizers of the arms industry among major exporters. However, this support is limited to relatively few countries, with over 90% concentrated primarily on the two parties to the Camp David Peace Accords[12]. Without grants to procure defense equipment through the FMS program, many countries would not be able to obtain affordable commercial financing to support purchases. The following section examines how efforts to utilize the Export-Import Bank, through the DCS arms export process, have been implemented in the past to increase affordability for customers unable to obtain commercial financing or sufficient grant aid.

1. ECA History

The United States has not always maintained its current policy of prohibiting Export-Import Bank support for sales of strictly defense articles and services to foreign nations. In the mid-1960s the U.S. Congress established the precedent for authorizing the bank to partner with DOD by providing financial backing in support of military sales to developing nations, totaling just under $2B in activity from 1962-67.[13] This authorization was reversed in 1968, with Congress specifically revoking Export-Import Bank support to developing nations due to increasing concerns of military sales activity before taking action to revoke all foreign military sales finance support in 1974.[14] Before this change in policy, Iran was a large beneficiary of Export-Import Bank support for defense equipment sales, which set the stage for strong institutional resistance once the Shah was overthrown in 1978, having just received the last F-14 aircraft as part of a $2.2B sale.[15] The unanticipated political upheaval in Iran, coupled with the domestic stagflation experienced in the late 1970s, prompted policy makers to resist persistent lobbying from the defense industry for restoration of access to competitive financing for military exports, such as that previously offered through the Export-Import Bank.[16] This position was further cemented as the global recession in the 1980s led to costly debt defaults by developing countries on military sale financing guaranteed through the Federal Financing Bank.[17]

However, defense industry proponents for this policy change argued that domestic industry was at a competitive disadvantage to firms operating in other major arms exporting countries, who benefitted from generous official government financing support offered to the purchasing nation, also citing the fact that the Export-Import Bank failed to utilize several billion dollars in annual loan guarantee authority which could presumably have been used to support foreign military sales.[18] It was finally the War on Drugs serving as a catalyst in the 1980s that prompted Congressional action, via Bank charter amendment, to permit bank involvement with guaranteeing sales in support of counter-narcotics operations, particularly in Central and South America.[19] An additional exception that remains today was initiated via Public Law 103-428 on October 31, 1994, authorizing the Export-Import Bank to utilize no more than 10% of its annual export finance authority in support of dual-use (military/civilian) exports that are primarily intended for civilian use.[20] From this brief history of Export-Import Bank support of foreign military sales since the 1960s, it is evident that its role has been altered frequently in response to a combination of changes in the international security environment and domestic policy considerations.

1. Defense Export Loan Guarantee (DELG) Program

Acknowledging the competitive environment faced by U.S. defense exporters, and due to legal restrictions prohibiting the Export-Import Bank from financing or guaranteeing financing for foreign military sales, the Defense Export Loan Guarantee (DELG) program was established via the Fiscal Year (FY) 1996 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) to provide more attractive financing terms for

qualified nations.[21] To the dismay of its supporters, this program is widely viewed as having failed to reach the primary objective of increasing the level of defense exports, with low activity levels that threaten its existence, since the NDAA stipulates that DELG program administration and operation costs are to be funded by an administrative fee assessed to each effort and cannot be subsidized by the government.[22] In accordance with the same public law that established DELG, the General Accounting Office (GAO) completed a two-year program status review in 1998. From this report, the following criticisms were levied:

- The NDAA specifies which countries are eligible for DELG, limiting participation to NATO members, select major non-NATO members (Australia, Egypt, Israel, South Korea, Japan), Central European countries that have transitioned to democratic governance, and non-Communist APEC member countries. Consequently, this program cannot be utilized to compete in countries in Latin America, Africa, and Asia where China has concentrated its defense exports, such as Bolivia, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Ecuador, Kenya, etc.[23]
- In accordance with the Inter-Agency Country Risk Assessment System (ICRAS) [24] score, nations must "fully cover [their] assessed risk of default as well as administrative fees"[25], or 'exposure fee', which can range from less than 5% of the loan guarantee for low-risk countries to more than 30% for higher risk countries per their ICRAS assessment.
- In contrast to Exim Bank finance of dual-use exports, which permits exposure fees to be incorporated into the guaranteed loan portion, DELG requires that countries cover the exposure fee in full.
- DELG is a DOD managed program modeled after the structure of the Export-Import Bank; lacking the scale and depth of financial expertise of the latter, greater administrative synergies could possibly be achieved by administering DELG under Exim Bank.

In summary, the narrow scope of eligible countries and aforementioned conservative, risk adverse policies are viewed as the reason for the program's failure to produce the desired level of interest in DELG. However, supporters of the program cite the success of DELG's first loan guarantee in 1997, to Romania for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) purchased from AAI corporation, as an example of how DELG can successfully compete against officially supported sales from defense industry in other countries. The following sub-section will address this in further detail.

i. The Romania Transaction

Finance is only one factor in a country's decision to procure defense equipment. In the case of Romania, the AAI vice president and chief financialofficer, stated that Romania's desire to pursue closer ties to the U.S. weighed heavy in its decision to procure UAVs from domestic firm AAI corporation, despite having concurrently initiated conversations with French and Israeli firms.[26] Therefore in this case, the willingness and ability of the U.S. government to finance this sale through DELG may not have been the deciding factor for Romania, but it effectively prevented the loss of a sale given Romania's inability to afford the $16.7M principal amount in one year and commercial bank unwillingness to lend that amount to Romania.[27] Through DELG, the ICRAS assessment and corresponding risk assigned produced an exposure fee of 21.23% of the principal amount, equating to around $3.5M with a 5-year principal repayment period, which Romania was responsible for financing.[28] These terms made the program affordable for Romania, securing the sale for AAI; DELG financing was certainly not attractive, but it helped Romania implement a foreign military sales transaction in pursuit of its strategic goal of pursuing closer ties to the U.S.

In conclusion to this section, the U.S. has a history of utilizing the Export-Import Bank to initiate loans and loan guarantees in support of military sales programs. Due to domestic political considerations, international security environment, the economic environment of the mid-1970s, and Credit Reform Act of 1990, military sales support has been phased out of the Export-Import Bank, which supports primarily dual-use sales and limited sales of military equipment related to counter-narcotics operations. Lobbying from industry and a declining international arms sales environment in the mid-1990s intensified competition, prompted the creation of the DELG program in 1996, whose purpose is to effectively function in the capacity of the Export-Import Bank for guarantees of military sales. This underutilized program has faced scrutiny for its limited scope of eligible nations and conservative policies; it has been unable to attract customers based on the terms of finance but has proven to be able to enable sales for which procurement decisions have been made due to other considerations.

1. China ECA Support

Operating in the 'non-OECD/BIC' universe of trade and finance, China arms exporters, most of which are state owned[29], benefit from operational cost subsidies that reduce unit costs and aggressive state supported credit terms for customers. The scope of such activities, to include specific credit terms, is difficult to estimate given that most governments of major arms exporter nations do not publish such information, with all parties typically bound by confidentiality agreements. The Exim Bank 2011 report on ECA competitiveness reflects this opaqueness in its assessment of Chinese ECA activity, using a conservative estimate that it acknowledges could actually be 50-100% lower than actual activity levels, which would surpass both OECD regulated ($94B) and OECD unregulated ($91.3B) activity in 2011.[30] Given that China exports arms mainly to developing nations with a corresponding higher country risk level, it is reasonable to assume that a large portion of arms sales must be financed or guaranteed with generous state credit terms that would be captured in this non-OECD/BIC activity.[31] The two principal institutions supporting this activity are China Export and Credit Insurance Corporation (Sinosure) and Export-Import Bank of China (China Exim Bank), seeking opportunities abroad for state firms by lending at rates – hundreds of basis points - far below the lowest domestic commercial rates in order to mitigate high levels of political risk and increase competitiveness.[32]

In response to such activity, President Obama declared his administration's willingness to support the U.S. Exim Bank, under existing authorities, to match 'noncompetitive' financing that does not meet OECD international export credit guidelines in order to assist American companies competing for domestic and third country sales.[33] This stated policy directly confronts the 'non-OECD/BIC third universe' activity that threatens trade and finance activities covered under the OECD Arrangement on Officially Support Export Credits, but it does not empower the U.S. Exim Bank to become further involved in the support of arms sales financing for U.S. defense firms, due to the legal prohibition of Exim Bank support of military sales. Consequently, this policy will remain irrelevant until the Exim Bank is empowered to assume a greater role in support of defense sales.

a. In Transition

Traditionally an exporter of primarily small arms, China has made great progress toward transitioning into capital-intensive major conventional weapon exports, displacing the United Kingdom as the 5th largest arms exporter in the world as a result of its rapid growth in this sector: 162% growth from 2008 - 2013.[34] A recent example of China's progress at moving up the defense export value chain is Turkey's decision to commit to the Chinese HQ-9 long-range missile defense system over the widely

presumed front runner produced by U.S. firms Raytheon and Lockheed Martin.[35] Even more perplexing is the fact that Turkey, a NATO member, chose a missile defense system that is largely incompatible with the missile defense logistical infrastructure utilized by other NATO members that would present a perceived security risk in allowing a Chinese system to integrate with NATO. Justifying the selection, Turkey's Undersecretary of Defense Industries cited "price, technology, local work share, technology transfer and credit financing terms" as areas where the Chinese firm, China Precision Machinery Import and Export Corporation (CPMIEC), outperformed competing bids.[36] Increasingly, especially in an over-supplied market, customers can demand the best price, near concessional or concessional financing, and co-production arrangements from supplier nations and contractors[37]. In China's case, this aggressive subsidizing of industry abroad can be viewed as a symptom to the problem of over-capacity resulting from inefficient, subsidized national companies.

ANALYSIS

Regional Focus

One of the advantages that Chinese policy has over U.S. policy is its principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of purchasing nations and its willingness to initiate arms sales with existing diplomatic relations as the chief prerequisite to conducting business.[38] This flexibility to initiate arms export relationships and willingness to provide attractive state supported financing provide it an advantage over the U.S. in competing for arms sales in developing countries. For the U.S. Department of Defense to be positioned to better compete with growing Chinese influence in Latin America, Africa, Southeast Asia and elsewhere, the domestic political will must exist to permit the extension of financing assistance to those countries that do not have documented records of gross human rights violations. Utilizing the SIPRI arms transfer database, the following paragraph analyzes the list of country recipients of Chinese arms exports from 2000-2012, comparing each country to the list of Foreign Military Financing (FMF) recipients in FY 2012[39], indicated with an asterisk (*).

Algeria	E.Q.	Kuwait	Nepal*	Sierra Leone	Venezuela
Argentina	Gabon	Laos	Niger*	Sri Lanka*	Zambia
Bangladesh*	Ghana*	Malaysia	Nigeria *	Sudan	Zimbabwe
Benin	Guyana	Mali	Oman*	Syria	
Bolivia	Indonesia*	Mauritania*	Pakistan*	Tanzania*	
Cambodia*	Iran	Mexico*	Peru*	Thailand*	
Chad*	Iraq	Morocco*	Rwanda	Timor-Leste	
Congo	Jordan*	Myanmar	Saudi Arabia	Turkey	
Ecuador*	Kenya*	Namibia	Seychelles	Uganda*	

The above listing of nations receiving arms from China shows that the U.S. approved FY 2012 FMF funding for several of these nations, demonstrating a desire to build relationships and establish influence in many of the developing countries where China activity has been most aggressive. However, the FMF funding provided – which with few exceptions, must be used for only the government-government FMS process – is very limited since over 90% is spread between Egypt and Israel each year.[40] As a result, developing nations, without sufficient commercial financing options, often have insufficient national funds to support FMS sales for the procurement, training, and subsequent sustainment of defense equipment. This is where a program such as DELG, or potentially the Export-Import Bank, could be leveraged to enable a DCS – purchasing nation to U.S. exporter - sale that commercial lenders are unable or unwilling to engage in.

However, most of the developing nations purchasing Chinese arms are not authorized by the NDAA to participate in the DELG program. Based on the analysis provided in prior sections, the conservative terms of finance underlying the DELG cannot compete with concessional financing offered by Chinese ECAs, but such a program can serve as a tool to enable a sale once other factors have influenced a country preference to procure from U.S. industry (political, logistical, technical, etc). Therefore, additional research should address why DELG was given such a limited scope of eligible countries as well as any obstacles to expanding its scope, especially given the program's risk adverse financial policies and DOD's current desire to become more competitive in and influential among developing nations in these key regions.

b. Expanding Scope

As noted in the Export-Import Bank's report on the ECA competitive environment, although the scope and volume of Chinese ECA activity – outside the OECD arrangement – is alarming, it is not immediately apparent that this activity is in direct conflict with U.S. industry interests. Paralleling this general trend, Chinese arms sales have traditionally focused on small arms exports to developing nations where the U.S. defense industry – concentrating on capital-intensive major defense equipment – is not as largely active, implying that the two nations have traditionally competed in different arms sectors in different countries. A new trend is changing this dynamic; in an October 2013 *New York Times* article, European Aeronautic Defense and Space head of strategy and marketing acknowledged China's transition into the export of more sophisticated, capital-intensive weapons systems and the corresponding future increase in competition posed:

"China will be competing with us in many, many domains, and in the high end, […] Out of 100 campaigns, that is, the commercial prospects we have, we may have the Chinese in front of us among the competitors in about three or four. They have the full range of capabilities, and they are offering them."[41]

This statement acknowledges that as China expands its military industrial base, refines technology, and improves manufacturing practices, U.S. and European arms exporters will face competition from China outside its traditional domain of developing countries, as Turkey's initial selection of a Chinese missile defense system over the favored U.S. system demonstrated.

The same article quotes IHS Jane senior military industry analyst Guy Anderson placing the current arms export competitive environment into context of the global financial recession: "We are in an era of 'good enough' — the 90 percent solution that will do the job at the best possible price, […] In some cases, that may even mean buying commercial equipment, upgrading it slightly and painting it khaki."[42] While arms procurement decisions are multi-faceted, Chinese encroachment into a traditionally Western domain will necessitate more competitive financing options to counter the lower unit costs of Chinese defense equipment and address the reality that cash strapped nations face in the wake of a global financial crisis. Therefore,

additional research should address the feasibility of removing the prohibition of Export-Import Bank support of military sales. In contrast to the way in which Exim Bank was utilized to issue loans and guarantees to support military sales in the past, the Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990 has mandated better accounting standards that now conservatively hedge against the risk of default with the establishment of a standardized risk assessment process, ICRAS, whose outcome translates into a risk commensurate 'exposure fee' in the case of foreign government default. The principal advantage offered by Exim Bank is the ability for countries to finance exposure fees within the loan or loan to be guaranteed, which is not an option under DELG.[43]

c. Additional considerations

Supporting U.S. national security interests through security cooperation and seeking new opportunities for the U.S. defense industry are not primary motivators of policy change with regard to promoting defense exports to developing nations. Even in the hypothetical case that the political will existed to match the concessional financing offered by China ECAs in support of arms exports, U.S. policy makers would face the moral dilemma of encouraging higher levels of debt in developing countries already awash in debt. Furthermore, most defense equipment is economically unproductive for the purchasing nation, increasing debt levels with no justifiable economic return to society. Aside from moral argumentation, increased resources devoted to government subsidy of arms exports represents an opportunity cost; resources are taken from the private sector where they can be used more productively to yield higher economic returns as opposed to the political returns of promoting national security interests and maintaining the U.S. industrial base during periods of declining defense spending and investment. However, the reality remains that the defense industry is not subject to the OECD Arrangement on Officially Supported Export Credits, and OECD-member major arms exporters, particularly the U.S., have little incentive to advocate for incorporation of the defense industry under the arrangement as long as Russia and China remain outside of OECD.

I. CONCLUSION

In order to compete with Chinese arms exports and growing influence in developing countries, the U.S. must reevaluate its policy regarding Export-Import Bank involvement in military sales financing.

Because developing countries have no access to commercial financing for purchases of defense equipment, failure of the USG to facilitate financing will result in lost sales, and more importantly, relationships. As the Romania UAV procurement demonstrated, the Defense Export Loan Guarantee program – which was established to fill the void left after Exim Bank was prohibited from financing military sales – can serve as an enabler despite its conservative terms. But for such a program to successfully compete with China in developing countries, access to the program must be increased beyond NATO and select Central European and Asian countries. Furthermore, in accordance with Exim Bank policy for commercial transactions, providing the purchasing nation the option to finance the 'exposure fee' into the loan amount should be permitted, given that such fees can reach in excess of 30% of the principal amount for higher risk customers, making the financing program unaffordable or undesirable for potential purchasers.

This will prove to be increasingly important in competing for and securing sales, as cheaper Chinese weapon systems with better financing terms are gradually entering the more capital-intensive defense sectors long dominated by U.S. and European defense industry, and expanding their customer base in the process, as NATO member Turkey's initial selection of a Chinese firm to provide its long range missile defense system demonstrated.

Finally, taking into consideration the altered geo-political environment since the Exim Bank

prohibition on financing military sales was enacted over two decades ago, it is time for this policy to be revisited as a potential supplement to the successful Foreign Military Sales government-to-government program. In the absence of grant aid, developing country participation in the FMS program is severely constrained; allowing the Exim Bank to provide the services for military sales transactions that it currently does for commercial transactions will support the goals of supporting domestic industry, furthering partnerships, and countering the influence of an ascending China in the developing world.

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[3]General Accounting Office, *Status of the Defense Loan Guarantee Program*. December 1998. (Accessed December 14, 2013). Available from http://www.dtic.mil/docs/citations/ADA358958, p. 8

[4]U.S. is currently prohibited by law from utilizing its ECA to support military sales; its inclusion in this listing of nations is to identify it as a major arms exporting nation. However, the U.S. Export-Import Bank has been utilized in the past to support military sales to developed and developing nations. (Assuming here that you are considering the Export-Import Bank as the U.S. ECA. If that is so, and if they are prohibited, under what authority were they utilized?) I realize you discus in footnote 9. below, but is confusing until you get there.

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[8]Ibid. p. 109

[9]U.S. law authorizes export finance support of 'dual use' articles that are non-lethal and will be used for primarily civilian purposes. Additionally, a limited waiver can be obtained to finance export of strictly defense material in support of drug interdiction activities. Any such item on the U.S. Munitions list, a Presidential Determination of National Interest must be granted.

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[12]Evans, Ibid p. 550

[13] Evans, Ibid p. 548

[14]Ibid

[15]Ibid

[16]Ibid, p. 549

[17]Government Accounting Office, *Status of the Defense Loan Guarantee Program*. December 1998. (Accessed December 14, 2013). Available from http://www.dtic.mil/docs/citations/ADA358958, p. 2

[18]Ibid

[19]Ibid

[20]GAO, Ibid p. 11

[21]GAO, Ibid p. 1

[22]Public Law 104-106-Feb. 10, 1996. *National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), 104th Congress,* Accessed on March 6, 2014. Available from http://www.dod.mil/dodgc/olc/docs/1996NDAA.pdf

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[25]GAO, Ibid p. 12

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[37]While most major arms supplier nations are directly involved in securing what is termed an 'offset' agreement, which can include co-production and technology transfer arrangements with the purchasing nation, the U.S. government does not facilitate, guarantee, nor is it a party to any offset agreements associated with arms sales. Such agreements are viewed as market distorting and politically risky; however, U.S. defense contractors may decide to enter into offset agreements with a purchasing nation.

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[39]Congressional Budget Justification, *Foreign Assistance,* Fiscal Year 2014, Available fromhttp://www.state.gov/documents/organization/208292.pdf, p. 7-10

[40]Evans, Ibid p. 551

[41]Wong, Ibid

[42]Wong, Ibid

[43]Evans, Ibid p. 554

Considerations for the Future National Military Strategy Opportunities and Challenges

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Any opinions, analysis, recommendations, or conclusions should be attributed to the author, and is not necessary the view of the USCG, DISAM, DSCA, DOD, or the USG

Introduction

Over the last twenty plus years, six different Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) have laid out a National Military Strategy (NMS) for the U.S. Military Services to use as a guide to fulfill the President's National Security Strategy (NSS) and the Secretary of Defense's National Defense Strategy (NDS). In addition, early in its existence, the NMS developed a secondary purpose. It evolved to become an unclassified document to communicate with the American people, rather than just being internal military guidance. All six previous documents published addressed the current and future strategic environment. But just as importantly, they all addressed the force planning and resource allocation (sometimes with even recommendations to the Secretary of Defense) to achieve the U.S. military's desired outcomes in those strategic environments. Resources and tools are variables to carefully consider in strategy development.[1] In the current political and economic environment, now more than ever, the Department of Defense (DOD) and U.S. Military Services must be flexible in force structure and resource allocation to successfully achieve strategic objectives. The following discussion addresses three areas in support of creative resource allocation that should be addressed in the future NMS; Force Planning, Budget and Acquisition Processes, and Interagency Cooperation.

Force Planning

It is no secret the current strategic environment is ever changing with the roles of both state and non-state actors. As a result, it is increasingly difficult to categorize potential contingency types (i.e., conventional or irregular warfare).[2]It is also no secret U.S. defense spending cannot maintain its current "burn rate". For these reasons, the U.S. military must look to and rely upon international partners and the interagency to share resources, advance military technologies, and ultimately develop a "united force".

With the numerous potential contingency types in the current environment, international cooperative security is paramount. The core tenet of cooperative security is working with partner countries against common security challenges such as terrorism, piracy, and illicit trafficking of weapons, drugs, and people.[3] To build operational capacity in our partners for these mission challenges, the DOD must seize the opportunity to work closely with the Department of State (DoS) and ensure these efforts align with foreign policy. Aligning DOD efforts with DoS objectives can relieve the stress on U.S. military resources. First,

if DOD engagements with international partners are congruent with DoS policy, unique funding and appropriations, not otherwise accessible, can be leveraged. Second, through this "shared investment approach", DOD can increase partner nations' capabilities, pass on certain missions to allies, and reduce requirements for major U.S. military interventions and the associated costs.

These opportunities bring obvious challenges. In attempting to leverage DoS resources, the DOD must effectively communicate with the interagency and justify its proposed requirements to another layer of U.S. government bureaucracy. To be successful in this increased interagency activity, DOD personnel must understand the organizational behaviors of other U.S. government agencies and international allies. It is vital for personnel to increase language and cultural capabilities and capacities in order to improve integration with other U.S. agencies and partners.[4] Another challenge is using the lengthy government budget process and an often bulky DOD acquisition system to build partner nation capacity and capability. These processes and systems are purposely filled with checks and balances to ensure the DOD develops the right material solution in an often non-competitive environment. This can be an obstacle in fulfilling international partner requirements. Often times the U.S. solution is competing against third countries (to include U.S. allies) and the defense industry to fulfill those same needs. Our current acquisition system regulations and requirements could inhibit the U.S. from effectively competing and providing the capability that builds our partner's defense capacity, in turn negatively contributing to U.S. force structure decisions.

Budget and Acquisition Processes

In the U.S. Government, national resources are allocated to develop capabilities and military force structure. This process involves the Executive and Legislative branches of government. The U.S. applies significant resources to national defense, and DOD uses formal processes as its decision and management system. The desired end state is a force structure that is relevant and effective at a cost that is efficiently managed.[5] The challenge in getting to the desired end state is in translating and defining current DOD warfighter needs, along with international partner needs, to the acquisition community. Because the current DOD acquisition system was developed during the Cold War to counter a communist threat at an undetermined time in the future, the system stresses performance and does not necessarily emphasize a reduced material solution delivery time. This was effective at that time, but is a challenge in the current environment when DOD warfighters need solutions delivered in 12-24 months (or DOD is competing in a business environment to provide solutions to our allies and support to our DOD warfighters). This disconnect lends itself to DOD acquisition reform/streamlining in order to make the process more responsive, in turn positively impacting force planning decisions and force structure.

Unfortunately, DOD acquisition reform has been occurring continuously for decades. Those past reform efforts have often just added an additional layer of review and greater centralization to solve whatever shortcomings exist. Reforms to date have not achieved the outcome of shortening lead times and therefore achieving U.S. military objectives in the current environment. Ultimately, affective acquisition reform has to change the culture. Changing the culture means convincing the acquisition community they no longer need multi-level bureaucracy. The acquisition personnel need to make decisions. The culture must change so that it is recognized that even reasonably well-managed acquisitions carry some risk. Accepting reasonable risks can make the system more responsive, and again, in turn positively contribute to U.S. force structure decisions.

Organizational Behavior and Interagency Cooperation

Positively influencing force structure and reforming DOD acquisition can be achieved

through improving international, interagency, and intra-agency relationships. The obvious way to improve any relationship is to enhance communication. To solve a simple problem, such as lack of communication, continuous and effective training and education programs are required. Preparing competent leaders starts with adequate doctrine, but doctrine alone is not enough. Having a shared body of common knowledge and practices is one thing. Doctrine does little good unless it is taught to people who are capable and practiced in execution. Proper education of interagency organizations for all DOD would enable both civilian and military personnel to break out of agency stovepipes, leverage other U.S. agencies processes, and ultimately lead to better coordinated and more cost-effective and time-sensitive interagency solutions. Specific to the DOD-DoS relationship, DOD is viewed as a "vertical organization," with a chain of command and hierarchy of decision makers. On the other hand, the State Department is a very "flat organization." "Subgroups in the State Department do not tend to rally around particular kinds of missions, as in the case of the some agencies or the military services. Rather, they take sides over the relative attention to be given to different issues, such as human rights, democracy, or narcotics, in particular in bilateral or regional relations."[7] This behavior leads to discussion, review, and, often times, unanimous consensus before a decision is made. All affected get a say in a decision based on both local and regional impact, thus the reason DoS is described as a "flat organization." This is an example of an organizational behavior that DOD as a whole, and as individuals, needs to recognize in dealing with international, interagency, and intra-agency issues.

Summary

The NMS should address numerous opportunities and challenges that affect U.S. national interests and security in today's strategic environment. The three topics discussed are related. For example, taking the opportunity to understand and educate the U.S. military on the view points and behaviors of other organizations can aid in interacting with the acquisition community to more efficiently fulfill requirements and reform its culture. And if requirements are fulfilled and material solutions are supplied more efficiently, force structure and resource allocation for the U.S. military can be more flexible.

Similarly, if DOD can communicate more effectively with DoS, DOD can more easily leverage DoS programs to engage international partners. And improved engagements with international partners enables DOD to integrate and consider improved partner capabilities and enhanced capacity in U.S. military force planning decisions. For these reasons, the upcoming NMS needs to address force planning, budget and acquisition process reform, and organizational behavior and cooperation. Leadership's emphasis in these three areas, and their relationship with each other, will have a two- and threefold impact on U.S. military achieving its desired outcomes in the current strategic environment.

About the Author

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Lessons Learned - An IG Inspection of Your Security Cooperation Office (SCO)

By Dan Dagher, Col, USAF
Director of Security Cooperation in Ankara, Turkey

Those who cannot remember the past are doomed to repeat it (George Santayana).

[Editor's Note: Col Dagher has multiple GCC SCO assignments in his portfolio, but the reader should be aware that each Geographic Combatant Command may have variations in how they approach IG or other type inspections]

The purpose of this editorial is to aggregate successful techniques found in preparation for and execution of Office of Defense Cooperation (ODC) and Office of Military Cooperation (OMC) inspections that have taken place throughout three Geographical Combatant Commands (CCMD). It also includes some perspectives from MGen (ret) Mark Zamzow's editorial on "Top 10 ways to dazzle the IG" and highlights how they are still relevant in ODCs worldwide.

Each inspection of a Security Cooperation Office (SCO) by an Inspector General (IG) brings with it Lessons Learned and may add to trends that, if adopted, can prevent repeat-errors found throughout the SCO community. In today's international environment, changes to tactics, techniques, procedures, and requirements happen so quickly that it is easier to use the successful ideas of others rather than finding out about a change after the fact and re-inventing the wheel for each change in policy.

This article brings together inspection results from eighteen IG inspections of ODCs and OMCs from three CCMDs. It presents preparation techniques to limit the most common FINDINGS and OBSERVATIONS, and is broken down into four sections:

Long-lead techniques one can use in the months and weeks leading up to the inspection;

1. Immediate actions your SCO can take for final preparation;
2. Techniques SCO personnel can do to help themselves during the actual inspection; and
3. Key considerations for post-inspection, to assist future SCO personnel for their inspection.

Each of the above sections has three perspectives: strategic planning, leading the ODC, and managing tactics for success.

LONG LEAD ITEMS

Several long-lead items should be accomplished in the months leading up to the inspection:

1. Establish the ODC tone for the inspection;
2. Know the strategic plans for the Partner-Nation (PN);
3. Obtain Best Practices from other inspections and bring relevant ones into the SCO;

4. Conduct two separate self-inspections including one with the IG SC checklist and one with the CCMD security office checklist;
5. Ensure any write-ups from the previous ODC inspection are cleaned up; and
6. Manage resources.

Further:

1. Establish the tone within the ODC for the pending inspection. The philosophy of the inspection comes in many forms, and it's important to note which one prevails in your ODC leadership and what the tone will be throughout your organization. The following are some examples, both good and not-so-good:
2. Don't fear the IG.
3. This is your report card.
4. If the minimum weren't good enough it wouldn't be the minimum.
5. My expectation of you is no FINDINGS.
6. I expect no FINDINGS and no OBSERVATIONS.
7. There's no way to do well on these things, just aim for passing.
8. Don't do anything dumb, dangerous, or different.
9. Since this is my report card, you can bet it's your report card as well (from ODC Chief to other ODC personnel).
10. The only bullets that make it to your FITREP (from this inspection) are the Best Practices and any Commendable personnel or Outstanding Contributors.
11. Just do what you do everyday.

The tone ODC leadership sets will be reflective of how personnel approach everything from inspection preparation through to the inspection itself. Gen Zamzow: "Lead by words and actions, formally and informally by motivating, communicating, and setting a positive example!"

Know the CCMD and Ambassador strategic plans for the Partner-Nation (PN), derived from the Country Cooperation Plan, the Regional Campaign Plan, and the Ambassador's Integrated Country Strategy (ICS)/Mission Resource Request (MRR). Understanding these strategic plans enables alignment and consistent execution of SCO planning. Understanding strategic goals also provides a clearer picture of funding prioritization for various U.S.-participatory events like exercises, International Military Education and Training, Foreign Military Financing, engagements, event attendance, public diplomacy, etc.

The IG will know the CCMD strategic goals for the PN before arrival and will ask SCO personnel. These strategic objectives are defined by (in EUCOM terminology) the Lines of Effort (LOE) and Lines of Activity (LOA). Expect to show the IG which in-country tasks have been established within the applicable LOAs. In EUCOM, the LOEs and LOAs are reviewed annually at the EUCOM Strategy Implementation Conference (ESIC), as part of the Strategy Implementation cycle. Also, the IG will ask if the ODC has added any tasks into the Theater Security Cooperation Management Information System (TSCMIS). These TSCMIS events are reviewed by LOA POCs annually or biennially in some PNs, to ensure ODCs are working towards accomplishing CCMD strategic plans.

Gen Zamzow: "Competence means knowing your job inside and out, and performing those duties to the best of your ability despite the inspection scenario or the inspector's glare!"

Competence for ODCs: IAW DODI 5132.03, the mission of a Security Cooperation Office is to <u>build partnerships</u>; that's why SCOs exist. We build those partnerships for the purpose of accomplishing the Joint Pub 3-22 SCO tasks listed.

Knowing the mission, i.e., building mil-to-mil partnerships must be understood by every person in your Security Cooperation Office.

Obtain Best Practices (BP) from other inspections. IGs expect to see BPs proliferate across ODCs in the same CCMD. Focusing on programs that work is efficient and productive.

The challenge with geographically-dispersed CCMDs is that personnel in one SCO do not always know what has worked with engagements or strategic planning execution in other SCOs. Additionally, SC success stories in one

Multinational Education	Facilities and Infrastructure Projects
Multinational Exercises	Humanitarian Assistance
Multinational Experimentation	Intelligence Cooperation
Multinational Training	Information Sharing
Counternarcotics Assistance	International Armaments Cooperation
Counter/Nonproliferation	Security Assistance (FMS)
Defense and Military Contacts	Other Programs and Activities
Defense Support to Public Diplomacy	

ODC are not always known by other ODCs. Most experienced ODC Chiefs will direct their personnel to the published Best Practices so they can see what the norms are, what works, and what has been recognized as successful. Three weeks at Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management (DISAM), as well as the annual CCMD Security Cooperation conferences, are not enough for SCO personnel to learn the ODC norms and programs that achieve results. That is why the Best Practices are published on the CCMD IG webpage, the DISAM webpage, and via the Joint Lessons Learned Information System (JLLIS). It is an opportunity for the CCMD commander (through the IG) and the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (through DISAM) to emphasize noteworthy programs.

The IG will ask SCO personnel if they have incorporated any BPs from other ODCs into the ODC being inspected. If one ODC has a particular technique or program that reduces waste or improves efficiency, the IG may be inclined to highlight it as a BP, which could save money or reduce efficiency in other ODCs utilizing the same SC program. The IG is one catalyst in making this cross-pollenization of ideas happen. If relevant information is missing from the CCMD, DISAM, or JLLIS websites, the next step is to call or email the applicable ODC and learn directly from the personnel who developed those BPs.

Conduct two separate self-inspections; one with the IG SC checklist and one with the CCMD security office checklist.

Use the IG's inspection checklist to accomplish a Security Cooperation self-inspection (EUCOM, AFRICOM, and PACOM have them published on their websites). A line-by-line comparison of IG checklist items against what your office does every day to comply with those items will ensure that what you are doing falls under the regulations and instructions, and are what's expected by the CCMD. Also, accomplishing this month›s in advance allows ample time to fix any problems discovered.

Once a line-by-line comparison is accomplished by the SCO, it should be done a second time, independently, by the ODC leadership. If any questions arise, there will be plenty of opportunity to engage with other recently-inspected ODCs, or to ask the IG directly, to ensure no misunderstanding of expectations. One technique, funding permitting, would be to request a neighboring ODC send someone to conduct the independent self-inspection. Naturally, the favor could be returned before their inspection as well. This cross-pollenization of good ideas will help raise the standard of both ODCs. No matter how the self-assessment is accomplished, it is an easy method to fix challenges before they become major problems highlighted during the inspection itself.

Use the CCMD security inspection checklist to accomplish security self-inspection within the ODC. Regardless of whether the inspected ODC is located within the U.S. embassy compound, general security and adherence to COMSEC procedures are two things for which every IG member looks.

If a DOD Security Manager is co-located at the ODC, that individual should perform a secu-

rity inspection encompassing the CCMD checklist. These checklists can be obtained from the CCMD Security Manager. Some 2013 common COMSEC FINDINGS or OBSERVATIONS include: 1) unclass desk-phones or NIPR computers too close to SIPR computers; 2) not removing cell phones from the room when working on SIPR; 3) classified trash in safes (have a shred party); 4) missing classifications on CDs; 5) and missing green or red UNCLASS or SECRET stickers on phones and/or computers. That old story about finding classified material in unclassified wastebaskets just doesn't happen that often (thankfully). The key is to make personnel aware early on that a high standard exists with regards to COMSEC in the SCO.

Ensure any write-ups from the previous ODC inspection are cleaned up. There is no excuse for a repeat write-up, as it implies an ODC ignored the previous IG findings, and also implies the ODC has not been complying with regulations and instructions for at least 2 years or more (since the last inspection).

The IG will arrive at the inspection location with a copy of the previous IG inspection results in-hand and know the previous OBSERVATIONS and FINDINGS. Any experienced IG will figure out in the first 15 minutes of looking at a program whether it is a part of the standard operating procedure for that ODC or whether it was thrown together in the last minute for the inspection. The IG will not do a surface glance at something and move on but will, in many cases, do a deep dive with questions that highlight how much thought and effort have gone into a particular program.

Manage resources. Being as efficient as possible with the resources given. This means knowledge management, program management, and people management are factors to consider in long-term preparation. Putting information and people in the right place at the right time.

Develop continuity of operations e-folders for each inspected program in each office. Developing e-continuity folders makes preparing for the inspection simpler and more organized, and it makes the IG's job much easier because the SCO responses are readied for each question. Utilize ODC-standardized/identical tabs in each. One format technique for the tabs in the electronic folder:

- CCMD checklist
- Appointment letters
- Required References from Inspection checklist
- CAVEATS
- Results of prior inspections
- Appropriate ODC generated SOPs or Policy Letters
- Supporting Documentation, to include the Theater Security Cooperation Management Information System (TSCMIS) products/displays

This standard presentation format highlights to the IG that the individual being inspected has already checked the applicable programs in detail and knows where their e-guidance material is. Another benefit [because every IG question can have the answer or response placed next to it and identify the AFI or DOD regulation linked to it] is it leaves no doubt where the requirement can be found.

These electronic continuity folders must be accessible to all ODC personnel. The e-continuity book should be on a shared drive so anyone else can access it without having to learn the passwords of others. The e-continuity folder needs to be stored in a folder marked FOUO, in accordance with CJCSM5760.01A vols I and II.

Familiarize the team with the governing regs/AFIs/DODIs and where they are located. Prepare for the inspection by consolidating and knowing where to locate governing e-documents, e-regulations, AFIs, DOD instructions, and of course the primary SCO directive, Joint Pub 3-22 or it's pending e-pub. The IG is usually an expert in only one or two fields, and is rarely smart on every job or task performed in the SCO. Therefore the IG will look to Security Cooperation personnel to fill in missing information and substantiate it with governing documents.

Ensure electronic document use. Advanced USG approved software is available to allow

personnel to make margin notes on e-copies of all documents. Referencing an outdated copy of the regulation or AFI is not the appropriate thing to do during the inspection. The IG will not expect the SCO project officer to know everything, but will expect that person to know where to find everything in the governing e-documents, etc. And if the governing documents are not readily available, that sends another signal that maybe the directives are not referenced often.

Manage resources -- set Leave and PCS expectations early on. This will provide an element of continuity for the inspection, and will provide the ODC being inspected stability in personnel moves leading up to the inspection. It is also important that the CCMD and Defense Security Cooperation Agency country desk officers are made aware of the pending inspection, so that they can plan to minimize disruption or taskers during inspection week.

Personnel should not plan to take Leave during the inspection itself. SCO leadership should notify all personnel of this and set the expectation months in advance. This one is self-explanatory but needs to be accomplished early enough to where personnel can advance-plan other Leave dates, should the requirement exist. Also, contact the J1 at the CCMD and request a freeze on PCSs in or out in the month (or two) preceding the inspection. Again, like Leave, this requires a long lead time.

FINAL PREPARATION

A few days before the IG visit, it's time to take care of final items in preparation for the visit. Some things to consider:

1. Re-energize the tone to ODC personnel and iterate expectations.
2. Prepare the hosts to meet the IG.
3. Go with what the IG knows.
4. Consider miscellaneous logistics.

Re-energize the tone to ODC personnel and iterate expectations. For those in a leadership role, provide an inspection pep-talk to ODC personnel a few days before game day. It's never too late to iterate expectations, to ensure personnel understand the level of performance expected, and most importantly, to understand the importance of a positive attitude.

The pep talk itself doesn't have to be a Patton-esque speech, but it should repeat the expectations (the same ones briefed up months earlier during long-lead prep). Comment on personnel appearance requirements (applicable uniforms, standard uniforms throughout ODC, etc.) and adherence to customs and courtesies. Explain some of the norms and set the expectation of professionalism, like greeting the IG with a hand-shake and introducing other ODC personnel/staff. Gen Zamzow: "Look people in the eye, pop that sharp salute, and exceed those standards for uniform, boots, and hair!"

Pre-coordinate meetings with the IG and local, Partner-Nation, military personnel with whom the US Security Cooperation personnel interact often, as well as with the PN IG, if able. Meetings with personnel of like rank or one level up lends credibility to the ODC partnership-building mission and highlights a qualitative edge in how the Security Cooperation Office does business.

The Partner-Nation is usually warmed by a sense of buy-in when participating in a U.S. process and this technique reflects the ODC working relationship with the Partner-Nation. The SCO leadership will have control over who the IG meets, so make it someone with whom the SCO personnel have developed a great relationship. Also, take this opportunity and use the IG to help accomplish ODC mission tasks via an engagement. Brief the IG up on a strategic plan the ODC is in the middle of executing, and provides the IG with messages to pass when talking to Partner-Nation personnel that help support that Line of Activity.

Download the same ODC information the IG will show up with. Have a meeting within the ODC to ensure strategic plans are understood, as well as how they relate to CCMD Lines of Effort.

The IG may show up with a 2-inch thick, 3-ring binder full of info about the SCO. Information could include: a comparison of your ODC in

the CCMD (Foreign Military Sales, International Military Education and Training, Enhanced End Use Monitoring, mil-to-mil engagements, Foreign Military Financing, the ODC budget, and ODC manpower); the CCMD *Theater Security Cooperation Management Information System* (TSCMIS) readout; some Security Cooperation Information Portal (SCIP) products; the applicable CCMD dashboard product (in EUCOM this is the Theater Security Cooperation Decision Support Dashboard); and a list of your FMS cases, EEUM listing, Exercise picture for the FY, etc. The IG will also have a listing of ODC Lines of Activity. The ODC should pull this information in advance, review the products for open issues, and be prepared to discuss some of the strategic plans and, in some cases, individual events, being executed to accomplish the CCMD Lines of Effort.

Miscellaneous Logistics

Cleanliness vs clutter–Reduce clutter in the ODC offices. Clutter and disorganization creates a negative perception.

ODC personnel do not have to worry about the white gloves coming on for an inspection but first impressions count; and that first impression when an IG walks into an office sets a tone. The IG can usually tell how an office is going to perform in an inspection based on how the ODC Chief presented themselves and their offices. In fact, based on those initial impressions, they could deduce physical fitness scores (in general), status of annual online training, and promotion rates. So the right answer is to control what's within one's circle of influence. Before the IG arrives, clean-up workspaces and desks which are vacant. With the budget pendulum in full swing towards less people and more unused desk space, it's important not to let desk space become the repository for all things not wanted in the office. With tight budgets, a supply NCO (if you have one) may sometimes have an empty shelf for a particular item that can be found in a long-vacant desk.

Clean up the COMSEC. This is a final chance to do a COMSEC inspection before the inspection. Burn the full burn-bags, shred what needs to be shredded, check safes, applicable stickers on phones, check procedures, etc.

Prepare ODC equipment -- ensure it works, so there are no surprises when you present an ODC brief to the IG. This may sound unimportant, but some SCOs don't get many DVs coming through, and therefore don't use their projectors or other presentation equipment often. Coordinate or accomplish miscellaneous logistics considerations: pre-coord entry badges into your facility; who will meet/greet the IG upon arrival into town; ensure they have a clean, private conference or gathering area; computer access; internet access; telephone availability; access to a safe; and check access to SIPR. Prepare contact cards to provide the IG; they should include key phone numbers and instructions for how to dial out. Determine who will provide a safety briefing, maps, and go/no-go locations around town, to include jogging locations. A list of tourist sites and places to check out after-hours is always appreciated. Many of IG personnel may be in a given country for the first time and want to take advantage of what there is to see. Plan to brief the IG on: the ODC building or Embassy lay-out; local security assessment; location of an ATM or place to get local currency in relation to hotel and ODC/Embassy; safe-haven areas within the building; and OSI or Intel brief of local area for the week. It is important for the Security Cooperation lead to remind DSCA and the J5 Help Desk (or equivalent at the CCMD) that personnel will be preoccupied with an inspection. Lastly, ensure the CCMD homepage is a homepage at computer startup for all ODC personnel.

GAME DAY

It's time to make a good first impression and it's never too late to fix those things that are broken, even during the inspection itself.

1. Leaders, set the tone for ODC personnel.
2. Be professional in setting the tone for the IG.

3. Communicate, communicate, communicate.
4. What to do if the IG identifies a FINDING or OBSERVATION.
5. Highlight successes the IG can relay to other ODCs world-wide.
6. This is a team effort, nothing says it has to be 1v1 with the IG.

Leaders set the tone for ODC personnel! Personnel will be looking at SCO leadership to see how to act. Leaders set the example! Good leaders will make a good impression with plenty of hustle and drive, and a positive attitude. Motivation or concern for the outcome of the inspection is reflective of ODC leadership's motivation and how leadership carries out the mission. Gen Zamzow, "Display a positive attitude, recognize enthusiasm is contagious, and that problems always arise in the "fog of war" and they can be overcome!"

Be professional in setting the tone for the IG. Professionalism goes a long way in first impressions. Provide the IG with a mission brief. They will already know it, but it gives them that ODC's perspective on priorities and concerns. Introduce the ODC team and their respective jobs. Customs and courtesies are important. If the IG walks into a room to inspect, even if the same rank equivalent is in the room, stand-up and greet them with a hand-shake.

Communicate, communicate, communicate. The inspector will want to ensure each ODC is communicating important information to applicable agencies.

ODCs should disseminate and/or communicate information to a greater extent. There are two major avenues of communication; up and out of the ODC, and down and in to all the personnel working in the ODC. There are multiple organizations who can gain benefit from SCO information: the Ambassador; the CCMD Commander; the CCMD SCO or ODC assistance desk or team; the applicable Partner-Nation office; the SDO/DATT; industry; DSCA; the Implementing Agencies; other SCOs; various USG agencies; etc. SCO personnel should make arrangements for the IG to meet the Ambassador or at least the DCM (for larger ODCs). Some IGs like to sit in on Country Team meetings. Other IGs will want to understand how often and with what information a particular ODC interacts with other ODCs in the same CCMD. Within the inspected ODC, simple questions related to upcoming events, security procedures, or recent Security Cooperation information or guidance put out by the CCMD, are ways the IG will assess communication flow within the ODC.

Recently modified internal processes or policies should be clearly explained to the IG. Early in the inspection process would be the right time to explain new internal ODC procedures with regards to Security Cooperation programs and how they accomplish goals with greater efficiency. This gives the IG the chance to look at new practices with a fresh set of eyes and make inputs or recommendations. Nothing precludes a last-minute change to how CCMD Lines of Activity are accomplished, as long as the IG is aware, and it behooves SC project leads to ask for IG advice on any techniques to better inculcate changes to policy.

If an OBSERVATION or FINDING is discovered, correct it immediately (if able), as the inspection continues on. Quickly correcting problems discovered during the inspection is critical if the systematic issue hinders successful and efficient ODC mission execution, but is also important because the problem may continue to manifest until fixed, costing the U.S. government money. Additionally, attacking the problem immediately after discovery reinforces the sense of urgency IGs are looking for in SCOs.

For example, when the IG discovered one ODC did not have a required formalized method of obtaining course feedback from PN students upon their return from an IMET course, the Training lead contacted the ODCs in Belgium and France to find out how they do it (coincidently, both of these ODCs were next in the queue to receive IG inspections). Within two hours of the OBSERVATION the ODC being inspected began the process of placing

a written feedback questionnaire in each student trip folder before student departure. The IG was appreciative for the sense-of-urgency displayed in response to the OBSERVATION.

Highlight successes the IG can relay to other ODCs world-wide. General Zamzow, "visibly exude pride in yourself, your unit, your mission, and your base: Looking Good, Feeling Good, Being a Winner!" Show off what you have. Highlight your strengths to the IG. Brief them on innovative programs, processes that improved efficiency, and money-saving ideas. Explain if you applied a Best Practice from another ODC, and emphasize any improvements you made to it.

Everything is an efficiency drill due to budget cutbacks. The IG inspection is an opportunity to highlight success stories. The IG has so many programs to review it is up to the SCO team to advocate the highlights. Good work doesn't usually speak for itself. You have to speak for the work.

The inspection of individual programs is a team effort. There is no reason a program-look has to be 1v1 with the IG, especially if there is more than one expert in the ODC on a particular subject

Some SCO personnel like to look up the responses in the regs/AFIs, etc, first, whereas other SCOs answer the IG via discussion, without the help of the E-SAMM or DOD regs and then double check their answer with the E-SAMM or regs. Both techniques display an understanding of job basics and it also highlight who is in the books/e-pubs enough to know where the answer is (CNTRL-F works well).

POST INSPECTION

The IG has departed; it is not time to forget the inspection and move on. There are still a few actions required:

1. Capture and disseminate Lessons Learned.
2. Thank Partner-Nation personnel who assisted.
3. Fix the OBSERVATIONS and FINDINGS

List some Lessons Learned immediately after the IG look. First, it captures important lessons while they are still fresh in the mind and second, the next ODC in line for an inspection can use the Lessons Learned to help themselves during their own inspection.

The Lessons Learned could include IG questions not related to the IG's checklist. Other Lessons Learned include any additional information the SCO needed in order to respond appropriately to IG questions. These Lessons Learned can be placed in a continuity folder until preparation for any future inspection; and the LLs should be sent to the JLLIS and/or DSCA for publishing [via SCIP]

The CCMD IG webpage will have a listing of which ODCs are next in line for inspection. In some instances, the IG report from one particular IG inspection will not be published with enough time for the next SCO to review the write-ups and make any last-minute corrections before their inspection. SCO Chiefs should email After Action Reports or Lessons Learned to the next ODC's in-line for inspection for that reason.

Draft letters or certificates of appreciation (for Ambassador Signature), addressed to any Partner-Nation personnel that helped the ODC succeed in the inspection.

For the Americans, bullets on Best Practices and outstanding contributions will make it to their OERs, OPRs, NCOERs, FitReps, etc, but for the international personnel, those letters of appreciation or certificates will be on their walls for decades, as will the presentation photo that goes along with it.

Correct any OBSERVATIONs or FINDINGs ASAP after the inspection. Letting the corrective action linger means the ODC is in the wrong. Also, the solution set should be institutionalized into the daily ODC process and norms in such a way that the problem is no longer a concern. Creating an internal process that everyone understands as the norm will fix the problem and make it a normal operating procedure within the ODC.

There are several keys to success SCO leadership can accomplish before, during, and

after an IG stops by the ODC. While it's always important for leadership to develop strategies that build partnerships with the Partner-Nation, it is just as important to prepare for the IG review of the programs SCO leadership have put in place to execute those strategic plans. Learning the lessons of past inspections will help SCOs prepare for that IG review.

About the Author

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A Closer Look at Strengthening Security Cooperation Organization Operations with a Civilian Workforce

By Timothy J. O'Sullivan
Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management

Any opinions, analysis, recommendations, or conclusions should be attributed to the author(s), and is not necessarily the view of DISAM, DSCA, DOD, or the USG

Helping other countries better provide for their own security will be a key and enduring test of US global leadership and a critical part of protecting US security, as well. Improving the way the US government executes this vital mission must be an important national priority.[1]
—Robert M. Gates, Former Secretary of Defense

Introduction

With ongoing funding cuts and the prospect of reduced military forces, it is vital that the Department of Defense (DOD) maximizes its existing resources. In April 2013, The White House published Presidential Policy Directive (PPD 23) on Security Sector Assistance which provides specific guidelines to effectively achieve the President's Security Sector Assistance goals by aligning its resources with National Security priorities. Specifically, the PPD provides a guideline to be more selective and use resources for the greatest impact.

In the Security Cooperation (SC) and Security Assistance (SA) arenas, DOD civilian professionals are potentially significant force multipliers. Whether supporting short-term gaps or long-term assignments, civilian workforce personnel can provide the expertise and stability in Security Cooperation Organizations (SCO's) to ensure U.S. National Security Objectives are met.

Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel recently stated, "The Pentagon has been rethinking not only its priorities, but also its policies and practices. This will require significant change across every aspect of our defense enterprise."[i] As a result, creating a formalized civilian security cooperation training program, to support Security Cooperation Organizations would provide needed relief for the Military Departments, save DOD appropriated funds, provide operational continuity, strengthen partner relationships, and advance our civilian security cooperation workforce experience.

The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) is developing a SC Workforce Development Program Initiative that outlines specific requirements needed to obtain certification levels and outlines SC career development objectives for the military and civilian workforces. As part of the existing initiative, this article proposes a concept using the DOD SC civilian workforce to deploy and support the critical mission of SC Organizations.

SCO Responsibilities and Manning

Before we explore this article's proposed concept, you first must understand how a typical SCO is organized along with its governing authorities' roles and responsibilities. Under the authority of the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) of 1976, as amended, the role of the SCO is to be the primary interface between the DOD and the Partner Nation (PN) on all DOD assigned SA activities. Moreover, the SCO is the lead organizations within each Geographic Combatant Command (GCCMD) for execution of SC/SA programs for the country assigned and are a crucial member of the U.S. Ambassador's Country Team. Section 515(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA), outlines seven required functions for assigned Embassy military personnel with respect to SA programs. Those required functions are identified in the Table 1-1.

Table 1-1

Mandated SA Functions

1. Equipment and services case management
2. Training management
3. Program monitoring
4. Evaluation and planning of the host governments military capabilities and requirements
5. Administrative support
6. Promoting rationalization, standardization, interoperability (RSI), and other defense cooperation measures
7. Liaison functions exclusive of advisory and training assistance

The FAA also specifies that the number of armed forces personnel assigned to a SCO conducting SA is not to exceed 6 unless specifically authorized by Congress. Funding for the SCO staffing is derived from the Congressional Budget Justification (CBJ) submitted to Congress. Included in the CBJ is the SA portion of SCO staffing costs from current year and projections for the next budget year. SCO military personnel support costs executing the SA program are funded with U.S. Code Title-22 (T-22). In some cases, SCOs can also be augmented to support SC activities by DOD personnel under U.S. Code Title 10 (T-10) authorities.

DSCA and the GCCMDs have the overall responsibility to ensure that the SCOs are appropriately staffed. The Joint Staff (JS) J1 manages the Joint Manpower Validation Process (JMVP) through which the SCO Joint Tables of Distribution (JTDs) are validated and updated at least annually. When GCCMDs determine that a new or increased SA workload requires additional staffing, the formal JMVP is put into effect and the GCCMDs oftenshift billets between SCOs within their Areas of Responsibility (AoR). Repositioning of those billets is closely coordinated with DSCA, the Joint Staff, and the effected U.S. Ambassador.

There is no standard size or make-up of a SCO; it largely depends on the number and magnitude of SA/SC activities conducted with the PN and the regional goals identified by the GCCMD for that country. In addition, any changes to the existing size or composition of the Embassy post will also require approval of the Ambas-

sador in consultation with the State Department, under the direction and authority of the National Security Decision Directive 38 (NSDD 38).

There are currently 152 SCOs worldwide (See Table 1-2) executing foreign military sales and a multitude of individual country relevant security cooperation programs. To successfully accomplish this mission, it takes a group of well-trained and experienced cadre who understand the latest SC policies and nuances of executing those programs and activities. In 2012, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) published a report to Congress on DOD's efforts towards SC reform which identified concerns that there are challenges within the existing workforce structure. A specific statement in the report quoted the following concern, "SCOs noted that they were insufficiently staffed or rotations in the field were not long enough. For example, some SCOs reported having only one security cooperation officer, and rotations sometimes lasted only 1 year, which was often less than the cycle time to develop and execute a Security Assistance (SA) Agreement." [ii]

Embassy SCOs by

Geographic Combatant Command

Table 1-2



The civilian SC/SA workforce

In 2009, the DEPSECDEF directed a concentrated effort to train the SC Workforce as part of ten High Priority Performance Goals reported to the Office of Management & Budget. The ultimate goal was, and continues to be, to maintain and train 95% of the SC workforce at appropriate skill levels as designated by their supervisory chain. The Security Cooperation Workforce Database (SCWD – pronounced "squid") is the tool created to monitor the level of training earned by the Security Cooperation (SC) workforce around the world. The SCWD is a web-based tool that performs two separate but interwoven functions. First, it identifies all the SC-associated positions globally and the required level of training for that position, and second, it identifies the personnel occupying the positions and their current level of training achieved. With these pieces of information, it is possible to compute the percentage of people who are trained to the appropriate level.[iii]According to SCWD, there are approximately 8,517 civilian personnel currently employed in the SC workforce. Those positions include a variety of staff personnel such as case managers, IT professionals, program managers, strategists, desk officers, policy makers, and educators. The training levels currently established are provided in Table 1-3 below.

The Concepts

This article's concepts are not new. Some GCCMDs are currently utilizing civilians in a few deployed SCO organizations. This article does not address civilianizing the Senior Defense Official/Defense Attaché (SDO/DATT) program or all of the current military positions. The proposed concepts focus on providing sustained and temporary expertise to the SCOs.

The first concept would be to position and develop career SC civilians as deputies to the SDO/DATT (SCO Chief). Using CENTCOM as an example, Table 1-3 lists a few of the current military

Security Cooperation Certification Levels

Table 1-3

Level	Position Level Details
1	Positions needing only an awareness of basic SC terminology or Senior Commanders and Staff indirectly responsible for SC supervision.
2	Positions needing only a basic understanding of SC program terminology and processes or positions directly responsible for some aspects of SC, but for which extensive knowledge of SC programs is not required.
3	Positions working SC programs directly involving the transfer of military articles, services, and training of supervising that work.
4	Positions requiring advance understanding of SC/SA processes and policy.

CENTCOM Deputy Positions

Table 1-3 (Some CENTCOM SCOs were not included due to their minimal staffing.)

Country	Title	Rank	Service	Tour Length
Bahrain	Deputy Chief	O5	USAF	2 Years
Egypt	Deputy Chief	O6	USA	2 Years
Jordan	Chief	O5	USA	2 Years
Kazakhstan	Deputy OMC	O4	USAF	2 Years
Kuwait	Vice Chief	O6	USAF	2 Years
Lebanon	Deputy Chief	O5	USA	2 Years
Oman	Deputy Chief OMC	O5	USA	2 Years
Pakistan	Acting Deputy Chief	O6	USAF	1 Year
Qatar	Deputy Chief	O4	USA	2 Years
Saudi (USMTM)	Deputy Chief	O6	USMC	1 Year
UAE	USLO Deputy Chief	O5	USAF	1 Year
Uzbekistan	SCO Chief	O4	USA	2 Years
Yemen	Deputy Chief	O5	USAF	1 Year
Iraq	Deputy SAO	O5	USAF	1 Year

Deputy SCO positions and tour lengths located in the CENTCOM Area of Responsibility (AOR).

The requirement and qualification standards for those civilian positions would preferably be former military Security Cooperation Officer's, Foreign Area Officer's (FAOs), Regional Affair Specialists (RAS) and Political Affairs Specialists (PAS).Experience as a joint country program managers at commands such as the GCCMDs, the Joint Staff, the Defense Security Cooperation

Agency (DSCA), and the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, with applicable language skills and basic cultural knowledge of the PN would be desired, but not necessarily required. However, non-prior military service civilian personal with a wide range of experience applicable to the particular assignment requirement should also be considered. The civilian grade would be dependent on the size and complexity of the position and the SCO. The main objective is to establish longer partner relationships and build trust where a stable relationship is a critical part of the PN culture. Building a relationship takes time, patience, commitment, and requires significant investment. In many places, personal relationships trump professional ones. The SCO business is not a "flash in the pan enterprise," it requires sustained commitment over time to be successful. For example, in a recent discussion with a partner nation's FMS selection committee, the senior officer was quick to point out frustration with ongoing turnover in the SCO at the U.S. Embassy. The officer stated, "Just when we establish a good relationship with our action officer, he or she leaves and it takes a long time to establish a new relationship and for the replacement to understand our desires and background of our program, so we consistently feel we have to start all over again".[iv]

A significant advantage of a civilianized concept is to aid the SCO with better continuity and operational stability. As Table 1-3 illustrates, the average SCO tour in USCENTCOM is approximately two years. In most SCOs, the first year on assignment is spent building PN relationships, finding supporting agency points of contacts, understanding the PN hierarchy, and learning about the PN SA/SC programs.

Finding the right civilian for a position involves a number of complicated variables. The size of the existing country team, the country's significance in the relationship with the U.S., and the number and complexity of SA/SC activities being conducted should be key deciding factors. The deployed officer billets salaries are currently funded by the owning service under Title 10 authorities and various support costs are covered under Title 22. Using table 1-4 below as an example, the CENTCOM deputy positions listed in Table 1-3 cost the Military Departments a Rough Order of Magnitude (ROM) of $1.5M annually. To replace those positions with civilians, the ROM civilian cost would be around $1.2M annually.

The second proposed concept is to develop a cadre of civilians from the SC/SA workforce that are SC coded in SCWD to help support short term gaps requested by the GCCMD on an as needed TDY basis. The type of activity the individual supports would determine their funding source (e.g. SA/SC). In some cases, professional development funding could also be

Average Cost Comparison of Annual Military Compensation by Pay Grade

Table 1-4 (Endnote [v])

Rank	Military compensation[a]	Grade	Civilian compensation[b]	Civilian cost advantage
O-6	$119,378	GS-15	$108,334	$11,044
O-5	100,502	GS-14	93,097	7,405
O-4	83,125	GS-12	67,394	15,731
O-3	67,469	GS-11	56,686	10,783
O-2	54,198	GS-9	47,333	6,865
O-1	40,458	GS-7	39,197	1,261

considered. The gap fill requirements would be short in duration to help support a critical mission need or an interim loss of personnel. There are many times when a critical military billet is vacant for an extended period of time (months) until the owning service identifies and provides a permanent replacement. There are also circumstances where an unforeseen SCO mission will require additional personnel support (Large 1206 deliveries, Enhanced End Use Monitoring, etc.).

In theory, when the SCO determines temporary civilian support is the best method to sustain the mission, the SCO would provide a formal request with the required qualifications to the GCCMD. The GCCMD would submit the request and justification to DSCA for approval. A mass email would be sent to the qualified SC civilian workforce based on their SCWD certification level and DISAM courses attended to solicit nominees. Individuals would need supervisory approval to ensure that the SCO assignment supports improving their existing qualification standards and requirements identified in their workforce development plans. Exposure in a SCO would help strengthen an individual's breath of experience and be extremely beneficial to incorporate the experience and perspective into their organization upon return. The program would benefit civilians who teach SA/SC curriculum or work specific SC programs at MILDEPS and various DOD organizations.

Programs as a Benchmark

DOD and State Department have rotational advisor programs which can serve as benchmarks for this article's proposed concept. The Ministry of Defense Advisors (MODA) Program and Afghanistan Pakistan (AFPAK) Hands are similar programs designed to develop a reach back capability from a cadre of experts (civilian and military) who are rotational advisors to develop deeper relationships and a better understanding of PN internal issues. In particular, the MODA Program matches senior DOD civilians with partner-identified requirements at the Ministry of Defense level. While deployed, the advisors exchange expertise with foreign counterparts in similar defense specialties.

State Department's Foreign Service, Hard to Fill (HTF) Program allows State Department's non-Foreign Service civilian employees to bid on Foreign Service positions. The objective is to allow non-Foreign Service civilian employees to participate directly in the Department's overseas mission and experience life and work at an embassy or consulate. The program is designed to help meet critical State Department overseas staffing needs while providing a unique career development opportunity for its non-Foreign Service civilian personnel.

The Challenges

No new program or idea goes without numerous challenges. For the purpose of this article, we will highlight two of the major challenges that often affect our enterprise (personnel and funding). To start, in order to make the concept successful, positions replaced by civilians would require a minimum tour length that supports the SDO/DATT's continuity and is designed to sustain a good PN relationship. A formalized DOD Foreign Service Security Assistance (FSSA) program very similar to the State Department's Foreign Service program would need to be established. Individuals accepting a SCO Deputy assignment would need a follow on career path or have return rights to their previous job to alleviate concerns of what's next after serving 3-5 years at a post (e.g. DSCA, MILDEP, Implementing Agency, GCCMD, JS, OSD, etc.).

Additionally, recruiting individuals willing to take positions in less desirable locations could pose a challenge. As a result, assignments known to have poor living conditions and an increased security climate would require recruiting incentives to be incorporated, such as Funded Environmental and Morale Leave (FEML). The FEML requirement would be approved on a case-by-case basis through the GCCMD and by Joint Staff. Other incentives for recruitment

could also include a follow on assignment preference at CONUS or other SCO opportunities.

As with anything in our current environment, funding is always one of the biggest challenges. Since the Military Departments currently supplement the existing military personnel deputy positions with appropriated funds, a decision based on the roles and responsibilities of the position would determine the appropriate source of funding for each position – appropriated or FMS Administrative Surcharge funds. If the amount of ongoing SA activity is significant at the assigned SCO and the FMS Administrative Surcharge is appropriate, it could provide potential cost savings to the Military Departments. A reserve is maintained in the FMS Trust Fund Administrative Surcharge Account. Any new additions to the FMS Administrative Surcharge Account could affect the existing reserve balance and potentially current percentage (3.5%) charged to our Foreign Military Sales (FMS) customers. The FMS Administrative Surcharge Account is closely monitored by DSCA. Regardless of the appropriate funding source, each position will require budgetary consideration for either T-10 or T-22.

Conclusion

In 2010, the Security Cooperation Reform Task Force conducted a series of workshops and provided recommendations to include workforce development. This article proposes additional recommendations that could offer significant improvements to the SC workforce structure, SCO operations, and support the DOD's ongoing SC/SA reforms and President's Policy Directive 23 on Security Sector Assistance. Further in-depth evaluation of this proposal and any existing efforts should be examined and considered by the DOD, JS, DSCA, and MILDEPs with support from the GCCMDs.

About the Author

Timothy O'Sullivan is a DISAM Instructor of Security Cooperation and a retired U.S. Air Force Officer. While in the Air Force, his security cooperation tours included serving as a Joint Staff Officer in USCENTCOM J5, Security Cooperation Division (Oman and Qatar Desk Officer) from 2008-2011, embedded advisor in 2007-2008 to the Iraqi Army 10th and 14th Division and US Air Force Special Operations. His other tours included Air Force Material Command/Acquisitions, Air Combat Command, Air Mobility Command, Executive Officer and Instructor at the U.S. Air Force Institute of Technology. His Academic Degrees include Bachelors in Professional Aeronautics and a Master's Degree of Aeronautical Science from Embry Riddle Aeronautical University.

[i]Robert, B. (2013, November 5). *Hagel Warns of Dangers in Deep Cuts to Defense*. Retrieved November 5, 2013, from ABC News: http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/wireStory/hagel-warns-dangers-deep-cuts-defense-20787119

[ii]U.S. Government Accountability Office. (2012). *DOD's Ongoing Reforms Address Some Challenges, but Additional Information Is Needed to Further Enhance Program Management*. Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Accountability Officer.

[iii]The Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management http://www.disam.dsca.mil/pages/programs/hppg_scti/default.aspx

[iv]Committee, B. F. (2013, October 23). United States Field Studies Program (Home Seminar). (T. J. OSullivan, Interviewer)

[v]Government Accountability Office. (1996). *DOD Force Mix Issues: Converting Some Support Officer Positions to Civilian Status Could Save Money*. Washington D.C.: Government Accountability Office.

Military Justice Engagement and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC): A Case Study in the Potential for Defense Institution Building in Austere African Environments

By LTC McCullough, USA, Branch Chief
U.S. AFRICOM, J5

Any opinions, analysis, recommendations, or conclusions should be attributed to the author, and is not necessary the view of the USCG, DISAM, DSCA, DOD, or the USG

Rule of law and human rights education is a significant engagement tool not only in the DRC but also in many countries worldwide. Watching the news, one will notice that rebel activity, loosely controlled militaries, and competing tribal interests plague many regions in Africa. The U.S. country team in Kinshasa, in cooperation with the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM), has designed an engagement strategy that takes a holistic approach to addressing the challenges surrounding the military justice system in the DRC. This approach facilitates defense institution building (DIB) in a country where defense spending is extremely limited. The strategy addresses three areas: education (recruit through Legal Magistrate), application of technology to facilitate defense/prosecution, and mentorship (Prosecution Support Cell).

Education and the DIILS Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

Taking the lead on education and providing the groundwork for DIB is the Defense Institute for International Legal Studies (DIILS). DIILS is a joint command located at the Newport Naval Station in Newport, RI. It is part of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) within the Department of Defense (DOD) and is tasked with delivering legal training on the rule of law, the law of armed conflict, human rights and other subjects throughout the world. It is another tool in the security cooperation toolbox that can impact our relationships with foreign military and security forces.

DIILS activities in the Congo are resourced through two different sources, International Military Education and Training (IMET) program and the Peace Keeping Operations (PKO) program. Initially, most security cooperation organizations (SCOs) are acquainted with DIILS training capabilities via the combatant command (CCMD) hosted Security Cooperation and Education Training Working Group (SCETWG) held once a year in Garmisch, Germany. SCETWG is the venue where SCOs typically plan the application of IMET funding via a full array of USG military pro-

grams. In the DRC, PKO is primary and IMET is secondary in resourcing DIILS activities.

The DIILS mission in the DRC began in 2008. Originally, the in-country program staff consisted of a U.S. Navy O-5 or O-6 JAG officer and a U.S. Navy E-7 based at the U.S. Embassy in Kinshasa, DRC. The in-country team is further supported by a locally employed staff member at the embassy. The job of the in-country staff is to run the program locally, work with the "Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo" (FARDC), and other government officials to facilitate training opportunities; they also work with the UN and other international governmental organizations (IGOs) as well as certain nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) working on rule of law issues to help compliment the efforts of all of the parties interested in moving the DRC government toward a system built upon the rule of law.

The FARDC is the DRC's primary force. The FARDC is minimally funded and not very mobile. Therefore, DIILS has traveled extensively to deliver the training to various commands throughout the country (see graphic). The DRC is very large, about 2/3rds the size of Western Europe or about 1/4th the size of the U.S., and has a very poor transportation infrastructure. Fortunately, the UN flies to most places where there are concentrations of the FARDC. DIILS utilizes UN flights to a particular area and then uses UN or locally procured transportation to reach the FARDC. Most training missions are executed over the course of a two-week period.

The training has focused on both the FARDC military magistrates' community, which is the equivalent of each of the U.S. Armed Services respective JAG Corps, and the FARDC officer corps. Training has been conducted on a variety of subjects including the rule of law, the law of armed conflict, human rights, international humanitarian law, sex and gender based violence, and international criminal law. The DIILS program is also integrated into other U.S. contractor programs to reach an even broader audience within the FARDC. The average class size is 30 to 40 students, but there are smaller groups when the focus is purely on the legal community and there are larger groups such as training conducted at the FARDC military academy.

In early 2014, DIILS demonstrated great flexibility in meeting COCOM, country team and partner nation (PN) requirements, when two groups of 3,000 trainees each were identified as available for training on short notice. The training timeline between notification and execution was less than 60 days due to the unpredictable nature of the FARDC unit assignments. Thanks to the existing DIILS infrastructure on the country team and the relationship between FARDC centers of Instruction and the Office of Security Cooperation (OSC), DIILS was able to train the largest audiences in the organization's history (1,687 recruits at Base Kitona and 2,361 recruits at the Mura Center of Instruction). A second example of flexibility and capacity was demonstrated during March 2014 when DIILS modified training to provide a seminar to the FARDC Inspector General's office. This event has opened the door to greater relations between the U.S. Embassy and one of two 4-star Generals in the FARDC. Additionally, the activity assisted a PN in increasing the capacity to professionalize and reduce corruption. *Having worked as a security cooperation officer in two COCOMs and at the Army Component level, I have never come across an organization that has been as consistent and successful as DIILS. I strongly encourage the SCO community to consider adding DIILS to country engagement plans.*

Technology:

The second element in the military justice DIB effort was the implementation of technology in order to facilitate case development (prosecution and defense). The technology was implemented through a program entitled the DRC Military Justice Regional Resource Center (MJRRC). In essence, an intranet, library, and the skills necessary to use these resources were established.



Since the implementation of the MJRRC project in 2010, the program assisted the connection of 34 resource centers equally distributed between the Prosecutor's Office and the Military Court. The program conducted training for all the key personnel in the various centers, including systems administrators who now conduct their own training under State Department-funded mentors. Each resource center is equipped with the following:

- 1 laptop with charger and storage bag
- 1 multifunction color printer
- 1 modem with a Vodacom SIM card
- 1 power strip
- 1 stabilizer
- 1 digital camera for the Prosecutor's Office
- 1 range of books for the law libraries

For the centers which have problems with electricity supply such as Kikwit, Mbandaka, Kananga, Kindu, Goma and Bukavu, the following equipment has been added for proper operation:

- 2 solar panels
- 3 batteries 100 AH
- 1 regulator
- 1converter
- 1 toolbox

Below is a graphic representation of the locations where the program delivered training on equipment, individuals who were provided training and the specific type of equipment provided to each location.



Prosecution Support Cell (PSC)

The third element of this effort which facilitated DIB is the Prosecution Support Cell (PSC). The role of the PSC is to help mentor partner nation (PN) prosecutors in the application of their skills. PSCs typically operate in war-torn Eastern Congo where most of the human rights violations occur. The PSCs are not allowed to personally partake in the military justice process, hearings or trials. Additionally, the PSCs (funded by the Department of State) provide feedback to the technology and education providers in order to refine the first two elements in this effort.

Conclusion

In summary, the aligning of three separate security cooperation programs: education, technology, and mentorship have provided a defense institution building capacity by the USG for the Democratic Republic of Congo. The results of this comprehensive approach to the creation of rule of law is paving the way to a more educated and professional military that is becoming more accountable for its actions. "Buyer Beware"…though this article paints a rosy picture of this effort, many challenges remain, primarily related to sustainability of the

program and its application in a very unstable defense system. Regardless, the aligning of programs that create a venue for DIB is a measurable effort that can demonstrate a positive impact of U.S. security cooperation that distances the U.S. from the misbelief that the U.S. only focuses on arms sales and provoking conflict.

Special thank you to Frank Robards (USN, ret.) who provided outstanding DIILS training in the Congo and contributed to the historical information on the DIILS program in the DRC.

About the Author

LTC McCullough is a Branch Chief at U.S. AFRICOM, J5. He was commissioned in 1993 from the Washington State University ROTC program as an armor officer, and became a FAO in 2002. His FAO assignments include Chief, Office of Security Cooperation, U.S. Embassy Kinshasa/Brazzaville, Operations Chief for the Multinational Training Division - USAREUR G3, J9 USFORA-S Afghanistan, ODC Chief Yerevan, Caucasus Team Chief and Deputy Division Chief for Counter Terrorism at RAF Molesworth, UK; and Deputy Commander USNIC Sarajevo.

Public Opinion and Security Cooperation in the Middle East and Central Asia

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Any opinions, analysis, recommendations, or conclusions should be attributed to the author, and is not necessary the view of the USCG, DISAM, DSCA, DOD, or the USG

Over the last three years, the Middle East has experienced tremendous challenges to its regional stability and security. The United States (U.S.), and its partners across the United States Central Command (USCENTCOM), had to frantically adjust their strategy to mitigate the fallout associated with the Arab uprisings, toppled governments, civil war, and military coups. At the core of these world-changing events is public opinion, which has consequences for Security Cooperation (SC), a cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East and Central Asia.

Security Cooperation is defined as a list of activities "undertaken by the Department of Defense (DOD) to encourage and enable international partners to work with the U.S. to achieve strategic objectives" (U.S. Department of Defense, 2014). SC is administered through various programs, which provide training, equipment, and support multilateral exercises that align with U.S. strategy. Thus, USCENTCOM is placing more emphasis on SC as a responsible approach "to reduce U.S. military presence… and by partnering with regional nations to distribute more of the security burden" in the Middle East and Central Asia (Mattis, 2013).

Security Cooperation Officers (SCOs) are key military members establishing and fostering professional working relationships to advance U.S. strategic interests through SC. SCOs accomplish their mission by using their influence, advice, and expertise to help the U.S. implement its foreign policy as well as secure its access and influence in critical areas across the USCENTCOM region (Moroney, Thaler & Hogler, 2013). Yet, there are times when regional and/or local politics, public opinion, and attitudes toward the U.S. and its foreign policy may negatively affect the SCOs' ability to influence their host nation counterparts within USCENTCOM. That said, the previously stated factors may beg the following question:

Is the ability to build relationships and enact diplomacy affected by negative views of the United States in the Middle East and Central Asia?

The DOD stated in a report, "Negative attitudes and the conditions that create them are the underlying sources of threats to America's national security and reduced ability to leverage diplomatic opportunities" (Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication, 2004, p. 15). What causes negative views of the U.S. or anti-Americanism? A recent study

found a correlation between U.S. military intervention in the Middle East and an increase in negative public perceptions of the U.S. in the region (Cummins, 2012). This article explores the theories surrounding public opinion in the Middle East and Central Asia, its relationship with U.S. foreign policy, and its relevance to SCOs working in the region.

Public Opinion in the Middle East and Central Asia

Do global perceptions of the U.S. affect SCOs operating in the Middle East and Central Asia? Many scholars have identified several consequences associated with anti-Americanism and its impact on U.S. foreign policy and U.S. citizens abroad. The body of literature indicates anti-Americanism has substantial consequences, which range from fostering terrorism, to paralyzing host nation leaders from cooperating with U.S. diplomats for fear of losing popular support in their country (Caves, Donahue, Falin, Ham, Jean-Baptiste, Kim, Metzger, Schmidt, Wilsey & Winsberg, 2010).

Stephen Brooks, a scholar on public opinion, argues the consequences of anti-American sentiment became apparent on September 11, 2001 and "terrorism that lacks a base of popular support is far easier to deal with" (Brooks, 2006, pp. 155-156). Unfavorable opinions of the U.S. can also damage American economic and political interests abroad. In particular, anti-Americanism can lead to boycotts of American goods and limit American investments abroad, which would be detrimental to the U.S. economy (Brooks, 2006).

Prominent political scientists, Peter Katzenstein and Robert Keohane, assert that anti-Americanism can damage U.S. "soft power" (Katzenstein & Keohane, 2007). In other words, this phenomenon could impede the U.S. government's ability to enact multilateral diplomacy and build security partnerships with other countries. Katzenstein and Keohane (2007) explain how anti-Americanism can spread and affect other partners in the region by stating, "distrust of the United States, or bias against it, could conceivably lead other governments to refuse to participate in American-led efforts" (p. 274). Katzenstein and Keohane (2007) also add, "anti-Americanism will prevent the United States from achieving important political objectives that can only be attained through extensive international cooperation" (p. 274-275). Therefore, it is important for SCOs operating in the USCENTCOM AOR to be familiar with the subject of anti-Americanism and its potential damage to U.S. foreign policy and interests. However, in order to fully understand public opinion in the Middle East and Central Asia, one must understand the competing theories.

"Their Fault" vs "Our Fault" Theories

The literature on anti-Americanism in the Middle East and Central Asia has largely been split into two separate arguments: the "their fault" argument and the "our fault" argument. The "their fault" theory asserts conflicting values and norms, and the increase in extremism, cause some in the Middle East to hold negative views of the U.S.. Political scientist Vaughn Shannon (2007) writes, "The 'their fault' camp suggests that anti-U.S. sentiments and violence result from radical ideology, incompatible values, psychological malaise, and political exploitation that fuels some elites and groups to hate the U.S. and its values and policies." The "our fault" theory contends that it is U.S. foreign policy that directly causes negative public perceptions of the United States. Shannon (2007) continues, "The 'our fault' studies suggest U.S. actions and policy have fueled anti-U.S. sentiments that lead to violence against U.S. citizens and institutions."

The "their fault" scholars believe anti-Americanism has emerged in the Middle East and Central Asia because of "who we are." These scholars believe contrasting values, culture, and religious differences cause hatred of the U.S. in the Middle East. Political scientist Stephen Walt

(2005) writes, "From this perspective, opposition to the United States is an inevitable, and thus unavoidable, reaction either to the concentration of power in U.S. hands or to the specific political and cultural values that the United States represents" (p. 70). Scholars, such as Barry Rubin, argue that political leaders and religious leaders in the Muslim world have blamed the U.S. for their own domestic problems or have used cultural or religious differences to advance hatred of the U.S.. Rubin (2002) writes, "Anti-Americanism has served as a means of last resort by which failed political systems and movements in the Middle East try to improve their legitimacy" (p. 1). Scholars that prescribe to the "their fault" theory claim that American culture spawns anti-Americanism because of divorce rates, sexuality, and parenting out of wedlock (Walt, 2005). Others claim that American culture is rejected because of materialism, individualism, violence, and democratic values (Walt, 2005).

Bernard Lewis and Samuel P. Huntington add to the "their fault" argument by insisting that the differences between the Middle East and the U.S. is a religious "clash of civilizations" that cannot be reconciled. Huntington (1995) writes that the differences in religion are "far more fundamental than differences among political ideologies and political regimes" (p. 25). Huntington further contends that the Middle East will be a "fault line" where increased conflict will occur between Western civilization and Islamic civilization.

The scholars who prescribe to the "our fault" theory blame the spread of anti-Americanism in the Middle East and Central Asia on "what we do." Scholars that make this claim, argue it is not about U.S. values, culture or power, but rather, how the U.S. uses its power that causes anti-Americanism. John L. Esposito (2007) writes, "The widespread anti-Americanism among mainstream Muslims and Islamists results from what the United States does—its policies and actions—not its way of life, culture, or religion" (p. 5-6). Some scholars contend that anti-Americanism exists because of U.S. support for Israel. Accordingly, Andrew Kohut (2005) cites a 2003 Pew survey, which shows that "enormous majorities in Arab and Muslim countries (at least 90% in Jordan, the Palestinian Authority, Morocco, and Lebanon) believed the U.S. favors Israel too much" (p. 1).

Other "our fault" scholars argue foreign military intervention is the definitive cause of anti-Americanism and also a very significant factor in suicide terrorism within the Middle East (Pape, 2010). Political scientist Robert Pape (2010) insists over 90% of international suicide terrorism is anti-American and a direct result of local regions being threatened by foreign troops. Abdel Mahdi Abdallah argues anti-Americanism also increases in the Middle East when the civilian population associates the U.S. with their oppressive rulers. Abdallah (2003) writes, "Another source of anti-Americanism has been America's support for some authoritarian Arab regimes that are unpopular with their own people" (p. 68). Esposito (2007) calls it "democratic exceptionalism," or the policy of "supporting authoritarian regimes in the Arab and Muslim world while not promoting democracy there as it did elsewhere after the fall of the Soviet Union" (p. 3)

Some scholars claim it could be a combination of the two arguments or that the solution may lie outside this debate. Walt (2005) argues that anti-Americanism in the Middle East is both "their fault" and "our fault". He claims that some in the region do see our culture and values as a problem, but that U.S. foreign policy has also had negative consequences. Lynch (2007) contends that neither argument is fully satisfying. He writes, "If policies have nothing to do with anti-Americanism, then why did such sentiments spike in 2002…If U.S. policies alone explain anti-Americanism, then how do we explain its persistence across different administrations with what appear to be very different policies" (Lynch, 2007, p. 197). While the "their fault" and

"our fault" theories do not completely solve the issue of anti-Americanism, they do shed some light on factors which lead to negative views of the U.S.. To test these theories, a recent study analyzed U.S. foreign policy and its possible links to public opinion in the Middle East.

U.S. Foreign Policy and Middle Eastern Public Opinion

Should SCOs be aware of how U.S. foreign policy affects public opinion in their partner country? To answer this question, a recent study analyzed U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East between 2002 and 2011 while tracking approval levels of the U.S. in Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey (Cummins, 2012). Although the study focused on the Middle East, the findings may also be relevant to SCOs working in Central Asia. The study found a significant correlation between U.S. intervention and the increase in anti-American sentiment in the region (Cummins, 2012).

Table 1 displays level of approval toward the U.S. prior to and after the U.S. intervention in Iraq in 2003 and U.S. intervention in Libya in 2011. The numbers shown represent support for the U.S. in percent, ranging from 1 to 100. The lower numbers reflect negative views of the U.S., while the higher numbers reflect positive views of the U.S.. In both cases there is a drop in approval of the U.S.. However, the largest and most significant difference occurs between 2002 and 2003, when the U.S. invaded Iraq. The regional statistical mean experienced a 15.83% drop in approval of the U.S. in just one year, and every country except Egypt and Turkey witness their lowest approval ratings of the ten year study. Jordan and Morocco also witness their largest decrease in U.S. approval, both decreasing by 24%.

The intervention in Libya did not cause nearly as much disapproval of the U.S. as the intervention in Iraq. The region witnessed a 2.33% drop in approval of the U.S. with four out of the six countries experiencing a drop in approval except for Lebanon, which remained constant, and Saudi Arabia, which increased by 6%. This difference between interventions could be based on the type of intervention. For example, the intervention in Libya was of a much smaller scale and did not include the use of ground forces by the U.S.. The intervention in Libya was also facilitated by the UN and approved by states in the international community, while the intervention in Iraq did not go through the UN and was seen as a unilateral use of force by many in the international community (Benvenisti, 2004). Many in the Middle East also supported U.S. efforts in Libya, including the Arab League, which was not the case in Iraq in 2003 (Bronner & Sanger, 2011). These findings show

Table 1: U.S. Intervention and Public Opinion of the U.S.

	2003 Intervention in Iraq			2011 Intervention in Libya		
	2002	2003	Difference	2010	2011	Difference
Egypt	15	13	-2	15	12	-2
Jordan	27	3	-24	19	11	-8
Lebanon	34	19	-15	36	36	0
Morocco	30	6	-24	14	12	-2
Saudi Arabia	14	4	-10	24	30	6
Turkey	35	15	-20	17	10	-7
Regional Totals	**25.83**	**10**	**-15.83**	**20.83**	**18.5**	**-2.33**

a correlation between U.S. military intervention in the region and an increase in anti-American sentiment. However, the findings also show that the type of military intervention matters. For instance, a smaller scale, multilateral intervention with regional support garners much less anti-Americanism than a more heavy handed "boots on the ground" approach.

What does negative public opinion mean for SCOs in the Middle East and Central Asia? A SCO's military counterpart will likely understand the strategic reasoning behind U.S. intervention, and therefore will not hold the same anti-American sentiment that could be found on the "Arab street." However, as Katzenstein and Keohane (2007) point out, it is also possible for foreign governments and militaries to harbor resentment toward U.S. foreign policy. In particular, the U.S. government's relationship with Israel is a source of criticism for many in the Middle East and Central Asia. From time to time, SCOs may experience resentment because the U.S. downgraded or disapproved the host nation's request for certain defense articles and services because of the Qualitative Military Edge (QME) commitment to Israel (Wunderele & Briere, 2008). In addition, the perceived unconditional U.S. diplomatic and military support to Israel may be a point of friction during SCO and host nation counterpart interactions.

SCOs may also face resistance as a result of issues that happen inside their partner country such as the "Arab Spring" protests, the 2011 killing of Osama bin Laden in Pakistan, or the burning of Qurans by U.S. troops in Afghanistan. This may lead to a lack of access for SCOs, delays in decision making by the partner nation's government, or a failure in diplomacy. In the worst-case scenario, it could also put the SCOs life in danger.

Strong public opinion can also affect host nation government decisions and derail actions and strategy in the Middle East and Central Asia. This occurred in February 2011 when the Iraqi government delayed the purchase of F-16s as a result of the public protests during the "Arab Spring." In February 2011, when the Iraqi government was set to make its first payment, protesters hit the streets speaking out against high food prices (The World Post, 2011). In response, the Iraqi government assured the people it would delay the nearly $3 billion F-16 deal, and instead use the money on food rations (Iraq-Business News, 2011). As a result, the F-16 FMS case was delayed because of the outcry of negative public opinion; however, the U.S. was able to overcome this delay and the deal was reinitiated in September 2011. Even though these protests were not anti-American in nature, the case of Iraq still displays the possible effects that public opinion can have on host nation decision-making.

Public opinion also played a major role in U.S. relations with Pakistan. In December 2010, thousands of classified U.S. diplomatic cables were released through the website WikiLeaks. Dozens of these cables discussed U.S. concerns over Pakistan's nuclear program and its support for militant groups, which sparked anti-American protests throughout the country (Bajoria, 2010). Furthermore, in January 2011, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) contractor, Raymond Allen Davis, was arrested in Lahore after killing two Pakistani men (Mazzetti, 2013). Anti-American sentiment in Pakistan erupted, calling for Davis to be tried and executed. *New York Times* reporter Mark Mazzetti (2013) writes, "Pakistan's Islamist parties organized street protests and threatened violent riots if Raymond Davis was not tried and hanged for his crimes" (p. 9). Anger toward the U.S. in Pakistan worsened in March 2011 when Davis was freed and quickly escorted out of Pakistan, after reports that the victims' families were paid off (Daily Mail, 2011). Mazzetti (2013) writes, "But the secret deal only fueled the anger in Pakistan, and anti-American protests flared in major cities, including Islamabad, Karachi and Lahore" (p. 11). To make matters worse, two months later the U.S. covertly sent a Navy Seal team into Pakistan,

which led to the death of Osama bin Laden. Once again, protesters hit the streets outraged that their sovereignty had been violated by the U.S. (Reuters, 2011). Shortly after the killing of bin Laden, the Pakistani military responded by cutting the U.S. military training program and limiting visas on U.S. personnel in Pakistan (Wolf, 2011). The U.S. responded by withholding nearly $800 million in security assistance aid to Pakistan (Schmitt & Perlez, 2011). This severely damaged the SCOs' ability to build relationships and gain access to their military counterparts.

Another major issue occurred several months later in November 2011, when a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) airstrike killed over 25 Pakistani soldiers near the Afghanistan-Pakistan border (Masood & Schmitt, 2011). In response, the Pakistani government ordered the U.S. to vacate a key location instrumental to combat operations. Pakistan also closed the Ground Lines of Communication (GLOC), which were the two main NATO supply routes into Afghanistan (Martinez, 2012). As a result, the rift in the U.S./Pakistani relationship widened, prompting the U.S. to reroute supply lines through the Northern Distribution Network, at a reported cost of $104 million per month (Martinez, 2012). Nearly seven months later, the U.S. was able to somewhat repair its diplomatic relationship with Pakistan and negotiate the reopening of the GLOC (Reuters, 2012). However, the case of Pakistan shows that public opinion can severely strain the ability for SCOs to gain access, build relationships, and enact U.S. foreign policy.

Similarly to Pakistan, a combination of events in Afghanistan in 2012 led to a massive anti-American movement that put the lives of SCOs in danger. Public opinion took a turn for the worse in January 2012 after a video of U.S. Marines urinating on the dead bodies of Taliban soldiers went viral (Bowley & Rosenberg, 2012). Protests over the U.S. presence in the country soon broke out. To make matters worse, a month later in February 2012, it was released that U.S. soldiers burned Qurans at a NATO military base. This severely damaged U.S. relations with the Afghan government and civilian population. Soon, thousands of protesters hit the streets in the cities of Kabul, Jalalabad, and Herat (Deutsche Welle, 2012). The protests quickly turned violent as the situation in Afghanistan worsened. The situation hit a breaking point as two U.S. officers, including one SCO, were killed in the Afghan Interior Ministry building by one of their Afghan counterparts (Bowley & Rubin, 2012). *New York Times* journalists Bowley and Rubin (2012) write, "The shooting of the two American officers took place in the Interior Ministry's command and control center, a highly restricted area where officials monitor conditions around the country" (p. 4). This attack was the worst possible outcome for the SC mission in Afghanistan. It broke the trust between the U.S. and their Afghan counterparts, severed communication and access for the U.S., and cost a SCO his life. The U.S. responded by withdrawing all military advisers from the country, which made it increasingly difficult for SCOs to repair this broken relationship (Bowley & Rubin, 2012).

The three previous cases demonstrate the extent of damage that can be caused by negative public opinion within the partner country. The cases also speak to the study, which linked U.S. military intervention with rising levels of anti-Americanism. In all three of these cases, the U.S. had a military presence in the host country, which led to negative public opinion and ultimately affected the SCOs ability to enact U.S. foreign policy objectives. Events that happen within the partner country can quickly lead to anti-Americanism and negatively affect the SCO's ability to complete his or her mission. Public opinion can lead to limited access, distrust from the military counterparts, or even put the SCO's life in danger. These events are often out of the SCOs control, but the SCO must have a plan in place on how to react and overcome negative public opinion.

Recommendations for SCOs in the Middle East and Central Asia

SCOs must take into account the operational environment when developing a strategy for implementing U.S. foreign policy in USCENTCOM. When regional dynamics, such as anti-Americanism festers in the Middle East and Central Asia, host nation politicians and military leaders may feel pressured to disalign with U.S. interests due to negative public opinion. In turn, the effects of anti-Americanism may trickle down to the host nation counterpart, making them reluctant to make decisions in support of U.S. interests or even trust SCOs. Thus, it is vital for SCOs to recognize and address the affects of anti-Americanism on their ability to build relationships. According to Lindberg and Nossel (2005), "There have been a host of ambitious reports on what to do about anti-Americanism released in recent years, though very few of their recommendations have ever been implemented and even fewer consistently so" (p. 26). Therefore, this paper offers the followings recommendations for SCOs dealing with anti-Americanism in the Middle East and Central Asia.

To respond to anti-Americanism in the Middle East and Central Asia, the U.S. government and SCOs themselves must play a role. The U.S. must focus its foreign policy efforts on diplomacy and military actions that benefit both the U.S. and the partner country. Unilateral intervention should be avoided if at all possible. Anthony Cordesman (2007), chair for the Center for Strategic and International Studies, writes, "Military cooperation can only succeed if the U.S. can deal effectively with the diplomatic and political sides of security cooperation" (p. 2).

At the tactical level, SCOs must first remain professional and attempt to understand the causes of negative public opinion. Although the SCOs may not agree with the opinions of the host nation population, understanding the causes of resentment will help them demonstrate respect and empathy toward their military counterpart. Another consideration for SCOs is to develop their cross-cultural awareness competency. Delving into the culture and learning about host nations' values and customs will aid in demonstrating empathy, which will enable SCOs to see things from the host nation counterpart's perspective while expressing a genuine concern in the process (Gregersen, Morris, & Black, 1998). However, SCOs must balance their ability to sympathize with the host nation counterparts, with mission objectives, thus avoiding going "native." Cross-cultural awareness will go a long way in building strong relationships that can overcome negative public opinion in the Middle East and Central Asia.

SCOs must remain aware of the political developments throughout the USCENTCOM region. Establishing a daily reading schedule and keeping up with regional news and scholarly articles is essential for SCOs to stay abreast of emerging political views, opinions, and rhetoric deemed harmful to U.S. foreign policy. Also, "Muslim populations are vocal about what is important to them" (Douglas & Neal, 2013 p. 7). Besides developing host nation language capability, SCOs should also solicit the talents of locally employed staff to fully understand the true essence of debate in the local vernacular expressed in local newspapers and broadcast news (Douglas & Neal, 2013).

In regard to execution of SC strategy, SCOs should look at expanding International Military Education and Training (IMET) and Exchange Officer programs to help host nation counterparts develop a "more sophisticated understanding" of American society, values, doctrine, and policy (Caves et al., 2013). Additionally, incorporating more humanitarian assistance/ humanitarian civic activities, which help improve the local community's infrastructure and economy, is a prudent way to make U.S. aid more visible and increase goodwill among the local population. U.S. sponsored projects that improve the local population's quality of life

are a low cost approach to helping overcome anti-American sentiment (Caves et al., 2013).

Lastly, SCOs need to get outside their offices and routinely meet with their counterparts. The number one priority for SCOs is to establish and maintain close personal relationships with host nation counterparts that would support U.S. foreign policy. SCOs must also be willing to share their own personal stories. These "stories" of perseverance and hard work are what make lasting connections and can ultimately "win over" the hearts and minds of the host nation counterpart and public population. SCOs may not be able to change the opinions of people who harbor resentment toward the U.S., but if they listen, become comfortable with the culture, and share their personal stories it will go a long way in building relationships.

In conclusion, the recently performed study draws a connection between anti-American sentiment and U.S. foreign policy decisions in the Middle East and Central Asia. Furthermore, the three case studies of Iraq, Pakistan, and Afghanistan show the degree to which public opinion can affect the SCOs ability to complete his or her mission. This can range from delays in decision making, a lack of access, or even put the SCOs life in danger. SCOs must be able to address these difficult situations by listening and showing empathy, embracing the cultural differences, and sharing their own personal stories of adversity and perseverance. Ultimately, by sharing their "story" with host nation counterparts, they can connect on a personal level. Thus, during difficult times when U.S. foreign policy and anti-Americanism clashes, the SCO's relationship may be the only option for diplomacy.

Notes

1. Soft Power: Describes the ability to persuade and influence the behavior of countries through prosperity and shared values instead of threats and bribes.
2. Arab Spring: Refers to the wave of revolutionary protests, uprisings, riots, and civil wars occurring throughout the Middle East which began in December 2010.
3. Arab Street: A political expression or metaphor referring to public opinion in the Arab world, which is often contrasted to the opinions of Arab governments.

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Mobile Cooperation Training (MCT): Enhancing Engagement

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*At the end of an air load train-the-trainer (T3) engagement with the U.S. Air Force Africa Deployment Assistance Partnership Team (ADAPT) in Entebbe, Uganda in 2013, the author recognized that these recently certified Ugandan trainers could accompany the ADAPT Mobile Training Team (MTT) to an upcoming air load training engagement in Burundi, and potentially to other states in the East Africa Region. The author approached the Chief of Training for the Uganda Peoples' Defence Air Force (UPDAF**[i]**) who readily agreed to export his regional ADAPT trainers. At the completion of the event, the ADAPT Team Leader informed the author that he considered the Ugandan T3 cadre "ready to train ADAPT anywhere."*

Following the Mobile Cooperation Training (MCT) model, the author first secured approval from the Office of Security Cooperation in Kampala, then gained acceptance from the Office of Security Cooperation in Burundi, which was the site of the next ADAPT engagement. With the host country and the MCT provider country on board, the AAFRICOM regional director readily accepted, but bureaucracy then prevented the export of the Ugandan trainers due to a short lead-time and a shortage of funding. However, thus began the concept of MCT, in using regional trainers to augment U.S. MTTs, and eventually conduct MCT on their own. The next few steps of the MCT model would have involved senior military decision makers and the embassy country teams from the host and exporting countries (Burundi and Uganda, respectively), as well as regional and local SC planners to ensure smooth execution.

The inclusion of UPDAF personnel on the standard U.S. MTT represents an expansion of the traditional mobile training concept and fulfills the regional strategic objectives of promoting greater cooperation among regional partners and encouraging these actors to take part in improving their own security environment. At a more developed level, the UPDAF could field its own mobile team and export it to countries that need the training. Furthermore, Ugandan Peoples Defence Force (UPDF) Military Police (MP) personnel could potentially form an MP MTT and export it, as well as could an Ethiopian counter-insurgency (COIN) MTT for MCT purposes. This concept does not yet enjoy wide practice and some regions may not currently have the capacity to execute it, but the possibility exists, such cooperation has its benefits, and the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) 2014 calls for it.[ii]

In recent Security Cooperation (SC) history, numerous training events and exercises have enhanced the competence of partner militaries in various skills. Many are ready to export these skills to others who need them. Because certain states lack the ability to conduct their own training, Geographic Combatant Commands (GCCs) utilize specialized mobile teams to fill this training gap. Normally, U.S. MTTs fill this role.

The capability exists now, however, to augment or replace U.S. MTTs with regional trainers using the MCT concept. The construct of MCT



Figure 1: Partner militaries possessing certified trainers export MTTs to other countries in the region. Air load trainers from the Uganda People's Defense Air Force prepared to accompany U.S. ADAPT training in Burundi.

enhances mobile training by integrating certified regional trainers into the teams of U.S. personnel. Enhanced MTTs thus bring all the benefits of having a regional face on training: They complete required training but also increase cultural awareness and cooperation. This new training construct fulfills the strategic objectives of the QDR by including regional partners as trainers instead of fielding only U.S.-led MTTs.

Security Cooperation has come to play a large role in the current international environment, and has a large effect in maintaining stability. Cooperation yields far more development and progress than conflict,[iii] and SC offers improved security and stability for partner states, as well as productivity for the international community. This essay describes MCT as a method of increasing cooperation at the regional state-to-state level.

One option for building partner capacity in a specific region is to send entire military units to a central training base, such as the Combat Training Centers (CTCs) of the U.S. military. Entire units deploy to the National Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin, CA, for example, to receive collective training and improve readiness, but the CTC concept does not operate without its obstacles. Although CTCs may fulfill the ideals of having a habitual relationship, depth in logistical details, and the stability of consistency, the cost of the centralized training location readily emerges as a large obstacle. Planners recognize that transporting entire units to regionally central locations becomes cost-prohibitive as well as lo-

gistically more tedious than sending MTTs. Few militaries have standing training cadres to support habitual training centers, and the MTT concept and other SC engagement events already fulfill this role. The idea of a centralized training location thus marks a possibility of refining regional cooperation training, but the details of transporting units and maintaining cadres prevent it. The MTT concept, however, avoids large costs by importing small teams of trainers to approximate the effect of the CTC. The advantages of MTT are its low cost and smaller logistics profile, and they meet the training requirement well. Mobile training is not new, of course. Mobile teams allows recipients to conserve funding and time by importing smaller cadres to their home stations instead of sending entire units to a CTC, and training readiness increases. The MTT thus plays a large role in regional training, and MCT capitalizes on and expands these advantages. MCT combines the logistical and financial advantages of MTT training with the strategic objectives of increased cooperation involving regional partners in their own security. Indeed, MCT enhances regional training readiness.

The concept of MCT combines the benefits of mobile training by including trainers from regional partners on the training teams, and thus expands the engagement focus of the combatant command. The paradigm builds on the concept of mobile teams by incorporating qualified regional partners as trainers to function along with normal team members. The MTT concept is not new but including regional trainers is, and it represents the next step in enhancing regional cooperation. As readiness progresses in a region, various states can become proficient in certain tasks and skill sets, and in turn could export MTTs to partner states, so that at a mature level of MCT, capable regional partner states field their own independent MTTs. This development represents the pinnacle of cooperation training readiness. The MCT construct thus refines the MTT concept, providing the next steps in increasing access and cooperation in a regional program. MCT fulfills the requirement of exporting MTTs to those partners that need it, but enhances the cooperative effort by placing the regional face on training instead of consistently casting foreigners – U.S. personnel – as trainers. In this manner, regional partners increase cooperation, familiarization, and readiness by sending MTTs in their respective skills. This paradigm fulfills an objective of the QDR 2014, regarding the "emergence of international partners with the capacity to play productive and even leading security roles in their respective regions."[iv]

MCT execution requires only a moderate amount of additional cooperation and coordination than the normal MTT effort. MCT involves the same actors as standard regional cooperation training, meaning the U.S. cooperation teams and the military cooperation teams of the exporting and trainee states. Training support also requires agreement from the regional cooperation team at the GCC and/or the service component command, respective country teams, and senior government officials of participating partner states. Lines of communication and coordination among these actors already exist, and as a bonus, the MCT concept requires additional coordination among these actors for the events to take place. The increased interaction of MCT thus serves the following three strategic objectives.

1. Increased regional training readiness.
2. Increased cooperation and familiarity among personnel of participating states.
3. Increased access in the region for sponsoring states.

Figure 2: Strategic Objectives from the QDR fulfilled by MCT

Planning

Generally, the same offices that plan existing cooperation training; conduct planning and coordination for MCT. These includes planners from participating countries' governments and militaries, Security Cooperation Offices (SCOs) and Defense Attaché Offices (DAOs), combatant command regional desk offices, and country teams from respective embassies. The only difference with MCT is that training events involve two countries at once, meaning the trainer and trainee states, instead of only the training recipient. Additionally, all actors must possess the flexibility to execute MCT, because of the additional coordination involving the details of the exporting state as well as the trainee state.

Implementation

Implementation begins with the coordination of involved SC personnel. The first step is to identify countries capable of participating in MCT and gain acceptance from respective SC offices. This includes both the country hosting the MCT as well as the exporter of trainers for MCT events. Ideally, all security cooperation offices within a region establish a standing agreement regarding MCT, where possible and feasible. The next step is to gain approval from higher decision makers at the combatant command and Service Component Command (SCC) regional offices, and from all country teams involved. Once all offices approve the training, coordination is a simple affair that develops according to the established procedures of each respective SC office.

Challenges and Benefits

As in all training events, MCT has its obstacles. The bureaucracy could not react on such short notice to accommodate the T3 personnel from Uganda to Burundi in 2013, and funding always presents an issue. Administrative requirements such as country clearances, passports, and visas can also become obstacles, and this assumes acceptance and seamless coordination from offices of security cooperation (OSCs), regional offices, recipient and trainer militaries, and country teams. Participation also requires partners to have the flexibility to execute such events, implying a need for depth of qualified personnel and available scheduling to export trainers. Disagreements or hostility between regional countries may also impede MCT and even prevent it. According to the model, OSCs are the primary actors to both recognize the possibility of MCT and overcome factors that would prevent it.

MCT also provides its benefits. The increased cooperation and facilitation of regional partners engaging in joint training represents the fulfillment of regional and even theater strategic objectives. As not every force possesses competency in all skills necessary in a region, MCT capitalizes on existing competencies, distributes them through decentralized training, and builds

A possible checklist follows, and these actions need not occur in order.

1. Identify countries capable of participating in MCT.
2. Present MCT plan to following actors and gain acceptance.
   a. Respective security cooperation offices
   b. Participating country military personnel
   c. Regional planners
   d. Respective country teams
3. Proceed with training event according to established regional procedures.

Figure 3: Steps in Establishing MCT Events

cooperation and relationships between regional partners along the way. It also strengthens the training base of regional militaries, which improves the security and by extension the stability of partner states. As host militaries improve their training readiness through MCT and other engagements, they can then export their MTTs and further extend cooperation and readiness.

Conclusion

MCT thus offers a new paradigm of fulfilling regional strategic and security cooperation objectives by engaging regional partners in joint training events. Mobile training teams composed of regional trainers promote cooperation and cultural awareness among regional partners, and ultimately increase access to regional countries by bringing regional actors together and adding a regional face to security cooperation training. Although mostly in the conceptual phase, MCT offers the potential of enhancing security cooperation training and fulfilling regional strategic objectives.

About the Author

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[i]Uganda Peoples' Defence Forces spelling form the UPDAF, http://www.gov.ug/ministry/ministry-defence.

[ii]Quadrennial Defense Review 2014, chapter six, p. 1.

[iii]Axelrod, Robert M. "The Complexity of Cooperation." Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997.

[iv]Quadrennial Defense Review 2014, chapter six, p. 1.

DISAM Online Learning

By Lt Col Marc Ferguson, USAF
Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management

The Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management (DISAM) provides professional education, research, and support to advance U.S. foreign policy through security assistance (SA) and security cooperation (SC). DISAM's target audience includes U.S. government civilians, military, and defense industry personnel working both CONUS and OCONUS. DISAM trains international partners as well. To reach this global audience, DISAM's Online Learning Directorate (DISAM/DO) offers a variety of online courses, as well as learning guides, for the SC community.

Within the first 6 months of FY14, DISAM graduated 7,845 students. Of those graduates, 5,085 students were online graduates. With 65% of DISAM's educational "market share" during that timeframe, online learning is clearly DISAM's dominant academic medium, presenting significant outreach potential over conventional teaching means.

DISAM offers four online courses. They are the Security Cooperation Management Familiarization Course (SCM-FA-OL), the Security Cooperation Management Orientation Course (SCM-OC-OL), the International Programs Security Requirements Course (IPSR-OL), and the Missile Technology Control Regime Course (MTCR-OL).

Security Cooperation Management Familiarization Course (SCM-FA-OL)

SC-FA-OL is an entry-level course designed to provide basic familiarization on SC as conducted by the U.S. government with many partner nations around the world. SCM-FA-OL is a SC Workforce Development (SCWD) Level 1 course. This course is available to everyone, including international partner personnel. This course serves as a familiarization to SC as conducted by the U.S. government with many partner nations around the world. Students gain an awareness of information on SC policies, programs, planning, implementation and execution by the DOD in support of U.S. national security and foreign policy objectives. The course includes a 4-page printable Continuity Book which captures the main instructional points in each of six modules.

Security Cooperation Management Orientation Course (SCM-OC-OL)

SCM-OC-OL is an orientation course designed primarily for personnel who are new to the SC field, or who perform SC duties on a part-time basis. SCM-OC-OL is a SCWD Level 2 course. It provides an overview of the full range of SC activities, to include legislation, policy, the foreign military sales (FMS) process, logistics, finance, training management, and international programs security requirements. SCM-OC-OL contains ten modules on topics in most functional areas of security assistance and SC management. It is available for U.S. and international government personnel and defense industry personnel. U.S. government employees are defined as U.S. civilians, military, Locally Employed

Staff (LES) working in U.S. embassies around the world, and support contractor equivalents. The course offers the advantage of immediate training beyond that of the SC-FAM-OL course for employees as soon as they are assigned to a SC position. SCM-OC-OL also serves as a prerequisite for DISAM's resident SCM-C in-residence course and SCM-C-X onsite course.

Figure 1: Screenshot from SCM-OC-OL online course

International Programs Security Requirements Course (IPSR-OL)

IPSR-OL is a course which meets the DOD Directive 5230.20 requirement to train DOD employees involved in international programs on the security arrangements, laws, policies, and procedures that protect sensitive and classified U.S. technology and other information. This requirement applies to all DOD employees who participate in international programs, including those responsible for negotiating, overseeing, managing, executing, or otherwise participating in international activities, including SC programs. This required training can be satisfied via this online course or via the three-day in-residence classroom equivalent IPSR course. Students must be a U.S. person as defined by the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) Section 120.15. The IPSR-OL course also covers the principles, policies, and procedures that govern international technology transfer, export controls, and foreign disclosure. Specific lessons address processes for international program security, controlled unclassified information (CUI), foreign government information (FGI), the National Disclosure Policy (NDP), and the ITAR. This course covers the export approval and licensing process, as well as the role of the Defense Security Service (DSS). Other topics include visits and assignments of foreign nationals; the Committee on Foreign Investment in the U.S. (CFIUS); Foreign Ownership, Control, or Influence (FOCI); international transfers of classified information;

Program Security Instruction (PSI); and Multinational Industrial Security Working Group (MISWG) documents. IPSR-OL also serves as a prerequisite for DISAM's resident SCM-C in-residence course and SCM-C-X onsite course.

Missile Technology Control Regime Course (MTCR-OL)

DISAM designed the instructor-facilitated MTCR-OL online course to train selected DOD personnel in recognizing and controlling the export of missiles, UAVs, and related technologies that have the potential for use in the delivery of weapons of mass destruction. The regime and supporting documentation assists in the implementation of national export controls to monitor, control, and deny exportation of these critical technologies. The MTCR-OL course provides familiarization with the MTCR basic guidelines and the relevant review process for FMS cases. Discussion of the FMS process and the relationship of the MTCR to the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) and ITAR provide the students with a framework for understanding the need for thorough reviews of items provided on Letters of Offer and Acceptance (LOA). The course includes a basic missile overview to assist students in understanding general terminology, types of missiles, and components associated with controlled items on the MTCR Annex to the U.S. Munitions List. In addition, this course introduces students to the roles and responsibilities of the Departments of State, Commerce, and Defense. U.S. government civilians, U.S. military, U.S. support contractor government employees, and U.S. industry personnel are eligible for this course. U.S. government and industry personnel should be programmed for or assigned to positions that require oversight of missile-related technologies. Personnel include those in program management offices,



Figure 2: Screenshot from the LOA Interpretation Guide.

key service acquisition personnel, the Missile Defense Agency (MDA), SA or SC personnel responsible for FMS cases, and U.S. contractors.

DISAM's online courses require student registration. Students may apply for DISAM online courses by submitting an online registration form on DISAM's website. Most courses are self-paced, meaning the student may register and start at any time. Students earn certification upon course completion. Defense Acquisition Workforce members may also obtain continuous learning points (CLPs).

DISAM Online Learning Guides

DISAM's learning guides provide those working in Security Cooperation with "just-in-time" training on specific topics to support them in performing their duties. DISAM learning guides act as a supplement to DISAM courses. These guides cover Security Cooperation Officer (SCO) resources, the FMS process, logistics, acquisition, international training, the Security Cooperation Information Portal (SCIP) as well as other miscellaneous topics. The following guides are currently available on the DISAM website: Acquisition, Annual Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) Update, Army Foreign Military Sales (FMS) for SCOs, Civilian Diplomatic Attire, Contracting for FMS, Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) and FMS Comparison, Ethics for SCOs, FMS Financial Management, FMS Process, International Military Student (IMS) Pre-departure Briefing, International Training Management, Intro to SC Management, International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) 101, Logistics, Letter of Offer and Acceptance (LOA) Interpretation Guide, Letter of Request (LOR) Writing Guide, Military Standard Requisitioning and Issue Procedures (MILSTRIP) for FMS, Protocol, SCIP, SCIP Case Status Demo, SCO Personal Entitlements, SCO Responsibilities, and Visitor Management for SCOs.

All of these learning guides are available for the general public without requiring student registration. Learning guides serve only as a reference and for professional development. Therefore, DISAM does not award certification for completing these learning guides.

Students can find more information on online courses and learning guides under the Online Learning tab on the DISAM homepage: http://www.disam.dsca.mil/pages/courses/online/catalog/default.aspx.

About the Author

Lt Col Marc Ferguson is the Deputy Director of Online Learning and an instructor at DISAM. He has been at DISAM since August 2013 and an active USAF officer since 1998. He has a Bachelor of Science degree in Mechanical Engineering from the University of Tennessee, a Master of Science degree in Operations Research from the Air Force Institute of Technology, and a Master of Military Operational Art and Science degree from Air Command and Staff College. Please contact him at marcus.ferguson@us.af.milwith any specific questions.

SCIP Improvements, Capabilities, and Training

By John O'Connor, Assistant Professor
Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management (DISAM)

The Security Cooperation Information Portal (SCIP) continues to be improved with new capabilities regularly added via planned systematic improvements that are managed by the SCIP Program Office with oversight by DSCA. With the frequent and numerous system updates, and the extensive array of SCIP capabilities, some common questions that current and future SCIP users may ask are listed below. This article is written to address and provide answers to those 3 questions.

1. "What are the future (or recent) improvements in SCIP?"
2. "What features and capabilities are there in SCIP should I be aware of and use?"
3. What SCIP training and help resources are available to SCIP users?

(1) What are the future (or recent) improvements in SCIP?

When SCIP is updated, announcements are posted in the applicable SCIP Community to alert users. Some recent notable SCIP system improvements to communities that authorized United States Government (USG) and International Purchasers' users can both access includes:

SCIP System Improvements: Upgrades to new Web Servers and new Collaboration servers has provided users with improved memory, load balancing, and redundancy on the SCIP system.

Case Information Community:

- A Term of Sale Adhoc report was added recently. This report allows users to query the Term of Sale, Term of Sale Name, and Term of Sale Value for each version of a case.
- Data refresh status portlet now displays a separate update date for Defense Integrated Financial System (DIFS) data
- Case Detail Report now displays the Actual Closure and Interim Closure Dates for cases
- Document Timeline now displays the Actual Closure and Interim Closure Dates for cases. This data is populated by data received from DIFS.
- A new report option, Export All to Excel, has been added to the report type drop-down to allow users to export all of the selected case report data directly to Excel.
- A new field, Status Date, has been added for users to quickly tell the status date for a specific version on a case.
- Active Requisitions Detail Report - An enhancement has been made in SCIP to now include applicable requisitions that have alpha line numbers. Previously some of these requisitions with alpha line numbers were inadvertently excluded from SCIP. These alpha line numbers will display as the converted numeric line number as established in DSAMS on requisitions in SCIP.
- Army Cancellation Remarks have been added for all CA Cancellations so the customer can be informed as to the reason for the CA Cancellation.
- The Longest Lead Time field the line associated with the longest lead time has been added as a hyperlink. Clicking on

the line number will display the Case Line Detail Report associated with that line.
- Requisition Status report added providing users the capability to filter for specific requisition(s) of interest, export results to Excel file, and 'drill-down' to view/use applicable Case Reports that was used to initiate the requisition
- Capability to retrieve/display/save Real Time Metrics (e.g. cases, documents, AOD performance, etc.)

Navy Community:

- Significant improvements to the "Information Warehouse" (i.e. Adhoc report capability) user interface and options
- Addition of Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) International Frigate Working Group linked page
- Parts and Repair Ordering System (PROS): Provides capabilities for authorized users to search and view details for PROS requisitions on Navy ("P") managed FMS cases
- Link to Case Execution Performance Tool (CEPT) results for specific case that user is looking at via the Case Reconciliation Review (CRR) Report

Case Execution Community:

- Enhanced Freight Tracking System (EFTS) Training capabilities including: capabilities to develop reports and metrics with training data (i.e. Bandaria)
- Tutorials and details on Introduction to EFTS presentation, responsibilities for Freight Forwarder, Country User/Expeditor, Director / Case Manager, EFTS User Guide, etc.

(2) What features and capabilities in SCIP should I be aware of and use?

The initial thought of an experienced SCIP user upon hearing that question might be confusion on where to begin first in responding. One reason for the confusion is that the applicability of SCIP's capabilities somewhat depends on the specific Security Cooperation management responsibilities of the user. Another reason is that there are a significant number of SCIP capabilities. But, while SCIP capabilities, reports, and data are extensive, and continue to expand and improve (as already noted in this article), certain SCIP system capabilities and reports though are 'heads-and-shoulders' above the rest. The following is a compilation of those significant SCIP capabilities that all SCIP users should be aware of and be proficient with if pertinent to their Security Cooperation management responsibilities:

Case Information Community:

- **Case Information Adhoc Reports**– Very powerful capability that permits users to develop/design their own report to answer their question(s) of interest at multiple levels including Case, Line, Active Requisition, SDR, Payment Schedule, Document Timeline, Delivery Set, Term of Sale. From my own experiences in the last 3 years, every time a USG or Foreign Purchaser user has asked me whether or not they can get their question(s) answered via SCIP, my typical response (if I didn't know another way) has been that if possible, Adhoc will be the way to do it. When we subsequently tried Adhoc, we have always gotten the answers and reports that the user wanted. Additional powerful features of the Adhoc reports are the capabilities to export results to Excel and also save the Adhoc query so that the user can rerun it at some future date without having to redesign/develop the report once again.
- **Real Time Metrics**– Great example of SCIP of being able to quickly develop country/region FMS 'strategic view' information/graphics (Historic Implemented Cases, Documents, Cases / Documents by Current Status Code, Open Offers, Offer/Acceptance Comparison, AOD Past and Current Performance) and then just as quickly 'drill-down' as required to get detailed Case Reports of interest.
- **Requisition Status** - Providing users the capability to filter for specific requisition(s) of interest, export results to Excel file, and 'drill-down' to view/use applicable Case Reports that was used to initiate the requi-

sition. Another great example of SCIP of being able to quickly develop country/region FMS 'strategic view' information and then just as quickly 'drill-down' as required to get detailed Case Reports of interest.

- **Information Extracts**– Provides authorized users with the capability to extract all requisition data for a particular case within 24 hours of requesting with a limit of one case per day
- **FMR Case Sheets** – Provides users with the capability to dynamically develop their FMR Case Sheets of interest to either prepare for a Financial Management Review (FMR) or just to review high-level financial information for case(s) of interest
- **Inputs** – Provides authorized users with capability to electronically submit (at no additional cost to the user) requisitions (either single or via batch) and Supply Discrepancy Reports (SDRs along with attachments as required) to the applicable MILDEP ILCO
- **Navy Community:** Provides numerous and significant capabilities and reports to authorized users/managers for Department of the Navy (Navy, Marine Corps, Coast Guard) Security Cooperation cases. The Navy Community provides much greater case and line financial transparency (i.e. commitments, obligations, expenditures, etc. by case and line) than is otherwise available via the Case Information Capability. Navy Community capabilities that authorized users should be aware of and using include:
- **Case Execution Performance Tool (CEPT) –** Incredible application that used pre-defined DoN business rules to determine and show (including stop light colors) whether or not a case is meeting overall, logistics, and financial requirements. If a business rule has been violated, the rule is identified and color coded for applicable manager's attention and resolution.
- **Case Financial Summary** – Quickly get financial details on any case of interest that user is authorized to view
- **Case Reconciliation Review** – View all case and line financial and logistics details (i.e. commitments, obligations, expenditures, deliveries, etc. by case and line
- **Annual Case Review Sheets** – View current and historical case reviews (including case manager comments) for any case of interest that the user is authorized to view
- **Information Warehouse** – Powerful Adhoc Capability with newly redesigned and improved user interface
- **Supply Discrepancy Reports (SDRs)** – View all details, comments, and timeline for any open or closed SDR on any case that the user is authorized to view. Provides significantly more information than is available in the Case Information Community
- **Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) International Frigate Working Group**linked page with a specific link for applicable countries
- **Parts and Repair Ordering System (PROS):**Provides capabilities for authorized users to search and view details for PROS requisitions on Navy ("P") managed FMS cases
- **Case Execution Community:**
- **Enhanced Freight Tracking System (EFTS)**– Provides authorized users with numerous significant capabilities to develop shipping reports, metrics, and data
- **Emall** – Provides authorized users with capability to research Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) and commercial source stocks to make better informed purchasing decisions (e.g. EMALL Supportability Analysis Stock Out Report)
- **Asset Visibility** - Provides authorized users with capability to research MILDEP stocks to make better informed purchasing decisions
- **Web RoR** – Department of the Navy capability that automates end-to-end the repair of repairable process
- **End Use Monitoring (EUM) Community:** Provides authorized users for the capabilities and reports that they need to fulfill their EUM responsibilities for their FMS appli-

cable munitions acquisitions per the LOA Standard Terms and Condition section 2.7.

- **Security Cooperation Management Suite (SCMS) Community:** SCMS resides within the SCIP and is a joint service, web-based capability that provides U.S. officials with a common operating picture of the SC process. SCMS has joint U.S. military and civilian users globally from all branches of the U.S. armed forces and associated support Commands, which increases joint communication resulting in enhanced decision making. SCMS provides USG personnel with key information used to track high priority FMS and Building Partner Capacity (BPC) programs, and is especially useful during the oversight process for expiring funds and those FMS cases that are funded via U.S. appropriated sources. SCMS allows data input and customization through its multiple reports showing information by appropriation and program which allows for intense information sharing among multiple program participants. Although initially conceived to support the war effort in Iraq, the utility of SCMS was recognized by additional communities within DSCA. SCMS has been expanded for use with all the Building Partner Capacity (BPC) programs, which proved to be of great benefit to U.S. decision makers when planning how to best build partner nation capacity.
- **Partner Info Community:** Provides numerous briefs, documents, and info to keep Spanish users informed on applicable Security Cooperation activities and responsibilities including:
- Foreign Procurement Group (FPG) meetings
- International Customer User Group (ICUG) meetings
- Tri-Service meetings
- Contract Summits
- Visitor Info

(3) What SCIP training and help resources are available to SCIP users?

The USG Security Cooperation Information Portal (SCIP)is designed to be relatively 'user-friendly' and intuitive despite the significant number of communities, capabilities, and reports that are available to SCIP users. Examples of SCIP's 'user-friendliness' are the case reports hyperlinks that provide word/phrase definitions and meaning of codes, standard design and implementation of filter and report formats, info prompting via user 'mouse' hovering, etc. In addition to all those 'user-friendly' advantages, there are numerous other SCIP training and help resources that are available to SCIP users including:

SCIP Help Community: Provides user with capabilities to:

- Submit online help ticket for issues or recommended system improvements that is sent directly to the applicable SCIP subject matter expert for response and resolution while keeping user updated of progress from beginning to end of the process
- Online posting on SCIP of over 40 detailed user guides (see DISAM SCIP Handbook Appendix 2 for list) with examples and graphics provided to train, assist, and guide users of the SCIP Community capabilities and reports

DISAM Online Training:

- "DISAM Security Cooperation Information Portal (SCIP) Practical Exercises and Handbook"
- Is posted on the DISAM web page and can be accessed via the "Publications" and the "SC Tools" web links.
- The current DISAM SCIP Handbook includes thirty-one (31) SCIP exercises including Process (Exercises #1 through #5), Logistics (Exercises #6 through #16), Financial (Exercises #17-26), and Miscellaneous Advanced (#27 through #31) exercises.
- All thirty-one (31) of the SCIP exercises in the handbook can be completed even without a SCIP account as

there are case examples (using training country data) for each of the exercises.

- As stated on the Preface page of that SCIP Handbook, "A basic understanding of the Security Cooperation FMS process, logistics, and finance subjects is needed to comprehend, interpret the materials, and complete the exercises in the handbook."
- DISAM has also posted "Introduction to Security Cooperation Information Portal (SCIP)" PPT presentation that can be downloaded and used. It can be accessed via the DISAM "Presentations" web link.
- DISAM has developed an online SCIP training module that is included in the just released operational SCM-OC-OL, Security Cooperation Management Orientation Course(MASL IIN D178258), which users can register for and take online. That module per the course objectives is intended as an introductory orientation to SCIP including high level insights into its capabilities, limitations, data sources, account registration, etc.
- DISAM is also developing additional online training modules / 'vignettes' for SCIP that will focus on many of the typical user SCIP questions (e.g. how to logon, navigate between SCIP communities and capabilities, develop reports, metrics, etc.). DISAM expects to begin posting those (and more) online 'vignettes' on the DISAM web page during the upcoming year.

DISAM SCIP Training in curriculum conducted in-residence at DISAM, online, and at onsite locations:

- 20 Block of Instruction (BOI) in DISAM curriculum – Supports DISAM 'Functionals' (i.e. Process, Finance, Logistics, SCO Ops, etc. curriculum focus areas) and Course Managers in support of DISAM Mission. Following are some overview highlights of DISAM's SCIP training curriculum:
- Significant growth (150% increase) in the last two years
- Continually updated to incorporate SCIP enhancements and changes
- Training goals:
  - Familiarize students (with emphasis on areas especially applicable to their assignments)
  - Highlight/emphasize to them why SCIP is an essential system tool for their success
- Minimal screen captures – Only background/ overview info
- Maximize online demos and student hands-on exercises
- Real world data for USG CONUS and OCONUS students
  - USG OCONUS SCO students use their own (obtained per DSCA Policy Memo 11-58) SCIP accounts throughout course
  - USG CONUS students use either their own SCIP accounts or DISAM Training tokens with their country of interest data
- International and LES students use training (Akadia, Bandaria, Zastavia) data or their own accounts with their country data if available
- EUM inventory data entry training for SCM-O and SCM-LO via training tokens
- Course details for all DISAM courses posted on DISAM Course Catalog. Following are list of DISAM courses that provide SCIP training with specifics on what type of SCIP training the students receive that attend each of the listed courses:
  - **U.S. Government employee (USG) SCIP training in DISAM curriculum for in-resident and on-site students**. Training is conducted at basic, intermediate, or advanced level depending upon the course and the student's SCIP knowledge:
  - Security Cooperation Mngt CONUS Course (SCM-C)
    - 0.7 hour SCIP introduction, orientation and demonstration followed by 1.3 hours of hands-on SCIP practical exercises in the SCIP Case Information, Case Execution, and SCMS Communities

- SCIP usage highlighted throughout course in process, finance, and logistics
- Security Cooperation Management Financial Management Course (SCM-CF)
  - 0.7 hour discussion and demonstration of Financial automation tools followed by 1.8 hours of SCIP financial practical exercises at the basic or intermediate/advanced level (depending upon the student proficiency) in the SCIP Case Information and the Security Cooperation Management Suite (SCMS) Communities.
- Security Cooperation Management Logistics Support Course (SCM-CS)
  - 0.5 hour SCIP logistics discussion and demonstration followed by 1.5 hours of hands-on SCIP logistics practical exercises at the basic or intermediate/advanced level (depending upon the student proficiency) in the SCIP Case Information and Case Execution Communities.
- Security Cooperation Management Program and Case Management Course (SCM-CM)
  - 0.5 hour SCIP Case Management discussion and demonstration followed by 2.0 hours of hands-on SCIP case management practical exercises at the basic or intermediate/advanced level (depending upon the student proficiency) in the SCIP Case Information, Case Execution, and Security Cooperation Management Communities.
- Security Cooperation Management USG Executive and U.S. Defense Industry Course (SCM-E)
  - 1.5 hours USG only SCIP Executive level demonstration and discussion that includes an optional 0.5 hour hands-on practical exercises.
- Security Cooperation Management Orientation Course (SCM-OC)
  - 0.8 hour introduction, overview, demonstration, and discussion of SCIP capabilities presented either in-class or via online presentation depending upon the class the student is registered in.
- Security Cooperation Management Action Officer Course (SCM-AO)
  - 0.5 hour introduction, overview, demonstration, and discussion of SCIP capabilities from USG Action Officer (AO) perspective.
- Security Cooperation Management Locally Employed Staff (LE Staff) Orientation Course (SCM-LO)
  - 0.8 hour SCIP introduction, orientation and demonstration
  - SCIP usage highlighted throughout course in process, finance, and logistics
  - 4.0 hours of hands-on SCIP case management practical exercises in the SCIP Case Information, Case Execution, End Use Monitoring (EUM), and Security Cooperation Management (SCMS) Communities.
- Security Cooperation Management Overseas Course (SCM-O)
  - 0.7 hour introduction, overview, demonstration, and discussion of SCIP capabilities
  - 5.0 hours of hands-on SCIP case management practical exercises in the SCIP Case Information, Case Execution, End Use Monitoring (EUM), and Security Cooperation Management (SCMS) Communities.
  - 2.0 hours of additional hand-on SCIP logistics focused practical exercises for those students in the Advanced Logistics training 'track'.
  - USG OCONUS SCO students are registered for (in accordance with DSCA Policy Memo 11-58) and use their own SCIP accounts throughout course
- International Purchaser SCIP training in DISAM curriculum for in-resident International Purchaser students:

- Security Cooperation Management International Purchaser Orientation Course (SCM-IO), TMASL IIN D178088, 8 Days
  - 1 hour SCIP introduction, orientation and demonstration
  - SCIP usage highlighted throughout course in process, finance, and logistics
- Security Cooperation Management International Purchaser Advanced Financial and Logistics Courses (SCM-IF / IL), TMASL IIN D178266/ TMASL IIN D178267, 4 Days
  - 5 hours of hands-on SCIP Practical Exercises in Finance or Logistics depending upon student's selected training 'track'
- DISAM training in-country. Four standard METs are available to the international purchaser via DISAM Mobile Education Teams (METs), TMASL IIN D305024, E-IMET TMASL IIN D305013):
  - International Purchasers Orientation Course (SCM-IO) - 5 Days
  - International Purchasers Course with Concurrent Tracks (SCM-IO/IL/IF/IT) - 8 Days
  - International Purchasers Course (SCM-I) - 10 Days
  - International Purchasers Executive Course (SCM-IE) - 3 Days

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About the Author

John O'Connor is an Assistant Professor at the Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management (DISAM - http://www.disam.dsca.mil/) where he has been teaching (Process, Finance, Logistics, Acquisition, Tech Transfer/Exports, Navy Seminars, SCO Operations, Legislation, SCIP, Training, etc.) since 2010. He is also the DISAM SCIP project lead responsible for developing, maintaining, and integrating SCIP lessons in the DISAM curriculum. Prior to working at DISAM, he was a U.S. Naval Aviator for twenty-six years, and a systems and financial analyst in industry (supporting DOD and Homeland Security) for four years. He has a Bachelor of Science Degree (U.S. Naval Academy with honors) in Engineering / Resource Management, Master of Science degree (Naval Postgraduate School with honors) in Computer / Information Systems, is certified by DSCA as Level III in International Affairs, is a DOD Acquisition Workforce member that has been certified by DOD as a Level III Program Management Acquisition professional, and served as a Country Program Director (CPD at Navy International Programs Office (Navy IPO). (http://www.nipo.navy.mil/). He can be contacted at John.OConnor@disam.dsca.mil.

"...As a start, the country must know that the men and women who serve have the soul of the servant that the only entitlement we feel is that we are entitled to serve the nation. Fortunately, very fortunately, most of you, most of your peers and most of those out there every day serving, signed up and understand just that...So I end where I began, all of us must reinforce the reasons that our nations put their trust in us and we must demonstrate the same tenacity, resilience and creativity that our people bring to the fight, those on the forward edge and then come back to lead at home."

Excerpt from Gen. Dempsey's Remarks
at the National Defense University